State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1500

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Lee Armstrong,
Appellant.

Filed July 30, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Wilkin County District Court
File No. 84-CR-13-362

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Carl Thunem, Wilkin County Attorney, Breckenridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third-degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that his conviction is inva lid because the district court (1) failed to
execute this court’s mandate for withdrawal of his guilty plea and (2) did not enter a new

2
conviction after remand. Appellant also contends that, if we conclude that his conviction
is invalid, then the underlying charges against him have remained untried for more than
180 days after his request for final dispos ition and are subject to dismissal under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Because we conclude that appe llant’s conviction is
valid, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Justin Lee Armstrong
with second-degree possession of a controlle d substance in viola tion of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.022, subd. 1(1) (2012), an d obstruction of legal process in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2012). Armstrong and th e state reached a plea agreement in which
Armstrong pleaded guilty to an amended charge of third-degree possession and agreed to
a 58-month sentence, and the state agreed to delay sentencing until separate charges against
Armstrong in North Dakota were resolved. The agreement would allow Armstrong to
serve his 58-month sentence concurrently with an anticipated prison sentence in North
Dakota. Months later, but prior to resolution of the North Dakota charges, the state returned
Armstrong to custody, and, over his objection, the district court sentenced him to 58 months
in prison under his previously entered guilty plea.
On appeal, we concluded th at the state violated the plea agreement to delay
sentencing until Armstrong’s North Dakota charges were resolved, which rendered
Armstrong’s guilty plea involuntary. State v. Armstrong, No. A15-0912, 2016 WL 764405,
at *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb. 29, 2016). Acco rdingly, we “reverse [d] the conviction and
remand[ed] for withdrawal of the guilty plea.” Id. at *4.

3
On March 8, 2016, Armstrong appeared in district court for a remand hearing.
Rather than withdraw his guilty plea, Arms trong asked the district court to honor the
original plea agreement with the additional terms that sent encing be delayed for nine
months for resolution of the North Dakota charges and that he waive his right to appear for
sentencing if he were in custody in North Dakota at the time. Armstrong affirmed that he
understood that he could withdraw his guilty plea but that he was electing to maintain his
plea under a modified plea agr eement with the state. The district court then vacated
Armstrong’s sentence and granted him a conditional release from custody.
In January 2017, Armstrong began serving a 34-month sentence in North Dakota.
The state subsequently filed an interstate detainer seeking temporary custody of Armstrong
for a plea hearing. In response, on April 7, 2017, Armstrong requested final disposition of
any untried indictments or complaints agai nst him under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD), Minn. Stat. § 629.294 (2016). The district court set a plea hearing for
June 27, 2017, but, prior to the hearing, Armstrong’s attorney notified the court that
Armstrong need not appear because he had not withdrawn hi s guilty plea and had agreed
to be sentenced in absentia after nine months . The attorney stated, “I believe that the
conviction can be entered and that the sentence as agreed to by the parties, can simply be
pronounced and entered.” The di strict court then quashed th e detainer and converted the
hearing to a sentencing hearing.
On June 28, 2017, the district court se ntenced Armstrong to 58 months in prison
and ordered that the sentence run concurrent ly with Armstrong’s North Dakota sentence
and that Armstrong receive credit for time served in North Dakota and in Minnesota from

4
the date of his arrest. The sentencing or der and warrant of commitment recorded the
conviction of third-degree possession of a c ontrolled substance. The district court
subsequently amended the sentencing order to clarify Armstrong’s credit for time served.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not violate this court’s mandate by allowing Armstrong
to maintain his guilty plea after remand.

Armstrong claims that his conviction is i nvalid because, on remand, the district
court violated this court’s or der to withdraw Armstrong’s guilty plea by allowing him to
maintain his plea. We disagree.
“It is well settled that an unqualified prom ise which is part of a plea arrangement
must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d
680, 687 (Minn. 1979). “On demonstration th at a plea agreement has been breached, the
court may allow withdrawal of the plea, orde r specific performance, or alter the sentence
if appropriate.” James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 728-29 (Min n. 2005). Under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, “the [district] court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea . . . [when] withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A manifest
injustice exists when the defendant establishes that his pl ea was “inaccurate, involuntary,
or unintelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010).
When an appellate court has concluded that a plea agreement was breached, a
defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea. In State v. Garcia, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that an unqualified promis e induced the defendant’s plea and remanded

