Cole Gilbert McGuire, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1504

Cole Gilbert McGuire, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-17-2376

Grant M. Borgen, Bird, Jacobsen & Stevens, P.C., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Stephen D. Melchionne, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of his driver’s
license, appellant argues that the police stop of the vehicle he was driving was unreasonable
because it was based on the officer’s mistaken belief as to the law. We affirm.

2
FACTS
On March 12, 2017, at about 3 a.m., Officer Craig Sammon of the Rochester Police
Department was working on foot patrol when he saw “a very large diesel pickup [that]
accelerated at a rapid rate, causing a large puff of black smoke to come from [the] exhaust
and the exhaust to emit a loud rapping, popping noise.” As Sammon watched, the truck
“rapidly accelerated” in an area with heavy foot traffic. Sammon got in to his patrol car
and followed the truck , and he saw that the truck did not have a rear license plate or a
temporary registration permit. Sammon believed that vehicles driven in Minnesota had to
have either a rear license plate or a temporary permit displayed in the rear window ,1 and
he decided to stop the truck . Sammon eventually cited the driver, appellant Cole Gilbert
McGuire, for fourth -degree driving while impaired , and McGuire’s driver’s license was
revoked.
McGuire challenged the revocation of his driver’s license, arguing that there was no
lawful basis for the stop. McGuire testified that he was a Missouri resident who was living
in Rochester for a short period of time for a temporary job. He was driving “a full-size
Mega Cab Truck 4 x 4” that was rated to pull an 18,000 pound trailer, and, under Missouri
law, he was required to have only a front license plate. 2 McGuire admitted that his truck
was “loud,” but he denied speeding. Sammon testified that he had no “reason based on
[his] observations of the truck to know that it wasn’t registered in Minnesota.”

1 Temporary vehicle permits that must be posted on the left side of the inside rear window
of the vehicle may be issued under Minn. Stat. §§ 168.091, .092 (2016).
2 For purposes of our analysis, we assume that, under Missouri law, the truck that McGuire
was driving was required to have only a front license plate.

3
The district court sustained the revocation of McGuire’s driver’s license, concluding
that Sammon had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that provided a
basis for an investigatory stop. McGuire appeals.
D E C I S I O N
In a proceeding challenging a driver’s lic ense revocation, w e review de novo the
district court’s application of law, Pallas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163, 167
(Minn. App. 2010), including the legality of an investigatory traffic stop. Wilkes v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 242 -43 (Minn. App. 2010). We review findings of fact
for clear error. Id. at 243. The petitioner has the burden of proving that he is entitled to
reinstatement of his license. Pallas, 781 N.W.2d at 166.
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. But a police officer may make a brief investigatory stop if
“the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion [of] criminal activity.” State v. Lugo,
887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). The stop cannot be “the product
of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn.
2004). Even an insignificant violation of a traffic law provides a basis for an investigatory
stop. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
Minnesota traffic regulations provide that
[n]o person shall operate, drive, or park a motor vehicle on any
highway unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with the
laws of this state and has t he number plates or permit
confirming that valid registration or operating authority has
been obtained . . . as assigned to it by the commissioner of
public safety, conspicuously displayed thereon in a manner that
the view of any plate or permit is not obstructed.

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Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subd. 1 (2016).
Generally, for any vehicle registered in Minnesota, “one plate must be displayed on
the front and one on the rear of the vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subd. 6 (2016). But the
legislature has authorized the commissioner of public safety to enter into agreements with
other states, which
shall provide that vehicles properly registered or licensed in
this state, when operated upon highways of the other state,
shall receive exemptions, benefits, and privileges of a similar
kind or to a similar degree as are extended to vehicles properly
registered or licensed in such state when operated in this state.
Any such declaration shall contemplate and provide for mutual
benefits, reciprocal privileges or equitable treatment of the
owners of vehicles registered in this and the other state.

Minn. Stat. § 168.187, subd. 7 (2016).3
Thus, a vehicle properly registered or licensed in Missouri will be treated as
properly licensed in Minnesota even if the Missouri licensing requirements are different
from Minnesota licensing requirements, and, for a properly licensed Missouri vehicle, the
requirement to have only a front license plate is an exception from the Minnesota
requirement that there be a plate displayed o n the front and the rear of the vehicle. See
Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2016) ( stating that, when general provision in law conflicts
with special provision in the same or another law and conflict is irreconcilable, special

3 For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Minnesota and Missouri have agreed to
provide reciprocal privileges and equitable treatment of the owners of vehicles registered
in Minnesota or Missouri.

