Surer Muse, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1558

Surer Muse,
Relator,

vs.

Dakota County Community Development Agency,
Respondent.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Dakota County Community Development Agency

Heather Meyers, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for relator)

Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Relator Surer Muse challenges the denial of her public housing assistance (Section
8 voucher), arguing that the informal hearing officer’s decision to uphold the Dakota

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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County Community Development Agency’s (CDA) decision was based on an error of law
and contrary to 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1) (2016). We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Surer Muse was culturally married to Ayaanle Ahmed Alim. They have
eight children together. On November 1, 2014, relator and Alim moved to a house in Eagan
(the Eagan House). Relator and Alim qualif ied for Section 8 hous ing assistance, and,
starting in November 2014, the CDA began making Section 8 housi ng payments to the
landlord of the Eagan House. Relator is Somali and has lim ited proficiency in reading,
writing, speaking, and understa nding English, which limits her ability to successfully
interact with the CDA. She relied on Alim to communicate with the landlord and CDA.
In 2016, Alim failed to s ubmit recertification paperwork to the CDA and failed to
respond to requests for documentation. On September 30, 2016, the CDA sent notice to
relator and Alim that their Section 8 housing assistance would terminate on October 31,
2016. The CDA presented Alim with the option of a hearing to appeal the termination, but
Alim never requested a hearing. Relator testified that she did not learn until February 2017
that she no longer had Section 8 housing assistance.
According to relator, she is a victim of domestic viol ence perpetrated by Alim.
Alim’s abuse included frequen tly limiting relator’s access to money, monitoring her
whereabouts, verbal abuse, and physical assault. Alim also frequently threatened relator
with homelessness and termination of Section 8 benefits. In March 2017, relator obtained
counsel through Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services and obtained a certification
of domestic violence under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Relator then

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requested the CDA to reinstate housing assist ance consistent with VAWA and to remove
Alim from the voucher. The CDA and relator resolved the issues and reached a settlement
agreement. Under the agreement, Alim was not to be present at th e assisted unit at any
time. Relator also agreed to attend every scheduled meeti ng with the CDA, and provide
accurate and complete information to the CDA.
The CDA reinstated relator’s voucher in April 2017, and relator continued to reside
at the Eagan House with her children. Re lator applied to have the Eagan House re-
approved for tenancy to receive Section 8 payments. The CDA ultimately determined that
the Eagan House was ineligible for housing assistance payments and informed relator that
the rent would need to be reduced by $62 to be eligible for housing assistance payments.1
Relator asked Alim to speak with the la ndlord because he wa s a stronger English
speaker. Alim spoke with the landlord. Th e landlord then contacted the CDA and asked
why Alim and relator’s rent was no longer e ligible for housing assistance, because it had
been eligible the year prior with no apparent changes. Th rough this communication, the
CDA discovered that Alim was never removed from the lease for the Eagan House and that
Alim was speaking with the landlord to help apply relator’s housing voucher to the Eagan
House.

1 The rent exceeded the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 40% of monthly
income eligibility standard. Relator brought a letter explaining the standard to her landlord,
but was not sure if the landlord was able to understand her request due to their language
barrier.

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In June 2017 the CDA informed relator th at it was “terminati ng” her assistance
voucher. In its termination letter, the CDA de termined relator had not provided accurate
information to the CDA, failed to attend a m eeting with the CDA, and permitted Alim to
remain as a member of the ho usehold. Though relator wa s not entitled to an informal
hearing, the CDA granted one due to the unique nature of this case.
At the hearing, relator argued that the CDA lacked the author ity to terminate her
housing assistance pursuant to either the regul ations or the settlement agreement because
the Eagan House had not been subject to a ssistance since October 31, 2016. Relator
testified that Alim was not cu rrently living at the Eagan House and offered evidence that
he was living elsewhere, citing two separate addresses. And relator argued that Alim only
contacted the landlord to assist her.
In response, the CDA offered evidence that Alim received mail at the Eagan House,
and that Alim’s cell phone was registered to the Eagan House’s address. The CDA also
referenced a March 17, 2017 domestic abuse incident where relato r told police Alim
assaulted her, but she later recanted those allegations in an affidavit dated April 10, 2017.
The April affidavit claims rela tor and Alim had never been separated prior to March 17,
2017, and that Alim never abused her. The CDA also submitted evidence that the
management company for one of Alim’s supp osed new addresses had no knowledge that
Alim was added to the lease at that address.
The hearing officer upheld the CDA’s te rmination of relator’s housing assistance.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
This court has presumptive judicial revi ew over agency decisions absent statutory
language to the contrary. In re North Metro Harness, Inc., 711 N.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Minn.
App. 2006), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). We defer to an administrative agency’s
decision but will reverse if it is “based on an erroneous le gal theory, un supported by
substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.” Carter v. Olmsted Cty. Hous. & Redev.
Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998). On review, we defer to an agency’s
expertise and special knowledge in its field. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake, 731
N.W.2d 502, 513 (Minn. 2007).
I. The hearing officer’s decision to up hold the CDA’s denial of relator’s
housing benefits was justified by 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1).

Federal law authorizes local agencies to administer the Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (HUD) Se ction 8 voucher program. Peterson v. Washington Cty.
Hous. & Redev. Auth. , 805 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. App. 2011). The CDA is the local
HUD agency for Dakota County. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (definition of public housing
agency). 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 authorizes the CDA to deny2 or terminate a family’s housing
assistance for a variety of reasons. The CDA may deny or terminate assistance if the family
violates any family obliga tions under the program, id. § 982.552 (c)(1)(i), including
providing required information to the CDA that is true and complete, id. § 982.551 (b)(4),

2 A denial of assistance includes “denying or withdrawing a voucher” that has already been
granted to an applicant. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (a)(2) (2016).