5
to the district court to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea “if he so chooses.”
582 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Minn. 1998). Similarly, in James, the defendant was “entitled
to withdraw his [guilty] plea, or if withdraw al would be unduly prej udicial to the state,
have the agreement modified in a way that does not violate the agreement” because his
plea “was induced by an unfillable promise.” 699 N.W.2d at 730. In Uselman v. State,
this court concluded that the defendant “en tered his plea involuntarily on an erroneous
understanding” and remanded to “t he district court to allow [the defendant] to withdraw
his guilty plea.” 831 N.W.2d 690, 694-95 (Minn. App. 2013). Armstrong cites no case in
which an appellate court manda ted withdrawal of a defenda nt’s guilty plea against the
defendant’s own wishes.
“On remand, it is the duty of the district c ourt to execute the mandate of this court
strictly according to its terms. The trial court has no power to alter, amend, or modify [this
court’s] mandate.” State v. Roman Nose, 667 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn. 2003) (citation and
quotation omitted). In our previous decision in this case, we were reviewing whether the
district court’s decision to sentence Armstrong before resolution of a pending criminal case
in North Dakota invalidated his plea. We “r emand[ed] for withdrawal of [Armstrong’s]
guilty plea” because we concluded that the state broke its promise to delay sentencing and
that “withdrawal of the guilty plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Armstrong,
2016 WL 764405, at *4.
Here, the record is clear th at the district court allowed Armstrong the choice of
withdrawing his guilty plea after remand. Ar mstrong, on his own and with advice of
counsel, chose not to withdraw his plea, and stated that he wanted the parties to honor the

6
original plea agreement as modified by the additional terms to which he agreed at the
remand hearing. Armstrong now seeks reversal of his conviction and remand “to allow
him to withdraw his plea.” But Armstrong already received this requested relief following
remand of his previous appeal. The district court was mandated only to allow Armstrong
to withdraw his guilty plea, which it clearl y allowed him the oppo rtunity to do. We
conclude that the district court did not violate a mandate of this court by allowing
Armstrong to maintain his guilty plea.
II. The district court entered a valid conviction after remand.

Armstrong next claims that hi s conviction is invalid beca use the district court did
not enter a new conviction after remand. We are not persuaded.
A conviction is defined as “(1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdic t of guilty by a jury
or a finding of guilty by the court” that is “accepted and recorded by the court.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2016). Therefore, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, “a
conviction requires that a dist rict court both accept and record the guilty plea.” State v.
Thompson, 754 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Min n. 2008) (citing Minn. St at. § 609.02, subd. 5)
(quotation marks omitted).
A district court records a guilty plea either by “accepting the guilty plea and
adjudicating the defendant guilty on the record,” State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d
1, 6 (Minn. 2011), or by entry of formal judgment of conviction, State v. Jeffries , 806
N.W.2d 56, 63 (Minn. 2011). “A conviction appearing in the official judgment of
conviction or in a conviction or der entered by the court has been formally adjudicated.”
State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). A district court

7
accepts a guilty plea when it uses “clear and unambiguous language of acceptance of the
plea,” but there are not “magic words” such as “convicted” or “I accept your plea” that
“always result in a conviction.” Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 63. “[T]he trial court judge must
reject or accept the plea of guilty on the terms of the plea agreement.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.04, subd. 3(1).
With regard to the recording of Armstr ong’s guilty plea, the parties agree that,
following remand, the district court allowed Armstrong to maintain his previous guilty
plea. The district court did not expressly state that it had “adjudicated Armstrong guilty of
the offense” before sentencing him. However, the district court issued a sentencing order
and warrant of commitment that entered the conviction of third-degree possession of a
controlled substance and sentenced Armstrong to 58 months’ imprisonment. Because the
district court entered a formal judgment of conviction against Armstrong after remand, the
district court properly recorded the conviction. See Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 63 (noting that
a district court records a guilty plea by entry of formal judgment of conviction).
The state concedes that the district c ourt did not explicitly reaccept Armstrong’s
guilty plea after remand. But the state contends that the district court implicitly accepted
Armstrong’s plea. Although no published case in Minnesota addresses implicit acceptance
of a guilty plea, we note that this court in State ex rel. Peltier v. Hvass held that the district
court “implicitly accepted” the defendant’s gu ilty plea when it adjudicated him guilty by
imposing a criminal sentence and that it did not need to expressly state that it had done so.
No. A03-0008, 2003 WL 22534260, at *3 (Minn. App. Nov. 10, 2003). “Unpublished