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provision shall prevail and shall be construed as exception to general provision unless it is
manifest intention of legislature that general provision shall prevail).
McGuire argues that, because his vehicle was properly licensed under Missouri law,
he was driving a vehicle with a legal license-plate configuration under Minnesota law when
he was stopped , and Sammon’s mistaken interpretation of Minnesota’s license -plate law
does not support a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity, which
is required for a valid stop. The supreme court has held that an officer’s mistaken belief
as to the law cannot p rovide an objective basis for an investigatory stop. George, 557
N.W.2d at 578-79. In George, an officer stopped a motorcyclist because he believed that
the motorcycle had an unlawful headlight configuration, but the officer was mistaken as to
the law, and the headlight configuration was lawful. Id. The supreme court concluded that
there was no legal basis for the stop because the officer did not have an objective legal
basis for suspecting that George was driving his motorcycle in violation of the law . Id. at
579.
Similarly, in Anderson, an officer believed that a statute required a driver to move
far enough away from a stopped emergency vehicle so that there was an entire free “buffer”
lane between the driver’s car and the emergency vehicle . 683 N.W.2d at 821. Based on
this interpretation of the statute, the officer stopped a car that had not moved far enough to
the left and eventually arrested the driver for an impaired-driving offense. Id. The supreme
court concluded that the officer had inco rrectly interpreted the statute and held “that an
officer’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective
basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop.” Id. at 823-24.

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There is a significant difference between the circumstances in George and Anderson
and the circumstances in this case. In both George and Anderson, the circumstances that
the officers observed could not constitute a statutory violation, and, in both cases, the
officer stoppe d the driver because the officer misunderstood the statute and incorrectly
believed that he had observed a violation. Unlike George and Anderson, the circumstances
that Sammon observed could be a violation of the general statute that requires both a front
and a rear license plate, and , because Sammon was following McGuire’s vehicle, he had
no reason to know that McGuire’s vehicle had a front license plate, as required in Missouri.
The supreme court addressed circumstances similar to this case in State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 2008). In Timberlake, police received a 911 call from
an identified private citizen who reported that he saw something fall as a man got out of a
white Pontiac Grand Prix at a gas station, and he then saw a gun lying on the ground. 744
N.W.2d at 392. The man quickly picked up the gun and got back into the car, which then
left the gas station. Id. A black female was driving the car, and a black male was the
passenger. Id. Within a half -minute of receiving this informat ion, officers in the area of
the gas station saw a black female driving a white Grand Prix with a black male passenger,
and, based on the information they had just received, the officers stopped the Grand Prix
and found a handgun under the front passenger seat. Id.
The passenger, Timberlake, was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, and,
before his jury trial, asked the district court to suppress the gun. Id. The district court
denied the motion, and Timberlake was found guilty. Id. This court reversed, holding that
the police did not have a sufficient basis to stop the Grand Prix because a “‘mere suspicion

7
that a person possesses a gun is insufficient to warrant a Terry stop, absent additional
particular and objective facts which create a reasonable suspicion that the possessor does
not have a permit or is otherwise about to commit a crime.’” Id. at 392-93 (quoting State
v. Timberlake, 726 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. App. 2007)).
On review by the supreme court, Timberlake contended
that because it is legal in Minnesota for a private citizen to
carry a permitted gun in public, police may not conduct an
investigatory stop without additional evidence that the
possession itself is illegal. For example, . . . police would need
to suspect that the person carrying the gun does not have a valid
permit or that some other criminal activity is afoot to warrant
an investigatory stop.

Id. at 394.
The supreme court rejected this argument because it concluded that the nonexistence
of a permit to carry a gun is not an element of the offense of possessing a pistol in a motor
vehicle without first having obtained a permit ; instead, a permit establishes an exception
to criminal liability. Id. at 395. Based on this conclusion, the supreme court reversed this
court and held “that the officers had a reasonable basis to suspect that Timberlake was
engaged in criminal activity, even without knowing whether he had a permit.” Id.
We conclude that this reasoning also applies to Sammon’s observation that th ere
was not a license plate displayed on the rear of McGuire’s vehicle as required under Minn.
Stat. § 169.79, subd 6. Just as the officers in Timberlake had a reasonable basis to suspect
criminal activity even though it is legal in Minnesota for a privat e citizen to carry a
permitted gun in public, Sammon had a reasonable basis to suspect a registration violation
even though it is legal in Minnesota for a truck registered in Missouri to have only a front

8
license plate. In both cases, the circumstances kn own to the police officers could have
involved either legal activity or illegal activity, and the officers had a reasonable basis to
suspect a violation, even though an investigation might show that there was no violation.
To determine whether McGuire was in violation of the law, Sammon needed to
obtain more information, which is the precise purpose of an investigatory stop. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) (stating that officer may investigate
“possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest”) ;
Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 388 N.W.2d 759, 760 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that
“[s]uspicion of a violation is enough if th e officer can sufficiently articulate the factual
basis for [the] suspicion”). When Sammon decided to stop McGuire’s truck, Sammon had
a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; the stop was not the product of mere
whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.
Affirmed.