A17-1336

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1323
A17-1336

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. L. G., D. M.
and J. T. B., Parents (A17-1323),

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. L. G., D. M.
and J. T. B., Parents (A17-1336)

Filed March 5, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File Nos. 02-JV-16-1008, 02-JV-16-1007

Gretchen R. Severin, Munstenteiger & Severin, P.A., Anoka, Minnesota (for appellant
father J.T.B.)

Christian R. Peterson, Clarice R. Scarnecchia, Christian R. Peterson Law Office, Anoka,
Minnesota (for appellant mother J.L.G.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka C ounty Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County Social Services)

Virginia Murphrey, Tenth District Public Defender, Kenneth Dee, Assistant Public
Defender, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent child G.G.)

Susan Drabek, Circle Pines, Minnesota (for respondent father D.M.)

Sara McKlugell, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
In this consolidated appeal, appellant -mother challenges the district court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her three youngest children and transferring permanent
legal and physical custody of her oldest child to the child’s father. Appellant -father
challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights to the three children he
has in common with mother. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal stems from the termination of appellant-mother, J.L.G.’s, and appellant-
father, J.T.B.’s, parental rights to their three children, M.B. (born in 2012), C.B. (born in
2013), and F.B. (born in 2014), as well as the involuntary transfer of legal and physical
custody of mother’s oldest child, G.G. (born in 2007), to G.G.’s father, D.M.
On August 13, 2015 , police officers conducted a welfare check at mother and
father’s home after receiving reports that two naked toddlers, M.B. and C.B., were
unsupervised and fighting in the neighborhood. The officers located father in the home;
he was passed out due to a suspected methamphetamine high. The officers also found an
unsupervised infant, F.B., inside the home. Mother was not home. She did not return until
later that night because she was out using illegal narcotics.
Respondent Anoka County Social Services (county) placed M.B., C.B., and F.B. in
emergency protective care. Mother’s oldest child, G.G., had been residing in the home
with father and mother, but was visiting her biological father, D.M., at the time of the
welfare check. The county temporarily placed G.G. with D.M. The county filed a petition
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alleging that the children were children in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The
district court held an emergency-protective-care hearing and continued the three youngest
children in nonrelative foster care, as well as G.G.’s placement with D.M.
More than a year after the children were placed out of home, the county petitioned
to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights to M.B., C.B., and F.B. , alleging the
following statutory grounds in support of termination: (1) the parents had failed to
substantially comply with the duties of the parent-child relationship; (2) reasonable efforts
had failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement; and
(3) the children were neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 (b)(2),
(b)(5), (b)(8) (2016). The county also filed a permanency petition seeking to transfer
permanent legal and physical custody of G.G. from mother to D.M. Father and mother
denied the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition, and mother denied the transfer of
legal custody (TLC) petition.
The TPR and TLC petitions were tried over six days in the spring and summer of
2017. The county presented testimony from 12 witnesses and introduced over 250 exhibits.
Mother called two witnesses and introduced one exhibit. Father testified on his own behalf
and introduced several exhibits, but he did not call any witnesses. The district court granted
the county’s petitions and made extensive factual findings in support of its order for TPR
and TLC. The relevant circumstances follow.
As to the children, M.B. and C.B. were placed together in the same foster home .
After their placement, school-district evaluators determined that M.B. and C.B. qualified
for special-educational services because they both had developmental and communication
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delays. The evaluators also determined that M.B. qualified for special-educational services
based on an Autism Spectrum Di sorder diagnosis. Because of M.B.’s developmental
delays, he needs a high level of adult supervision to perform tasks and activities normally
expected of children his age.
Initially, M.B. and C.B. exhibited aggressive behavior such as hitting their heads
against the floor, hitting each other, and hitting and kicking their foster parent. M.B.’s and
C.B.’s behavior improved dramatically during their foster -care placement , and the
attendant structure, routine, and nonphysical discipline caused them to be less aggressive
and to follow the rules in the foster home . However, M.B.’s and C.B.’s foster parent
reported they often reverted to negative behavior for a few days after visits with mother.
When F.B. entered foster care, she was completely nonverbal and typically stayed
awake late into the night. She also screamed frequently to get her needs met. After several
months in foster care, she screamed less and had improved sleep. She also began to develop
verbal and motor skills . However, F.B.’s f oster parent testified that F.B. revert ed to
negative behaviors such as aggression and combativeness after visits with mother.
After G.G. was placed with D.M., she developed a strong and loving bond with him.
G.G. also bonded with D.M.’s fiancée and her younger half-siblings in D.M.’s home. G.G.
experienced routine and consistency in D.M.’s home and began to e xcel in school. A
county social worker testified that when she visited G.G., G.G. was very excited to tell her
about all of the good things in G.G.’s life. The social worker also testified that she believed
G.G. was in a healthier en vironment because G.G. does not have to worry about her
caregiver’s mood or whether her caregiver will be attentive to her needs.
