State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1550

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohammad Bilal Chughtai,
Appellant.

Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-17-886

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Mohammad Bilal Chughtai challenges his conviction of stalking, arguing
that the evidence was in sufficient to prove that he knew or had reason to know that his

2
conduct would cause the victim to feel fright ened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or
intimidated. Chughtai also challenges his conviction of violating a domestic-abuse no-
contact order (DANCO), arguing that the district court committed plain error by allowing
references to the term “domestic abuse” at trial. Finally, Ch ughtai argues that the district
court erred in entering the DANCO-violation conviction because both the stalking and the
DANCO violation arose from a single behavioral incident. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2016, a DANCO was issued against Chughtai, prohibiting him from
contacting his ex-wife, H.B., in any way. Five months later, Chughtai and H.B.
coincidentally had appointments at approximately the same time at the same clinic. At the
clinic, Chughtai, knowing that the DANCO wa s in effect, called H.B.’s name, followed
H.B. to the staircase as she moved to go from the second floor downstairs to the lab, initially
blocked H.B. from going down the stairs, then followed H.B. to the lab, grabbed her by the
arm, and spoke to her. While H.B. checked in with the lab receptionist, Chughtai remained
within about 15 feet of H.B. H.B. called the police. Chughtai had two previous domestic-
violence-related convictions within the past ten years.
The state initially charged C hughtai with two counts of stalking, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subds. 4(b), 5(a) (2 016), and one count of violating a DANCO, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2016), but eventually dropped one of the
stalking charges. Chughtai pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial.
At a pretrial hearing, the parties stipul ated to the existence of two previous
domestic-violence-related convictions. The ju ry found Chughtai guilty of both stalking

3
and violating the DANCO. The penalties for both counts were enhanced to felony levels
based on the previous domestic-violence-relate d convictions. The district court held a
sentencing hearing and adjudicated Chughtai guilty on both counts and sentenced him on
the most serious offense of stalking.
Chughtai appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficient evidence supports Ch ughtai’s conviction of stalking.

Chughtai argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew or should
have known that his conduct would cause the victim to feel frightened or intimidated. To
prove stalking, the state must show, among other things, that “the actor knows or has reason
to know” that his conduct “would cause th e victim under the circumstances to feel
frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749,
subd. 1 (2016). The state does not have to prove specific intent. Id., subd. 1a (2016)
(“[T]he state is not required to prove that th e actor intended to cause the victim to feel
frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated . . . .”).
In considering a claim of insufficient ev idence, an appellate court’s review “is
limited to a painstaking analysis of the reco rd to determine whethe r the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorab le to the conviction, was suffi cient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The
reviewing court must assume “the jury belie ved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). This
assumption “is particularly appropriate when resolution of the case depends on conflicting

4
testimony, as it is the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State
v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 92 (Minn. 2002). Th e reviewing court “will not disturb the
verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the
necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude
that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence showed the
following: A valid DANCO has prohibited Chughtai from contacting H.B. since 2016. On
March 8, 2017, unbeknownst to each other, H.B. and Chughtai bo th had appointments
scheduled at the same clinic around 8:00 a.m. When checking in at the front desk on the
first floor, H.B. noticed Chu ghtai standing in the line. H.B. and Chughtai did not
communicate with each other at that time. H.B. went to the second floor after checking in
and sat on a chair. Chughtai also went to the second floor and, after noticing H.B., sat on
a chair at another area. This action did not cause H.B. any concern.
H.B. was instructed by the clinic personnel to go to the basement for some lab work.
When H.B. was going to the stairs, Chughtai called her name, stood up from the chair, and
went toward her. Chughtai then stood in fr ont of H.B., asking her to forgive him and to
give him a minute, with his hands clasped in a prayer-like manner. H. B. felt frightened.
Chughtai initially blocked H.B. from going down the stairs, but she was able to use other
people as a shield to move around Chughtai. Chughtai followed H.B. to the first floor,
asked H.B. to sit down with him so that they could talk , and grabbed her arm in a
nonaggressive way to try to direct her to a seat. H.B. threw her arm out to break Chughtai’s

