County of Hennepin, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1539

County of Hennepin,
Respondent,

vs.

Sandip C. Bhakta, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed August 12, 2019
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-14-20893

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Louis K. Robards, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel J. Biersdorf, Ryan R. Simatic, Biersdorf & Assoc iates, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Following a jury verdict awarding appellants minimum-compensation damages for
the condemnation of their motel, appellants argue that the district court abused its
discretion by : (1) denying appellants ’ motion to exclude the expert te stimony of
respondent’s minimum-compensation witness; (2) denying appellants’ motion to exclude
respondent’s minimum-compensation evidence; (3) denying appellants’ motion to exclude
the assessed value of their property; and (4) using its equitable powers to offset appellants’
judgment in accordance with a prior order requiring satisfaction of appellant s’ unpaid tax
liabilities. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Sandip C. Bhakta and Jagruti S. Bhakta (collectively the Bhaktas) were
the owners of a motel located in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. In May 20 12, respondent
County of Hennepin (the county) filed a petition to acquire the Bhaktas’ motel by eminent
domain as part of a project to upgra de County Road 81. On August 14, 2012, the district
court granted the c ounty’s condemnation petition and appointed commissioners to
determine damages resulting from the taking. On August 17, 2012, the county made a
quick-take payment to the Bhaktas of $765,443.
Following administrative hearings and an inspection of the Bhaktas’ parcel, the
commissioners awarded the Bhaktas damages of $760,000. The Bhaktas appealed the
commissioners’ award to the district court. Following trial, the jury awarded the Bhaktas
$810,000 in minimum-compensation damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.187 (2018).

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The district court deducted the quick -take funds already recovered by the Bhaktas
and entered judgment of $44,567 in their favor. Following the county’s successful motion
to offset the judgment by the Bhaktas’ delinquent taxes on the property, the district court
vacated its prior entry of judgment.
The Bhaktas filed their notice of appeal on October 2, 2017. This co urt dismissed
the portions of the appeal pertaining to the district court’s denial of their motions in limine,
because the Bhaktas did not move for a new trial. County of Hennepin v. Bhakta , 907
N.W.2d 908 (Minn. App. 2017), rev’d, 922 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. 2019). The supreme court
reversed and remanded the matter back to this court, holding that a motion for a new trial
was not necessary in order to preserve the Bhaktas’ challenge to the denial of their motions
in limine. County of Hennepin v. Bhakta, 922 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. 2019).
D E C I S I O N
Expert testimony
The Bhaktas argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their
motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the county’s minimum-compensation expert,
Kenneth Helvey. First, the Bhaktas argue that Helvey was prevented from testifying by
operation of Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.03(a), which prevents the admission of improperly
disclosed expert testimony, because the county failed to produce Helvey’s written report
in accordance with the timing requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01(b)(4). Next, the
Bhaktas argue that because Helvey is not a real -estate appraiser, he was not qualified to
provide expert testimony regarding minimum-compensation damages.

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“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42,
45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). “The district court has considerable discretion in
determining the sufficiency of foundation laid for expert opinion . . . . This is a very
deferential standard . . . . the decision of the [district court] . . . will not be reversed absent
clear abuse of discretion.” Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 757, 760-61
(Minn. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
Production of expert report
The Bhaktas argue that the county did not produce Helvey’s ex pert report in
accordance with the timing requirements of rule 26.01(b)(4), and therefore he should have
been precluded from testifying. The Bhaktas assert that Helvey’s expert report was not
disclosed to them until the eve of trial. In support of this assertion, the Bhaktas rely on the
county’s response to interrogatory 7, wherein the Bhaktas asked the county to: “Identify
any minimum-compensation report, as that term is defined by Minn. Stat. § 117.187 that
Petitioner intends on introducing at trial.” The county responded: “See appraisal report
and hearing testimony of Jason Messner. See also hearing testimony of Ken Helvey[.] The
county may supplement the minimum compensation information to be offered at trial and
will supplement this answer in that event.” The county supplemented its response to
interrogatory 7 as follows: “There is no minimum-compensation report.”
Regardless o f whether Helvey’s analysis was properly subject to the Bhaktas ’
request for disclosure in interrogatory 7, the issue on appeal is whether the county provided

