Collegians for a Constructive Tomorrow, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1311

Collegians for a Constructive Tomorrow,
Relator,

vs.

University of Minnesota, Board of Regents,
Respondent.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

University of Minnesota

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
relator)

Douglas R. Peterson, General Counsel, Brian J. Slovut, Carrie Ryan Gallia, Assistant
General Counsel, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Respondent University of Minnesota (the University) collects a fee from its students
to fund student groups on its campus. Relator is a student group called Collegians for a
Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT) that requested student-fee funding. The University
partially granted CFACT’s funding request and CFACT appealed to the University ’s
2
appeals committee, arguing that recent changes to the University’s funding system were
not viewpoint neutral and lacked due process . The University denied CFACT’s appeal,
claiming that it was not biased in its fee distributions and that some of CFACT’s grievances
were unrelated to the fee-distribution process.
CFACT petitioned for a writ of certiorari from this court, arguing th e University
violated its due -process rights for multiple reasons, including use of the form to submit
student-funding appeals, elimination of direct appeals to the vice provost, and lack of a
verbatim record in the process. CFACT also argued that several University decisions were
not viewpoint neutral, including decision s to cap overall student funding, to designate
media groups for separate treatment, and to allow a small number of student groups to use
rent-free space in the student union. We affirm the determinations of the University’s
appeals committee.
FACTS
The University collects a services fee from its student population. This fee is used
to fund non-instructional programs such as student groups and administrative units. In
2017, the University redesigned some of the procedures for distributing this funding. One
of the changes was to split the types of funding that student groups can request into two
categories: operational and programming funds. 1 These funds are capped at a possible
$25,000 per year for each student group and programming funds are capped at $30,000 per
year per student group.

1 Operational funds are for items like equipment, meeting space, stipends, insurance, and
travel.
3
At the same time these procedures were being redesigned, the University also
designated a new category of student group called media groups. These media groups were
required to have “a mission that indicates that the group’s primary focus is to provide a
media-related service (not exclusive to soc ial media) to campus.” And media groups had
a unique feature distinguishing them from other student groups: media groups did not have
a cap on operational-funding requests.
To apply for either operational or programming funds, every student group must
meet various minimum requirements and submit an application. Once funding applications
are received, the Student Services Fee Committee (Fee Committee) holds public
deliberations on each request.2 After public deliberations close, the Fee Committee begins
internal deliberat ions where it decides on its funding recommendations. Once the Fee
Committee makes its recommendations and notifies the applicants, a student group may
appeal that recommendation to the University’s Stude nt Services Fee Appeals Committee
(Appeals Committee) under three ci rcumstances: (1) the Fee Committee violated its own
rules, (2) the Fee Committee exhibited bias, or (3) the Fee Committee’s decision was not
viewpoint neutral.
In early 2017, CFACT submitted a funding request for $25,000 in operational funds
(the maximum allowed) and $15,000 in programming funds (half the maximum allowed)
to the Fee Committee. After deliberating, the Fee Committee recommended that CFACT
receive $15,300 in operation al funds and $12,950 in programming funds . CFACT

