State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1368

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Lynae Nicole Davis,
Respondent.

Filed April 9, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-22611

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Sarah Becke r, Assistant City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth Dist rict Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Sc hellhas, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s pretrial suppression order in favor of
respondent. We reverse and remand.

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FACTS
While patrolling in Golden Valley with a traffic-safe ty detail at 11:40 p.m., in
August 2016, Edina Poli ce Officer Nicholas Pedersen observed a vehicle traveling south
on Highway 100 north of the ac cess lane that split into two lanes —leftward for East
Interstate 394, and rightward for West Interstate 394. Offi cer Pedersen saw the vehicle
make a left-hand signal, but then make a right -hand signal and exit Highway 100 onto an
access lane leading to both East and West Interstate 394. O fficer Pedersen followed the
vehicle, which continued on the East-394 access lane travelling toward the cloverleaf turn.
The access lane split once more: leftward for East-394 Minneapolis, rightward for the car-
pool express lane.
After the vehicle traveled on the left side of this split, for Ea st 394, the driver
signaled left for about six seconds although no left-hand turn or lane change was possible.
At the same time, the vehicle drifted to the right and its tires touched the fog line without
crossing it. Continuing toward the cloverlea f turn, the vehicle signaled rightward and
changed lanes to the right within a second. As the vehicle entered the cloverleaf turn, its
tires again touched the right fog line. Office r Pedersen suspected traffic law violations,
stopped the vehicle, and identified the driver as respondent Lynae Davis. Davis smelled of
alcohol, performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and Officer Pedersen arrested her.
After testing revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.13 within two hours of driving,
appellant State of Minnesota charged Davis w ith two counts of driving while impaired
(DWI), driving after revocation, and failure to drive in a single lane. Davis moved to
suppress all evidence obtained due to the vehicle stop. After a contested omnibus hearing,

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the district court granted Davis’s suppression motion, concluding that Officer Pedersen
stopped Davis based on an erroneous interpre tation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a)
(2016), governing lane changes on a highway, and Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (2016),
governing the use of turn signals before turning.
This pretrial appeal by the state follows.
D E C I S I O N
In an appeal of a pretrial ruling on a suppression motion, appellate courts will only
reverse the district court when the state shows that the ruling will have a “critical impact”
on its ability to prosecute the case, and that the district court’s ruling was erroneous. State
v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 2011). To show a critical im pact, the state must show
that excluding the evidence “significantly reduces the lik elihood of a successful
prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the distri ct court’s ruling had a “critical
impact” because it suppressed all evidence obtained after the stop, thereby precluding the
state from prosecuting the DWI and driving-after-revocation charges. We therefore address
whether the district court erred in its reasonable-suspicion determination.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Cont. art I, § 10. Searches and seizures conducted
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 486
(Minn. 2016). One exception allows the police to conduct a “brief, investigatory stop when
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id.; Terry
v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). “In reviewing a district court’s
determinations of the legality of a limited inves tigatory stop, we re view questions of

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reasonable suspicion de novo.” State v. Morse , 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). An appellate court reviews a district court’s factual findings for “clear
error.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487.
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on spec ific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Morse, 878 N.W.2d at 502 (quotations
omitted). “The reasonable-suspi cion standard is not high.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A
trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences on the basis of all of the circumstances
. . . inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. (quotation
omitted). A district court must assess the totality of the circumstances of the stop. Id.
The state argues in its brief that the district court erred because (1) Davis’s “nearly
simultaneous signal and change of course” was a per se violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.19,
subd. 4 (2016), and (2) the totality of the ci rcumstances demonstrates suspicious driving
behavior that would lead a reasonable office r to believe that Davis was driving while
impaired. After briefing in this case, this court held in Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, that
“the markings that establish lanes for traffic are not part of the lanes within the meaning of
Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), that driving onto such a marking is movement from a lane,
and that such movement could constitute a violation of the statute.” 906 N.W.2d 554, 560
(Minn. App. 2018).
Minnesota statutes section 169.18, subdivision 7(a), provides:
When any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . :

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(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such
lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement
can be made with safety.

In Kruse, the officer observed the driver’s vehicl e “move right and onto the fog line, but
not over [it],” and then “move left and onto the center line, but not over [it].” 906 N.W.2d
at 556. The time of day was 11:50 p.m. and the vehicle was on a county road with a center
line. Id. Under those facts, we held that the offi cer had a reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a). Id. at 560−61.
At oral argument, the state argued that Kruse controls the result of this case.
1 We
agree. The facts here are nearly indistinguishable from the facts in Kruse. Officer
Pedersen’s observation that Davis’s vehicl e twice moved onto the fog line provided a
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a). Because
Officer Pedersen had an objective basis to su spect a violation of section 169.18, the stop
of Davis’s vehicle was lawful, and the distri ct court erred in granting her suppression
motion.
Davis argues that Kruse and section 169.18, subdivisi on 7(a), require an officer to
articulate that a vehicle’s tires hit the fog line and that such driving behavior was unsafe in
order for an officer to have reasonable suspic ion that the statute was violated. And Davis
contends that Officer Pedersen had no reason to believe that Davis’s driving on the fog line
was unsafe because, unlike Kruse, Davis was in a single isolat ed lane with no oncoming

1 The state gave notice th at it intended to cite Kruse pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
128.05.

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traffic. Although the officer opined that it wa s not “proper” for Davis to drive on the fog
line, Davis is correct that the officer did not state that her driving was therefore unsafe. But
we are not persuaded by Davis’s argument.
When examining reasonable suspicion, courts do not focus on the “subjective belief
of the officer” but rather whether an objective basis to suspect criminal activity exists. State
v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Min n. 2004). Additionally, in State v. Ellanson , the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a traffic stop was justified when an officer observed a
vehicle weaving within its la ne but did not believe the weaving constituted a traffic
violation because the officer “had a right to stop defendant in order to investigate the cause
of the unusual driving.” 293 Minn. 490, 491, 198 N.W.2d 136, 137 (1972); see Morse, 878
N.W.2d at 502 (citing Ellanson and concluding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop
a vehicle when squad-car video showed defendant’s vehicle drifting in its lane, and when
that reason was supported by other justific ations). Likewise, here, after observing Davis
drive on the fog line twice, the officer had a right to investigate the cause of Davis’s driving,
irrespective of the officer’s subjective belief that such driving violated a traffic law.
Additionally, an objective ba sis to suspect a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd.
7(a), exists in this case. Davis’s vehicle drove onto the right fog line twice at night. While
the vehicle faced no oncoming tr affic, the officer had an obj ective basis to suspect that
Davis’s driving was unsafe because, “driving on the fog line could compromise the safety
of any stopped motorist . . . on the right side of the fog line.” Kruse, 906 N.W.2d at 559.
We agree with the state th at, under the totality of the circumstances, an objective
basis existed for an officer to suspect Davis of driving while impaired. The facts show that:

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(1) Davis was driving at night around 11:40 p. m., (2) the vehicle signaled left in an area
where vehicles cannot go left, (3) the vehicl e moved rightward and touched the right fog
line as it signaled left, and (4) the vehicle ag ain hit the right fog line while turning down
the cloverleaf turn. On these facts, an officer would not be acting on “whim” or “caprice”
in stopping a driver for suspicion of impaired driving.
Because an objective basis existed for Offi cer Pedersen to suspect a violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), and impaired dr iving, we conclude that the district court
erred in granting Davis’s mo tion to suppress, and we re verse and remand for further
proceedings. Because reasonable suspicion exists on other grounds, we do not address the
state’s argument that Davis’s driving violated Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 4.
Reversed and remanded.