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As to mother and father, the dist rict court found that they had been addicted to
various drugs since they were teenagers and that their drug u se continued during the
underlying child-protection case. Although mother had demonstrated recent sobriety at the
time of trial, her longest perio d of sobriety was for two years, before the CHIPS case
opened. Although father had documented seven months of sobriety at the time of trial,
father’s longest period of sobriety was for a year and a hal f and occurred more than a
decade before the start of the trial. Mother and father each had mental-health issues and
each had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Mother suffered from severe
mood dysregulation, which, according to witnesses at the trial, makes safe parenting
impossible without successful completion of treatment.
Mother and father have an extensive history of domestic violence, and the children
were exposed to it on a regular basis. Domestic violence had destabilized the family, but
mother and father had not adequately invested themselves in therapy to address the ir
volatile relationship, the violence that had occurred, and the trauma that the violence had
created for the children. The district court credited the testimony of the children’s guardian
ad litem (GAL) who opined that the children would not be protected from exposure to
domestic violence if they were returned to either mother’s or father’s care.
Mother and father did not immediately engage in caseplan services that had been
ordered in the child-protection case. Father acknowledged that he did not follow through
with any of the services for at least 15 months after the children were placed out of home
and that he continued to use drugs during th at time. Mother intermittently engaged in
caseplan services, including a restorative -parenting class and a domestic -violence
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survivors group. She also started dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) near the time of trial
and had participated in DBT earlier in the case.
Mother tested positive for drug use while the case was pending and missed several
drug tests. Moreover, the district court found that mother “ha[d] been deceitful to medical
professionals, service providers, the county, the GAL, and [the district court] about her use
of substances, [and] he r progress in programming.” Multiple doctors expressed concern
about mother’s drug -seeking behavior, and the district court noted that as recently as a
month before trial, mother had continued to use prescribed opiates. Although those drugs
were prescrib ed, the district court found that given mother’s extensive history of drug
abuse, her extensive number of emergency room visits , and the cancellation o f p rior
prescriptions by multiple doctors b ased on their concerns regarding mother’s past drug
addictions and abuse , mother’s continued use of legally prescribed opiates was both
suspicious and dangerous.
The district court found that mother coerced G.G. into making false allegations of
sexual abuse against her father and consistently subjected G.G. to negative and demeaning
comments about her father and his family. The district court also found that several
witnesses credibly testified that the children often reverted to negative behaviors after visits
with mother and that mother’s comfort level during her supervised visits had not
significantly improved.
At the time of trial, neither parent had safe and independent housing that would have
allowed them to protect and provide for the children. Father lived at a sober-living facility
that did not allow children, and he did not have a scheduled release date from that facility.
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Father did not have a job or driver ’s license, and h e previously had a difficult time
assimilating to life on his own without the use of chemicals. Mother lived with her own
mother, who had been unable to prevent the children from being exposed to domestic abuse
and drug abuse in the past.
The district court found that the county had made reasonable efforts to reunify the
family by providing numerous services reasonab ly aimed at correcting mother’s and
father’s mental-health, chemical-dependency, and domestic -abuse issues. The following
services were offered to mother: a chemical-dependency evaluation, chemical-dependency
treatment, a neuropsychological evalua tion, eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR) trauma therapy, DBT, a domestic -violence survivor group, and a
restorative-parenting class. The following services were offered to father: a chemical-
dependency evaluation, chemical-dependency treatment, domestic-violence classes , and
EMDR trauma therapy. In addition, the parents were encourage d to participate in the
children’s services.
As to D.M., the district court found that he had developed a strong and loving bond
with G.G., and had become a stabilizing force in her life. The district court also found that
D.M. had followed the county’s caseplan and the court’s orders for nearly two years, had
acted responsibly when disciplinary issues came up, and had been an attentive caretaker to
his daughter.
The district court credited the testimony of a county social worker and the children’s
GAL that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate mother’s and father’s parental
rights to M.B., C.B., and F.B. and that it was in G.G.’s best interests to permanently transfer
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her physical and legal custody from mother to D.M. It also credited the GAL’s testimony
that neither mother nor father would be able to protect the children from exposure to
domestic violence and that the children’s behaviors and development drastically improved
after they were removed from their mother’s and father’s care. The district court noted that
all of the children had positively bonded with their new caregivers, which had led to much
needed stability in their lives.
The district court determined that the county had prove d its petitions for TPR and
TLC. It provided multiple conclusions in support of its determination. Examples follow.
8. MB, CB and FB were consistently emotionally
dysregulated while in the primary care of [mother] and [father].
Additionally, MB and CB have special needs which were
neglected while they were in the care of [mother] and [father].