2 The record is unclear if the Fee Committee considers funding requests from media groups.
4
appealed these recommendations, arguing that the University was not acting in a
viewpoint-neutral manner because it allowed a small number of student groups to use rent-
free space in the student union —which allowed these groups to spend their student funds
elsewhere—and the University lacked a procedure for outside groups to challenge this
arrangement. CFACT also complained that the University’s recent decision designating
media groups was not viewpoint neutral because these new media groups did not have a
cap on their operational funding requests.
After reviewing CFACT’s claims and consulting with the vice provost, the Appeals
Committee denied CFACT’s appeal . The Appeals Committee explained that it did not
believe the Fee Committee acted in a biased manner against CFACT, that the Fee
Committee had no power to grant or deny space in the student union to student groups, and
the Fee Committee did not play a part in creating the media/non-media group classification.
CFACT petitioned for a w rit of certiorari from this court , arguing that the
University’s funding procedures violate due process and that several University decisions
were not viewpoint neutral. As for how the University violated due process , CFACT
claimed the funding appeals form lacked adequate spac e, the University wrongly
eliminated direct appeals to the vice provost, and the funding process lacked a verbatim
record. The decisions CFACT claims were not viewpoint neutral include cappi ng overall
student funding, designating media groups without funding caps, and allowing certain
student groups to use rent-free space on campus.
5
D E C I S I O N
CFACT appeals the University’s student-fee decisions using a procedure known as
a writ of certiorari , found in Mi nnesota Statutes sections 606.01 to 606. 06 (2016). Our
review under a writ of certiorari is not as expansive as it would be under a typical appeal
from a district court decision. We are confined to an inspection of the University record
and narrowly focused on addressing two types of questions . The first type are questions
that affect the regularity of the University’s funding process. Chronopoulos v. Univ. of
Minn., 520 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994). The
second type are questions that affect the actual merits of the University’s decisions—and
even here, due process only requires that the University’s decisions cannot be “arbitrary,
oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, made under an erroneous theory of law, or without
any evidence to support it.” Id.
We generally defer to the University’s decisions and we are reluctant to interfere
with its governing body “as long as it properly executes its duties.” Tatro v. Univ. of Minn.,
800 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012); Bd. of
Regents v. Reid, 522 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. App. 1994) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 27,
1994). But this deference is not absolute. Besides requiring that decisions not be arbitrary,
oppressive, or unr easonable, we also require the decision-making itself to be “reasoned”
and supported with “legally sufficient reasons” based on factual support from the record.
Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 2012).
CFACT uses our certiorari jurisdiction to make two types of challenges to the
University’s funding procedures. The first type are procedural due-process challenges to
6
the student -funding procedures. The second type are challenges to specific University
decisions that CFACT claims are not viewpoint neutral. We address each type of claim in
turn.
I. The University’s funding procedures contain adequate due process.

CFACT first claims that the University’s procedures violate due process for three
reasons: (1) the word limit in the student-funding appeals form lacks adequate space ,
(2) the University eliminated direct appeals to the vice provost, and (3) there is no verbatim
record of the deliberations in the Fee Committee . We review whether the University
violated CFACT’s procedural due process de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes , 823
N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). The essential idea underlying procedural due process is
straightforward: the government—in this case, the University—is required to give CFACT
both notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. Id.
The appeals form’s word limit does not violate due process.

CFACT first claims the word limit in the University’s appeals form did not provide
the group with an adequate opportunity to be heard. The appeals form is an online form
that is split into three sections. The first section gives the appealing student group 250
words to articulate the grounds for the appeal, t he second section provides 750 words to
provide evidence, and the last section allows 500 words for the group to propose a solution
to the problem.
Although CFACT argues these word limits are not sufficient, it fails to explain how.
We recognize that w ord limits help streamline the machinery of any appellate process
7
because they require parties to fine-tune their arguments and be economical with their
space. Even this court imposes word counts in its briefing requirements . See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 132.01, subd. 3 (outlining length limits for written briefs).
Altogether, CFACT had 1,500 words to explain its funding issues, outline the
evidence supporting its appeal, articulate its reasoning, synthesize the evidence, and then
offer solutions to the dispute. Nothing in this limitation hindered these objectives and
CFACT’s complaints were adequately heard.3 Without evidence in the record suggesting
that this word limit created an obstacle for CFACT, we conclude that the University’s word
limits do not violate due process.
The decision to eliminate direct appeals to the vice provost does not violate due process.

