In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S.S. and S.W., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1472

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S.S. and S.W., Parents

Filed February 12, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-17-165

Patrick D. McGee, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for appellant-father S.W.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kathryn M. Eilers , Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Torrina Burns, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-father appeals from the district court’s decision terminating his parental
rights, challenging only the determination that te rmination is in the child ’s best interests.
We affirm.

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FACTS
S.S., mother, gave birth to A.W. in Marc h 2015. S.W., father, is the adjudicated
father of A.W. Father was present at his son’s birth and lived with A.W. and mother at the
maternal-grandmother’s house in Mankato for around two months after A.W. was born.
Father then moved to St. Paul. Mother and father disagreed about who should care for
A.W., and father eventually br ought A.W. to live with him in St. Paul later that summer.
A.W. stayed with father for about a month. At the end of August, father allowed mother
to bring A.W. back to Mankato.
On September 3, Ramsey County Social Services Department (the department)
received a police report that A.W., then 5 m onths old, had been placed on a 72-hour
protective hold after being aban doned at the maternal grandm other’s house in Mankato.
On September 9, the department ordered that A.W. be put in out-of-home placement.1 The
following day, A.W. was adjudicated as a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS).
A child-protection worker me t with father, and father was given a case plan
requiring that he be more involved in his son’s well-being, have consistent and timely
visitation, work and communicate with the social worker and guardian ad litem (GAL),
and identify a safe and appropriate housing environment for the child. Father’s compliance
with his initial case plan was limited to his having two visits with A.W.
In late September, father, believing mo ther was cheating on him, committed a
violent domestic and sexual assault against her. After the assault, mother called 911 and

1 From this point on, A.W. remained in out-of-home placement. Mother voluntarily
terminated her parental rights to A.W.

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father was arrested. He remained incarcer ated from the time of his arrest through his
termination-of-parental-rights trial; he was scheduled to be released on November 27,
2017. At the time of his arrest, father also had a pending charge for the sale of a controlled
substance. In December 2015, father pl eaded guilty to felony domestic assault by
strangulation and third-degree sale of narcotics. In connection with the assault, father was
also charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct (forced penetration) and thus was
required to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2014).
On January 18, 2017, the department file d a petition for termin ation of parental
rights (TPR), alleging five statutory grounds for termination, including (1) refusal or
neglect to comply with parental duties under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2016);
(2) palpable unfitness under Minn. Stat. § 260 C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016); (3) the failure
of reasonable efforts to corr ect the conditions that led to out-of-home placement under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2016); (4) th e child being neglected and in foster
care under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016); and (5) S.W. had been convicted
of an offense that requires registration as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) (2016).
Near the time the TPR petition was filed, father sent his social worker a letter
requesting a case plan. Father was given a new case plan and met with the social worker
and GAL that spring. The social worker and GAL explai ned the case plan and discussed
A.W.’s best interests with fath er. This was father’s first c ontact with the social worker

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since his incarceration approximately 19 months earlier. 2 In summer 2017, father began
seeking treatment options and got on the wa iting lists for various classes. Father
participated in the Changing Faces progr am and took domestic-violence prevention
classes. Father also signed up for anger-m anagement classes, although he had not yet
begun them at the time of trial.
A termination trial was held in August 2017. At the trial, father, father’s probation
officer, a family counselor, the social worker, two visitation supervisors employed by the
department, and the former GAL3 testified. Father acknowledged that at that time he was
not in a position to care for A.W. but maintain ed that A.W. was very important to him.
While father agreed that he had “a lot of things to work on,” including overcoming his
pattern of domestic violence, securing housing, and finding employment, he testified that
he wants to be in a position in which he is able to provide and care for his son.
The child-protection social worker testified that A.W. has not had an opportunity to
bond with anyone and that this is very important for a child’s emotional development. The
former GAL also believed term ination was in A.W.’s best interests, testifying that
“permanency is good for his br ain formation, for his developmental needs, the sense of
belonging, healthy attachments to adults. Ri ght now, he doesn’t have that. He has
attachments to his foster parents, but ther e is some uncertainty.” The GAL also noted

2 Because father was ordered to register as a predatory offender, the department was
relieved of its obligation to undertake reasona ble efforts to reunify father and A.W. See
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(6) (2016).

3 This GAL was appointed on October 21, 2015 and remained on the case until May 31,
2017 when she took new employment. No new GAL was appointed after her departure.

