State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1455

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Grant David Hendrickson,
Appellant.

Filed July 16, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-16-4562

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Kathryn M. Keena, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, F. Richard Gallo, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Pr esiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions and sentences for second -degree intentional
murder and attempted second-d egree murder, arguing that he should be permitted to
withdraw his Alford pleas. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charge d appellant Grant Hendrickson with
attempted first-degree murde r, second-degree murd er, attempted seco nd-degree murder,
first-degree assault, and prohi bited person in possession of a firearm. The complaint
alleged that on November 7, 2016, Hendri ckson’s girlfriend, N.A., “had a verbal
altercation” with a store employee, T.R., at the Dollar Tree Store in Burnsville, “regarding
[T.R.’s] family being evicted from their apartment.” During the altercation, T.R. told N.A.
that Hendrickson was a sex offe nder. T.R.’s friend and job-applicant, S.D., witnessed the
altercation. Shortly after N.A. left the store, Hendrickson entered the store and argued with
T.R. Store personnel escorted Hendrickson out of the store, but he soon returned with a
gun and shot S.D. in the leg and upper abdomen. He also s hot a customer, D.H., in the
head. S.D.’s injuries rendered him a paraplegic; D.H. died of his injuries.
The state submitted the case to a grand jury, which indicted Hendrickson of several
crimes, including first-degree murder and a ttempted first-degree murder. Hendrickson
pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder of D.H. and attempted second-degree
murder of S.D. In exchange for Hendrickson’s guilty pleas, the state agreed to recommend
a 390-month sentence for the second-degree mu rder offense and a c oncurrent 203-month

3
sentence for the attempted second-degree murder offense. The state also agreed to dismiss
the remaining charges.
During the colloquy to establish a fact ual basis for Hendrickson’s guilty pleas,
Hendrickson admitted that he fired multiple shot s at S.D. and that one of the shots killed
an innocent bystander, D.H. But, even though Hendrickson shot toward S.D. multiple times
and admitted that he “shot S.D. one time, and . . . left him for a short period of time and
. . . came back and shot him a second time,” Hendrickson denied that he intended to kill
S.D. After an off-the-record discussion, Hendrickson agreed to proceed with his guilty plea
“pursuant to an Alford plea.” The district court accepted Hendrickson’s guilty pleas. Before
sentencing, Hendrickson moved pro se to withdraw his guilty pleas. 1 The district court
denied the motion and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“Once a guilty plea has been entered, ther e is no absolute right to withdraw it.” State
v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). Bu t “[w]ithdrawal is permitted in two
circumstances. First, a court must allow wit hdrawal of a guilty plea if withdrawal is
necessary to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn.
2010) (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). “Second, a court may allow withdrawal

1 Hendrickson’s handwritten pro se motion refers to his “re quest for withdrawal of guilty
and alfla [sic.] plea deal.” At the sentenci ng hearing at which He ndrickson’s motion was
discussed, the district court, prosecutor, and Hendrickson refer to hi s guilty plea, in the
singular. The record nevertheless causes us to conclude that Hendrickson’s motion
pertained to withdrawal of both his guilty plea s, and the district c ourt, prosecutor, and
Hendrickson understood that.

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at any time before sentencing if it is ‘fair and just to do so.’” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 2). The fair-and-just standard is discretionary and less demanding than the
manifest-injustice standard. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). “A
manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be
valid, a guilty plea must be accu rate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State , 887
N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). The validity of a guilty plea is a ques tion of law that an
appellate court reviews de novo. Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016).
Here, in denying Hendrickso n’s presentence motion to w ithdraw his guilty pleas,
the district court noted that Hendrickson’ s motion included no indication of what was
unjust and unfair about the court’ s acceptance of his pleas. The district court also stated
that it had “no doubts whatsoever” that Hendr ickson’s pleas were “knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent.” On appeal, Hendrickson argues th at the district court erroneously denied
his request to withdraw his guilty pleas in order to correct a manifest injustice because his
pleas were inaccurate.
“The accuracy requirement exists to prot ect a defendant from pleading guilty to a
more serious offense than he could be convicted of if he were to go to trial.” Matakis v.
State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). For a guilty plea to be accurate,
a proper factual basis must be established. State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.
1994). “The factual-basis requirement is satisfied if the record contains a showing that there
is credible evidence available which would support a jury verdict that defendant is guilty
of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 859
(quotation omitted).

