A17-1314 A17-1315

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1312
A17-1314
A17-1315

In the Matter of the Civil Commitments of:
Alexander Donovan Christodoulou (A17-1312),
Eric Emanuel Elm (A17-1314), and
Mohamed Garad Ahmed Hassan (A17-1315)

Filed March 5, 2018
Vacated
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-MH-PR-17-499, 27-MH-PR-17-456, 27-MN-PR-17-501

Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, Brandon Boese, Scott H. Ikeda, Assist ant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Commissioner of Human Services)

Aaron Andrew Powell, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Christodoulou)

Mary Ferris Jensen, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Elm)

Daniel M. Wexler, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hassan)

Mike Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, J ohn L. Kirwin, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Mike Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Christina M. Martenson, James W. Keeler, Jr.,
Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Richard D. Hodsdon, General
Counsel, Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association, Stillwater, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Commissioner of Human Serv ices (Commissioner) appeals from the
district court’s orders in three commitmen t files requiring the Commissioner to submit
quarterly reports to the district court regarding all Hennepin County cases to which Minn.
Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1 (2016) applies. We vacate the district court’s orders.
FACTS
Respondents Alexander Christodoulou a nd Eric Elm were civilly committed as
mentally ill on June 1, 2017. Respondent Mohamed Hassa n was civilly committed as
mentally ill on June 2, 2017.1 Each of them was in jail when committed.
Patients who are civilly committed from a jail or correctional facility “must be
admitted to a service operated by the commi ssioner within 48 hours.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2016). This is colloquially referred to as the 48-hour rule. None of
the respondents were admitted to a commissioner-operated service within 48 hours, and all
remained jailed. Department of Human Se rvices (DHS) Executive Medical Director,
Dr. KyleeAnn Stevens, sent letters to the district court on June 2, informing the court that
DHS would not be able to admit respondents in conformity with the 48-hour rule because
the treatment facilities that would be suitable for these th ree respondents were operating
above capacity. Dr. Stevens reported that respondents would be admitted as soon as beds
became available in a suitable facility. That day, the district court responded to Dr. Stevens

1 We refer to the three committed patients as respondents. He nnepin County, another
respondent, makes no appearance on appeal.

3
and requested that DHS confirm compliance with the 48-hour rule, and advised the doctor
that a hearing would be scheduled “for the Commissioner to explain why [DHS] is unable
to comply with the statutory mandate” if no such confirmation was received.
On June 5, the district court, acting sua sponte, issued an Emergency Order to Show
Cause and set a hearing for that very afternoon, ordering the Commissioner and Dr. Stevens
to appear and show cause wh y DHS had not admitte d respondents to a service under the
48-hour rule. The Commissioner and Dr. Stev ens both appeared at the hearing and
testified.
The Commissioner testified that all thr ee DHS facilities offe ring competency-
restoration treatment were over capacity wh en respondents were committed as mentally
ill.2 Dr. Stevens testified that , by the time DHS received th e orders for respondents’
commitments, the facilities had already exhausted their options to transfer, discharge, or
otherwise shift patients to make space for resp ondents. As such, when respondents were
committed, DHS could not safely admit them within 48 hours. D r. Stevens agreed that
jails are not the appropriate place to treat pers ons with mental illness, but testified that
hospital overcrowding also creates an unsafe environment.
Elm was admitted to the CRP on June 6, and Christodoulou and Hassan were
admitted to the AMRTC on June 7.

2 Specifically, the Anoka-Metro Regional Treatment Center (AMRTC) was three patients
over capacity, the Competency Restoration Program (CRP) was one patient over capacity,
and the Community Competency Restoratio n Program (CCRP) was two patients over
capacity.

