A17-1552

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1551
A17-1552

In re the Custody of L. R. W.,
Child of Taylor Marie Woodside and Jeremiah Patrick Johnson

Susan Kathleen Taylor, petitioner,
Respondent,

Jeremiah Patrick Johnson, petitioner,
Appellant (A17-1551),
Respondent (A17-1552),

vs.

Taylor Marie Woodside,
Respondent (A17-1551),
Appellant (A17-1552).

Filed July 23, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File Nos. 07-FA-16-634, 07-FA-15-344

Elizabeth L. Weinandt, Weinandt Law Office, LTD., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent
Susan Kathleen Taylor)

Kezia Smith, Killion Smith Law, Mankato, Minnesota, and

Tami Lynn Peterson, Saxton Peterson Law Firm, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant
Jeremiah P. Johnson)

Amanda Hagen, Hagen Family Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Taylor M.
Woodside)

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Considered and decided by Larkin, Pr esiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Parents challenge the district court’s de termination that its custody and parenting-
time orders are not void for lack of an unspecified type of jurisdiction. Because parents
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by actively participa ting in the proceedings, we
determine that they have effectively waiv ed objections and defe nses to personal
jurisdiction and service of process, and we affirm.
FACTS
Mother T.M.W. and father J.P.J. are the biological parents of a minor child born in
August 2012. The parents never married, but father signed a recognition of parentage
(ROP) after the child’s birth in 2012. See Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (2012) (describing effect
of ROP).1 Mother was the sole legal and physical custodian of the child. After the child
was born, mother and child lived intermittently with S.K.T., the child’s maternal
grandmother, and T.W., the child’s matern al grandfather. The child’s maternal
grandparents are not married to one another and maintain separate homes. During this
time, grandmother frequently kept the child for “weekends and entire weeks at a time.” In

1 The ROP signed by father has “the force and effect of a judgment or order determining
the existence of the parent and child relationship. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 3. An
ROP establishes the parent-child relationship and permits a father to commence an action
to determine parenting time under chapter 518. See Beardsley v. Garcia, 753 N.W.2d 735,
737-38 (Minn. 2008). Because the 2016 amendment did not make substantive changes to
the ROP statute, we reference the 2012 statute.

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May 2014, mother told grandfather that she wa s unable to care for the child. The child
came to live with grandmother permanently in May 2014, and has lived continuously with
grandmother since that time.
In January 2015, grandmother and moth er submitted a proposed custody consent
decree for approval in Blue Earth County Dist rict Court File No. 07-FA-15-344, seeking
to transfer temporary legal and temporary p hysical custody of the child to grandmother
under Minn. Stat. § 257C.07. The consent decree recognized that mother placed the child
in grandmother’s care “regularly from the ti me of his birth” and grandmother “accepted
the caregiving responsibility, including resp onsibility for medical and/or emergency
caregiving. . . .” The district court judge si gned the decree, establishing temporary legal
and temporary physical custody of the child with grandmother. Father was not served with
notice of these proceedings.
In September 2015, mother filed a motion for parenting time. After participating in
a neutral evaluation, grandmother and mother agreed that grandmother would have sole
legal and sole physical custody of child, a nd mother would have parenting time. The
district court judge signed the stipulation and order for custody, parenting time, and child
support in March 2016. Father was not served with notice of these proceedings.
In February 2016, one month before the court signed the stipulation and order in
mother’s case, father filed a summons and petition to establish custody and parenting time
in Blue Earth County District Court File No . 07-FA-16-634. Father sought an award of
parenting time and joint physical and joint le gal custody with grandmother. Because the
existing custody order awarded temporary sole legal and temporary sole physical custody

