Julia Wang, d/b/a Orchid Massage Spa, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1520

Julia Wang,
d/b/a Orchid Massage Spa,
Relator,

vs.

City of Minneapolis,
Respondent.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Minneapolis Department of Regulatory Services

Ryan Kaess, Kaess Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Joel M. Fussy, Assistan t City Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Julia Wang challenges a decision by respondent City
of Minneapolis denying her license-renewal application for a massage and bodywork
business. Because the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is
neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm.

2
FACTS
Relator Julia Wang operated a massage and bodywork business in the City of
Minneapolis. In 2016, the city sent two inspectors to the business to investigate complaints
involving male spa cu stomers. The inspectors were experienced business license
inspectors, one of whom had “extensive and pa rticularized expertise and training” in sex
trafficking and commercial sex businesses.
Upon arrival, the inspectors noticed unusual parking activity. The business’s large,
plate glass front window was broken and comple tely covered with plywood. Inside, one
of the massage rooms was occupied by a ma le customer and a female masseuse, who
immediately closed the room’s door upon seeing the inspectors. Wang was not present at
the location. Instead, an unidentified woman in the reception area stated that she was
watching the business while Wang was away. Inspectors found a large amount of food,
cooking equipment, beds, clothing and personal effects inside, suggesting that the business
was used for “long-term and overnight residence by some of the workers, consistent with
massage parlors utilized for illicit trafficking and commercial sex.” Further investigation
revealed that Wang advertised the business exclusively on the BackPage website using
sexually suggestive photographs and copy consistent with commercial sex advertisements.
Wang filed a license-renewal application in 2017. Minneapolis city staff reviewed
the application and recommended that it be de nied because the business violated several
provisions of the Minnesota Code of Or dinances (MCO), including (1) MCO § 286.80
(2018), requiring all massage a nd bodywork establishments to be open to inspection by
city officials during business hours and be ca pable of providing employment records for

3
each employee; (2) MCO § 259.250(2) (2018), requiring a licensee to maintain and operate
the business in compli ance with Minneapolis laws and or dinances, including ordinances
related to the exterior maintenance of th e business; and (3) MC O § 286.100, prohibiting
unlawful acts on the premises.
Wang sought administrative review and the matter came on fo r an evidentiary
hearing before an Administrative Hearing O fficer (the AHO). The AHO found that the
evidence, “taken in [i ts] totality and viewed through th e expertise of the city staff,”
constituted “substantial and credible evidence that the establishment . . . would likely fail
to comply with applicable laws and requirements and has as a purpose . . . the facilitation
of, or acquiescence to, illicit commercial sex activities.” Based upon these findings, the
AHO concluded that the city had good cause to deny the license-renewal application
because the business was presently in violation of city ordinances. Consequently, the AHO
recommended that Wang’s application for renewal of the business’s massage and
bodywork establishment license be denied by the city co uncil. The city council voted
unanimously to deny renewal of the business license, and this certiorari appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
An action undertaken by a municipal government may be either quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial in nature. See Zweber v. Credit River Twp ., 882 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn.
2016). “City council action is quasi-judicial a nd subject to certiorari review if it is the
product or result of discretionary investig ation, consideration, and evaluation of
evidentiary facts.” Mathews v. City of Vill. of Minnetonka Beach , 899 N.W.2d 881, 882
(Minn. App. 2017). Discretionary licensing decisions are generally regarded as quasi-

4
judicial acts. See Lam v. City of St. Paul , 714 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn. App. 2006). We
review a quasi-judicial decision rendered by a city using a limited and “nonintrusive”
standard of review, and we will only reverse the city council’s decision if it was “arbitrary,
oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any
evidence to support it.” Dietz v. Dodge County , 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992)
(quotation omitted). Under this standard, we do not substitute our own findings of fact for
those of the city or engage in de novo review of conflicting evidence. Sawh v. City of Lino
Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2012); see also Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d
298, 303 (Minn. App. 2007) ( cautioning reviewing court against retrying facts or making
credibility determinations). In stead, we will uphold a city council’s decision “if the city
has explained how it derived its conclusion and the city’s conclusion is reasonable on the
basis of the record.” Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 635 (quotation omitted).
We determine that the city council’s decision is reasonable and sufficient evidence
in the record supports the city’s denial of the license-renewal application. The evidence in
the record supports a determination that Wang violated city ordinances by failing to provide
employment records for each employee upon request during the inspection; MCO § 286.80;
by failing to properly maintain the business premises under Minneapolis’s building codes;
id. at § 259.250(2); and by engaging in unlawful acts; id. at § 286.100(7).
First, the record demonstrates that Wang left an unidentified woman in charge of
the business and failed to keep employment re cords on the premises. During business
hours, massage and bodywork establishments “shall be open to inspection by city . . . and
license inspectors” and, upon demand, “any pe rson engaged in providing services in any