9. During the pendency of these cases, neither
[mother] nor [father] have demonstrated the development of
skills necessary to provide MB, CB, or FB with the care and
control necessary for their health and success. [Mother] has
continued to demonstra te the emotional dysregulation that
began this case, and led her to leave her children without proper
care for substantial periods of time. During visits with her
children, she has pulled away from them emotionally and has
shown that she is unable to contr ol their violent behaviors
towards each other and towards herself. This has caused the
children emotional distress. [Mother] has not engaged with her
children’s special services.

10. Nearly 17 months after the children were placed
outside the home, [mother] suffered a mental health crisis that
caused her to stay in bed for three weeks. The Court recognizes
that [mother] has had a difficult life and experienced many
traumatic events . While it is understandable that she would
have significant mental h ealth issues stemming from these
traumas, she is not able to effectively parent wh en she is in
crisis, and she has demonstrated that she is not able to
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effectively utilize support service s to work through these
crises.

11. The expert testimony presented at trial establishes
that [mother] has not been able to develop the appropriate skills
and coping mechanisms necessary to effectively provide for
the mental and emotional health and the development of her
children. Because [mother] was not succe ssful in completing
DBT, she will have to begin that process again, which will take
approximately a year. She will not be able to begin to directly
address the trauma in her past until that co urse of treatment is
completed.

12. [Mother’s] work on her sobriety is commendable.
However, she remains at significant risk to use chemicals as a
coping mechanism for her trauma until that trauma is
sufficiently addressed and treated.

13. [Mother’s] children have been exposed to serious
domestic violence in her home in the past. [Mother] has not
shown a sufficient commitment to ensuring that her children
never experience such traumatic abuse again. She has
repeatedly demonstrated that she is still stuck in a cycle of
abuse, as she has continued to pursue a relationship with
[father] despite the toxic nature of their relationship and the
rampant abuse present, as well as the existence of a Harassment
Restraining Order and other impediments. [Mother’s]
participation in domestic abuse-related services has not yielded
much progress.

14. [Father] is also to be commended for his efforts at
sobriety, as well as his recent participation in other services.
However, [father] is only at the beginning of a very long
journey to understand and treat his issues with trauma,
chemical dependency, anger and domestic abuse. [Father’s]
continued sobriety will hinge on the success of his mental
health treatment.