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of the child to grandmother, father served his summons and petition upon grandmother but
not mother. Father and grandmother participated in a neutral evaluation and, in July 2016,
submitted a stipulation and pro posed order for custody, pare nting time, and judgment to
the court. The stipulation acknowledged that there was “an existing Order regarding the
custody of and parenting time for the minor ch ild. . . .” Father and grandmother agreed
that grandmother would retain sole legal and sole physical custody of the child and father
would be entitled to parenting tim e. The district court signe d the proposed order in July
2016 and entered judgment on the order.
In April 2017, father moved to vacate the January 2015 custody consent decree and
the March 2016 parenting-time order between grandmother and mother, as well as the July
2016 order based on the stipulation between grandmother and father. Father’s motion does
not reference any particular statute or court rule upon which his moti on to vacate relies.
Nevertheless, father asserted that all of the orders were void because the court lacked an
unspecified type of jurisdicti on. The district court denied the motion, and father and
mother filed separate appeals, which we consolidated.
D E C I S I O N
Parents argue that the district court lack ed jurisdiction over the custody proceedings
involving their child. “Jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and decide disputes.”
McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights , 883 N.W.2d 580, 584-85 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted) (distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from claim-
processing rules). The Supreme Court cautions us to “use[] th e label ‘jurisdictional’ . . .
only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the

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persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S. Ct. 906, 915 (2004).2
At the outset, we clarify the distinctions between subject-matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the type
of dispute at issue and to grant the type of relief sought.” Seehus v. Bor–Son Constr., Inc.,
783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010). Defects in subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time in the proceeding, including for the first time on appeal. Cochrane v. Tudor
Oaks Condo. Project , 529 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn.
May 31, 1995). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by the consent
of the parties. Seehus, 783 N.W.2d at 147. Personal jurisdiction, by contrast, “refers to a
court’s power to decide the rights and in terests of the parties in a lawsuit.” H.A.W. v.
Manuel, 524 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995).
“[S]ervice of process is th e means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. . . .” McCullough & Sons, Inc. , 883 N.W.2d at 590. Unlike subject-matter
jurisdiction, parties may waive a challenge to personal jurisdiction. Hanson v. Woolston,
701 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2005); see also
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (noting that lack of personal jurisdiction is an affirmative defense);
Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08 (noting that certain defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction,

2 Appellants’ argument assumes that the matter is jurisdictional in nature, and uses the term
imprecisely. “[C]ourts and parties often us e concepts and language associated with
‘jurisdiction’ imprecisely to refer to, am ong other things, nonjurisdictional claims-
processing rules or nonjurisdictional limits on a court’s authority to address a question.”
Moore v. Moore , 734 N.W.2d 285, 287 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 18, 2007).

6
are waived if not raised by motion or pleading); McCullough & Sons, Inc., 883 N.W.2d at
590 (noting that unlike a defect in a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, parties can waive
defects in personal jurisdiction).
Jurisdiction presents a “threshold issue” that must be ad dressed prior to reviewing
the merits of the case, State v. Eibensteiner , 690 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Minn. App. 2004),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2005), and we review legal issues concerning jurisdiction
de novo, Porro v. Porro, 675 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Minn. App. 2004). First, appellants raise a
jurisdictional challenge by asserting that grandmother failed to properly commence a
proceeding under chapter 257C. Appellants fa iled to specify the type of jurisdiction
implicated by their argument. For purposes of this appeal, we assume appellants use the
term “jurisdiction” in th e sense referred to in Kontrick. Under section 257C.03, an
individual other than a child’s parent may petition the district court for custody of the child
as a de facto custodian or an interested th ird party. Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 1(a)
(2016). Section 257C.07 permits a parent to transfer legal and physical custody of a child
to another by a custody consent decree. Minn. Stat. § 257C.07 (2016).
The parties disagree whether someone seeking legal and physical custody of a child
via a custody consent decree must first initiate a proceeding under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03.
Appellants argue that any petitioner seeki ng a custody consent decree under section
257C.07 must first commence a proceeding un der section 257C.03 and comply with the
requisites of that section re quiring petitions or motions, in cluding written notice to the
child’s parents. See Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subds. 2- 3 (articulating requisites of petition
and necessity of serving written notice of hear ing on parents of minor child). Appellants