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(d), and (e) (2016). Failure to provide true and complete information to the CDA authorizes
the CDA to deny or terminate Section 8 benefits. Id. § 982.552 (c)(1)(i).
Relator argues the CDA did not have the authority to terminate relator’s housing
voucher because the housing unit had not been assisted since October 31, 2016, and was
not yet receiving housing assistance payments. Relator is correct that her housing voucher
could not be terminated, because termination is defined as “r efusing to enter into a HAP
[Housing Assistance Payment] contract or approve a lease, terminating housing assistance
payments under an outstanding HAP contract, and refusing to process or provide assistance
under portability procedures.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (a)(3) (2016). Because none of these
criteria existed, the CDA did not have the power to terminate relator’s Section 8 voucher.
However, the CDA did have the authority to deny relator’s Section 8 voucher. A denial of
a Section 8 voucher includes withdrawing a vo ucher that has already been granted. Id.
§ 982.552 (a)(2). The CDA did have the author ity to revoke relator’s housing assistance
in the form of a denial. The hearing office r may have used imprecise language when it
determined the CDA terminated relator’s Section 8 voucher, but the outcome was
authorized under the regulation.
II. Substantial evidence supports the CDA’s and hearing officer’s decision that
relator provided untrue and incomplete information to the CDA.

Relator argues that, even if the CDA was authorized to take the action it did, there
was not substantial evidence to show that relator provid ed untrue or incomplete
information to the CDA. Rela tor argues that she provided information to the CDA that
Alim was not living at the Eagan House and that no substantial evidence was presented to

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suggest that he was. Also, re lator claims that even if Alim was shown to be living at the
Eagan House, his presence would not warrant de nial of housing bene fits, because relator
only claimed that she would exclude Alim af ter she began receiving Section 8 payments.
Despite relator’s arguments, there was substantial evidence that relator provided untrue and
incomplete information to the CDA.
In her application for reinstatement of ho using benefits, relator claimed that the only
residents of the Eagan House were herself and her seven children. 3 She did not list Alim
as a member of the household.
Relator presented evidence to show that Alim lived at two different addresses. First,
relator provided a lease agreement for an apar tment in Minneapolis. The hearing officer
noted that Alim was not listed as tenant but as landlord. The lease agreement, to be in
effect June 1, 2017 to June 1, 2018, listed the same address for both Alim and his supposed
landlord. The hearing officer questioned the validity of the document.
Relator then claimed that Alim lived at a different address on Blaisdell Avenue in
Minneapolis and had lived there for “quite some time.” To corroborate her claim of this
alternative residence, relator provided a bank statement ma iled to the Blaisdell address
dated July 3, 2017. The CDA’s investigator spoke to the management company for the
Blaisdell address, who stated that Alim was not on the lease and had never been seen on
the premises. The management company informed the investigator that the unit had been

3 When the CDA noted the discrepancy in the number of children in her household—seven
children or eight children—relator explained that she “forgot” to list her youngest child on
the application. The hearing o fficer found that it was difficu lt to believe a mother would
forget to list her child and that the discrepancy “brings into question her overall credibility.”

8
rented by the same tenants since 2014. The investigator also spoke to Alim’s probation
officer, who said that Alim briefly mentioned he lived at the Blaisd ell address, but the
investigator concluded that there was no ev idence that Alim lived anywhere but at the
Eagan House.
The CDA presented other evid ence at the hearing showin g that Alim was still a
member of the household contrary to relator’s claims. Alim was never removed from the
Eagan House lease and was the primary contact for the leasing company. Alim’s driver’s
license, two parking citations, and his cell phone registration all listed the Eagan House as
his address.
Given the many discrepancies, the hearing officer questi oned relator’s credibility.
The hearing officer also noted that relator seemed aware that she could move to a different
county, live with Alim there, and receive a Section 8 voucher, which seemed to indicate an
intent to “play a game with the CDA” and that “any separation from [Alim] is temporary
at best.”
Relator further argues the hearing officer lacked substantial ev idence to conclude
that she violated the settlement agreement. 4 Relator argues that she cannot have violated
the settlement agreement becau se the settlement agreement only required her to exclude
Alim from an “assisted unit. ” Since the Eagan House was not receiving reinstated

4 Relator also argues that th e CDA cannot base its decision in federal law, because it did
not cite federal law as a justification when it notified relator of the denial. However, relator
raised this argument for the first time in her reply brief, and we may disregard an argument
raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc.,
654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003). We
conclude that this issue is not properly before this court and will not consider the argument.

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assistance payments during this time, Alim was never present in an “assisted unit.”
However, one and a half months after agr eeing to provide accurate and complete
information to the CDA, rela tor claimed on her reinstatemen t application that Alim was
not living at the Eagan House, when substantial evidence indicates that he was.
The settlement agreement (and statutes an d regulations) also required relator to
provide accurate and complete information to the CDA during the reinstatement process.
Relator contends that there wa s no evidence of di shonesty occurring after she signed the
settlement agreement on April 25, 2017. But in June of 2017, relator twice applied for the
Eagan House to be approved to receive Section 8 payments. In both of her applications,
relator claimed that Alim was not living there. Substantial evidence shows that Alim was
still living there. Relator’s applications cont ained inaccurate and incomplete information
in violation of the settlement agreement.
Our review of the record and defere nce to the hearing officer’s credibility
determinations, leads us to the conclusion th at there is substantial evidence that Alim
continued to reside at the Eagan House in contravention of the settlement agreement relator
reached with the CDA and her obligation to provide true and complete information.
There was substantial eviden ce for the informal hearing officer to uphold the CDA’s
denial of relator’s Section 8 housing voucher.
Affirmed.