15. [Father] has only recently begun to resume contact
and maintain a presence in his children’s lives. For the
majority of time during these cases, [father] was not present in
the lives of his children. Since the resumption o f visits with
his children this year, [father] has had difficulty engaging with
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the children. This has led to anger on the part of [father], and
aggressive behaviors and emotional dysregulation on the part
of his children. [Father] has also not engaged in his children’s
special services.

….

30. The Court does not discount the interest of the
parents in preserving a relati onship with MB, CB, and FB.
[Mother] and [father] have both made commendable strides in
sobriety and in working towards stabilizing their mental and
emotional health. However, neither parent is yet in a position
to be able to effectively parent their chi ldren, and will not be
in such a position for a very long time. Both [mother] and
[father] have a lot of work to do, and need to continue to focus
on accessing the services they need to process their trauma and
maintain sobriety. They have not yet demons trated the ability
to provide the stability that their children need.

31. MB, CB, and FB have developed strong, healthy
bonds with their caretakers. It would not be in the ir best
interests to return them to parents who still have much work to
do in processing their own childhood traumas.

32. Both parents involved have significant work to do
in achieving mental and chemical health. The Court does not
believe it would be in the best interests of the children to
terminate the parental rights of solely [mother] or [father].
Both parents should continue to seek therapy, domestic abuse
programming and other services to help achieve health and
stability.

Mother and father separately appealed the district court’s order, and this court
consolidated their appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Before we address the parents’ assignments of error, we note the principles that
govern our review. As an appellate court, our purpose is to correct errors, and not to retry
the case. Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House , 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n. 2 (Minn. 1979).
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Accordingly, we do not reweigh evidence or determine witness credibility. See Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (stating that it is not the appellate court’s
function to reweigh evidence, find facts, or as sess credibility); see also In re Welfare of
L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (giving the district court’s credibility
determinations deference in the juvenile protection context). Because a district court is in
a far superior position to determin e the credibility of witnesses, we give such
determinations considerable deference. L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 396.
Many of mother’s and father’s arguments fail to recognize one or more of these
principles. We therefore do not address those arguments. Instead, we focus our review on
the arguments that raise issues that are appropriate for appellate review.
I.
Minnesota courts presume that “a natural parent is a fit and suitable person to be
entrusted with the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647
(Minn. 1995). Generally, “it is in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his or
her natural parents.” Id. Thus, Minnesota courts will only terminate parental rights for
“grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).
Petitioners bear “the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that [a] statutory
termination ground[] exists” in a TPR proceeding. In re Welfare of C.K., 426 N.W.2d 842,
847 (Minn. 1988). A d istrict court’ s decision in a TPR proceeding must be based on
evidence concerning the conditions that exist at the time of the trial. In re Welfare of Child
of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007) , review denied (Minn. July 17, 2007).
Termination of parental rights is intended for those situations in which it appears “that the
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present conditions of neglect will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re
Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
There are nine statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2016). In a TPR appeal, an appellate court examines the record to
determine whether the district court applied the appropriate statutory criteria and made
findings that were not clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 249
(Minn. App. 2003). We give the district court ’s credibility determinations and factual
findings considerable deference. See In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,
660-61 (Minn. 2008) (stating that appellate courts will defer to the district court’s factual
findings so long as they address the statutory criteria and are not clearly erroneous); L.A.F.,
554 N.W.2d at 396. An appellate court reviews the district court’s u ltimate decision to
terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853
N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014). We will affirm the district court’s decision to terminate
parental rights if at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the child, In re Welfare of
Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004), so long as the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2005).
Regarding a district court’s assessment of a child’ s best interests, this court has
stated that
the best interests of the child must be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to actually terminate
parental rights, and, if there is a conflict between the interests
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of a parent and a child, the interests of the child are paramount.
In analyzing a child’ s best interests, the court must balan ce
three factors: ( 1) the child’ s interest in preserving the parent -
child relationship; (2) the parent’ s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child. Competing interests include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.

