Nicole LaPoint, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1333

Nicole LaPoint,
Appellant,

vs.

Family Orthodontics, P. A.,
Respondent.

Filed April 9, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge
Dissenting, Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-13-18122

Steven Andrew Smith, Matthew A. Frank, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
On appeal following the supreme court’ s remand to the district court for
consideration of whether the district court correctly applied the la w, appellant Nicole
LaPoint contends that the district court erred in concluding that it did not misapply the law
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when it found that respondent Family Ort hodontics P.A. did not discriminate against
appellant under the Minnesota Human Right s Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44
(2016 & Supp. 2017). We affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from a decision by Dr. Angela Ross, owner of Family Orthodontics
P.A., to rescind a job offer to appellant after appellant disclosed her pregnancy and
indicated that she intended to take 12 weeks of maternity leave. Dr. Ross, in rescinding
the offer, indicated that she was confused as to why appe llant did not tell her of the
pregnancy during the interview, and was concerned that the office could not accommodate
a 12-week maternity leave. Respondent’s office policy only permitted employees to take
six weeks of maternity leave. The district court found that Dr. Ross rescinded the job offer
because of the disruption a 12-week maternit y leave would cause to the office, and not
because of the pregnancy.
This court reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that appellant proved her
claim of discrimination. LaPoint v. Family Orthodontics, P.A. , 872 N.W.2d 889, 894
(Minn. App. 2015), rev’d, 892 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 2017). The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted review and reversed the decision of this court. 892 N.W.2d at 508. The supreme
court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of whether the district court
incorrectly believed that animus was required for a finding of discrimination, and whether
it would have made the same findings if it had “applied the correct law regarding animus.”
Id. at 517. On remand, the district court upheld its original decision, indicating that it had
not believed that animus was required for a fi nding of discrimination, and that it “did not
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base its decision on [respondent’s] lack of animus towards [appella nt] or her pregnancy
status.” The district court indicated that its original decision was based on appellant’s
failure “to prove her pregnancy ‘actually motiv ated’ [respondent’s] de cision not to hire
her.”
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The MHRA “prohibits disparate treatment of pregnant women” in employment and
hiring practices. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn.
1988). Under the MHRA, it is generally an unfair employment practice for an employer
to “refuse to hire” a person because of sex or to “require or request” a job applicant to
provide information concerning sex. Minn. St at. § 363A.08, subds. 2, 4(a)(1). “Sex” is
defined as “pregnancy, childbirth, and disab ilities related to pregna ncy or childbirth.”
Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 42.
“When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment [under the MHRA], liability depends
on whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Goins v. W.
Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001) (emphasis added) ( quotation omitted). This
standard is satisfied if the plaintiff can de monstrate that the protected trait “was ‘a
substantial causative factor’ in the employment decision.” LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 513
(quoting Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 624). The plaintiff is not required to prove that the
employer held animus toward the protected trait in order to prove that it actually motivated
the employer’s decision. Id. at 517. Even if an employe r has a legitimate reason for the
adverse employment decision, a plaintiff may prevail “if an illegitimate reason ‘more likely
4
than not’” motivated the employer’s decision. McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB , 509
N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627).
“[T]he ultimate question of whether [a] defendant discriminated against [a] plaintiff
is one of fact.” LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 514. We review findings of fact for clear error
and “accord[] great deference” to a district c ourt’s findings because of the advantage the
district court has in “hearing the testimony, assessing relative credibility of witnesses and
acquiring a thorough understa nding of the circumstances unique to the matter before it.”
Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1 996). We review questions of
law de novo. Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete Prods., 852 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 2014).
Appellant argues that the two concerns th at Dr. Ross expressed to appellant when
she rescinded the offer prove that the pregnancy actually motived Dr. Ross’s decision; any
finding to the contrary, appellant argues, is legal error based on a misapplication of the law.
In the alternative, she argues, the district c ourt’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
Finally, she argues that the district court’s postremand order fails to adequately address the
finding of no discrimination in light of the supreme court’s clarification that animus is not
required; that is, appellant argues that additional findings of fact were required on remand
to validate a finding of no discrimination.
Appellant also asserts that an employer’s adverse hiring decision motivated by an
applicant’s proposed length of maternity leave is discrimi nation “as a matter of law”
because the proposed leave is “related to” pregnancy. To support her argument that an
employer’s decision need only be “related to” a protected st atus to be discriminatory,
appellant cites a footnote from the supreme court remarking that “pregnancy-related
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considerations” may have played a role in respondent’s hiring decision. LaPoint, 892
N.W.2d at 517 n.3. From this footnote, ap pellant argues that an employer’s illegitimate
motivating factor need only be somehow “related to” a prot ected trait—a standard she