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father’s “very minimal contact” with A.W. and observed that “[father is] not in the position
to parent his child, and I don’t see him being in the position in the reasonably foreseeable
future. He has a lot of things to work on individually, and we do not know how much time
that will take.”
Later that month, the district court filed an order terminating father’s parental rights.
Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A district court’s termination of parent al rights requires clear and convincing
evidence establishing that at least one stat utory ground for termination exists and that
termination is in the best interests of the child. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “We give considerable defere nce to the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights,” but we closely inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing. See id. We review factual
findings for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A findin g is clearly erroneous if it is
“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted).
Father does not dispute the district court’s finding that at least one statutory ground
for termination was met. Rather, he argues that the district court erred by concluding that
termination was in the best interests of A.W. Even if a statutory condition for termination
of parental rights is met, the “paramount ” consideration in determining whether to

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terminate parental rights is the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2016). To analyze the best in terests of the child, the district court must balance three
factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). Such competing
interests include “a stable environment [and] health considerations.” Id. The district court
“must consider a child’s best interests a nd explain its rationale in its findings and
conclusions.” In re Termination of Parental Rights of Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 626
(Minn. App. 2003). We review the district court’s ultimate determination that termination
of parental right is in the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905.
Father contests the district court’s findings on all three factors. Father argues that
he has an interest in preserving the parent-c hild relationship because he has relationships
with his other children and provides for them financially and he wants to do the same for
A.W. The district court acknowledged father’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship but observed that father’s claim that he wants to parent A.W. “derives from a
focus on himself and not the child.” As the district court noted, father testified that he does
not want it to be said that he “gave up” on his child and saw reunification with A.W. as
fitting into his larger plan for self-betterment. The record supports the district court’s
finding regarding father’s limited interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.
Father next argues that A.W. has an in terest in preserving the parent-child
relationship because it would allow A.W. to remain “part of a larger extended family” that

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father will financially and emotionally support. He contends th at A.W. has an interest in
“the love and devotion of a parent and a connection to family” and reasons that he showed
his son this devotion by reach ing out to the child -protection worker on his own initiative
for a case plan, even th ough the department had not cont acted him for over a year and a
half. The district court found that A.W. had little interest in preser ving the parent-child
relationship. As the district court noted, A.W. was too young to express a preference and
could not reasonably prefer father because A.W. “does not know him.” As an infant, A.W.
spent only a couple months with his father and, as of the time of trial, had not seen father
in almost two years. The record supports the district court’s finding.
Finally, father argues that his and A.W.’s interests are not in conflict because:
To be able to safely parent th e child [father] needs to finish
treatment, remain sober, remain law abiding, continue therapy
and stay in safe and sober, violence free housing and violence
free relationships. . . . These in terests coincide [with A.W.’s
interests] as long as [father] stays on his path to recovery.

Yet, the district court made detailed findings related to several interests of A.W. that
compete with the preservation of the parent-child relationship. The court found that A.W.
“needs a parent who can provide financially for him and can meet his basic needs,” and
that father “has no apparent ab ility to parent the ch ild, either at the pr esent time or in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” The court also found that A.W. needs “stability and
permanency” and needs to “reside with a parent who will not expose him to drugs, violence,
anger and criminal behavior.” Ultimate ly the court concluded that A.W’s needs
outweighed father’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.

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These findings are supported by the record . Father repeatedly neglected to meet
A.W.’s parenting needs. Befo re A.W. was under child-protec tive custody, father left his
infant with various caregivers, including mother, who father knew had chemical-abuse and
mental-health issues and believed was not capable of being what he referred to as a “24/7”
parent. A.W. was placed on an emergency-protective hold after being left at the maternal-
grandmother’s home in Mankato while father remained in St. Paul. Just weeks after this,
father was incarcerated for violently assaulting A.W.’s mother. After the assault, an order
for protection prevented contact with A.W.; thus , father has been unable to see, let alone
care for, A.W. since his incarceration in September 2015.
Moreover, father acknowledged at trial that he was not in a position to care for A.W.
He had not had steady employment since 2003 and would be living in a halfway house
after his release from prison. Although father stated that he intended to find employment
“as soon as possible” and was confident that many “felony-friendly” jobs with good pay
would be available to him, he never identif ied any specific jobs or concrete plans for
securing such a job after his release from prison. At the time of trial, father also had not
identified safe housing where he could live with A.W., nor had he articulated a plan for
how he would parent A.W. after his release from prison.
As to A.W.’s need for the stability that comes with permanency, both the GAL and
social worker testified to the importance of attachment on A.W.’s emotional development
and brain formation. They believed it was critical, especially given A.W.’s young age, that
he have the opportunity to bond with an adu lt and be able to have “one person to call his
parent.” This is something A.W. cannot do while remaining in foster care.

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While father may have an interest in pres erving the parent-child relationship, the
district court made detailed findings, supported by the record, about A.W.’s best interests
to the contrary. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
termination of father’s parental rights was in A.W.’s best interests.
Affirmed.