Stephani Martinsen, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1346

Stephani Martinsen,
Respondent,

vs.

Jay E. Webb,
Appellant.

Filed May 29, 2018
Affirmed; motion denied
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-19210

Travis M. Ohly, Ohly Law Office, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jay E. Webb, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that a quitclaim deed
conveying a condominium from himself to respondent and himself as joint tenants is valid.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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Because the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous , and it did not err in its
application of the law or abuse its discretion by concluding the quitclaim deed is valid, we
affirm.
FACTS
In June 2011, a condominium was purchased in Minneapolis and titled in appellant
Jay Webb’s name the next month. The condominium is Torrens property. Webb an d
respondent Stephani Martinsen, who were in a relationship and planning to get married at
the time that the condominium was purchased, lived together in the condominium until
April 2015, when Martinsen moved out. Martinsen subsequently filed a complaint against
Webb, alleging unjust enrichment, equitable mortgage, quiet title, and legal partition . At
some point in the litigation, Martinsen produced a deed purportedly signed by Webb that
had not yet been filed with the Examine r of Titles. Under Min n. Stat. § 508.47, subd. 1
(2016), the deed, if filed, would convey and quitclaim the condominium from Webb to
Webb and Martinsen as joint tenants.
The district court referred the case to the Examiner of Titles to determine whethe r
the deed is valid. A hearing was held at which Martinsen, Webb, and a notary testified.
Martinsen testified that she convinced Webb to make her a joint tenant and on March 12,
2015, he signed the quitclaim deed in front of a notary. She also explained that they agreed
to backdate the deed to January 1, 2012 , because she had paid all of the property taxes on
the condominium and wanted to be able to write it off on her taxes. According to
Martinsen, she tried to record the deed a few days after it was signed, but was unable to do
so because of outstanding property taxes owed on the property, so she held on to the deed

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and intended to file it . The notary confirmed that the stamp and notary signature on the
deed were his, and he testified that he was a co mmissioned notary on March 12, 2015.
Webb disputed Martinsen’s testimony, claiming that he did not sign the quitclaim deed that
Martinsen was relying upon.
The Examiner of Titles determined that the deed is valid, that it had not taken effect
as a conveyance of the property (operating only as a contract between them) ,1 and that it
meets the standards for recording under Minn. Stat. § 507.24 (2016). The district court
adopted the report of the Examiner of Titles, including the findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and attached memorandum. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Webb first argues that the quitclaim deed violates Minn. Stat. § 507.24 because it
does not meet the statute’s standards for legibility and execution. The statute reads , in
relevant part:
To entitle any conveyance, power of attorney, or other
instrument affecting real estate to be recorded, it shall be
legible and archivable, it shall be executed, acknowledged by
the parties executing the same, and the acknowledgment
certified as required by law.
Minn. Stat. § 507.24, subd. 1. We understand Webb’s argument to raise a mixed question
of law and fact because it asserts that the deed does not meet the legal standards of legibility

1 See Minn. Stat. § 508.47, subd. 1 (explaining that aside from wills and leases under three
years, a “voluntary instrument of conveyance purporting to convey or affect registered land
. . . shall operate only as a contract between the parties” until it is registered).

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and execution. Accordingly, we review factual findings for clear error and legal questions
de novo , but the district court is accorded “discretion in its ultimate conclusion s and
[appellate courts] review such conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Porch
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Cor p., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. June 26, 2002).
The Examiner of Titles specifically found that “[t]he unrecorded deed meets the
standards for recording under Minn. Stat. § 507.24 as it is a conveyance that is legible and
archivable, executed, acknowledged by the parties . . . and the acknowledgement certified.”
After reviewing a copy of the deed and being able to read its contents, we are satisfied that
the district court did not commit clear error in determining that it is legible . As to its
execution, the copy of the deed in the record bears a signature and there was testimony
from Martinsen and the notary that Webb was the one who signed the deed. Although
Webb testified that he did not sign it, th e district court, through the Examiner of Titles, 2
was able to judge t he credibility of the witnesses , and we do not see fit to disturb that
assessment. See State v. Vasko , 889 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Minn. 2017) (explaining that
appellate courts defer to a district court’ s determinations of witness credibility).
Accordingly, we do not believe that the district court committed clear error in deciding that
the deed was executed.
Webb next argues that the quitclaim deed is not valid un der Minn. Stat. § 359.08
(2016)—which criminalizes acting as a notary after the expiration of a term —because the