argues she has met by labeling the requested 12-week leave of absence as maternity leave.
This is not the standard rearticulated by the supreme court in LaPoint: the standard for
whether discrimination occurred is whether a “protected characteristic actually motived the
employer’s conduct.” Id. at 514 (quotation omitted) (rejec ting a standard that required a
“specific link” between the discriminatory purpose and the employment decision); see also
Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 722 (indicating that the protected trait “must have actually played a
role in the employer’s deci sionmaking process” (quotati ons omitted)). Based on the
supreme court’s narrow instructions on rema nd, we need not reach appellant’s argument
that the district court legally erred in its original decision when it concluded that the
discrimination standard was not met by a hiring decision based on a request for 12 weeks
of leave.
Appellant likewise argues that the district court committed legal error when it found
that appellant’s failure to disclose the pr egnancy did not actually motivate the adverse
hiring decision. While it is unlawful to re quest or require an applicant to furnish
information about pregnancy, the district court found that the adverse hiring decision was
not made because of appellant’s failure to disclose her pregnancy; rather, it was made
solely because of the requested leave of absenc e. Appellant argues that the district court
legally erred, but to so conclude would require us to find that the di strict court’s factual
finding was clearly erroneous. On this point, we defer to the supreme court’s conclusion:
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“there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the [d istrict] court’s findings.”
LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 516 (quotation omitted).
Finally, appellant argues that the district court failed to adequately explain on
remand how it did not base its decision on Dr. Ross’s lack of animus toward the pregnancy,
given the district court’s repeated references in its original order to Dr. Ross’s lack of anger
or hostility. The supreme court charged the district court with considering whether it
believed that animus was required for a finding of discrimination under the MHRA, and if
it misapplied the law concerning animus, whet her it would make the same findings. The
district court concluded that it had not believe d that animus was required for a finding of
discrimination when it issued its decision, and it did not base its decision on Dr. Ross’s
lack of animus. The district court’s postrem and order adequately e xplained its original
decision. We discern no reversible error.
Affirmed.
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BRATVOLD, Judge (dissenting)
While I am mindful of the supreme court’s narrow instructions on remand, I
respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority’s summary of the applicable law and, in
particular, that this appeal turns on our review of the district court’s conclusion that Family
Orthodontics did not discriminate against LaPoint in rescinding her job offer after Dr. Ross
found out that LaPoint was pre gnant. The majority is correct that our standard of review
requires that we defer to a district court’s factual findings. But we review de novo the
district court’s application of the law to those facts. In re Petition for Distribution of
Attorney’s Fees between Stowman Law Firm, P.A., 870 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 2015) (de
novo review of legal conclusions after bench trial).
In my opinion, however, the district court’s terse statement on remand that LaPoint
failed to prove her pregnancy “actually motiv ated” Family Orthodontics’ decision not to
hire her is inconsistent with the law and with the district court’s detailed findings of fact
after trial. The district court did not amend or alter in any way the relevant factual findings
upon remand. I conclude that district court’ s decision is founded upon a legal error that
requires reversal.
The MHRA is a remedial act that shoul d be construed liberally in order to
accomplish its purpose of “s ecur[ing] for persons in th is state, freedom from
discrimination.” Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.04, .02, subd. 1(a) (2016). To combat pregnancy
discrimination, it is critical that we rigorously enforce the MHRA. When the correct legal
standard is applied to the district court’s factual findings, I can reach only one conclusion:
Family Orthodontics discriminated against LaPoint on the basis of her pregnancy.
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The majority decision correc tly recognizes that Family Orthodontics’ liability for
discrimination under the MHRA depends on wh ether LaPoint’s failure to disclose her
pregnancy “actually motivated” Dr. Ross’s decision to withdraw the job offer. See Goins
v. W. Grp. , 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001). The majority also reco gnizes that the
supreme court’s decision in the previous appeal held that this standard is satisfied if
pregnancy “was ‘a substantial causativ e factor’ in the employment decision.” LaPoint v.
Family Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Minn. 2017).
The district court expressly found th at Dr. Ross cited two reasons for her
employment decision and that the reasons were interrelated. First, Dr. Ross withdrew the
job offer because LaPoint chose not to disclo se her pregnancy during her interview. The
district court stated this finding as fo llows: “Although Dr. Ross’ handwritten notes,
voicemail, and follow-up email to [LaPoint] cited [LaPoint’s] failure to disclose her
pregnancy during the interview as a reason for withdrawing the job offer, the totality of the
evidence establishes that Dr. Ross was not ups et about the pregnancy.” Second, Dr. Ross
withdrew the job offer because LaPoint requested 12 weeks of maternity leave. The district
court stated this finding as follows: “Dr. Ross’ overriding concern has been the disruption
that would be caused by [LaPoint’s] absence if [Ross] were to deviate from its policy of
limiting maternity leave to six weeks.”
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the di strict court’s decision as
finding that the hiring decision “was made solely because of th e requested leave of
absence.” While this is how the district court describes its decision in a posttrial
memoranda, it is not consistent w ith the court’s findings of fact. It is true that the district
D-3

