In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of Renewal of Therapeutic Massage License Numbers EMT-13217 and TM15-13217

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1545

In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial of
Renewal of Therapeutic Massage
License Numbers EMT-13217 and TM15-13217

Filed June 11, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

City of Burnsville
File Nos. EMT-13217, TM15-13217

Rachel K. Nelson, Law Offices of Rachel K. Nelson, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
relators Yuanping Huang and Burnsville Bodyworks)

Matthew Brokl, Shana N. Conklin, Campbell Knutson Professional A ssociation, Eagan,
Minnesota (for respondent City of Burnsville)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Yuanping Huang, owner of Burnsville Bodyworks,
challenges the decision of respondent City of Burnsville to deny her application for renewal
of an individual massage-therapist license. Because Huang was denied massage-therapist
licenses by the City of Minneapolis in 2015 and 2017, and those denials are a proper basis
for denial of an individual massage-therapist license by Burnsville, we affirm.

2
FACTS
Beginning in 2013, Huang was licensed as an “individual massage therapist” by
Burnsville under Burnsville’s city code.
In early 2015, Huang applied for a “massage and bodywork establishment license”
from Minneapolis under that city’s code. Minneapolis denied the license. The denial letter
stated that the city had received “[c]om munity and Minneapolis Police Department
complaints” that the business wa s operating in a manner “that is not consistent with the
regulations of a massage and bodywork establishment” and that approval of the license was
“not in the public interest.”
In late 2016, Patrick Orth, then the ow ner of Burnsville Bodyworks (where Huang
worked as a massage therapist), also app lied for a massage-and-bodywork-establishment
license from Minneapolis for th e business Massage Meadows. Following an evidentiary
hearing (at which Huang was present), a Minneapolis administrative hearing officer issued
a decision recommending denial of Orth’s application. The hearing officer found that
Huang had previously been denied a license from Minneapolis; that Orth’s application
failed to disclose Huang’s involvement in Ma ssage Meadows; that Huang had paid Orth
$33,000 to use his name on the application and not, as Orth claimed, as payment for house
painting; that Huang “us[ed] aliases to recr uit Chinese women from different states using
promises of making unrealistic amounts of money”; and that online advertisements for
Burnsville Bodyworks containe d pictures “of a man on a massage table with a woman
wearing lingerie on his back” as well as “various therapists’ cleavage,” and language such
as “Brand New & New Pretty Young Girls” and “[T]he girls are very pretty and hot . . . .

3
Just come and enjoy!” The h earing officer concluded that th e license application should
be denied based on false statements and om issions in the application and based on the
obligation of a business to prevent criminal activity arising out of the conduct of the
business. The Minneapolis city council adopted the hearing o fficer’s decision in January
2017.
In May 2017, Burnsville sent Huang a letter indicating that it would not be renewing
her individual massage-therapist license (indi vidual license). The letter stated that non-
renewal was based on the “[d]enial of a massage license in the City of Minneapolis in April,
2015,” “[d]enial of a massage license in the City of Minnea polis in January, 2017,” and
Huang’s “[f]ailure to disclose the above denials on [her] 2016 application for renewal.”
1
Huang appealed the nonrenew al of her individual license to a city administrative
panel. While that appeal was pending, Hu ang indicated that, although Orth was the
putative owner of Burnsville Bodyworks, she was the “actual owner” of the business. She
therefore requested that her appeal be expa nded to encomp ass the transfer of Orth’s
enterprise license from Orth to her, as well as the nonrenewal of that license. 2 T h e
administrative panel concluded that Burnsville properly denied transfer of the enterprise
license and renewal of both licenses.3

1 We note that, because the 2017 denial happened in (of course) 2017, it would have been
impossible for Huang to disclose that denial in a 2016 application.