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a written expert report supporting Helvey’s proposed testimony in accordance with the
timing requirements of rule 26.01(b)(4). The county asserted, and the district court found,
that Helvey’s expert report was provided to the Bhaktas in 2012. On this basis, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bhaktas ’ motion to exclude Hel vey’s
expert testimony for failure to timely produce an expert report in accordance with rule
26.01(b)(4).
Competency to testify
The Bhaktas also argue that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
exclude Helvey’s testimony on the bas is that he was not competent to testify as an expert
witness. The Bhaktas assert that minimum -compensation damages can only be based on
the appraised value of comparable properties within the community, and because Helvey
is not an appraiser, he was unqua lified to opine on the Bhaktas’ minimum -compensation
damages.
The Bhaktas rely on the following language from this court’s opinion in County of
Dakota v. Cameron: “We discern no reason not to rely on traditionally utilized market -
value approaches when d etermining damages under the minimum -compensation statute.”
812 N.W.2d 851, 861 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 2013). The
Bhaktas assert that this language mandates that testimony regarding minimum -
compensation damages can only take the f orm of market-value appraisals of comparable
property, but this argument ignores both the cited language from Cameron and the
remainder of that opinion. This court stated only that it could “discern no reason not to
rely” on traditional market value when estimating damages. Id. We did not state that only

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traditional market value may be relied upon, nor did we state that traditional market-value
appraisals are required. See id.
Just one paragraph above the passage cited by the Bhaktas, this court stated:
“Although the list or offer price may be an appropriate consideration when a comparable
property in the community is available for purchase at the time of the taking, it is not t he
only basis for a damages calculation under the minimum -compensation statute.” Id. The
Bhaktas assert that Helvey was not qualified to provide expert testimony because his
minimum-compensation analysis was based on the list prices of available properti es.
Because the precedent that the Bhaktas rely upon allows for the consideration of list price
when a comparable property is available for purchase , the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding Helvey competent to provide expert testimony.
Minimum-compensation evidence
Similar to their motion to exclude Helvey’s testimony, the Bhaktas argue that the
district court abused its discretion in denyi ng their motion to exclude the c ounty’s
minimum-compensation evidence, because it was based up on the list price of properties
available for purchase, and did not define the community. As discussed above, because
this court stated in Cameron that list price “may be an appropriate consideration” when
determining the value of comparable property within the community, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the county’s minimum -compensation
evidence on this basis. See id.
The minimum -compensation statute provides a remedy to displaced property
owners so that they recei ve compensation sufficient to purchase a comparable property

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within the community. Minn. Stat. § 117.187; see also Cameron , 839 N.W.2d at 708
(“[T]he phrase ‘comparable property’ in the minimum -compensation statute refers to a
piece of property that has enough like characteristics and qualities to another piece of
property that the value of one can be used to determine the value of the other.”). In
Cameron, t he supreme court stated that “[p]roperties located beyond the condemned
property’s ‘community’ cannot provide the basis for damages under the minimum -
compensation statute.” 839 N.W.2d at 706.
The minimum-compensation statute does not define the term “community,” but the
supreme court has defined it for purposes of the statute as: “an identifiable locality that has
a socially or governmentally recognized identity, or a group of such localities. Depending
on the facts of a particular case, the relevant ‘community’ could be a neighborhood, district,
town, village, city, county, region, or other similar locality.” Id. at 706-07. As defined by
the supreme court, “community” is a fluid, fact-specific concept.
Helvey provided the following testim ony regarding his selection of comparable
properties:
Q: And did Mr. Bhakta tell you or give you an area that he
would like to find a motel in?
A: Mr. Bhakta’s goal was to stay within the 694-494 loop.
Q: Did he say anything specifically in Robbinsdale?
A: I don’t recall a discussion about a specific city, but he
definitely was interested in being in the loop.
. . .
Q: Did you look both inside the loop . . . and beyond?
A: Yes. We looked just about anywhere in the general
metro area that we could look.

