State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1421

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angela Sophia Councilman,
Appellant.

Filed July 30, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-3724

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jonathan D. Holets, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chie f Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from her conviction of a controlled -substance offense , appellant
challenges the district court’s pretrial determination that she was competent to stand trial.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Angela Sophia Councilman was arrested on a warrant. During a search
of Councilman incident to her arrest, police discovered methamphetamine and synthetic
marijuana. Councilman was charged with fifth -degree controlled -substance offense, a
felony, and possession of a synthetic cannabinoid, a misdemeanor.
Councilman’s attorney moved for a rule 20.01 competency examination and a rule
20.02 mental examination to support a possible mental-illness defense. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.01-.02. The district court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Dr. Ryan
Goldenstein to conduct the examination and issue a written report.
Goldenstein conducted a three -hour interview of Councilman and reviewed other
information, including medical notes ; a police report ; a jail tracking report ; a child -
protection intake, summary, and c ase notes; and a child -protection file. Goldenstein also
asked Councilman to complete five tests, including a measure of her understanding of basic
legal concepts, a competency assessment, an intelligence test, a test of memory
malingering, and a personal ity inventory. Goldenstein completed a 12 -page evaluation
report that addressed Councilman’s mental condition.

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As to her competency within the meaning of rule 20.01, Goldenstein concluded that
Councilman was “competent to proceed with her criminal proce edings.” Goldenstein
opined that Councilman “was not suffering from a mental deficiency and/or illness at the
time of commission of the alleged offenses.” Goldenstein also determined that Councilman
was “malingering while completing the interview and testing,” and “[a]lthough her testing
suggested an inability to effectively participate, the nature of her response was considered
to reflect active resistance rather than a true deficit of knowledge.” Goldenstein also found
that Councilman had only a minimal to moderate risk of serious danger to herself or others.
Councilman objected to the Goldenstein report, and the district court held a
competency hearing that was limited to a challenge of the rule 20.01 competency
determination. During the hearing, the district court admitted documents that Councilman
presented and heard arguments of counsel, but no witness testified. The district court found
Councilman competent to stand trial.
The state dismissed the misdemeanor charge, and the felony charge was tried to the
court pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Councilman
guilty, stayed imposition of sentence, and ordered Councilman to serve two years on
probation. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“A defendant has a due process right not to be tried or convicted of a criminal charge
if he or she is legally incompetent.” Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011).
“A defendant is incompetent and must not plead, be tried, or be sentenced if the defendant
lacks ability to: (a) rationally consult with counsel; or (b) understand the proceedings or

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participate in the defense due to mental illness or deficiency.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 ,
subd. 2. If a defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against” her, the defendant is competent. Bonga, 797
N.W.2d at 718 (quotation omitted).
“If the court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant is
competent, it must enter an order finding the defendant competent. Otherwise, the court
must enter an order finding the defendant incompetent.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 5(f). On review of a comp etency determination, an appellate court “independently
review[s] the record to determine if the district court gave proper weight to the evidence
produced and if its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.” State v.
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Councilman challenges Goldenstein’s conclusions that Councilman was competent
to stand trial and that she was malingering. Based on our review of the record, we conclude
that the district court ’s determination that Councilman was competent is adequately
supported by Goldenstein’s report.
Before reaching a professional opinion about Councilman’s competency,
Goldenstein reviewed relevant documents, interviewed Councilman, and conducted five
tests. Goldenstein reported that Councilman was “pleasant” during her interview, but
“guarded” and “resistant ,” and Goldenstein questioned “the veracity of her statements.”
She gave coherent responses, but asked Goldenstein to answer questions she had been
asked, sometimes provided “vague” or “conflicting” answers, and when asked about