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Hendrickson pleaded guilty to intentional second-degr ee murder and attempted
second-degree murder. To support a conviction of second-degree intentional murder, the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of a person
with the intent to effect th e death of that person or another, but without premeditation.
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2016). For attempted second-degree intentional murder,
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant performed an act that is
“a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for,” the commission of second-
degree intentional murder. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1 (2016), 609.19, subd. 1(1). Both
second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder with intent are specific intent
crimes. See State v. Young , 710 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2006) (stating that Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004), requires proof that one “either had a purpose to kill [the victim]
or believed that his actions, if successful, would kill”); see also State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Minn. 1990) (“First de gree murder, like an attempted crime, is a specific attempt
crime.”); State v. Alladin, 408 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 1987) (“An essential element
of the crime of attempted second-degree murder is that appellant acted with intent to kill.”),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 1987).
Hendrickson argues that he shoul d be permitted to withdraw his Alford pleas under
the manifest-injustice standard because the factual basis for the pleas negated the element
that he intended to kill anyo ne, and he did not acknowle dge that there was a strong
probability that a jury hearing the evidence would convict him of the crimes. He also argues
that the district court accepted his guilty pleas without the required findings regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence to support Hendrickson’s guilt. The state argues that the district

6
court could properly infer Hendrickson’s intent because the facts were adequate to establish
Hendrickson’s intent to kill both D.H. and S.D.
Intent to murder D.H.
Hendrickson admitted that he fired multiple shots at S.D., and that one of the shots
struck D.H. and caused his death. Minnesota caselaw has consistently applied the doctrine
of transferred intent to specific intent crim es. The doctrine of transferred intent “is the
principle that a defendant may be convicted if it is proved he intended to injure one person
but actually harmed another.” State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2006) (quoting 9
Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice § 44.8 (3d ed. 2001)). In State v.
Holliday, the defendant shot an in nocent bystander while ch asing and shooting in the
direction of another person. 745 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Minn. 2008). In applying the doctrine
of transferred intent, the supreme court affirmed convictions for the first-degree murder of
the bystander and the attempted first-degree murder of the intended victim. Id. at 564.
Similarly, in State v. Cruz-Ramirez , the supreme court applied the doctrine of
transferred intent to first- and second-degree murder charge s for the death of a man in a
vehicle and attempted first- and second-degree murder charges for three other men in close
proximity to the vehicle in a gang-related shooting. 771 N.W.2d 497, 501–03, 507 (Minn.
2009). The supreme court affirmed the de fendant’s convictions, explaining that
“transferred intent allows evidence of an intent to harm someone to transfer to the person
actually harmed when there is a possibility the victim was not the intended recipient of the
specific act.” Id. at 507 (quotation omitted) (noti ng that the defendant “shot a
semiautomatic weapon multiple times toward several people in close proximity,” in

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concluding that “[t]he evidence, while showing intent to kill and pr emeditation, [did] not
unerringly show that each fired bullet was intended for the person that it hit”).
Here, the factual basis provided by Hend rickson during his initial examination by
defense counsel sufficiently satisfied the elem ents of the offenses because Hendrickson’s
intent can be inferred from his actions u nder the doctrine of transferred intent. See Hall,
722 N.W.2d at 477 (stating that the doctrine of transferred intent is “the principle that a
defendant may be convicted if it is proved he intended to in jure one person but actually
harmed another”). Hendrickson ad mitted that he fired multiple shots, and that one of the
shots struck D.H. and caused his death. Hendrickson also admitted that although he did not
intend to hit D.H., he intend ed to shoot S.D. And Hendric kson agreed that under the
doctrine of transferred intent, “because D.H. was an innocent bystander and [he] did not
intend to shoot [D.H.] but [he] did, and it caused [D.H.’s] death, that by [Hendrickson]
intentionally shooting at S.D., that [would be sufficient to convict him of] second-degree
murder.” And Hendricks on admitted that “by firing multiple shots at [S.D.], . . . it’s
presumed that [he was] attempting to kill [S.D.] or take [his] life.”
Intent to murder S.D.
The record reflects that after being ex amined by defense counsel, the prosecutor
asked Hendrickson if when he shot at S.D. a second time, he did so “with the intent to try
and kill him.” Hendrickson answered, “No.” The factual basis for a guilty plea is
inadequate if “the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element of the
charged crime because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” Mikulak,
903 N.W.2d at 603 (quotatio n omitted). Hendrickson’s answ er negated an essential