5
grip and continued walking downstairs to th e basement, again usi ng other people as a
shield. Chughtai followed H.B. to the basement, calling her name repeatedly.
After H.B. got to the reception area at th e basement, she took out her phone and
called the police, while Chughtai was standing about 15 feet behind her. H.B. later entered
into the lab area, and Chughtai wanted to follow her. One of the receptionists asked H.B.
whether she and Chughtai were together. Beca use she was on the p hone with the police,
H.B. swung her finger back and forth indicating that Chughtai was not with her, and, as a
result, the receptionist did not let Chughtai enter into the lab area with H.B.
Later, the police arrived and arrested Chught ai. H.B. told the police that she felt
upset and frightened and was shivering the whole time that Chughtai was with her.
Chughtai argues that the evid ence was insufficient to sh ow that he knew or had
reason to know that his conduc t would cause H.B. to feel frightened because his actions
were nonviolent. This argument is unpersua sive. “In determining whether there is
sufficient evidence . . . we examine the evidence as a whole.” State v. Hurd, 819 N.W.2d
591, 599 (Minn. 2012). The evidence esta blishes that Chughtai pursued H.B. from the
second floor of the clinic to the basement, blocked her way down, grabbed her arm, called
her name repeatedly, and tried to speak to her. The evidence also establishes that H.B. was
trying to avoid contact with Chughtai the wh ole time. Importantly, Chughtai engaged in
this conduct knowing, as he readily admitted, that a DA NCO protected H.B. from any
contact by him. This context should have given Chughtai reason to know that his actions,
even if they were nonviolent, would cause H. B. to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed,

6
persecuted, or intimidated. The evidence was sufficient to support Chughtai’s conviction
of stalking.
II. The district court did not commit plain error with respect to the DANCO-
violation conviction by allowing the state to use the term “domestic abuse” or
by including the term in the jury instructions.

Chughtai argues that the district court committed plain error with respect to the
DANCO-violation conviction by allowing the state to refer to the DANCO as a “domestic-
abuse no-contact order” at trial and to introduce the DANCO without redacting it to remove
the reference to “criminal domestic abuse” at the top. Chughtai also argues that the district
court committed plain error by including the term “domestic abuse” in the jury instructions.
Chughtai did not object at trial to the use of the term “domestic abuse.” “Ordinarily,
the defendant’s failure to object to an error at trial forfeits appellate consideration of the
issue.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. 2006). In the absence of an objection,
an appellate court may review an issue first raised on appeal for plain error. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 31.02; State v. Pearson, 775 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Minn. 20 09). The plain-error standard
“requires the defendant to show (1) error (2 ) that was plain and (3) that affected the
defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). The
party asserting plain error has the burden of establishing all three elements. State v. Hollins,
765 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Minn. App. 2009). “ If these three prongs are met, the court must
then decide whether it should address the issue in order to ensure fairness and the integrity
of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001) (quotation
omitted). An appellate court may exercise its discretion to correct an unobjected-to error
only after all three plain-error elements are satisfied. Id.

7
“Under the plain-error doctrine, an error is a deviation from a legal rule unless the
rule has been waived.” State v. Kelley , 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014) (quotation
omitted). In the context of jury instructions, a district court has broad discretion. State v.
Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 239 (Minn. 2010). A district court abuses that discretion if its
jury instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State v. Vang , 774
N.W.2d 566, 581 (Minn. 2009). A district court’s instructions “must be read as a whole to
determine whether they accurately describe the law.” Id.
Chughtai argues that it was an error to use the term “domestic abuse” because the
term “injected prejudice and speculation into the trial.” This argument is unpersuasive.
Chughtai was charged and convicted under Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1), which
contains the term “domestic abuse” as part of the statutory language. Minn. Stat. § 629.75
(2016). Chughtai has provided no authority to support his position that it is an error for the
state to use the statutory language for the offe nse or for the district court to include the
statutory language in the jury instructions. Therefore, we conclude that it was not an error
to allow the state to use the term “domestic abuse” at trial or to include it in the jury
instructions.
Because Chughtai does not meet his burde n to show error, we do not address the
remaining plain-error elements. See Montanaro v. State , 802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn.
2011) (stating that if an appellate court finds that any one of the plain-error elements is not
satisfied, it does not need to address any of the others).