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argue that, because grandmother failed to co mply with section 2 57C.03, the original
custody consent decree is invalid for lack of jurisdiction. Grandmother counters that
section 257C.07 operates as a stand-alone provision under the chapter and that she was not
required to initiate an action under section 257C.03 before being awarded custody by a
custody consent decree.
This dispute raises a questi on of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation
presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Hince v. O’Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577,
582 (Minn. 2001). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” In re Welfare of J.P.–S., 880 N.W.2d 868,
871 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). We begin by determining whether the statute’s
language is ambiguous on its face. Id. (quotation omitted). When a statute is unambiguous,
we apply its plain language without exploring the spirit or purpose of the law. See Matter
of Welfare of A.R.B ., 906 N.W.2d 894, 897 (M inn. App. 2018). But if we conclude that
the statutory language is ambiguous, we apply the canons of statutory construction. J.P.–
S., 880 N.W.2d at 871. When engaging in statutory interpretation, we “read a statute as a
whole and give effect to all of its provisions.” State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625
(Minn. 2018).
The plain language of the statute, viewed as a whole, supports the conclusion that a
petition filed under section 257C.07 does not require a petitione r to first comply with the
requirements of section 257C.03. In the definitional section of chapter 257C, a de facto
custodian is defined as an individual, other than a parent of the child, who has acted as the
primary caretaker of a child who has “resided with the individual without a parent present

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and with a lack of demonstrat ed consistent participation by a parent” for certain defined
periods of time. Minn. Stat. § 257C.01, subd. 2(a) (2016). An interested third party is
defined as a person who is not a de facto custodian, but who can prove the existence of a
child-endangerment factor liste d in Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a). Minn. Stat.
§ 257C.01, subd. 3. Notably, the definitions of “de facto custodian” and “interested third
party” exclude individuals who have a child placed in their care through a section 257C.07
custody consent decree. Id., subds. 2(d) (“‘De facto custodian’ does not include an
individual who has a child placed in the i ndividual’s care . . . through a custody consent
decree under section 257C.07.”); 3(b) (“‘Inte rested third party’ does not include an
individual who has a child placed in the indi vidual’s care . . . through a custody consent
decree under section 257C.07.” ). Moreover, placement of a child by way of a custody
consent decree may occur prior to a petition for legal custody by a de facto custodian or
interested third party, indicating that a custody consent-decree proceeding provides an
independent basis for custody transfers. Mi nn. Stat. § 257C.07. For these reasons, and
applying the plain language of the statute, we conclude that it was permissible for mother
to use a custody consent decree to transfer legal and physical custody to grandmother under
section 257C.07 without first initiating a section 257C.03 proceeding.
Further, we note that if the legislature intended for section 257C.03’s requirements
to govern pre-existing custo dy orders initiated under sec tion 257C.07, it could have
inserted language to that effect into the statute. See State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 304
(Minn. 2015) (articulating the principle that it is not the function of a reviewing court to
“supply that which the legisl ature purposely omits or ina dvertently overlooks”). Based

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upon the plain language of the chapter, we re ject appellants’ argument that the orders
awarding temporary and perman ent custody to grandmother are defective for lack of
jurisdiction because she did not comply with the requirements of section 257C.03.
Next, parents raise a personal-jurisdiction challenge by claiming that they were not
properly involved, served, or subject to th e individual orders in the separate cases.
Specifically, father argues that he was not se rved with notice of the custody proceedings
between mother and grandmother in File No . 07-FA-15-344, and mother argues that she
was not served with notice of the custody proceedings between father and grandmother in
File No. 07-FA-16-634. Together, parents ar gue that the district court erred by denying
father’s motion to vacate the custody orders as void due to the underlying defects in the
court’s jurisdiction over father in File No. 07-FA-15-344 and mother in 07-FA-16-634.
We disagree. We acknowledge that a judg ment is void “if the issuing court . . .
lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties th rough a failure of service that has not been
waived. . . .” Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. App. 1999),
aff’d, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000). But it is we ll established in Minnesota that a party
may consent to personal jurisdiction and “does so when he takes or consents to any step in
the cause which assumes that jurisd iction exists or continues.” C omm’r of Nat. Res. v.
Nicollet Cty. Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit , 633 N.W.2d 25, 31-32 (Minn. App.
2001) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). Here, the district court
declined to vacate the January 2015, March 2016, and July 2016 custody and parenting-
time orders, reasoning that:

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[I]t is this Court’s position that even if there is some claim that
[mother] is not bound by the Fi ndings and agreement in file
FA-16-634, she is still boun d by the agreement and Court
ordered Judgment in FA-15-344. Similarly, [father] in light of
the information he had, may not be bound by the Findings in
FA-15-344 wherein he was not a party but acknowledged and
adopted substantially the same information by his agreement
with attorney representation in 07-FA-16-634. As such, each
of the parties are currently bound by the judgment and
stipulated agreement which was reached in the files pertaining
to [each parent].
We discern no error in the district court’s conclusion. Father actively participated
in family court proceedings in his case and functionally reaffirmed grandmother’s custody
of the minor child when he asserted his custodial rights in his 2016 court filing and named
grandmother as a party. Fath er voluntarily participated in the neutral evaluation process
and submitted a stipulated agreement to the court for approval.3 Similarly, mother agreed
that grandmother should have custody of th e child, participated in a neutral evaluation
procedure, and submitted stipulated custody and parenti ng-time orders to the court in the
2015 action. We therefore conclude that appellants waived any purported defects in
personal jurisdiction by “affirmatively invok[ing] the jurisdiction of the court to rule” in
their favor. Patterson v. Wu Family Corp ., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2000); see also
Wachsmuth v. Johnson , 352 N.W.2d 132, 133 (Minn. App. 1984) (rejecting personal-

3 We note, moreover, that even if grandmot her and mother had initiated an action under
section 257C.03 and served written notice of the petition upon father, father would have
had the opportunity to petition for rights of pa renting time or custod y in an independent
action under section 518.156—which is exactly what father did. See Minn. Stat. § 518.156
(2016) (permitting a parent to initiate a child-custody proceeding by motion where mother
and father have signed a recognition of parentage).

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jurisdiction challenge where parent moved to reduce child support arrearage because he
“made a general appearance and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court”).
Lastly, we reject parents’ collateral atta cks on the judgments. Parents claim that
although they each invoked the power of the court in their i ndividual cases, they did not
invoke the power of the court in each other’s actions. Parents did not raise this argument
below. A party may, when appropriate, make a collateral attack on a “judgment entered in
a different proceeding.” Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res. , 612 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Minn.
2000) (quotation omitted). Minnesota does not permit a collateral attack on a judgment
that is “valid on its face,” a lthough an attack “going to th e jurisdiction of the court” may
be grounds to challenge a judgment. Nussbaumer v. Fetrow, 556 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn.
App. 1996) (stating that “[a] judgment alle ged to be merely erroneous, or founded upon
irregularities in the proceedings not going to the jurisdiction of the court, is not subject to
attack”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997). However, jurisdictional attacks in collateral
actions must be made within a “reasonable time.” Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 869. What
qualifies as a “reasonable time must be de termined by considering all attendant
circumstances,” including intervening rights, prejudice to the adverse party, and the
commanding equities of the case. Id. at 870 (quotation omitted).
Parents failed to assert their collateral attacks within a reas onable time. Father
waited more than a year between filing his pe tition and then seeking to vacate it. Given
the state’s strong preference for finality in fixing custody in child-custody matters, we
consider this delay unreasona ble as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.R ., 655
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003) (noting that dela ys affect “a child’s o pportunity to have a

12
permanent home”); In re Welfare of J.J.B ., 390 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1986)
(characterizing “untoward delay” in resolu tion of certain child-c ustody matters as
“intolerable”); Majestic Inc. v. Berry , 593 N.W.2d 251, 257 (Minn. App. 1999) (“In the
interest of finality, ‘setting aside a judgment on voidness grounds is narrowly restricted.’”),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 18, 1999).
Affirmed.