In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotations
omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
In determining whether the county made reasonable efforts, the court must consider
whether it offered services that were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) reali stic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016). It must also consider “the length of the
time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). The county’s
efforts must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that predicated the out-of-home
placement, and the efforts must conform to the problems presented. In re Welfare of S.Z.,
547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996); H.K., 455 N.W.2d at 532.
We now turn to the parents’ arguments in support of reversal.
Mother
Mother’s argument s address the district court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions, the statutory grounds on which the district court relied, the county’s
reasonable efforts, and the children’s best interests. The majority of her arguments invite
us to assess witness credibility, reweigh evidence, and disregard supported factual findings.
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For example, mother argues: “[the district court’s] conclusions were based off the
testimony of witnesses with limited personal knowledge” ; “being emotionally withdrawn
. . . should not be weighed against her” ; the testimony of the GAL and other witnesses ’
testimony that the children act ed out was not sufficient to show mother had trouble
controlling the children’s behavior; although testimony establishes that mother had little to
no involvement in the children’s therapy sessions, it did not support a conclusion that she
could not provide for her children’s mental and em otional health; even though mother
failed and missed drug tests throughout the case, the district court was wrong in concluding
that chemical use provided a statutory ground for termination; and the district court erred
in finding that the children were in danger because of mother’s cycle of abuse, even though
several experts testified to the contrary.
Although we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the termination
order with the clear-and-convincing proof requirement in mind, our purpose is not to retry
this case. We therefore do not consider arguments that invite us to do so , like those in the
preceding paragraph. Instead, we focus on the following three arguments, which do more
than simply challenge witness credibility and the district court’s weighing of the evidence.
First, mother argues that the district court ignored evidence regarding the positive
progress that she had made on her caseplan services and goals at the time of trial.
Specifically, mother complains that the district court’s findings are “completely void of …
testimony provided by [her therapist,] C.L.[,] stating that [she] was in DBT therapy and
trauma therapy at the time of trial.” Mother claims that she saw C.L. twice a week for DBT
and trauma therapy and that C.L. testified that mother was progressing well in therapy.
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Mother argues that because she was making progress in DBT and trauma therapy, the
district court improperly concluded that she was not in a position to be able to effectively
parent her children and “will not be in such a position for a very long time.”
C.L.’s testimony shows that mother restarted D BT the month the trial began and
that it typically takes approximately one year to complete DBT. Multiple therapists
testified that individuals typically complete DBT before trauma therapy. During direct-
examination, C.L. testified that mother had started both DBT and EMDR trauma therapy.
But on cross-examination, C.L. clarified that mother had only started DBT and that mother
had not started EMDR trauma therapy . C.L. also testified that there was no projected
completion date for mother’s D BT and EMDR trauma therapy. Indeed, the evidence
showed that it would likely take mother at least a year to complete treatment.
Although the district court’s findings do not highlight mother’s participation in
therapy at the time of trial, the record refutes mother’s assertion that she was successfully
engaged in both DBT and EMDR trauma therapy. Instead, the record clearly and
convincingly supports the district court’s findings regarding the time it would take mother
to complete treatment and her resulting inability to safely parent her children for a very
long time.
Second, mother argues that the district court erred by focusing on factors other than
her chemical use as grounds for termination because chemical use was the underlying
reason for the children’s out-of-home placement. Mother complains that the district court’s
termination decision heavily focused on her mental-health issues and that her mental-health
issues were not the basis for the children’s out -of-home placement. Mother asserts that