8
element of the offenses and, therefore, his plea is valid only if a proper factual basis was
established in the context of an Alford plea. The state asserts that “intent can be inferred
from the facts [Hendrickson] admitted during his plea.” See Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860
(stating that “intent can be inferred from th e idea that a person intends the natural
consequences of his or her actions” (quotation omitted)).
A defendant entering an Alford plea maintains his innoce nce, but agrees “that the
evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” Matakis, 862 N.W.2d
at 38. An Alford plea is accurate if (1) it is established by a proper factual basis, which
exists if the plea is based on “evidence discus sed with the defendant on the record at the
plea hearing” and (2) the defendant “agrees that evidence the State is likely to offer at trial
is sufficient to convict.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. The former can be established through
“an interrogation of the defe ndant about the underlying co nduct and the evidence that
would likely be presented at trial.” Id. The latter can be accomplished by having the
defendant “specifically acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the
State would likely offer against him is suffici ent for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt
standard, to find the defendan t guilty of the offense to wh ich he is pleading guilty.” Id.
Both requirements “provide the court with a ba sis to independently conclude that there is
a strong probability that the defenda nt would be found guilty of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Id. If a plea is entered without
an adequate factual basis, the district court must permit withdrawal of the plea. Id. at 650.
Hendrickson argues that the factual basi s for his plea was inadequate because he
“did not acknowledge that a jury hearing the evidence would actually believe the evidence

9
and therefore would be likely to convict.” We disagree. The record reflects that
Hendrickson acknowledged that he had the oppo rtunity to review th e evidence that the
state would likely present at trial, including S.D.’s statem ent that “he believed that
[Hendrickson was] trying to kill him.” Hendrickson then admitted that
if the jury were to believe that evidence that the State would
offer at trial - - in addition to the other reports that the State
would offer at trial, if a jury was to believe those facts and that
that happened the way S.D. said it happened, . . . that a jury
would find [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And Hendrickson answered, “Yes,” to the following question asked by defense counsel:
And that Alford plea is basi cally saying that while you
maintain that you - - it was not your intent to kill [S.D.], if the
jury were to believe the evidence that would come into trial, a
jury could find that you were guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt[?]

Hendrickson’s admissions at the plea hearing specifically acknowledge that the evidence
the state “would likely offer against him at trial is sufficient fo r a jury, applying a
reasonable doubt standard, to find him guilty of the offens es to which he was pleading
guilty.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. The factual basis for Hendrickson’s Alford plea is
therefore adequate.
Hendrickson further argues that his plea was inaccurate because the district court
accepted Hendrickson’s guilty plea without the required findings regarding the sufficiency
of the evidence to support Hendrickson’ s guilt. We disagree. Although analyzed in the
context of a Norgaard plea,
2 Hendrickson’s argument was rejected by this court in

2 A Norgaard plea is similar to an Alford plea but different in that the defendant’s “inability
to admit the allegations in the complaint is due to his lack of recollection” and not due to

10
Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, in which this court recognized that a “district court’s obligation
is to ‘ensure that an adequate factual ba sis has been established in the record.’” Id. at 216
(quoting Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716). The court held that there is “no suggestion in the
caselaw that a district court, as a routine matter when accepting a Norgaard plea, must
make an express finding that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found
guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, a district
court must assure itself that “the accuracy standard is satisfied.” Id. (citing Theis, 742
N.W.2d at 649).
Here, by accepting Hendrickson’ s guilty plea, the district court implied that an
adequate factual basis had been established on the record. And in denying Hendrickson’s
motion to withdraw his guilty pl ea, the district court affirmed its belief that an adequate
factual basis had been established, noting th at any time “there was a question or concern
on the factual basis, [Hendrickson’s] attorneys took the time to review it with [him] and to
clarify the record.” Hendrickson is unable to establish that his guilty plea was invalid.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Hendrickson’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
Affirmed.

maintaining his innocence. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 n.1 (Minn. App. 2015),
review denied (Minn. June 20, 2015). Johnson advised that the “caselaw indicates that the
same standard applies to either type of guilty plea.” Id.