Before 2017, student groups could appeal their funding recommendation directly to
the Vice Provost for Student Affairs . B ut this layer no longer exist s under the 2017
revisions to the University’s procedures. CFACT claims this elimination of the vice
provost’s role illustrates the “lack of safeguards in the appeal process ,” but the University
counters that the vice provost still oversees and reviews all funding appeals, even if this is
no longer an explicit step on its appellate ladder.
There is no bright-line rule mandating how many layers the University’s funding
appeals process must contain. Even without direct appeals to the vice provost, groups like
CFACT may still send their funding disputes through the University’s appellate chain. And
the record shows that the University continues to respond to these appeals with adequate

3 Although not determinative, we do note that CFACT did not use much of the available
word count to articulate its appeals.
8
support for its decisions. All that the law requires is that the University’s decisions be
based on “legally sufficient reasons” grounded in factual support from the record .
Williams, 820 N.W.2d at 813. Nothing in our review of the record suggests that removing
explicit review by the vice provost from the appeals process erodes these basic safeguards
nor prevented CFACT from being heard by the University. For these reasons, we conclude
that eliminating direct appeals to the vice provost does not violate due process.
The lack of a verbatim record does not violate due process.

CFACT’s final argument alleging a due -process violation concerns the lack of a
verbatim record in the Fee Committee’s decision-making process. An administrative body
like the University is required to maintain a record in its decision-making processes. Shaw
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 594 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied
(Minn. July 28, 1999). But this does not mean a verbatim record. See, e.g., Honn v. City
of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn. 1981) (holding a city’s non-verbatim record
of public proceedings was sufficient where the reasons for decisions were put in writing
and made in more than just a “conclusory fashion”). It is not necessary for the exact words
spoken in a decision-making process to be preserved in the amber of a stenographer’s pad
or electronic equipment. Instead, the record must show that the University’s decision was
made with enough “clarity and completeness” so that this court can determine if the facts
justify that decision. Morey v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492 , 271 Minn. 445, 450,
136 N.W.2d 105, 108 (1965).
Although the Fee Committee did not maintain a verbatim record, it did explain its
funding decisions for every item of CFACT’s funding request in a detailed spreadsheet.
9
That spreadsheet itemizes CFACT’s specific funding requests, provides a recommended
amount of funding for each item, and then lists justifications if the recommendation falls
below CFACT’s request. To illustrate the level of detail, at one point the spreadsheet
shows that the Fee Committee recommended approving CFACT’s request for $50 worth
of chalk, while at another point , recommended denying a request for online advertising
since advertising funds were already being used for physical posters.
Although the Fee Committee’s recommendations were not preserved in a verbatim
record, there is enough “clarity and completeness” in the record that on review, we can see
how the unique factual threads tie into the final funding recommendations. Id. Because
the Fee Committee’s decisions were made with sufficient clarity and completeness, we
conclude that the University’s decision to not use a verbatim record for the Fee
Committee’s recommendations does not violate due process.
II. The University’s funding cap, designation of media groups, and use of student-
union space are not reviewable under certiorari.