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“the direct reason why the children were taken into protective custody was because [she]
left the home in order to use methamphetamines, not because she was emo tionally
unavailable or because of a domestic abuse incident” and that the district court’s focus
“should have been on whether [she] had accomplished a state of sobriety, to correct the
situation of [her] leaving her children in order to use drugs.”
Termination was based, in part, o n Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) , which
provides for termination when: “the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and
child relationship . . . [and] reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to
correct the conditions that formed the basis for the petition .” (Emphasis added.)
Termination was also based on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), which pro vides for
termination when: “following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts,
under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.” (Emphasis added.) Mother argues that th is statutory language “suggests the
focus is on the reason why the children were placed into foster care to begin with.”
But this court has held, in an analogous context, that “[a district] court may find that
a child cannot safely return home even though the fac tual bases for the conditions
preventing the child’s return home are not identical to the factual bases for the c onditions
that led to the child’ s out -of-home placement .” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d 315, 3 16-17 (Minn. App. 2015) (affirming child -protection permanency
disposition transferring legal and physical custody of a child from a mother to a father),
review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(4) (2016) (providing
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that a n order permanently placing a ch ild ou t of the home of the parent must include
detailed findings that “the conditions which led to the out -of-home placement have not
been corrected so that the child can safely return home”).
Although the children’s out -of-home placement was initially a nd primarily
attributed to the parents’ drug use, mother’s mental-health and domestic-abuse issues were
identified as factors compromising mother’s ability to properly care for the children , and
they were a focus of her caseplan. And a lthough mother was newly sober at the time of
trial, she still had unaddressed mental-health issues that contributed to her inability to care
for her children. Because mental -health and domestic -violence issues were part of the
constellation of issues that led to the children’s placement, the district court did not err by
considering those issues when determining that the statutory ground s for termination of
parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) and (b)(5), were established.
Third, mother argues that t he county’s reunification efforts were unreasonable
because the county “refused to allow [her] more parenting time prior to trial” d espite her
progress on the caseplan. Although mother complains that the county did not increase her
visitation, mother does not assert that she asked for increased visitation. We have
previously rejected a parent’s challenge to a reasonable -efforts determination based on
denial of visitation where the parent did not contest the denial of visitation in district court.
H.K., 455 N.W.2d at 533. Similarly, we are not persuaded that reunification efforts were
unreasonable simply because the county did not offer to increase visitation on its own
initiative prior to the start of the TPR trial.
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Father
Father’s arguments address the district court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions, the statutory grounds for termination,1 the county’s reasonable efforts, and the
best interests of the children. Many of these arguments invite us to reweigh evidence.
Again, that is not our ro le. We therefore focus on the following two arguments, which
raise appropriate appellate issues.
First, father argues that the district court erred in concluding that he, like mother,
needed to complete DBT before beginning trauma therapy. Specifically, the district court
found, “Based on the testimony of the experts working with [ mother], it would seem
necessary for [father] to do so before he can successfully complete therapy with a counselor
specially trained to deal with his history of trauma.” Witnesses testified that it is common
to recommend completion of DBT therapy before trauma therapy because DBT is a skill-
based therapy that can commonly aid a participant in trauma therapy. Although the record
supports an inference that father could benefit from DBT therapy, father correctly notes
that there is no direct evidence that he needed to complete DBT to be successful in trauma
therapy.
Even if a complaining party shows error, reversal is not automatic; the complaining
party must also show that the error was prejudicial. See In re Welfare of D.J.N. , 568

