Leon Tijuan Jackson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1445

Leon Tijuan Jackson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-2014

Gregory R. Merz, Amanda M. Sicoli, Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, James W. Keeler, Jr., Assistant County
Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Certified Stude nt Attorney, Minnea polis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant Leon Tijuan Jackson appeals a district court’s denial of a petition to
restore his firearm rights. Jackson’s fir earm rights were revoked following a juvenile
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adjudication for a crime of violence, but he argues that he has since improved his life and
behavior. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Leon Tijuan Jackson was adj udicated delinquent of theft of a motor
vehicle in 2000, when he was a juvenile. Theft of a motor vehicle was considered a crime
of violence at the time, and, as a resu lt, Jackson lost his firearm rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 624.712, subd. 5 (2000). Since 2000, Jack son has been convicted of minor offenses,
including driving without a valid license and disorderly conduct. He has been arrested and
charged with, but not convicted of, a variety of other offenses including disorderly conduct
and obstructing the legal process. Since 2009, he has attempted to expunge all charges and
convictions from his record, and he has been largely successful at doing so.
Jackson asserts that since his most serious adjudication, the theft of a motor vehicle,
he has attempted to change his life for the be tter. He is attending community college and
is close to completing an associate’s degree in business a nd criminal justice. In addition
to attending school, he works as a persona l-care attendant and is licensed with the
Minnesota Department of Human Services. He is the father of three children and has
participated in parenting classes.
Jackson’s ultimate career goals are to ow n his own business a nd to be a probation
or parole officer.1 Jackson asserts that to be a probation officer, he will need the ability to

1 Probation and parole are used interchangeably throughout this record.
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obtain a license to carry a firearm, but he lost his firearm rights with his juvenile theft-of-
a-motor-vehicle offense.
After the expungements, including that of his juvenile theft- of-a-motor-vehicle
offense, Jackson applied to the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Department for a conceal-and-
carry-permit but was rejected in 2015 because of his theft adjudication, as well as his
subsequent arrests and convictions. Jackson filed a petition in district court to restore his
firearm rights.
The district court held a hearing on Jackson’s petition on May 18, 2017. The state
waived its appearance but subm itted a letter stating “it is appropriate that the Court take
into account the long list of relatively mino r, but troubling crimes (many uncharged)
reflected in [p]etitioner’s record,” and that “society’s safety is better served by [p]etitioner
not being permitted to possess a firearm.” In addition to th is letter, the district court
received documentation including Jackson’s criminal record and his expungements, as well
as the conceal-and-carry-permit rejection letter from the Hennepin County Sheriff detailing
its review of Jackson’s convictions and arrests. Jackson explained to the district court his
achievements such as parenting, school, employment, and his future career goal of being a
probation officer. The court questioned Jack son regarding his many arrests, focusing
specifically on his behavior in non-traffic-rela ted incidents that took place when Jackson
was an adult.
Some of the behavior in the most recent incidents included: being aggressive toward
police who had to threaten the use of a taser in September 2008; police officers having to
pull Jackson off a security guard and tase hi m in October 2008; and a girlfriend wanting
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Jackson removed from the premises in August 2009. Only the October 2008 incident ended
in a conviction, for disorderly conduct. The remaining incidents ended with charges being
dismissed.
The district court issued an order in July 2017 deny ing Jackson’s petition. The
district court’s findings of fact highlighted his interactions with law enforcement between
2008 and 2010. The district court, in its conclusions of law, took issue with Jackson’s
assertion that he has been rehabilitating himself for the last 17 years, when he had multiple
problematic interactions with law enforcement within that tim e. While the district court
credited Jackson for the recent improvements he has made in his life, it determined that
“[u]nfortunately, the charges in 2008-2010 have occurred too recently to show good cause
for the [c]ourt to be assured that [Jackson] will continue on this more responsible and law-
abiding path, making it questionable whether [Jackson] is ready to responsibly possess a
firearm.”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by denying Jackson’s petition to
reinstate his firearm rights.