8
III. The district court did not err by co nvicting Chughtai of both offenses.

Chughtai argues that the district court e rred in entering both the stalking and the
DANCO-violation convictions because they arose from the same behavioral incident.
The district court, in imposing two conv ictions but only one sentence, relied on
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2016). Section 609.035 app lies “if the multiple offenses
arose out of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Bookwalter , 541 N.W.2d 290, 294
(Minn. 1995). Under this section, “[m]ultiple punishment refers not to convictions but
sentences and any multiple sentences, including concurrent sentences, are barred if the
statute applies.” State v. Scott , 298 N.W.2d 67, 68 (Minn. 19 80). As a result, section
609.035 “allows multiple conv ictions for different [offens es] arising out of a single
behavioral incident.” State v. Papadakis , 643 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted).
“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question
of law and fact, so [an appellate court] review [s] the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error and its application of th e law to those facts de novo.” State v. Bakken , 883
N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016). “[T[he district court’s determination of whether multiple
offenses constitute a single behavioral incident is a factual determination” that will not be
disturbed “unless clearly erroneous.” State v. O’Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 37 (Minn. App.
2008). When the facts are not in dispute, the district court’s decision of whether an offense
is subject to multiple sentences is a ques tion of law that is reviewed de novo. State v.
Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012).

9
At the sentencing hearing, the district cour t concluded, and the parties agreed, that
both offenses arose from a single behavioral incident. The state does not argue otherwise
on appeal. “Under section 609.035, the factor s to be considered in determining whether
multiple offenses constitute a single behavioral act are ti me, place, and whether the
offenses were motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Soto,
562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1997). Applying these factors, we agree that the two offenses
were committed as part of a single behavioral incident. Therefore, the district court, by
imposing only one sentence, correctly applied section 609.035.
Chughtai contends, however, that, becau se both offenses arose from a single
behavioral incident, his DANCO-violation conv iction is prohibited by section 609.04.
Chughtai’s reliance on section 609.04 is misplaced. Section 609.04 prohibits convictions
of both the crime charged and an included offense, a nd lists five situations in which an
offense will be deemed an included offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2016).
Chughtai does not argue that a DANCO viola tion is an included offense of stalking.
Therefore, section 609.04 does not apply here.
Likewise, Chughtai’s reliance on several section 609.04 cases from the Minnesota
Supreme Court is misplaced. Chughtai relies heavily on State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660
(Minn. 2006). In Bertsch, the supreme court addressed whether an offense and an included
offense under section 609.04 were nonetheless subject to separate convictions because they
constituted separate criminal acts. Id. at 664. To analyze that issue, the court analogized
to section 609.035’s single-be havioral-incident inquiry. Id. B u t Bertsch involved an
included offense, and Chughtai cites no auth ority for the proposition that section 609.04

10
prohibits a separate conviction of an offense that arose from the same behavioral incident
as another offense but is not an included offense. For the same reason, Chughtai’s citation
to State v. Pflepsen is not persuasive. 590 N.W.2d 759, 765-66 (Minn. 1999) (vacating
convictions of included offenses).
Chughtai cites another case, which holds that a defendant cannot be convicted twice
of the same offense based on the same act. See State v. Hodges, 386 N.W.2d 709, 710-11
(Minn. 1986) (concluding that section 609.04 bars a defendant from being convicted of
three burglaries based on his single unlawful entry into one dwelling). But Chughtai has
been convicted of two different offenses—not the same offense twice.
Chughtai thus fails to establish that the district court erred in entering separate
convictions of stalking and violating a DANCO.
Affirmed.