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Helvey also testified that “[o]ur search is limited to properties that were currently for sale.”
Because the c ounty limited its analysis to for -sale properties, it expanded the Bhaktas’
preferred community of the 694-494 loop of Minneapolis-St. Paul to the greater-metro area
of Minneapolis-St. Paul. Helvey testified: “We began our search trying to find something
inside the belt line, but those were difficult properties to identify . . . . So then we just
continued to expand . . . our circle of analysis unti l we could find properties that were for
sale.”
The county justified its expansion of the relevant community for the purposes of its
minimum-compensation analysis due to its difficulty in locating comparable properties
available for purchase, but a prope rty does not need to be available in order to form the
basis of a minimum-compensation analysis, because the statute is a damages remedy only.
See id. at 710 (“ [W]e conclude that the phrase ‘comparable property’ in the minimum -
compensation statute refers to an existing property —regardless of its availability for
purchase—that has enough like characteristics . . . that the value of one can be used to
determine the value of the other.”) (Emphasis added.)
While the county improperly relied exclusively on properties available for purchase
in its characterization of the relevant community, the issue on appeal is whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying the Bhaktas ’ motion to exclude the county’s
minimum-compensation evidence. Although the s upreme court opinion in Cameron
clearly states that properties beyond the relevant community cannot form a basis for
damages, it also states that the relevant community is a fact -specific issue. Id. at 706-07.
Because the relevant community is a fact que stion, the district court did not abuse its

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discretion by allowing the county to present its evidence, which the Bhaktas sought to rebut
on cross -examination, that the relevant community for the purpose of an award of
minimum-compensation damages constituted the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area.
Tax-assessment evidence
The Bhaktas argue that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence
of the tax -assessed value of the property. The Bhaktas assert that tax assessments are
irrelevant to a property’s market value. They also argue that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing the Brooklyn Park city assessor to testify, because he did not produce
an expert report.
Admissibility of tax assessments
The Bhaktas principally rely on a tax case, EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. County of
Hennepin, 723 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 2006), and a bankruptcy case, In re Slovak, 489 B.R.
824 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2013), both of which are distinguishable.
In denying t he Bhaktas’ motion to exclude, the district court relied on County of
Ramsey v. Miller , which provides that “[s]ince all relevant evidence relating to market
value should be admissible . . . . the assessed valuation of the property as shown in the
county auditor’s records should be admissible as bearing upon the fair market value of the
property.” 316 N.W.2d 917 , 922 (Minn. 1982). Contrary to this statement of presumed
admissibility, the Bhaktas rely on the following language from EOP-Nicollet Mall:
Regarding relevancy, we conclude that the tax court did not
abuse its discretion. EOP’s contention at trial was that the
assessed value of these four properties was relevant to whether
[the county assessor] properly valued the four properties under
the sales comparison approach. . . . The tax court’s ruling is in

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accord with the rule that the assessed value of property for tax
purposes, in and of itself, is generally not admissible as direct
evidence of value for purposes other than taxation of that
property.

723 N.W.2d at 283 (quotation omitted). EOP-Nicollet Mall does not hold that assessed
value is per se inadmissible, but rather provides that assessed value is not admissible “in
and of itself,” “as direct evidence of value for purposes other than taxation.” Id., see also
Slovak, 489 B.R. at 826 (“Generally, the assessed value of a property for tax purposes is
not considered direct evidence of a property’s market value.”) (Emphasis added.)
The county did not offer the assessed value of the Bhaktas ’ property as direct
evidence in and of itself of the market value of the property. The county introduced,
through the testimony of Jason Messner, an independent real estate appraiser, the appraised
market value of the property as of September 2011—when the county offered to purchase
the property—and September 2012—when the county acquired title to the property. Mr.
Messner also testified that under the sales-comparison appraisal method, the property had
a market value of $675,000, and under the income appraisal method the property had a
market value of $676,000. Because the county did not rely exclusively on the assessed
value of the property as direct evidence of its market value, but instead int roduced its
appraised market value under both the sales -comparison and income methods, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the property’s assessed value as evidence
bearing upon the market value.