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conflicting information, “she provided additional details ,” answered “I don’t know ,” or
changed topics. Goldenstein did not find this “reaction” “the result of confusion and/or
disorganization,” but rather that it was due to her shutting down when he “press[ed] for
additional information.”
While some of the test results suggested that Councilman was not competent to
stand trial, Goldenstein’s report repeatedly states that Councilman was “resistant” to telling
the truth, and that test results were either “invalid” or did “not match her true capabilities”
because she made only a “minimal” effort, gave inconsistent responses, or did not take
testing seriously. Goldenstein cited examples of how inconsistencies in Councilman’s test
answers demonstrated that she was not being truthful. In one instance, Goldenstein noted
that although Councilman “was unable to answer ‘what is a bal loon,’” “she correctly
identified ‘smooth and rough’” as “textures” and recognized that animals show
“unconditional companionship.” She also “quickly recognized” similarities between tests,
and demonstrated that she was not taking a test seriously by defi ning vacation as “ [h]ot
sunny beaches with b --ches in bikinis.” Goldenstein rejected the suggestion that
Councilman has an alternate personality, noting that although she appeared to “endorse[]
symptoms suggestive of psychosis, she did not exhibit signifi cant confusion, distortion of
reality, and/or comprehension difficulties which would be considered consistent with such
symptoms.”
In the report’s summary and conclusion, Goldenstein stated that Councilman’s
“reported symptoms and presentation were . . . an unsophisticated attempt to appear as
though she was suffering from a psychotic disorder.” With regard to whether Councilman

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was competent within the meaning of rule 20.01, Goldenstein opined that “Councilman
was malingering while completing the interv iew and testing for this evaluation,” that her
participation in the criminal proceedings “would be considered reflective of a personality
disruption and not the result of a significant mental illness,” and that she was “competent
to proceed with her criminal proceedings.”
The district court properly based its findings and determination of competency on
Goldenstein’s evaluation report. See In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn.
1998) (stating, “[o]ur review of the record indicates that, notwith standing appellant’s
limited intellectual abilities, the [district] court properly inferred from the evidence
presented that appellant was competent to proceed”). In adopting Goldenstein’s conclusion
as to Councilman’s competency, the district court stated,
The examiner is, in large part, the Court’s eyes and ears,
although with much more experience in making judgments of
competency or incompetency. The Court cannot simply rely
on test results, because there is some need for those results to
be interpreted. That is particularly important in a case like this,
where Dr. Goldenstein is in a much better position than the
Court to determine whether Ms. Councilman’s inappropriate
responses are the result of some incompetency on her part or
of intentional manipu lation of the system. While the Court
does not feel compelled to accept every conclusion an
examiner comes to, Dr. Goldenstein has done a thorough job,
and explained the reasons for his conclusions in a way the
Court finds credible.

Councilman argues that even if it is true that her oppositional behavior and
malingering affected the result of Goldenstein’s examination , “that finding by itself is not
evidence supporting Goldenstein’s conclusion because the finding of malingering is not
the equivalent of a finding of competency.” Citing Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d at 237,

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Councilman argues that a finding of competency despite malingering must include
additional reasons for the competency finding. Councilman contends that “Goldenstein
did not point to any facts w hich showed [she] possessed the intellectual and mental
aptitude, or the foundational legal knowledge, necessary for her to effectively and
rationally consult with her attorney or to participate in her own defense.”
In Ganpat, the forensic psychiatrist who diagnosed Ganpat with malingering
“testified that ‘the low scores that [Ganpat] got on his tests were not consistent with the
bigger picture of Jairam Ganpat. It didn’t make sense that he’s able to . . . function just
fine, have no developmental history, and yet all of a sudden he is mentally retarded.’” 732
N.W.2d at 237 (alternation in original). The district court found that Ganpat was competent
and specifically noted:
“Defendant graduated from high school and has demonstrated
the ability to obt ain and maintain employment, including
supervisory positions and other positions that required
Defendant to be responsible independently for certain tasks,
accounting for money, planning and executing delivery routes
and other employment related duties. D efendant has
maintained a bank account and has obtained a driver’s license.”

Id.
The fact that there was stronger evidence of malingering in Ganpat than here does
not persuade us that the evidence of Councilman’s competence was insufficient.
Goldenstein specifically stated in his report that “Councilman said her current legal
involvement arose due to possession of substances,” which demonstrates that Councilman
understood the nature of the charges against her, and Councilman told Goldenstein that, as
an adult, she had been arrested a lot, which was consistent with criminal records.

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Goldenstein also reported that Councilman “was able to accurately recall previous
discussion topics of the interview, her exposure to previous testing information, and she
was aware of her hearing timeframe without any prompt and/or discussion from the
evaluator,” which all indicate that Councilman had the ability to consult with her attorney
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and had a rational as well as a fac tual
understanding of the proceedings against her.
Affirmed.