Davenia Porter, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1367

Davenia Porter,
Appellant,

vs.

Allina Health Systems, d/b/a United Hospital, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 14, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-16-4601

A. L. Brown, Capitol City Law Group, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kelly A. Putney, Christine E. Hinrichs, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss
appellant’s complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12 .02(e) because appellant did not state a
claim under the Minnesota Health Records Act for which relief can be provided.
FACTS
On February 5, 2016, appellant Davenia Porter checked in at United Hospital, now
known as respondent Allina Health Systems, for tubal removal surgery. Upon checking
in, Porter told the nurses at the nursing station that they should not share details of her
procedure with her family, but may l et her family know that she is okay. Porter repeated
this instruction to the nurses before surgery. She also shared this instruction with her
physician, but she stated that her physician could disclose her medical information to her
mother, as she had pr eviously explained to her physician in the past. Her physician
acknowledged this request.
Porter underwent surgery, woke up, and was experiencing “greater than expected
pain.” She learned that her father and uncle visited her after her surgery later in the day,
while she was sleeping. Porter asked the hospital staff if they informed her father or uncle
of any medical information, and the hospital staff stated that they did not . Her uncle and
father visited her again that same day. While they were present in the room, Porter asked
a nurse why she was bleeding, had so much pain, and had a catheter. The nurse answered
her question by informing her that she had a hysterectomy. This was the first time that
Porter heard that she did not simply undergo a tubal removal surgery, but instead underwent

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a hysterectomy. Porter was upset that she had a hysterectomy and that her uncle and father
heard this information. She then told her father and uncle that the nurse did not know what
she was talking about. The nurse then repeated to Porter that she had undergone a
hysterectomy.
The next day, Porter was in her hospital room, again with her uncle and father. She
complained to a nurse that she was experiencing pain. The nurse stated, “Well, that is what
happens when you get a hysterectomy.” The nurse left the room and Porter’s father asked
her about the hysterectomy. Porter did not know what to say because her physician still
had not info rmed her about the procedure. Porter eventually learned that her physic ian
discovered a large mass during the tubal removal surgery that required him to perform a
hysterectomy.
Porter’s father and uncle shared this information with her family, and Porter claims
that she suffered emotionally, psychologically, and physically from the nurse’s disclosure
of her medical information to her family. Porter filed a complaint with the district court,
alleging that Allina violated the Minnesota H ealth Records Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-
.34 (2016), by sharing her health information wi th her father and uncle , v iolated her
privacy, and that Allina was vicariously liable for the nurse who shared the medical
information with her father and uncle.
Allina moved to dismiss Porter’s claim under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12 .02(e), arguing
that her complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and requested
the district court to dismiss the claim as a matter of law. Allina also moved for an award
of sanctions against Porter and Porter’s attorney under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03, arguing that

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their claim had no evidentiary support, and that Porter had no legal claim under Minn. Stat.
§§ 144.291-.34, invasion of privacy, or vicarious liability.
The district court granted Allina’s motion to dismiss the complai nt for failure to
state a claim . The district court reason ed that Allina did not violate its statutory duty of
releasing Porter’s records without authorization under Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2,
because the hospital was required to answer Porter’s question regarding her medical
condition under Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 2. The district court also reasoned that, even
if Allina had released her medical information to another person, Porter could not recover
under Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2, because she waived her statutory right by asking the
nurse a medical question in the presence of her father and uncle. Porter appeals the district
court’s order granting Allina’s motion to dismiss.
D E C I S I O N
In reviewing a complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim, we review de novo
whether the complaint “sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Hebert v. City of
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). We are to consider only the facts alleged
in the complaint, accept those facts as true, and must construe all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id. A complaint “will be dismissed only if it appears to a
certainty” that no facts consistent with the complaint could be introduced that would
support granting the requested relief. Bahr v. Capella Univ. , 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn.
2010).
In her complaint, Porter alleged that Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subds. 1 -2, prohibited
Allina from disclosing her health information to her father and uncle in the hospital room.