2 See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“The findings of a referee, to the extent adopted by the court,
shall be considered as the findings of the court.”).

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notary was not commissioned or eligible on January 1, 2012, which was the backdated date
included on the quitclaim deed. Whether the notary was commissioned or eligib le on the
day that the quitclaim deed was signed is a factual question that we review for clear error.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Although the quitclaim deed was backdated to January 1,
2012, there was testimony from Martinsen and the notary that the qu itclaim deed was
actually signed on March 12, 2015. The notary’s commission application was brought into
evidence and shows that he received his commission on August 22, 2012 , and his stamp
on the quitclaim deed shows that his commission expired on Januar y 31, 2017. Because
there was evidence that the deed was signed on March 12, 2015, a date on which the notary
was commissioned and eligible, and not on January 1, 2012, the district court did not
commit clear error, and Webb’s argument fails.
Webb’s th ird claim is that the quitclaim deed is fraudulent because it contains
alterations and crossed out words. It appears that Webb is arguing that the deed is
fraudulent because Martinsen’s name was crossed out with pen on the part of the deed
where the notary is supposed to print out the grantor’s name to indicate who signed the
document. But Webb cites to no legal authority supporting his argument, so he has
forfeited it. See State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017).
Webb’s fourth claim is that the quitclaim deed is not valid because it was backdated
by Martinsen, which violates Minn esota Statutes chapters 357-359. After examining that
range of statutes, we understand Webb to mean that the quitclaim deed is not valid because
the signature v iolated Minn. Stat. § 358.47(a) (2016), which states that “[a] notarial act
must be evidenced by a certificate physically or electronically signed and dated by a

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notarial officer in a manner that attributes such signature to the notary public.” This
argument would be based on the fact that the January 1, 2012 date does not correspond to
when the document was signed. If that is indeed Webb’s argument, then it raises a factual
question that is reviewed for clear error, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, and it fai ls for two
reasons. First, the quitclaim deed clearly shows that the notary dated the signature as being
on March 12, 2015, and Webb cites to no authority that states that a notarized document
cannot have a different date elsewhere within it. Second, the district court found that it
was Webb who backdated the document, not Martinsen, and he points to no evidence that
would make this finding clearly erroneous.
Webb’s final claim is that the quitclaim deed is not valid because the Examiner of
Titles erre d by acknowledging multiple alterations to the deed, which he says violates
Minn. Stat. § 507.24. Webb does not explain why this would violate Minn. Stat. § 507.24.
Furthermore, the only time that the Examiner of Titles even mentioned an alteration was
on the last page of her memorandum where she stated that “[a]n alteration could be cause
for rejection, but in this case the only alteration is the strikethrough of the plaintiff’s name
in the acknowledgement.” This alteration does not change the substance of the quitclaim
deed, and Webb’s argument fails.
II.
Webb filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal with new evidence. The
purpose of the supplemental evidence would seem to be to undermine Martinsen’s
explanation for why she backdated the quit claim deed to January 1, 2012. But the
documents filed in the district court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if

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any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. An
appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may
not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below. Thiele v. Stich , 425
N.W.2d 580, 582–83 (Minn. 1988). “[P]roduction of record evidence is never allowed in
an appellate court for the purpose of reversing a judgment.” Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl
& Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1977). Webb’s motion to supplement the record is
accordingly denied.
Affirmed; motion denied.