Charlie Siegle, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1360

Charlie Siegle,
Appellant,

vs.

Vern Karst,
Respondent.

Filed June 18, 2018
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-16-13465

Richard L. Swanson, Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Bradley John Haddy, Minnesota Esquire, LLC, Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order denying his motion for Minn. R. Civ. P.
60.02 relief, appellant contends the district court abused its discretion in applying the
Finden elements. He argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that appellant
failed to establish excusable neglect for filing a complaint more than one year after serving
the same on respondent. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 3, 2015, appellant Charlie Siegle served a summons and complaint on
respondent Vern Karst, alleging that he had paid Karst $23,000 to complete body work on
his 1970 Dodge Challenger, but that Karst had failed to complete the work “in a workable
like manner.” Karst served an answer denying the allegation and stating that all repairs
“were done properly.” On July 11, 2016, Siegle filed the summons and complaint in district
court. On September 15, 2016, Karst moved to dismiss the complaint as be ing filed
untimely under Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a). The district court granted Karst’s motion the next
day. The district court administrator, however, did not enter judgment.
Without leave, Siegle moved the district court in November 2016 to reconsider the
motion to dismiss, explaining that he and Karst had been engaging in discovery and he did
not timely file the complaint because his attorney was suspended from the practice of law
when Karst filed the motion to dismiss . He did not bring the motion und er Minn. R. Civ.
P. 60.02. The district court scheduled a hearing. For reasons “unclear” to the district court,
Siegle cancelled that hearing and withdrew his motion.

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On April 5, 2017, nearly four months after bringing his first motion to reconsider,
Siegle filed a second motion to reconsider, again without leave. Although he did not move
under rule 60.02, he cited rule 60.02 in a supporting legal memorandum as grounds for
relief from the rule 5.04(a) dismissal.
In May 2017, the district court denied S iegle’s second motion to reconsider. In
doing so, the district court acknowledged that Siegle had not complied with the rules of
general practice in filing a motion to reconsider without leave, but because Siegle cited
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 in his suppor ting legal memorandum, the district court treated the
second motion as one to vacate. After analyzing the four Finden elements under rule 60.02,
the district court concluded that Siegle had failed to meet his rule 60.02 burden.
Siegle appealed the May 2017 order denying his second motion to reconsider. We
dismissed the appeal in a special -term order because the district court administrator had
not yet entered judgment on the September 2016 order dismissing Siegle’s complaint. The
district court administrator subsequently entered judgment on August 2, 2017. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Siegle argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying him rule 60.02
relief, reasoning that the district court incorrectly concluded that he had not established a
reasonable excuse and had not acted with due diligence in missing the rule 5.04(a) one -
year complaint-filing deadline. He maintains that his attorney being suspended from the
practice of law constitutes a reasonable excuse to miss the on e-year complaint -filing

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deadline and that the district court administrator’s failure to timely enter judgment
constitutes “excusable neglect” under rule 60.02.
We will not reverse a district court’s rule 60.02 decision except for a clear abuse of
discretion. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). A district court abuses
its discretion within the rule 60.02 context when it acts under a misapprehension of law,
when its findings are clearly erroneous, or “when a movant has met the burden of clearly
demonstrating the existence of the four elements of the Finden analysis, and the court
nevertheless denies relief.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Any complaint that is not filed with the district court within one year of serving the
complaint against any party is “deemed dismissed with prejudice against all parties unless
the parties within that year sign a stipulation to extend the filing period.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
5.04(a). The district court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a).
Rule 60.02 applies to rule 5.04(a) dismissals. Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619.
Before granting rule 60.02 relief from a rule 5.04(a) dismissal, the district court must
consider and expressly find that all four Finden elements are satisfied. Id. The four Finden
elements are:
(1) a debatably meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for
the movant’s failure or neglect to act; (3) the movant acted with
due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and
(4) no substantial prejudice will result to the other party if
relief is granted.

Id. at 620 (quotations omitted). The party moving for rule 60.02 relief carries the burden
to establish that all four elements are satisfied. Id.

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Here, the district court analyzed the Finden elements. For the first element, the
district court determined that, based on the complaint, Siegle “may have a reasonable claim
on the merits.” For the second, the district court determined that Siegle had offered “no
reasonable excuse” for failing to file the complaint within one year after serving it on Karst.
For the third, the district court determined that whether Siegle acted with due diligence in
bringing the April 2017 motion to reconsider was “questionable” because Siegle filed his
first motion to reconsider in November 2016 and subsequently withdrew it. For the fourth,
the district court determined that Karst “would certainly incur additional expenses should
[Siegle’s] [m]otion be granted.” The district court concluded on those bases that Siegle
had failed to meet his burden under rule 60.02.
Siegle argues that his attorney’s failure to file the complaint while he was suspended
during the one -year complaint -filing window is a mistake of law that constitutes a
reasonable excuse. The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long said that mistakes of law, as
well as mistakes of fact, may afford grounds for relief.” Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634,
638 (Minn. 2016) (quotations and alterations omitted). The supreme court has also
determined, however, that there are no per se rules of law that require a district court to
grant or deny relief under rule 60.02. Id. at 639. Rather, determining what constitutes a
reasonable excuse is “fact intensive.” Id. It is , therefore, within the district court’s
discretion to determine if the moving party’s excuse is “true and reasonable under the
circumstances.” Id. In the order denying Siegle’s motion , the district court found that
Siegle’s attorney was suspended on March 10, 2015, and was reinstated on June 18, 2015.