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“When interpreting a st atute we give the words and phrases of the statute their plain and
ordinary meaning.” A.A.A. v. Minnesota Dep’ t of Human Servs. , 832 N.W.2d 816, 819
(Minn. 2013). We examine the language of a statute as a whole to give effect to all of its
provisions. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012)). We must first examine the statute’s
language to determine whether it is clear and unambiguous. A.A.A., 832 N.W.2d at 819 .
“A statute is ambiguous if, as applied to the facts of the case, it is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation. If the statute is clear and not ambiguous, then we apply its
plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2, prohibits a provider from releasing a patient’s health
records to a person without “(1) a signed and dated consent from the patient or the patient’s
legally authorized representative authorizing the release; (2) specific authorization in law;
or (3) a representation from a provider that holds a signed and dated consent from the
patient authorizing the release.” A “health record” includes information that relates to the
physical health or condition of a patient, or a provision of health care to a patient, whether
oral or recorded. Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c). A “pati ent” means “a natural person
who has received health care services from a provider for treatment. ” Id., subd. 2(g). A
person who negligently or intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2 , “is liable to the patient for compensatory damages caused
by an unauthorized release . . . plus costs and reasonable attorney fees .” Minn.
Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2. Under the plain meaning of the statute, Allina is a provider, Porter
is a pa tient, and Allina shared Porter’s health care record with another person by stating
that she had a hysterectomy in front of her uncle and father.

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But a hospital may share a patient’s medical information with another person
without violating Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2, if it is specifically authorized to do so
under the law. See Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2(2). Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 2,
provides that, “Upon request, a provider shall supply to a patient complete and current
information possessed by that provider concerning any diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis
of the patient in terms and language the patient can reasonably be expected to understand.”
The statute does not define request. In defining words, we examine their plain meaning
and often consider dictionary definitions. Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292
(Minn. 2016). Request is defined as “ [t]o express a desire for.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1492 (5 th ed. 2011). Porter expressed a desire to
obtain information relating to her diagnosis, treatment, or prognosis by asking the nurse
why she was suffering great pain, had a catheter, and why she was bleeding, when she was
in the hospital room wit h her father and uncle. Therefore, Allina was specifical ly
authorized under Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 2 , to provide Porter with her health
information when she requested it.
Porter argues that Allina cannot avoid liability by sharing her health information
with her father and uncle simply because Porter asked the nurse a question. We do not find
Porter’s argument persuasive. First, under the plain meaning of Minn. Stat. § 144.293,
subd. 2(2), Allina is not liable for sharing Porter’s medical information if it was authorized
in law to do so. Here, Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 2, authorized Allina to release Porter’s
health record when Porter requested information. Second, Porter’s argument ignores Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2016), which requires that we examine the language of a statute as a whole

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to give effect to all of its provisions. If we conclude that a hospital may not share a health
record with the patient upon the patient’s request, we would be essentially ignoring that
Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd. 2, allows a patient access to her own health record. Third, in
ascertaining the intent of the legislature, we may assume the legislature did not intend an
absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 6 45.17(1) (2016) . Porter’s interpretation of Minn.
Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2 , would require a provi der to obtain a signed and dated consent
form before a doctor or nurse could communicate with the patient about her own medical
care during the course of treatment . Porter’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 144.293,
subd. 2, would create an absurd result, and therefore is not persuasive. Instead, we
conclude that the plain language of Minn. Stat. §§ 144.293, subd. 2(2), and 144.292, subd.
2, authorized the nurse to share Porter’s health record with her when she requested her
medical information in her hospital room.
Porter also argues that she is entitled to relief for the conversation she had with the
nurse the day after she had surgery, when the nurse again informed her, in the presence of
her father and uncle, that she underwent a hysterectomy. The district court concluded that
Porter did not allege facts that would entitle her to relief based on the second interaction
because she could not prove damages from the disclosure since her father and uncle already
learned of the procedure the day before. We agree with the district court that Porter could
not prove she suffered damages resulting from the nurse’s second disclosure because her
uncle and father already knew that she underwent a hysterectomy.
Lastly, Porter argues that the district court erroneously concluded that a party may
waive their rights under Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subds. 1 -2, without a signed and dated

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consent form. Because we have determined that Allina had express statutory authority to
release Porter’s health record when Porter requested information , we need not reach the
issue of whether a patient may waive their right to privacy under the Minnesota Health
Records Act. Assuming all facts in Porter’s complaint are true, we conclude that the
complaint does not allege facts that state a claim under Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2, upon
which relief can be granted.
Affirmed.