State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1386

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Todd Allan Wenner,
Appellant.

Filed August 6, 2018
Affirmed; motion dismissed as moot
Reyes, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-17-265

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on appeal that his guilty plea was inaccurate and therefore invalid
because the plea lacked a proper factual basis. We affirm.

2
FACTS
On January 29, 2017, appellant Todd Alla n Wenner became upset with D.B. and hit
him in the head five or six times with a flashlight. When D.B. collapsed to the floor,
appellant kicked him repeatedly in his head and stomach while wearing steel-toed boots.
As a result, D.B. sustained a brain hemorrhage and a laceration behind his ear.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appe llant with first-degree assault resulting
in great bodily harm under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2016), second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon und er Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016), second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 2 (2016), and third-degree assault resulting in substantial bodily harm
under Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2016).
In April 2017, appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree assault and second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon, and the state dismissed the other counts. The state further
agreed to dismiss the first-degree-assault count at sentencing if appellant cooperated with
the pre-sentence investigation, abided by conditions of release, and returned for sentencing.
Appellant and the state agreed that if he fa iled to comply with these conditions, he would
be sentenced for first-degree assault instead of second-degree assault.
At the plea hearing, appellant admitted that D.B. suffered a brain hemorrhage due
to appellant kicking him in th e head with steel-toed boots, causing very serious harm.
Appellant also admitted that he could have killed D.B. by kicking him in the head with the
steel-toed boots. Based on these admissions, the district court found that there was a
sufficient factual basis to fi nd appellant guilty beyond a r easonable doubt of both first-

3
degree assault and second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. The court deferred
acceptance of the plea.
In May 2017, appellant failed to appear at sentencing. The district court convicted
appellant of first-degree assault pursuant to the plea agreement and sentenced appellant to
146 months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his guilty plea wa s not accurate and was therefore invalid
because the record does not provide a proper f actual basis to establish that he inflicted
“great bodily harm” upon D.B. We are not persuaded.
The validity of a guilty plea is a ques tion of law that we review de novo. Lussier v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). In order to be vali d, a guilty plea must be
accurate. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010 ). An accurate plea must be
established on a proper factual basis. Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 588. “The factual-basis
requirement is satisfied if the record contai ns a showing that ther e is credible evidence
available which would support a ju ry verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a
crime as that to which he pled guilty.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). If the de fendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably
inferred from the facts, the district court can accept his plea. Id. at 861. One way of
satisfying the factual-basis requirement is to ask the defendant to express in his own words
what happened. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94; State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn.
1983).

4
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1, “[w] hoever assaults another and inflicts great
bodily harm” can be convicted of first-degree assault. “Gr eat bodily harm” is defined as
“bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 8 (2016) (emphasis added).
Minnesota caselaw is replete with instance s in which an individual suffers a brain
hemorrhage and dies as a result. In State v. Humphrey , the defendant hit a high-school
student in the head, and the student died fr om a brain hemorrhage. 173 Minn. 410, 411-
12, 217 N.W. 373, 373-74 (1928). In State v. Smith, the defendant hit his wife, who then
fell down a staircase and died from a brain hemorrhage. 295 Minn. 65, 65-66, 203 N.W.2d
348, 349 (1972). In State v. Goblirsch , 309 Minn. 401, 403-04, 246 N.W.2d 12, 13-14
(1976) an infant died from a brain hemorrhage as a result of his father’s assault.
Here, appellant admitted that he kicked D.B. in the head with steel-toed boots and
caused a serious brain hemorrhage. In addition, he admitted he could have killed D.B. by
kicking him in the head with steel-toed boots. These facts are sufficient for a jury to
reasonably infer that appellant’s actions created a high probab ility of death. Therefore,
appellant’s guilty plea was established on a proper factual basis and was valid. 1
Affirmed; motion dismissed as moot.

1 Appellant filed a motion to strike portions of the state’s brief and addendum as outside
the appellate record. Because we reach the merits of this case without considering the
pertinent portions of the state’s brief and addendum, we need not rule on appellant’s
motion.