Etsegenet Setegn, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1516

Etsegenet Setegn, petitioner,
Respondent,

Hennepin County, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Belay Assefa,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-10-6350

Etsegenet Setegn, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Charles S. Weber, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Belay Assefa, New Brighton, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion for modification of his basic
child-support obligation, appellant father argues that his income has been greatly reduced
by working part-time to pursue graduate studies and was overstated for the purposes of
determining child support. Because appellant has not demonstrated how the district court
abused its discretion in determining that fath er did not establish a substantial change in
circumstances warranting modification of his child-support obligation, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Belay Assefa (father) and re spondent Etsegenet Setegn (mother) share
two minor children. In a 2 010 order predating their marri age dissolution, father was
ordered to pay basic child support of $381 per month.
In August 2016, father first moved for modification of his support obligation. In
support of this request, father explained that he was working part- time to attend graduate
school and had taken out a $10,250 student loan to pay his expenses. In October, a child-
support magistrate (CSM) denied father’s moti on, finding that father’s income while in
school was still “sufficient for the current support obligation and does not warrant any
change in support.” In early November, father moved for district court review of the
CSM’s October order denying modification, arguing that his then-current income was
lower than what the CSM ha d calculated. Because father’s motion for review was
untimely, the district court dismissed it without further review.

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In March 2017, father filed a second mo tion for modification, asking the district
court to “suspend child support” while he co mpleted his graduate studies. A hearing was
held before a second CSM. In an order filed June 5, that CSM also denied father’s motion
to modify, concluding that there had not be en a substantial change in circumstances
rendering his existing child-support order un reasonable and unfair. Father timely sought
review of the CSM’s order in district court. In an order filed August 9, the district court
affirmed the CSM’s order and denied father relief from his child-support obligation.
Father appeals, seeking review of the di strict court order affirming the second
CSM’s denial of his motion for modification.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts review orders addressing motions to modify child support for an
abuse of discretion. Haefele v. Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013). When a
district court affirms a CSM’s decision, th e CSM’s decision becomes the decision of the
district court and subject to our appellate review. See Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d
528, 530 n.2 (Minn. App. 2004 ) (explaining appellate review of decisions made in the
expedited child-support process). While a dist rict court has broad di scretion in ordering
modifications, it abuses its di scretion when it acts outside the statutory limits set by the
legislature, or when it resolves the question in a manner “that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d. at 708 (quotation omitted).
A district court may modify an existing award for child support if the moving party
shows both a substantial change in circum stances and that the changed circumstances
render the existing child-support order unreas onable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,

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subd. 2(a) (2016); Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Minn. App. 2002). The
party seeking modification of a child-support order has the bu rden to prove a substantial
change in circumstances. Gorz v. Gorz, 552 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Minn. App. 1996).
A substantial change in circumstances th at may warrant a modification of child
support exists if a parent experiences “substantially increased or decreased gross income.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(1). Gross income is defined by statute:
Subject to the exclusions and deductions in this section,
gross income includes any form of periodic payment to an
individual, including, but not limite d to, salaries, wages,
commissions, self-employmen t income, . . . workers’
compensation, unemployment be nefits, annuity payments,
military and naval retirement, pension and disability payments,
spousal maintenance received under a previous order or the
current proceeding, Social Secu rity or veterans benefits
provided for a joint child, . . . and potential income . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2016) (emphasis added). Whether a source of funds is
considered to be income for ch ild-support purposes is a legal question reviewed de novo.
Hubbard Cty. Health & Human Servs. v. Zacher, 742 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. App. 2007).
The CSM found that father has a gross m onthly income of $2,028. That amount
was based on father’s income from his part-tim e job as well as the funds father receives
from his student loan. Using father’s gross monthly income and mother’s gross monthly
income, the CSM calculated a basic child-support obligation for father of $521 per month.
Because that amount is higher than father’s current obligation, the CSM found no basis to
reduce basic child support. The CSM conclude d that “[father] has not demonstrated any

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decrease in his income or earning ability”1 and that “there has not been a substantial change
in circumstances that renders the existing child support order unreasonable and unfair.”
Father challenges that determination, arguing that the CSM miscalculated his gross
income, specifically, by improperly consider ing his potential summer work, teaching-
assistant position, and student-l oan distribution as sources of income. We address those
issues.
Although father’s teaching-assistant income and summer-work income were
included in calculating his gross income to determine his child-support obligation in the
October 2016 order, they were no t considered in the June 2 017 order, which is the order
under review. Rather, in the June 2017 or der, only father’s part-time-work income and
student-loan distributions were used to calculate his income. Father’s assignment of error
based on his potential summer work and on a teaching-assistant position is therefore
without merit.
Turning to the student-loan issue, father argues that his student-loan distributions
were erroneously included as gross mont hly income based on the entire $10,250-per-
semester distribution, rather th an based on the amount of lo an money left over after his

1 The CSM also found that fath er “remains voluntarily unde remployed as determined in
the Order dated October 5, 2016.” While father does not appear to directly challenge the
voluntarily-underemployed finding, we note that, regardless, this finding would not impact
the outcome of father’s appeal. First, fath er forfeited his opportunity to challenge the
voluntarily-underemployed determination made in the October 2016 order. Second, the
findings of voluntary underemployment in the October 2016 order and in the order
currently under review did not impact father’s support obligation; in fact, neither CSM
used it as a basis to impute additional income to father. As discussed below, the CSM, in
the order under review, calculated father’s support obligation based only on his actual gross
monthly income.

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educational expenses were paid . Father provided documents showing that he received a
$10,250 student loan for his 2017 fall semester. While father asserts that “in Fall 2017, out
of $10,250 I borrowed, the University deducted $9,269.67 and refunded me only $871.03
on September 15, 2017 at the beginning of th e semester,” he prov ided no documentation
to support this assertion.
Father has a duty to present this court “with a record which is sufficient to show the
alleged errors and all matters necessary for consideration of the questions presented.”
Truesdale v. Friedman, 267 Minn. 402, 404, 127 N.W.2d 277, 279 (1964). Error is never
presumed on appeal; “[i]t must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal[.] . . . [And] the burd en of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”
Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 216 Minn. 489, 495, 13 N.W.2d 46 1, 464-65 (1944). “When an
appellant acts as attorney pro se, appellate courts are disposed to disregard defects in the
brief, but that does not relieve appellants of the necessity of providing an adequate record
and preserving it in a way th at will permit review.” Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Morse ,
451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
Father complains that the CSM included the full distribution of his student loan in
determining his gross monthly income. Bu t father did not produce any documentation
showing how his 2017 student-loa n distribution was used. Fath er thus did not establish
whether all, none, or some of the loan proc eeds were left over after paying educational
expenses and might properly be subject to inclusion as gro ss income. He thus fails, on
appeal, to present a record that is sufficient to demonstrate error in the calculation of his
gross income and to demonstrate what, if any, impact such error would have on the

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determination of whether child-support modifi cation is warranted. Consequently father
has failed to meet his burden of showing that the district c ourt abused its discretion in
concluding that there is no substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of
father’s child-support obliga tion under Minn. Stat. § 518A.3 9, subd. 2. We express no
opinion on what result would be reached on a more fully developed record.
Affirmed.