1 Father asserts that the county petitioned for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4) (2016), alleging that he is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child
relationship. Neither the county’s petition nor the district court’s termina tion order was
based on this statutory ground. We therefore do not address father’s arguments regarding
palpable unfitness.
19
N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that the complaining party did not show
prejudice regarding alleged error). We review a district court’s erroneous finding of fact
under the harmless-error standard. See In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88,
98 (Minn. App. 2008) (applying har mless-error test to TPR cases). An error is harmless ,
and therefore not a basis for reversal, if “the [decision] is surely unattributable to the error.”
In re Welfare of T.J.C. , 670 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted) ,
review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2004).
Father acknowledges that for approximately the first year and a half of the child-
protection case, he did not engage in caseplan services offered to reunify the family . He
also acknowledges that he did not start having regular visit s with his children until
approximately one month before the TPR trial began and that he had problems managing
the children ’s behavior during visits . Although father eventually engaged in caseplan
services, at the time of trial, he did not have a discharge date from his sober-living facility,
a job, or a driver’s license; he had not participated in the children’s programming since
they were removed from his care; and he had not developed the skills necessary to provide
for the special needs of the children. When the challenged DBT finding is considered in
the context of the entire record and the multiple findings supporting the district court’s TPR
order, it is clear that the termination order does not significantly depend on the challenged
DBT finding. Because the termination order is surely unattributable to the assigned error,
the error is harmless.
Second, f ather argues that the county’s reunification efforts were not reasonable
because the county “faile d to offer appropriate services . . . to assist him in learning the
20
appropriate parenting skills he would need to parent [the] three children with their special
needs.” Father argues that the services provided only addressed his issues such as chemical
dependency, mental health, and domestic abuse.
However, father concedes that from August 13, 2015 to March 2017, he “shouldn’t
have b een around [his] children, ” because of his continuing drug abuse and frequent
incidents of domestic violence. T he record clearly shows that before father could spend
quality time with his children , he needed to work through his chemical -addiction and
mental-health issues. Initiation of that process was delayed by father, and not the county.
Once father made some progress on his case plan services and began visiting his
children, the county recognized that a parenting -skills worker would be helpful. But the
county did not make a refe rral for that service until three months after visits had started ,
and as the trial was ending. The district court noted that father “expressed frustration that
[the county] was not able to arrange several services for him in 2017.” But the distric t
court reasoned, “Context is again important in assessing reasonableness. [Father] wanted
the services he identified when he wanted them , although he had failed to take advantage
of reasonable services throughout the pendency of the CHIPS case.”
As to context, a lthough the three-month delay in the referral is unfortunate, we
cannot overlook father’s preceding 18-month delay in starting his caseplan services. We
are hard pressed to find error in the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination based
on the three-month service-referral delay when father did not participate in any services
for the first 18 months of the case plan and thereby failed to bring about the changes
necessary to progress to the point of utilizing the services of a parenting-skills worker.
21
In sum, we recognize that each parent argues that the evidence does not support the
statutory grounds on which termination was based. However, the majority of the ir
arguments regarding the statutory grounds are not properly before this court because they
invite us to assess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence. That is not our role. But
we have reviewed the record with these arguments in mind , and with the exception of
father’s challenge to the district court’s finding regarding his need for DBT treatment, the
evidence provides clear and convincing support for the district court’s thorough, thoughtful
findings. And th ose findings clearly and convincingly establish all of the statutory
termination grounds on which the district court relied. In addition, the findings show that
reasonable efforts were made to reunify th e family and that termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the three youngest children. The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights to M.B., C.B., and
F.B.
II.
Mother challenges the district court’s order transferring permanent legal and
physical custody of G.G. to D.M. The district court has the authority to order a transfer of
permanent legal and physical custody “to a fit and willing relative in the best interests of
the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2016).
Except for an order terminating parental rights, an order
permanently placing a child out of the home of th e parent or
guardian must include the following detailed findings:
(1) how the child’ s best interests are served by
the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
services agency’s reasonable efforts or, in the case of an Indian
22
child, active efforts to reunify the child with the parent or
guardian where reasonable efforts are required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to
use services to correct the conditions which led to the out -of-
home placement; and
(4) that the c onditions which led to the out -of-
home placement have not been corrected so that the child can
safely return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2016); accord Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.05, subd. 1. Each of
these four findings must be proven by clear and con vincing evidence. See Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 39.04, subd. 2(a) (“[I]n a termination of parental rights or other permanency matter
involving a non-Indian child, the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.”).
In challenging the TLC order regard ing G.G., mother re peats many of the same
arguments on which she relied in asserting that the district court erred in terminating her
parental rights to her three youngest children. She again wants this court to reweigh
evidence, which we cannot do. Moreover, she wants this court to discount the district
court’s finding that both G.G.’s social worker and GAL credibly testified that it was in
G.G.’s best interest to transfer her legal and physical custody to her father because she had
developed a strong bond with her father, her father’s fiancée, and her younger half-siblings,
and because her father was attentive to her needs and development.
Based on our review of the record and deference to the district court’s weighing of
the evidence, we do not discern error justifying reversal of the district court’s transfer of
legal and physical custody of G.G. to D.M.
Affirmed.