State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1353

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Geral Leanerd Halbert,
Appellant.

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-2085

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
On appeal from his convictio n of first-degree criminal-sexual conduct, appellant
argues that the district court’s admission of an audiotape of an investigating police officer’s
interview interrogation of appellant containe d vouching statements about the victim’s
credibility that implicated his ri ght to a fair trial and therefore was reversible error. We
affirm.
FACTS
On January 21, 2017, K.H. was drinking with appellant Geral Leanerd Halbert, who
is her twin brother, and her ot her three brothers. She fell as leep but later awoke to find
appellant grabbing her. Appellant wrestled her off the bed, dragged her into the next room,
punched her in the face, and told her that she was going to “give it up.” He choked her
with a scarf, smothered her face with a pillow, told her he was going to kill her, and ripped
her bra and shirt off. When he hit her in the face, he broke her teeth. She wasn’t sure how,
but her pants were pulled down.
Appellant then attempted to anally rape K. H. but failed. He then told K.H. to
perform oral sex on him. She did not want to, but placed appellant’s penis in her mouth so
appellant would stop punching her. She bit down hard on appellant’s penis, and he began
punching her again. After he stopped punching her, appellant went into the bathroom.
K.H. grabbed her coat, ran to neighboring houses, and knocked on five doors for help. At
the fifth house, K.H.’s neighbor answered the door and called the police. The police took
both K.H. and appellant to the hospital for an examination.
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On January 24, the state charged appellant with first-degree criminal-sexual conduct
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2016). After a three-day trial, the jury
found appellant guilty, and the district court se ntenced appellant to 280 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred in ad mitting an audiotape
recording of the investigating police officer’s interrogation of appellant, which affected his
substantial rights. We disagree.
When an appellant fails to object to an a lleged error at trial that does not involve
prosecutorial misconduct, he or she has the bur den of proving (1) an error; (2) that was
plain; and (3) that affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Dao Xiong , 829
N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. 2013). Plain error must be clear or obvious and must clearly
contradict caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302
(Minn. 2006). A plain error affects appellant’s substantial rights if the absence of the error
would have had a significant effect on the verdict. Id. If all three prongs are met, this court
may address the error to ensure fairness and preserve the integrity of the proceeding. Id.
If “any one of the requirements” for plain error is not satisfied, we “need not address any
of the others.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“It is well settled that one witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of
another witness.” State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 68 9 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
Instead, the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given to their testimony is for the
jury to decide. State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 512 (Minn. 2005). Improper vouching
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testimony is testimony that another witness is telling the truth or testimony that one
believes one witness over another. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 836 (Minn. 1998).
During appellant’s trial, th e jury heard the interrogating officer make the following
statements in the audiotape:
 I don’t think she’s gonna make all this stuff about you
raping her.
 Well there’s a reason she’s . . . said that your had sex—
sexually assaulted her.
 But you—you didn’t have a ny problem with your sister
. . . . So there’s no reason she would make this up.

Appellant argues that these statements vouched for the victim’s credibility.
Appellant relies on Van Buren v. State , 556 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996), to support his
argument. In Van Buren, the supreme court held that th e appellant was entitled to a new
trial because of the admission of improper vouching testimony from three witnesses,
including a police officer, who testified that certain members of the victim’s family
believed that the victim was sexua lly abused by the appellant. Id. at 550-52. But
appellant’s reliance on Van Buren is misguided because that case’s holding was limited to
in-person testimony during trial and did not in volve a recording of a police interrogation.
Id. at 550.
Instead, Auringer v. State is dispositive of appellant’s argument. 695 N.W.2d 640
(Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). In Auringer, the appellant
challenged the district court’s admission of an audiotape recording of a police
investigator’s interrogation of the appellant. Id. at 645. The appellant claimed that the
investigator made impermissible comments abou t the credibility of th e victim during the
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interrogation. Id. The investigator commented that the victim gave a “convincing story”
three times during the interrogation. Id. We held that the inves tigator’s statements were
not error, much less reversible error, because the statements were made in the context of
the officer’s attempt to persuade the appellant to be forthcoming during the interrogation,
not during the officer’s trial testimony. Id. at 645-46.
Like Auringer, here, the officer made three pa ssing comments in an attempt to
persuade appellant to be forthcoming during the interrogation, and the context of those
statements in the audiot aped interview was made clear to the jury. See id. The jury had
the necessary information to un derstand that the detective’s st atements were made as an
investigative technique and we re not necessarily indicative of his personal opinion. See
id.; Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d at 835-36 (concluding th at because defendant was at police
station, jury could have understood officer’s statements about credibility of defendant and
other witnesses as mere attemp t to elicit defendant’s confession). The district court’s
admission of the officer’s statements did not contradict case law and was not error, much
less plain error, thus ending our analysis.
Affirmed.