Jackson argues that the district court erred by determining that he did not
demonstrate good cause to reinstate his firearm rights and abused its discretion by denying
his petition to reinstate those rights.
“Whether the petitioner shows good cause is a mixed que stion of fact (what the
petitioner shows) and law (whether th e showing amounts to good cause).” Averbeck v.
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State, 791 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Minn. App. 2010). This court defe rs to the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous but does not defer to the district court’s
decision on the legal question. Id. at 561. Even if the pe titioner shows good cause, the
district court still has discretion to grant or deny the petition, meaning the court’s findings
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (2016)
(“The court may grant” the restoration of firearm rights (emphasis added)).
Jackson lost his right to “ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition
for the remainder of [his] life time” following a juvenile adj udication for theft of a motor
vehicle, which, at the time it was committed, was classified as a crime of violence. Minn.
Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1a (2016); Minn. Stat . § 624.712, subd. 5 (201 2). The legislature
changed what constitutes a crime of violence in 2014, removing theft of a motor vehicle,
but made clear that the change only applies to “crimes committed on or after” August 1,
2014. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 260, § 1, at 937.
A person prohibited from possessing firearms may petition a court to restore that
right of possession, and the court may restore that right “if the person shows good cause to
do so and the person has been released from physical confinement.” Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1d. Therefore, th e burden is on the petitione r to show good cause. Averbeck, 791
N.W.2d at 560-61. Good cause is “a reason fo r taking an action that, in legal terms, is
legally sufficient, and, in ordinary terms, is justified in the context of surrounding
circumstances.” Id. at 561.
Because the reason for prohibiting those w ith certain convictions from having a
firearm is to protect the public’s safety, this court has determined that the most significant
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surrounding circumstance in rest oring firearm rights is the in terest in public safety. Id.;
State v. Moon , 463 N.W.2d 517, 520 (M inn.1990). In order to determine whether good
cause exists to grant the restoration of rights, a court must weigh the interest in public safety
against the private interest of the individual seeking the restoration of those rights and
determine that the private interest outweighs the public interest. Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at
561.
Looking first at the interest in public safety, Jackson’s most recent interactions with
law enforcement are relevant and concerning. As the district court pointed out, there were
multiple incidents, ending in both convictions and dismissals, that demonstrate “seemingly
aggressive and potentially violent circumstances.” In one instance, Jackson was aggressive
toward law enforcement and in another, he ha d to be stopped from physically attacking
someone. This behavior indicates that he poses some danger to public safety.
Looking next at the private interest, Jackson asserts that his firearm rights should be
restored because he needs to be able to carry a firearm in order to fulfill his dream of
becoming a probation or parole officer. We are not persuaded. First, Jackson has not yet
completed his education to be a probation or pa role officer. While Jackson states that he
is currently working toward completing a degree in business and criminal justice, he has
not yet graduated, therefore hi s argument is premature since he is not yet eligible for a
probation- or parole-officer job. See Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 562 (determining that
because Averbeck had not yet applied to be a private investigator, the district court did not
abuse its discretion). Second, Jackson did not present evidence of denial of probation- or
parole-officer employment on the basis that he does not have the right to carry a firearm.
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Jackson argues that he was turn ed down for a promotion at a security job because he did
not have the ability to carry a firearm, but wo rking in security is different from being a
probation or parole officer. Third, Jackson did not present evidence that he actually needs
firearm rights to work as a probation or parole officer.
In weighing the public and pr ivate interests here, we dete rmine that the interest in
public safety outweighs Jackson’s private interest. We are not persuaded that Jackson has
demonstrated a private interest with his fu ture, potential employment. Therefore, the
district court did not err by determining that Jackson did not show good cause to reinstate
his firearm rights. And, even if the district court had erred in its determination, whether or
not Jackson showed good cause is not dispositive, since th e district court retains the
discretion in granting or denying the petition even if he ha d shown good cause. When a
district court has such discretion, its deci sion will be affirmed as long as it has “an
acceptable basis in fact and principle,” even if this court might have taken a different
approach. Antone v. Antone , 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). The district court’s
decision has an acceptable basis in fact and prin ciple, thus the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Jackson’s petition.
Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion by improperly relying on
expunged records to determine Jackson did not dem onstrate good cause. But Jackson
offers no case law to support this assertion, and there are no specific limits on what a court

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can consider when deciding whether to rein state firearm rights stated in the statute. 2 See
Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d. The statute simply allows the court to “grant the relief
sought if the person shows good cause to do so and the pe rson has been released from
physical confinement.” Id. Because what the court can consider to determine good cause
is not limited, the district court did not abuse its discretion here by considering arrests and
expunged convictions.
Because Jackson did not show good cause to restore his firearm rights, and because
the discretion to reinstate rests with the district court, the di strict court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Jackson’s petition.
Affirmed.

2 Jackson points to limitations in Minnesota Statutes section 609A.01 (2016), which states
that expunged records are sealed and prohibited from disclosure and opening “except under
court order or statutory authority.” But th ese are the court’s records, and therefore
acceptable for the court’s consideration.