5
licensed premises shall identify himself/herself giving his/her true legal name and his/her
correct address.” MCO § 286.80(a). Additionally,
[e]mployment records, including copies of documents used to
determine the employee, agent or contractor is eighteen (18)
years of age or older, for each employee employed by a
licensed massage and bodywork establishment shall be kept at
the licensed premises and available for immediate review upon
request of a city officer.
Id. at 286.80(b).
Here, the inspectors did not encounter the spa owner or a business manager on the
premises when they arrived. Instead, Wang left an unidentified woman in charge of the
business while she ran errands. At the administrative hearing, Wang provided inconsistent
testimony regarding the woman’s identity, clai ming at various times that she was an
employee, was not an employee, or was there for a job interview. The woman lacked any
identification. Wang was similarly unable to produce a list of employees or copies of their
legal identification, as required by the city ordinance. During the hearing, Wang conceded
that she did not keep identification records at the business location but could access the
records on her cell phone. Wang later provi ded the city with copies of employment
agreements, most of which were dated after the inspection. The re cord supports the city
council’s determination that Wang’s inabili ty to produce employment records for her
employees constitutes a violation of code ordinance § 286.80.
Next, the evidence shows that Wang committed an aggravat ed building code
violation by failing to maintain the building ex terior in violation of MCO § 259.250(2).
This ordinance provides that a licensee is responsible for main taining and operating a

6
business in compliance with “a ll applicable laws and ordina nces, including . . . building
codes.” Id. The building code further articulates that “[w]indows . . . may be temporarily
boarded only for security reas ons when the building is vacan t and is unoccupied,” for a
period not to exceed 60 days. Id. at § 85.100(g) (2018). Here, the business’s large, plate
glass front window was broken and completely covered with plywood. The business was
not “vacant” or “unoccupied.” Id. The city ordered Wang to repair the window to comply
with the city’s building codes. Wang later told a city inspector that the window was
repaired. Wang stated that her landlord re placed the original plywood covering with a
metal covering, painted to match the exterior of the building. Wang also argued that the
repair was taking longer than expected because her insurance company was having
difficulty finding a replacement window, “due to the odd shap e of [the] window and the
huge size of [the] glass.” However, city o fficials performed a follow-up inspection and
discovered that the window was still broken and boarded up with plywood several months
later. The city council charact erized the violation as an “aggravated” violation due to
Wang’s delay in making the required repairs and her misrepresentations to city staff. The
evidence supports the city council’s determination that Wang failed to maintain her place
of business in violation of MCO §§ 259.250(2) and 85.100(g).
Lastly, the record supports a determination that Wang’s license-renewal application
was properly denied under MCO § 286.100, which prohibits unl awful acts. This section
makes it unlawful for any person in a massa ge and bodywork establishment to touch the
genital area of another person or the breasts of any female, to expose or otherwise fail to
conceal one’s genital area or the genital area of another, or to permit anyone under the age

7
of 18 to work in or patroni ze such an establishment, exce pt in limited circumstances not
present here. Id. at (2)-(6). Moreover, the owner, operator, or manager of a massage and
bodywork establishment may not “knowingly . . . cause, allow, suffer or permit in or about
such massage and bodywork establishment any agent, employee, independent contractor
or any other person under his or her control or supervision to perform or allow such acts
prohibited in subsections (2) th rough (6) of this section.” Id. at (7). A business owner
bears direct and vicarious responsibility for any violations of this section occurring on the
business premises. Id.
Acting upon neighbor complaints of susp icious activity near the business, two
experienced city inspectors visited the estab lishment and discovered activity consistent
with the operation of an illegitimate massage parlor. The business was “generally cluttered,
unkempt, uninviting and unprof essional,” and contai ned beds, food, co oking equipment,
clothing, and personal effects, suggesting that the space was used for “long-term and
overnight residence by some of the workers, consistent with massage parlors utilized for
illicit trafficking and commercial sex.” Th e business advertised exclusively on the
BackPage website, which is characterized as “the larg est commercial sex services
advertising platform in the United States.” The advertisements contained “sexually
provocative photographs and copy” that were “consistent with commercial sex
advertisements.” The inspectors testified that this evidence, taken together, suggested that
the massage parlor was being used for illicit trafficking and commercial sex. The AHO
and the city council credited the observations of these “specially-train ed city staff” and
determined that there was a “reasonable conclusion that the facility was not and would not

8
be operated in compli ance with the law and in furtheranc e of the public interest.” The
evidence in the record supports this determination.
Wang argues that the eviden ce does not sufficiently su pport the city’s decision
because it could have been co nstrued in an alternative wa y, namely, that her business
activities were entirely lawful. But we decline to retry the facts or reconsider the city
council’s credibility determinations. Staeheli, 732 N.W.2d at 303. Applying the
deferential standard of review, Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 239, we determine that sufficient
evidence in the record supports the city council’s denial of Wang’s massage and bodywork
license-renewal application.
Wang also suggests that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was
motivated by racial animus. Wang failed to provide any evidence for this contention. And,
on appeal, the burden is on the appealing part y to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the
council’s action. Country Liquors, Inc., v. City Council of Minneapolis, 264 N.W.2d 821,
824 (Minn. 1978). Wang has failed to do so here. We theref ore affirm the city council’s
decision denying Wang’s license-renewal application.1
Affirmed.

1 Wang urges this court to find MCO § 286.80(b) unco nstitutional in light of City of Los
Angeles v. Patel , 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), and Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen.
United States, 825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016 ). Because sufficient facts in the record justify
denial of the license-renewal application on other grounds, we decline to consider Wang’s
constitutional challenge. See In re Senty–Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998)
(“It is well-settled law that cour ts should not reach constituti onal issues if matters can be
resolved otherwise.”).