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The district court also found that he was suspended again on March 10, 2016, and was
reinstated on October 4, 2016.
On March 10, 2015, the Minnesota Supreme Court suspended Siegle’s attorney for
90 days for a laundry list of violations, including mishandling client funds, failing to appear
for hearings, and failing to communicate with clients. In re Disciplinary Action against
Swanson, 860 N.W.2d 677-678 (Minn. 2015). The supreme court conditionally reinstated
Swanson on June 18, 2015, provided that he complete “the professional responsibility
portion of the state bar examination by March 10, 2016.” In re Disciplinary Action against
Swanson, 885 N.W.2d 668 -669 (Minn. 2016). Swanson did not provide proof of
completing the exam. The supreme court revoked his conditional reinstatement on March
21, 2016. Id. On October 4, 2016, the supreme court reinstated him after proof of
completion was provided. Siegle contends that his attorney being suspended constitutes a
reasonable excuse to miss the one-year complaint-filing deadline. We disagree.
Siegle’s attorney was suspended for 90 days within the 365 -day window, not the
entire year. Siegle’s attorney could have filed the complaint at any time during the 275
days in which he was not suspended. Siegle has offered no excuse, let alone a reasonable
one, explaining why his attorney did not file the complaint during those 275 days. What
is more, in an affidavit filed with his second motion to reconsider, Siegle swore under oath
that “[o]n April 1, 2015, Swanson properly advised [Karst’s attorney] of the suspension
and indicated to [Karst’s attorney] that all settlement offers should be directed to attorney
Tory Langemo.” (Emphasis added). Siegle, therefore, had an attorney who could have

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filed the complaint during Swanson’s suspension. Siegel has offered no excus e as to why
his other attorney did not file the complaint within the one-year filing deadline.
To the extent Siegle is arguing that Swanson misunderstood the rule 5.04(a) one -
year complaint-filing deadline, or that Siegle relied on a misrepresentation by Swanson
that the complaint would be filed, he cites to no record evidence establishing it. Cf. Cole,
884 N.W.2d at 636 (“At the hearing, [the movant] argued that his counsel’s neglect was
‘excusable’ because the online version of the rules, on which his counsel relied, did not
state that rule 5.04(a) applied to actions pending before its effective date.”); Conley v.
Downing, 321 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 1982) (determining that a client’s reliance on an
attorney’s representation “that he was filing a brief in response to the summary judgment
motion” constituted a reasonable excuse). Siegle provides no reasonable excuse for why
he or his attorney did not file the complaint during the one-year window. The analysis for
determining what constitutes a reasonable excuse is fact intensive, and the district court is
afforded wide discretion in determi ning the truth and reasonableness of an excuse. Cole,
884 N.W.2d at 639. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Siegle offered no reasonable excuse for missing the rule 5.04(a) one-year
complaint-filing deadline. Siegle cannot establish all four Finden elements.
Siegle also argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that whether Siegle
acted with due diligence in bringing the “rule 60.02(a) motion” was “questionable.” 1 He

1 We put the “rule 60.02 motion” in quotes because Siegle did not move under rule 60.02;
he instead moved the district court to reconsider the motion to dismiss. The district court
treated the motion to reconsider as one to vacate under rule 60.02 because Siegle cited rule
60.02 in his legal memorandum supporting his motion to reconsider.

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reasons that the timing of his April 2017 motion to reconsider is ir relevant because the
district court administrator did not enter judgment on the order dismissing the complaint
until August 2017.
Contrary to Siegle’s assertion, the timing of his April 2017 motion to reconsider is
relevant. The third Finden element asks whether “the movant acted with due diligence
after learning of the error or omission .” Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 6 20 (emphasis added)
(quotation omitted) . The one -year complaint -filing deadline under rule 5.04(a) fell on
February 2, 2016. The district court dismissed the complaint in September 2016. Siegle,
at the very latest, knew about the error in September 2016. Siegle brought his first motion
to reconsider in November 2016, nearly two months after the district c ourt dismissed the
complaint. Bringing his first motion to reconsider within two months of learning of the
error might be considered acting with due diligence, but Siegle withdrew his first motion
to reconsider for reasons unclear to the district court. It was not until April 2017, nearly
seven months after the district court dismissed the complaint, that Siegle brought his
second motion to reconsider. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Siegle’s due diligence was “questionable” because he brought one motion
to reconsider, withdrew it, and filed another, seven months after learning that his complaint
had been dismissed.
A motion brought under rule 60.02(a) must be made “ not more than one year after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). In
Johnson v. City of Duluth , we determined that an automatic dismissal under the “deemed
dismissed” provision of rule 5.04(a) is a “proceeding . . . taken” under rule 60 .02 that

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therefore triggers the rule 60.02 one-year motion-filing period. 903 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Minn.
App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2017). In other words, the rule 60.02 one-year
motion-filing period is triggered “the moment [the movant] misse [s] the one -year
complaint-filing deadline” imposed by rule 5.04(a).
Here, the rule 5.04(a) one-year complaint-filing deadline was February 2, 2016. The
complaint was deemed automatically dismissed on that date, and the automatic dismissal
was a “proceeding . . . taken” under rule 60.02. Id. Siegle had one year from February 2,
2016, to timely file a rule 60.02(a) motion. Id. Siegle did not file his motion to reconsider,
which the district court generously treated as a rule 60.02 motion, until April 5, 2017. The
motion was not filed within the rule 60.02(a) one -year motion-filing deadline. Johnson,
903 N.W.2d at 5-6. Siegle did not file a timely motion under rule 60.02, if he filed one at
all.
Affirmed.