CFACT also claims that the University violated the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality in its student-funding decisions. This concept of viewpoint neutrality is derived
from the First Amendment’s guarantee that the government may not “restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t. of City
of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 2290 (1972). At the heart of this
principle is ensuring open speech and debate, and allowing the government to handpick its
preferred message s at the expense of those it dislikes would undercut the “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
10
robust, and wide -open.” Id. at 96, 92 S. Ct. at 2290 (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721 (1964)). This is the essence of viewpoint
neutrality: the requirement that the government may not regulate expression based on a
disagreement with the speaker’s ideology, opinion, or perspective. Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995). And the
United States Supreme Court has applied this principle to public universities as well,
stating that the proper measure to protect objecting students is to require “viewpoint
neutrality in the allocation of funding support.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2000).
CFACT claims that three decisions by the University violated the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality . First, imposing a cap on overall student funding because the cap
creates a “zero-sum game” for student groups, which fosters competition among them and
necessarily means that some grou ps will receive more funding, while others receive less.
Second, designating media groups because, unlike typical student groups, media groups do
not have a cap on operational -funding requests. And third, allowing a few groups to use
rent-free space in the student union because these groups do not need to spend money on
rent and are then free to use their funding to promote their ideologies and messages above
and beyond what the typical student group can accomplish.
Before we can address CFACT’s claims, we must first examine whether they fit into
our limited jurisdiction. CFACT brings this appeal under our certiorari jurisdiction.
Certiorari is described as an “extraordinary remedy” that is only available to review judicial
or quasi -judicial pro ceedings and actions —it is not available to review legislative or
11
administrative actions. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838,
842 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted) . Distinguishing between judicial and legislative
decisions is often more an art than a science, but generally, l egislative actions affect the
rights of the public generally. Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles County Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2000). This is in contrast with judicial actions, reviewable on
certiorari, which affect the rights of a few individuals, similar to the way adversarial parties
are uniquely affected by a court proceeding. Id.
Not all decision s can be neatly packaged into the se legislative and judicial boxes.
In order to distinguish between these quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative decisions, we look
to three indicators: quasi-judicial actions are distinguished by “(1) an investigation into a
disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts, (2) application of those fact s to a
prescribed standard, and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim.” Minn. Ctr.
for Envtl. Advocacy , 587 N.W.2d at 842 . In contrast, while quasi-legislative decisions
often involve research and public comments, there is usually no formal admittance of
evidence, taking of sworn testimony, and no formally identified opposing parties. Id. at
842-43.
The question then is whether the University’s decisions imposing an overall funding
cap, creating a new media-group classification, and allowing certain student groups to use
rent-free space in the student union are quasi-judicial decisions. We conclude they are not.
Nothing in the record indicates that these decisions were made with the typical
characteristics indicative of judicial decision-making. The University was not presented
with a disputed claim , it did not weigh evidence, and it did not investigate the facts . No
12
findings were made and then applied to a settled standard, and there was no binding
decision connected to the underlying dispute. All of these indicators signal quasi-judicial
decision-making, and none are present in this case. Id. at 842.
Additionally, the administrative record contains almost no information discussing
these decisions, and this is what ultimately strikes at the heart of why these decisions are
not appropriately before us . We cannot use the limited scope of certiorari to analyze
CFACT’s challenges without a developed record detailing why and how these decisions
were made because our certiorari jurisdiction does not allow parties to try issues of fact de
novo. In re On-Sale Liquor License, Class B, 763 N.W.2d 359, 371 (Minn. App. 2009).
Our certiorari review is necessarily limited. Certiorari is designed to address only
fine-grained issues within a limited record—it is not equipped to address the larger, more
complex quasi-legislative decisions that CFACT raises in its final three challenges. How
and why the University came to its decisions imposing its funding cap, designating media
groups, and allow ing certain groups to use student-union space do not implicate any
judicial decision -making. They are quasi -legislative or administrative in nature and
necessarily fall outside the reach of our current review.4

4 This does not mean that CFACT is left without a remedy. We have previously stated that
a party who wishes to challenge a legislative or quasi-legislative decision must first litigate
the question in district court. Watab Twp. Citizen Alliance v. Benton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
728 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2007). And as for
the specific mechanisms to challenge these quasi -legislative decisions, the supreme court
in Honn provides an answer: mandamus, injunction, or a declaratory-judgment action. 313
N.W.2d at 413.
13
In sum, despite the fact that CFACT’s viewpoint challenges to the University’s
funding cap, media-group designation, and the student -union space fall outside our
jurisdiction, we are well -equipped to address its remaining claims. With respect to
CFACT’s due-process claims, we conclude that the University’s decision to impose a word
limit in its funding appeals does not violate due process . The limit served a reasonable
goal of forcing student groups to streamline their grievances and making the overall appeals
process more efficient. We also conclude that the University’s decision to eliminate direct
appeals to the vice provost does not violate due process . Groups may still appeal their
funding recommendations to the Appeals Committee and the vice provost c ontinues to
review these cases. Nor does the lack of a verbatim record violate due process since the
law only requires that the record be clear and complete, which the Fee Committee
demonstrated. CFACT’s remaining claims regarding the University’s funding cap, media
groups, and rent-free space in the student union are quasi -legislative or administrative
decisions that fall outside our limited review under certiorari.
For all these reasons, we affirm the determinations of the Appeals Committee.
Affirmed.