State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1422

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lamont Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed September 4, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-27902

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middle brook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court err ed in not suppressing evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant that was issued based in part on a dog-sniff. We affirm.

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FACTS
Officer Lee is assigned to t he FBI Safe Streets Task Force. His duties include
investigating narcotics, firearms , gang crimes, violent criminals, and repeat violent
offenders. Around July 2016, Officer Lee received narcotics-related information from a
confidential reliable informant ( CRI) regarding appellant Lamont Johnson and began an
investigation. Through this i nvestigation, Officer Lee connected Johnson to a particular
apartment and learned that Johnson used the alias “Baby C.”
In September 2016, Officer Lee received a tip from a cooperating defendant (CD)
who “ knew a guy ” called “ Baby C” who lives at a certa in location and who was in
possession of firearms and controlled substances. There is an apartment building at the
intersection identified by the CD. The CD told Officer Lee that to reach Baby C’s
apartment “you go through the front doors on the south si de of the building, . . . up
the . . . stairs and it’s the first [apartment] on the right-hand side.” Officer Lee verified that
the apartment was consistent with the location of the apartment that he had connected to
Johnson—he had a phone-tracking ping on Johnson’s phone that tracked to that corner of
the apartment building, and through surveillance, he verified that a vehicle that Johnson
used was located at the apartment building. Officer Lee showed the CD a color photo of
Johnson without names or identifiers and the CD identified Johnson as Baby C. The CD
also provided a cellphone number, which Officer Lee verified belonged to Johnson.
On September 15, 2016, Officer Lee arranged for a dog-sniff to be conducted at the
apartment building after verifying th e information provided by the CD. When officers
arrived, they were let in by a tenant who was exiting. The dog-sniff was conducted on the

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“whole second floor.” The canine sniffed at every door in the hallway and alerted to the
apartment connected to Johnson. The same day, Officer Lee applied for a search warrant
based on his belief that controlled substances and firearms, among other things, would be
found in Johnson’s apartment.
When officers executed the search warrant, Johnson yelled that there were guns in
a closet. Officers found a loaded 9mm firearm with two extended magazines, a .40 caliber
firearm with a magazine, ammunition, another extended magazine, and over $4,000 .
Johnson told the officers that the firearms belonged to him. Johnson was previously
convicted of felony controlled-substance crimes, mak ing him ineligible to possess a
firearm.
Johnson was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during execution of the search warrant.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Johnson’s motion. A jury found Johnson
guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced Johnson to the presumptive sentence of
60 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Search warrant
Johnson argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained
during execution of the search warrant. When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on
a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings under
a clearly erroneous standard and legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega , 77 0
N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).

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Johnson argues that the evidence should have been suppressed because the search
warrant was based on the dog -sniff, which was unlawful. Johnson relies on State v.
Edstrom, in which this court held that a dog-sniff at an apartment door inside a secured
building is unconstitutional. 901 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, __ N.W.2d__, 2018 WL 3867515 (Minn. Aug. 15, 2018) .1 Here, we do not need
to analyze the applicability of Edstrom or whether the dog-sniff was constitutional because
the search -warrant application and affidavit established probable cause to support the
issuance of the search warrant without consideration of the dog-sniff.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions require that probable cause support
a search warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When reviewing a
district court’s prob able-cause determination made in connection with the issuance of a
search warrant, this court must determine whether the issuing judge “had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Rochefort , 63 1 N.W.2d 802, 804
(Minn. 2001 ). We afford great deference to an issuing court’s probable -cause
determination. State v. Gabbert, 411 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1987). This deference
is not boundless, however, and we may reverse if a “probable-cause determination reflected
an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that police do not intrude upon the curtilage
of an apartment when they conduct a dog-sniff in the hallway immediately adjacent to an
apartment door; thus, a Fourth Amendment search does no t occur under these
circumstances. See Edstrom , 2018 WL 3867515, at *1. The recent Edstrom decision,
therefore, does not support Johnson’s argument.