court found Dr. Ross’s “overriding concern” wa s the length of maternity leave, but the
district court also found that Dr. Ross told LaPoint that she was withdrawing the job offer
because LaPoint failed to disclo se her pregnancy during the in terview. In fact, when the
supreme court reviewed the district court’s d ecision in the first appeal, it determined that
Dr. Ross’s statement “that LaPoint’s failure to disclose her pregnancy during the interview
was a concern, provide evidence that such considerations ‘actually motivated’ Dr. Ross’s
decision.” Id. at 516.
LaPoint’s choice not to disclose her n eed for maternity leave during her job
interview is an illegitimate reason to withdraw a job offer. Family Orthodontics could not
lawfully ask whether LaPoint was pr egnant during the job interview. See Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, subd. 4(a)(1) (2016) (prohibiting an employer from requiring or requesting that
a job applicant provide information pertaining to sex). The Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.44 (2016 & Supp. 2017), prot ects an applicant’s right
to withhold her pregnancy status and the need for maternity leave. Thus, the first reason
Dr. Ross rescinded her job offer penalizes La Point for failing to di sclose a fact that
Minnesota law prohibits Family Orthodontics from inquiring about during the interview.
Because Minnesota law requires that LaPoint prove that pregnancy was “a
substantial causative factor” and not “the ca usative factor” in the employment decision,
and the district court made the necessary fa ctual finding based on th e record evidence, I
would reverse. Simply stated, I conclude that the district court erred in determining that
Family Orthodontics may escap e liability because Dr. Ross gave two reasons for her
decision, even if the two reasons are interrelated. McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB , 509
D-4

N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993); see also LaPoint , 892 N.W.2d. at 519 (Chutich, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “two reasons, even if interrelate d, are still two reasons;” one
unlawful reason “gives rise to liability” under the MHRA).
Unlike the majority, I am not persuaded by the supreme court’s single statement that
there was “reasonable evidence in the record to support the [d istrict] court’s findings.”
Id. at 516. In reviewing the same factual findi ngs that are before us today, the supreme
court also stated it was left “with doubt about whet her the district court properly applied
the law.” Id. at 517. The supreme court remanded with instructions to consider whether the
district court had incorrectly believed th at animus was required for a finding of
discrimination, and expressed uncertainty whether the district court would make “the same
findings” upon remand. Id.
The district court has made the same findings of fact on remand and merely issued
ten lines in a memoranda. Thus, this court is squarely presen ted with whether the district
court erred in its application of the law to its factual findings. I conclude that it did.
Affirming the district court’s decision based on its factual findings implicitly approves Dr.
Ross’s discriminatory conduct and potentially renders meaningless Minn. Stat. § 363A.08,
subd. 4(a)(1)’s prohibition against asking applicants about mate rnity needs before
extending a job offer. Because the district c ourt did not amend its findings upon remand,
and these findings, as a matter of law, establish Family Orth odontics’ liability for
discrimination under the MHRA, I respectfully dissent.