4
On June 6, the district court issued an order in each commitment file requiring the
Commissioner to, among other things, report quarter ly to the district court concerning all
cases to which the 48-hour rule applies, iden tifying the originating county, the time and
date that each committed patient was transferred to DHS, and the time and date that the 48-
hour period woul d have expired for each such patie nt. The Commissioner objected in
writing to these orders, arguing that the distri ct court did not have personal jurisdiction
over her because she is not a party to the ju dicial commitment proceedings. Two months
later, the district court issued an order determining that the Commissioner could not
“presently be held in contempt of court,” but the district court continued the requirement
that the Commissioner file quarterly reports with the district court regarding when
committed persons from Hennepin County were transferred to DHS facilities, and other
reporting obligations.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The Commissioner argues that she was not a party to the initial civil-commitment
proceedings. Consequently, she argues, the district court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over her and lacked any authority to order her to submit any reports to the
district court. Amicus Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association argues that the district court’s
orders were proper because the Commissioner is “an integral part of the statutory scheme
for mental health treatment and commitment.” Respondent Hennepin County filed no brief
and takes no position. We agree with the Commissioner.

5
The district court lacks personal jurisd iction over one who is not a party to the
proceeding before it. In re Marriage of Sammons , 642 N.W.2d 450, 457 (Minn. App.
2002). The district court abuses its discre tion when it attempts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty. In re Ferlitto, 565 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn. App. 1997). That
a law exists imposing a duty on a nonparty is not, without more, sufficient to confer district-
court jurisdiction over the nonparty. See Seaway Port Auth. v. Midland Ins. Co. , 430
N.W.2d 242, 250 n.2 (Minn. App. 1988) (stating that while a nonparty insurance company
may have been obligated by st ate law to pay amounts owed to a party, the district court
does not have personal jurisdiction over a n onparty insurance company to order such
payment by the nonparty).
The Commissioner is not a party to civil-commitment proceedings. In re Bowers,
456 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Minn. App. 1990). In Bowers, the district court ordered DHS to
pay the costs for care, treatment, and transportation for committed persons. Id. at 736. We
recognized that a rule of civil procedure au thorized parties to move to vacate a void
judgment. Id. A party is “one who has the right to control the proc eedings, to examine
and cross-examine the witnesses, and to appeal.” Id. We held in Bowers that, because “the
Commissioner did not receive notice of the hearings or the claim for costs, and she did not
participate,” the Commissioner was not a party to the ci vil-commitment proceedings. Id.
at 736-37. We therefore held that the district court’s order requiring DHS to pay costs was
“void.” Id. at 737-38.

6
Here, the Commissioner did not receive notice of the commitment hearings and was
not served with process.3 The Commissioner did not partic ipate in the civil-commitment
proceeding. It was only after the district court had committed the three respondents that it
ordered the Commissioner to do anything. The Commissioner, as a nonparty to the
underlying commitment proceedings, was not subject to the district court’s jurisdiction.
Because the Commissioner was not a part y to the civil-commi tment cases, the
district court did not have personal jurisdiction over her in these cases. See Sammons, 642
N.W.2d at 457. The district court acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the
Commissioner, a nonparty, to submit quarterly reports. See Ferlitto, 565 N.W.2d at 37. 4
We therefore vacate the appealed-from orders.
Vacated.

3 The record contains no evidence of whether and how the Commissioner was served with
process regarding the Emergency Order to Show Cause. Nothing in the record shows that
she was served with either a summons or the commitm ent petition in the underlying
commitment proceedings.

4 Because we vacate the district court’s order on this basis, we do not reach the many other
issues raised in the briefs, including the possibility of moot ness, the likelihood that the
presenting issue will recur, and the concerns of the Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association, as
amicus, that a remedy is needed for the Commissioner’s failure to adhere to the 48-hour
rule. These issues, and particularly the ques tion of whether and how the 48-hour rule is
enforced, can only be addressed in an appropriate forum. Because the district court’s orders
impermissibly asserted jurisdiction over a nonparty, any attempt to resolve these important
questions here would be beyond our proper role. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d
151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). Whether a different
procedural posture in a future case will permit a court to reach those questions remains to
be seen.