8
opinions are not precedential, but they may have persuasive value.” State v. Ellis-Strong,
899 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Minn. App. 2017) (citing Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016)).
In addition, federal circuit courts have held that a district court may implicitly accept
a plea under the analogous Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we find instructive.
See Wheeler v. State , 909 N.W.2d 558, 563-64, 568 n. 7 (Minn. 2018) (recognizing that
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3), addressing judici al consideration of plea agreements, is
“comparable” with Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, addr essing district court’s role to reject or
accept plea agreements); Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 n.4 (Minn.
2000) (quotation omitted) (“Where our rules of procedure parallel the federal rules, federal
cases interpreting the federal rule are helpful and instructive but not necessarily controlling
on our interpretation of the state counterpart.”). In United States v. Arafat , the Eighth
Circuit held that “[a] guilty plea may be explicitly or implicitly accepted by a district court.”
789 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2015). The Eighth Circuit c oncluded that, even though the
district court had not explicitly accepted the defendant’s plea, “[t]aken as a whole and
considered in context, the district court’s stat ements reflect that it intended to accept, and
that it did implicitly accept [the defendant’s] guilty plea.” Id. In United States v. Sanford,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court implicitly accepted the defendant’s guilty
plea by entering judgment of guilt and sentencing the defendant. 429 F.3d 104, 107 n.2
(5th Cir. 2005).
Here, the record shows that the district court implicitly accepted Armstrong’s guilty
plea even though it did not use explicit words of acceptance. At the remand hearing,
Armstrong’s attorney asked the district court to reaccept his guilty plea under the original

9
plea agreement and to delay sentencing by nine months. The district court clarified whether
Armstrong was requesting to maintain his previo us guilty plea, rather than withdraw it,
with the modified terms that he be released and resentenced in nine months and that his
sentence be vacated. Armstrong to ld the district court that th at made “perfect sense” to
him. The district court then asked Armstr ong several questions to confirm that he
understood the plea agreement, his right to withdraw his guilty plea, and his agreement to
be resentenced in nine months. Armstrong answered all of the district court’s questions in
the affirmative. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court vacated Armstrong’s
sentence and released him, consistent with the parties’ modified plea agreement. On this
record, we conclude that the district court accepted Armstrong’s guilty plea under the terms
of the modified plea agreement.
Because we conclude that the district court accepted Armstrong’s guilty plea and
recorded it by entry of formal judgment of conviction, Armstrong’s conviction of third-
degree possession of a controlled substance is valid.
III. Armstrong is not entitled to relief un der the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(IAD).

Armstrong claims that, if his conviction is invalid, then the state’s charges have
remained “untried” for more than 180 days after his request for final disposition under the
IAD, Minn. Stat. § 629.294, which requires dismissal of the charges. 1 Because

1 The IAD is a compact among 48 states, the federal government, and the District of
Columbia to establish proced ures for resolving one jurisdiction’s outstanding criminal
charges against a prisoner who is incarcerated in another state. State v. Wells, 638 N.W.2d
456, 459 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002). The agreement’s
purpose is to require prompt disposition of outstanding charges so that persons incarcerated

10
Armstrong’s argument is predicated on his claim that his conviction is invalid, and because
we conclude that his conviction is valid, Ar mstrong is not entitled to his requested relief
under the IAD. Moreover, we note that the di strict court issued its sentencing order and
warrant of commitment entering conviction against Armstrong on June 28, 2017, 82 days
after he requested final disposition of the ch arges, and well within the 180-day deadline
under the IAD.
Affirmed.

in other jurisdictions receive a speedy trial on those charges. State v. Burks, 631 N.W.2d
411, 412 (Minn. App. 2001). Minnesota an d North Dakota are par ties to the agreement
and have codified it in their respective statutes. Minn. Stat. § 629.294, subd. 1; N.D. Cent.
Code § 29-34-01 (2016); Wells, 638 N.W.2d at 459. Under the IAD, a prisoner of a party
state who has “pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodge d against the prisoner . . . shall
be brought to trial within 180 days” of delivering a proper request for “final disposition . . .
of the indictment” against him, or the charges will be dismissed with prejudice. Minn. Stat.
§ 629.294, subd. 1, arts. III(a), V(c); see State v. Kurz, 685 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. App.
2004) (describing the IAD), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004).