2 In April of 2017, Burnsville decided not to renew Burn sville Bodywork’s enterprise
license.

3 We explain Burnsville’s licensing scheme for individual and enterprise licenses below.

4
Huang appealed the administ rative panel’s decision to th e Burnsville city council.
The council heard arguments from Huang at a public hearing, and then voted to adopt the
administrative panel’s decision.
Huang petitioned for certio rari review of the individual-license nonrenewal.4
D E C I S I O N
Huang argues that Burnsville wrongly denied her a license. She contends that the
Minneapolis massage-license denials do not pr ovide a basis for denial under Burnsville’s
city code. In addition, she argues that she wa s not obligated to disclose those denials and
thus did not provide false or incomplete information in her license application. She further
argues that Burnsville cannot on appeal assert another basis for denial that was not relied
on by the city council.
I. Standard of Review
Certiorari review of a city council’s deci sion is “confined to questions affecting
whether the order or determination in a pa rticular case was arbitrary, oppressive,
unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theo ry of law, or without any evidence to
support it.” Dead Lake Ass’n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County , 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn.
2005) (quotation omitted). We review factual findings “in the light most favorable to the
decision, and if there is evidence reasonably tending to sustain th em, they will not be
disturbed.” Markel v. City of Circle Pines , 479 N.W.2d 382, 383- 84 (Minn. 1992). In
determining whether the city council acted under an erroneous theory of law, we review de

4 Huang does not seek review of the nonrenewal of the enterprise license.

5
novo the city’s interpretation and application of its ordinances. Staeheli v. City of St. Paul,
732 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of
Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980)).
We will uphold a licensing denial so long as at least one of the reasons given for
denial is legally adequate. Cf. Trisko v. City of Waite Park, 566 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn.
App. 1997) (“[A] city’s denial of a land use request is not arbitrary when at least one of the
reasons given for the denial satis fies the rational basis test.”), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 25, 1997).
II. Bases for License Denial
Burnsville provides three bases for refusing to renew Huang’s individual license, all
of which Huang challenges. Firs t, the city code permits deni al of licenses to applicants
that have been refused a massage-therapist license in another juri sdiction. Burnsville,
Minn., City Code (BCC) § 3-15 -3(A)(7)(c) (2017). Second, the city code permits denial
of licenses to applicants that falsely answer a question on the application form. Id. (A)(3)
(2017). And third, while not cite d below by the city council as a basis for denial in this
case, the city code permits the city council to base nonr enewal “upon any additional
grounds which they may, in their sole discretion, impose.” BCC § 3-15-6(C) (2017). We
begin with the first basis.
Under Burnsville’s ordinances governing therapeutic massage, the city manager
“shall approve the issuance of a license by the city to an applicant . . . unless the manager
finds” one or more potentially disqualifying ci rcumstances to be true. BCC § 3-15-3(A).
One such circumstance is that “[a]n applicant or any employee, contractor or other person

6
associated with the business or performing massages at the licensed premises or as part of
the licensed business . . . [h]as had a massage therapist license revoked or denied by a state,
city or other licensing authority within five (5) years.” BCC § 3-15-3(A)(7)(c). Burnsville
found that Minneapolis had “issued denials of two massage therapy license applications
that involved Ms. Huang and her business” and concluded that t hose denials warranted
denial of her license renewal under this subsection.
Huang contends that Burnsville acted under an erroneous theory of law, arguing that
the licenses denied by Minneapolis were not “massage therapist license[s] . . . denied by a
. . . city” under BCC § 3-15-3(A)(7)(c). Burn sville, on the other hand, argues that the
Minneapolis license denials were such deni als. Resolution of this issue requires
interpretation of the phrase “massage therapist licenses denied by a city.”
We interpret ordinances in the same way we interpret statutes. In re Haslund, 781
N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2010). “Our first task is to dete rmine whether the language of
the [ordinance] is ambiguous.” J.D. Donovan, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 878 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Minn. 2016). An ordinance is ambiguous “if it is unclear or reasonably susceptible
to more than one reason able interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). Assessing whether
an ordinance is ambiguous “does not depend on a reading of words or phrases in isolation.”
Id. Instead, we “read and construe [the ordinance] as a whole and interpret each section in
light of the surrounding sections.” Eng’g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co.,
825 N.W.2d 695, 711 (Minn. 20 13) (quotation omitted). In do ing so, “we interpret [the
ordinance], whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions.” Id. (quotation
omitted). If we conclude that an ordinance is ambiguous, then we must attempt to