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This court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a judge
had a substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue a warrant. State v. Holiday, 749
N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App. 2008). A judge must “make a practical, common -sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . including the
veracity and basis of knowledge o f persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id.
(quotations omitted). “[C]ourts must be careful not to review each component of the
affidavit in isolation” and be mindful that “a collection of pieces of information that would
not be substantial alone can combine to create sufficient probable cause.” Id.
Here, the search-warrant application and af fidavit stated that during the past three
months, Officer Lee investigated Johnson for narcotics. Through surveillance during this
investigation, Officer Lee knew that Johnson stayed at his girlfriend’s a partment. Officer
Lee went to the apartment building and verified the apartment number. Officer Lee also
worked with a CRI in the past three month s and conducted a controlled buy in which the
CRI purchased narcotics from Johnson that field-tested positive for cocaine.
Officer Lee then received information from a CD that a male going by the alias
“Baby C” was in possession of multiple firearms and selling large quantities of crack
cocaine out of his apartm ent. The CD provided an address and described the location of
the apartment. The CD provided Baby C’s cellphone number and described him as “a
black male, approximately 6 feet tall, with short hair.” The CD knew Baby C to be a Vice
Lord, to be armed with multiple firearms, and to be involved in a recent sho oting in south
Minneapolis. The CD identified Johnson as Baby C wh en shown Johnson’s photogra ph.

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Officer Lee stated that within the past 72 hours, he had the CD contact Baby C through the
cellphone number and the CD was observed talking to Baby C about narcotics and guns.
Officer Lee also stated that the CD and CRI observed Johnson “in possession of a firearm
within the last couple of weeks.”
Johnson argues that the CD was un reliable and the tip was unreliable because it
lacked a basis of knowledge. An informant’s reliability can be established if the police can
corroborate the informant’s information. State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App.
2004). A basis of knowledge may be supplied by first -hand information or through self -
verifying details that permit an inference that the information was gained in a reliable way
and is not merely based on general reputation or rumor. State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664,
667 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Assessing the basis of
knowledge involves “consideration of the quantity and quality of detail in the . . . rep ort
and whether police independently verified important details.” Id. at 668.
The CD had personal knowledge. The CD recently observed Johnson in possession
of a firearm, as did the CRI. Officer Lee also had the CD call the cellphone number that
the officer verified was connected to Johnson and observed the CD talk to Baby C about
narcotics and guns.
The CD provided detailed information. The CD provided Johnson’s alias, described
him, and identified him in a photograph. The CD knew “ Baby C to be a Vice Lord street
gang member [who] associates with known 10’s gang members.” The CD kn ew Baby C
to have been involved in a recent shooting in south Minneapolis. The CD provided Baby
C’s address and described the location of the apartment.

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Officer Lee independently verified important details provided by the CD. Officer
Lee was already investigating Johnson for narcotics and conducting surveillance at the
address provided by the CD. Officer Lee knew that Johnson stayed at the apartment, which
was his girlfriend’s. Officer Lee had a CRI conduct a controlled buy from Johnson in the
past three months. Additionally, Officer Lee confirmed that Johnson has a criminal history
that includes controlled-substance convictions and verified that he is a convicted felon who
is prohibited from possessing firearms. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the
affidavit provided a substantial basis for the judge to determine that probable cause existed
based on the CD’s information that was corroborated by the offi cer’s independent
investigation, information provided by the CRI, and Johnson’s criminal history.
Pro se brief
Johnson raises several allegations in his pro se supplemental brief. He asserts that
he was profiled, there was exc ulpatory evidence, the dog-sniff was pret ext to enter the
apartment, and the district court misstated the law reg arding constructive possession.
Johnson fails to provide legal argument or authority supporting his allegations. As such,
we consider them forfeited on appeal. State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2016)
(stating that an appellate court may deem issues raised in a brief, but not adequately argued
or explained, forfeited on appeal); State v. Krosch , 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002)
(stating that allegations set out in a pro se supplemental brief are considered waived when
“[t]he brief contains no argument or citation to legal authorit y in support of the
allegations”).
Affirmed.