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Expert report
The Bhaktas arg ue that the district court erred in allowing the county assessor to
testify because he did not produce an expert report in advance of his testimony. In ruling
on the Bhaktas’ motion to exclude, the district court limited the county assessor’s testimony
to introducing the official records of the property’s assessed value and the Certificate of
Real Estate Value. The district court excluded testimony regarding the methodology
underlying the assessed value and the history of the property’s assessed value. In so ruling,
the district court treated the county assessor as a record keeper, not an expert witness.
Certified copies of public records are self -authenticating documents that do not
require extrinsic evidence of authenticity . Minn. R. Evid. 902(4). Because the district
court limited his testimony to the information contained in the official records, he was
treated as a lay witness custodian of records. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the county assessor to testify despite the lack of an expert report.
Unpaid-tax offset
The Bhaktas argue that the district court erred by using its equitable powers to offset
their judgment by the amount they previously owed for unpaid property taxes. The county
sought to offset the judgment by $1,777.72 for unpaid water charges and $58,887.29 for
unpaid property taxes, but conceded that by operation of Minn. Stat. § 117.187 , the
minimum-compensation award could not be less than the quick-take payment amount.
“The right to set off one judgment against another is . . . an incident of the general
jurisdiction of the [district] court over its suitors and is of an equitable nature.” La Fleur
v. Schiff, 58 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Minn. 1953). “This court will reverse a district court’s

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equitable remedy only if the district court abuses its discretion. A district court abuses its
discretion if its decision is against the facts in the record or if its ruling is based on an
erroneous view of the law.” State ex rel. Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet Cty.
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 799 N.W.2d 619, 6 25 (Minn. App. 2011) (citations and quotation
omitted).
The Bhaktas argue that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that
they remained liable for property taxes following the condemnation of their property. The
Bhaktas did not challenge the district court’s finding that they failed to pay taxes levied
against the property in 2009, 2010, and 2011 totaling $58,877.29. The c ounty acquired
title to the property in August 2012. The Bhaktas rely on State by Spannaus v. King
Props., Inc. for the proposition that “since property tax liens are not personal, the obligation
to pay passe[s] with the title.” 363 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 1985) . The Bhaktas
therefore assert that thei r obligations regarding the unpaid taxes on the property were
extinguished when the state took title in August 2012.
This court went on to state in King Props. that “[i]t may well be that some inequity
arises in this situation. However, this problem is better addressed in direct negotiations,
the Commissioner’s award, or with the legislature.” Id. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 272.68
(2018), “[w]hen . . . a political subdivision of the state . . . acquires a fee interest in property
before forfeiture, by any means, provision must be made to pay all taxes, including all
unpaid special assessments and fut ure installments thereof, unpaid on the property at the
date of acquisition.”

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In its order granting the county’s petition to acquire the Bhaktas’ property , the
district court ordered that “the District Court Administrator shall, from the deposited funds,
pay to the Hennepin County Assessor such amounts as are levied and pending against the
Properties as special assessments or other annual charges that may be or become a lien
thereon as of the dat e of transfer of title.” Provision was therefore made for the payment
of the delinquent taxes at the time the county took title to the property. T he district court
provided that the unpaid taxes would be deducted from the quick -take award, which was
never done.
The Bhaktas’ attorney argues that the judgment should not have been offset because
he possessed a superior lien on the award. The attorney possessed a statutory lien “upon
the interest of [ his] client in any money or property involved in or affected by any action
or proceeding in which [he] may have bee n employed, from the commencement of the
action.” See Minn. Stat. § 481.13, subd. 1(a)(2) (2018). The attorney also possessed a lien
“upon [the] judgment . . . . from the time of giving notice of the claim to the judgment
debtor. Th[is] lien . . . is subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the action
or proceeding.” Id., subd. 1(b) (2018).
While the Bhaktas argue that this is a matter of lien priority, their lawyer misstates
the issue on appeal . As required by Minn. Stat. § 272.68, provision was made for the
satisfaction of the Bhaktas ’ delinquent taxes at the time the county acquired title to the
property. The district court ordered the court administrator to withhold from the quick -
take funds the amount owed by the Bhaktas for un paid taxes. This was never done.
Because provision was made for the payment of the delinquent taxes at the time title was

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transferred, the district court did not abuse its discretion in using its equitable powers to
offset the Bhaktas’ judgment in accordance with its August 2012 order granting title to the
county.
Affirmed.