7
“ascertain and effectuate the inten tion” of the legislative body. Cannon v. Minneapolis
Police Dep’t , 783 N.W.2d 182, 194 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2008)).
An understanding of the parties’ competi ng arguments about the phrase “massage
therapist license denied by a city” requires review of Burnsville’s and Minneapolis’s
ordinances governing massage services. Burnsville’s city code requires persons and
businesses providing therapeutic massage services to be licen sed. BCC § 3-15-2 (2017).
Burnsville issues what it calls “individual massage therapis t licenses” and “enterprise
license[s].” Id. An enterprise license enables the holder to lawfully operate a “therapeutic
massage business.” See BCC §§ 3-15-1, -2 (2017). An individual massage-therapist
license enables the holder to “practice[] or administer[] therapeutic massage.” BCC § 3-
15-1. For an individual therapist to lawf ully work at an establishment providing
therapeutic-massage services to the public, the therapist must have an individual massage-
therapist license and the establishment must have an enterprise license. BCC § 3-15-2.
Minneapolis issues what it calls “massage and bodywork establishment licenses.”
Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances (MCO) § 286.20 (2017). Such licenses are issued
to a “person” and enable the person to lawfully operate “a massage and bodywork
establishment.” Id. Huang argues that Minneapolis, unlike Burnsville, does not require
licensure of individuals who perform massag es at, but do not operate, a massage and
bodywork establishment. Burnsville disagrees with Hu ang’s interpretation of the
Minneapolis ordinance. For purposes of our analysis, ho wever, we assume without

8
deciding that Minneapolis’s scheme differs from Burnsville’s in the manner claimed by
Huang.
Huang argues that a “massage therapist license denied by a city” in BCC § 3-15-
3(A)(7)(c) is limited to individual-therapist-license denials—that is, the denial of a license
to an individual to perform massage therapy. To support her argument, Huang narrowly
focuses on the first two words of that phrase, “massage therap ist,” and directs us to the
definition of massage therapis t in the Burnsville city code . In that code, “massage
therapist” is defined as “[a] person who pr actices or administers therapeutic massage.”
BCC § 3-15-1. Based on the definition of that term—which is part of the larger phrase
“massage therapist license denied by a city”— Huang’s interpretation of the language is
reasonable.
Burnsville, on the other hand, takes a broader view, arguing that “massage therapist
license denied by a city” is not limited to deni als of individual massage-therapist licenses
as they are defined in Burnsville’s code but rather includes any massage-therapy license
denial under other jurisdictions’ licensing sche mes. As noted abov e, in considering
whether a statute is ambiguous, we do not read its words in isolation, but rather “interpret
[the ordinance], whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions[,] . . . interpret[ing]
each section in light of the surrounding sections.” Eng’g & Constr. Innovations, Inc., 825
N.W.2d at 711 (quotation omitted). Looking at the language of the chapter governing
massage licenses as a whole, we find instructive that, when referring to individual licenses,
the ordinance requiring such lic enses refers to them as “ individual massage therapist
licenses.” BCC § 3-15-2 (emphasis added). That modifier, “individual,” also appears

9
when discussing licensing fees. BCC § 3-15-4 (2017). The term “individual” is notably
absent, however, from subsection 7(c). This absence suggests that the phrase “massage
therapist license denied by a city” in subsection 7(c) is not limited to individual-license
denials but rather may comprehend other t ypes of massage-therapy-license denials.
Burnsville’s interpretation of the language of the phrase is thus also reasonable.
Because the language of BCC § 3-15-3(A)(7)(c ) is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, we conclude that the ordinance is ambiguous. We therefore “may resort to
canons of construction” to resolve the ambiguity. Figgins v. Wilcox, 879 N.W.2d 653, 656
(Minn. 2016). Our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention” of the city in passing
the ordinance. See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud , 813 N.W.2d 68, 72-73 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted) (“If the words are not free of ambiguity, the court may look beyond the
statutory language to ascertain the Legislatur e’s intent.”). In interpreting the ordinance,
we may consider the object to be attained. See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532,
537 n.4 (Minn. 2013 ) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016) (listing
factors for consideration in determining legisl ative intent). In addition, we are guided by
the presumption that the city intended the entire ordinance to be effective and not lead to
an absurd or unreas onable result. See Cannon, 783 N.W.2d at 194; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.17 (2016).
The object to be obtained by section 3-15-3(A) is to set out the criteria under which
the Burnsville city manager may refuse to approve the issuance of a license. BCC § 3-15-
3(A). And the specific object of subsection 7(c) is to permit the city manager to rely on
recent (within five years) license denials by Burnsville or by another jurisdiction—“a state,

10
city or other licensing authority”—to refuse a license. Id. (A)(7)(c). Because not all states,
cities, and licensing authorities are likely to use precisely the same definitions or to employ
the identical licensing schemes as Burnsville, subsection 7(c), to be effective, must be read
to apply to comparable denials of massage-therapy licenses sought by the applicant in other
jurisdictions. Here, Huang was the person who applied for the Minneapolis licenses and
her conduct was at issue in the denial of th ose licenses. The Minneapolis license denials
were therefore comparable denials falling within the scope of BCC § 3-15-3(A)(7)(c).5
Additionally, Huang’s narrow interpretation of subsection 7(c) would lead to an
unreasonable result. Notably, the criteria for denying a license under § 3-15-3(A) apply
not just to individual massage-therapist lic enses (as Huang sought here) but also to
enterprise licenses under Burnsville’s code. See id . However, unless section 3-15-
3(A)(7)(c) is read to include more than just individual massage-therapist licenses, no part
of section 3-15-3(A) would allow the denial of an enterprise-license application based on

5 We recognize that, in add ition to arguing that the Burnsv ille ordinance does not extend
to cover the Minneapolis denials, throughou t this litigation Huang has also taken the
position that she was never denied a license of any kind, beca use in 2015 “she withdrew
her application,” and in 2017 she was not the applicant, Orth was. However, the Burnsville
administrative panel found that “[t]he Minneapolis proceedings resulted in the denial of a
massage license for a business, finding that Ms. Huang was the owner of the business.”
We defer to administrative fact-findings so long as “they are reasonably supported by the
evidence in the record.” See Rasidescu v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec. , 644 N.W.2d 504, 506
(Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2002). The record reasonably supports
the administrative panel’s finding that the Minneapolis proceedings were denials to Huang.
In 2015, Huang received a letter denying licensure due to “[c]ommunity and Minneapolis
Police Department complaints,” not because Huang withdrew her application. In 2017, the
Minneapolis hearing officer concluded that Huang was effectively a “part owner or
manager” and that she had paid Orth $33,000 “to use his name on the application.”

11
a previous revocation or denial of an enterprise license. This is an unreasonable result.
Under Huang’s proposed reading, an enterprise-license holder could engage in misconduct
resulting in revocation of the enterprise license, see BCC § 3-15-6(B) (2017); the license
holder could immediately reapply for a new enterprise license; and the city manager would
be required to grant a new enterprise license because that enterprise-license revocation was
not a “massage therapist license” revocation. Instead, we think that, in passing section 3-
15-3(A)(7)(c), Burnsville intended denials of both individual and enterprise licenses to be
grounds for denying an application.
Applying this interpretation, we conclude that, even if Huang’s Minneapolis license
denials were more akin to enterprise-license denials than individual-license denials, they
still constituted adequate grounds under BCC § 3-15-3(A)(7)(c) for Burnsville to refuse to
renew Huang’s individual massage-therapist lic ense. Accordingly, we conclude that
Burnsville did not err in refusi ng to renew Huang’s individual massage-therapist license.
Because we conclude that the Minneapolis denials were adequate grounds for denying
renewal, we do not address the parties’ argum ents regarding other bases for nonrenewal.
See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 815 n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues
raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address this argument.”).
Affirmed.