State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1561

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Maurice Ray Washington,
Appellant.

Filed August 27, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-10405

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant appeals his conviction for third -degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing
that the state failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the prosecution
committed serious misconduct while cross-examining him. He also raises additional issues
in his pro se brief. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Maurice Ray Washington was charged with and convicted of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2014). Appellant
waived his right to a jury trial. During a bench trial, the district court heard the following
evidence, among other things.
In late 2014 and early 2015, K.Y. was 13 years old and in eighth grade. She lived
in a two-bedroom apartment with her sister and her mother. K.Y. and her sister each had
a bedroom, and their mother slept in the living room. K.Y.’s sister met appellant in either
2012 or 2013 when she was a senior in high school and he was in prison, and they
eventually started a romantic relationship. When appellant got out of p rison, he began
spending nights at the family’s apartment. Appellant was 24 years old at the relevant time,
and he knew that K.Y. was in middle school because he “went along” when K.Y. was
driven to school and, according to appellant’s testimony, he belie ved K.Y. was 10 to 11
years younger than he was. Appellant earned money from selling marijuana, and he would
sometimes sell it to K.Y. and her friends.

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In early 2015, appellant began spending almost every night at the family’s
apartment. He was neither working nor going to school and he did not have a car. K.Y.’s
sister was away at work from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. every day. During this time, appellant
and K.Y. began to interact more; they began to “hang out” by watching movies, listening
to music, and talking. K.Y.’s sister and mother noticed that K.Y. and appellant had begun
spending time together, and they were grateful that appellant was “acting and expressing
that he was like an older brother” to K.Y. because K.Y. had no father or brother living with
her.
At some point between March 1, 2015, and May 1, 2015, while K.Y. and appellant
were alone in K.Y.’s room watching a movie, appellant had sexual intercourse with K.Y.
Afterward, K.Y.’s sister came to the bedroom door, and appellant left to go to the store
with her. K.Y. did not tell her sister what had happened. After this first assault, appellant
assaulted K.Y. many more times, and for an unknown number of days, appellant assaulted
K.Y. almost daily. These incidents happened when no one else w as home or when her
sister was sleeping, cooking, or in another room.
Appellant assaulted K.Y. at least once outs ide of her apartment. In April of 2015,
K.Y.’s sister and appellant were house sitting for a friend in the city of New Hope.
Appellant drove K.Y.’s sister’s car, picked up K.Y. from the family apartment, and brought
her to the New Hope home. K.Y.’s sister had left t o give plasma and was gone for two to
three hours. Appellant had sexual intercourse with K.Y. while K.Y. was menstruating, and
blood got on the sheets. When K.Y.’s sister returned, she noticed the blood, and after K.Y.
had left, her sister asked appellant about it. Appellan t said it came from one of the dogs

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biting its nails, but K.Y.’s sister checked the dogs and did not see any blood on them. She
also did not see blood on appellant.
K.Y. told no one of the sexual assaults. Appellant did not threaten her, but told her
that he would get in trouble and “go away for a long time” if she told. K.Y. testified that
she did not tell anyone because she was embarrassed and thought it was her fault. She also
knew that her sister was in love with appellant, and K.Y. did not want to hurt her.
Appellant and K.Y. began texting each other after the first assault. Appellant told
K.Y. to delete the text messages, which were sometimes of a sexual nature and sometimes
included plans to meet her. Appellant initially denied texting K.Y., and he denied texting
her at “all hours of the day and night.” However, K.Y.’s sister paid for appellant’s cell
phone, and she testified that she saw the bills and saw that K.Y. and appellant messaged
each other often. Additionally, a police examination of K.Y.’s cell phone records revealed
extensive communication between appellant and K.Y., beginning on March 3, 2015. The
communication was initiated by appellant and included over 2,000 text messages over two
months. The time frame of the text messages was consistent with the time frame that
appellant was having sex with K.Y.
K.Y.’s sister first became suspicious about a sexual relationship between appellant
and K.Y. after she found the bloody sheets. She became more suspicious one day when
she, K.Y., and a ppellant went to the park across the street from the family’s apartment.
She wanted bread to feed the ducks, and appellant said he and K.Y. would go get some.
After waiting about 30 minutes, K.Y.’s sister walked back to the apartment; both doors
were locked, and when she yelled for someone to open the door, appellant came from the

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hallway that led to the bedrooms. He had changed from jeans and a t -shirt into basketball
shorts and no shirt. K.Y., who had followed behind appellant, had changed into shorts and
a shirt. K.Y.’s sister asked appellant what was going on, and they began to argue. He said
“I’m not talking to you,” and left.
K.Y.’s mother made a police report the same day as the park incident. She testified
that when she was visiting her niece in the hospital, her niece told her that appellant was
having sex with K.Y. K.Y.’s sister did not call the police. She and appellant broke up after
May 2, 2015, when the police got involved. She was angry with appellant because he
refused to answer whe ther or not he did what was alleged. The day that the police were
called, K.Y. was angry, upset, crying, yelling at everyone, and would not speak to anyone.
K.Y. testified that she did not want to get appellant in trouble. After the police report was
made, K.Y. told her mother that what was said about her “physical involvement” with
appellant was true. About a month after the police got involved, on June 4, 2015, K.Y.
participated in a forensic interview with an interviewer qualified as an expert in the area of
child sexual abuse. In mid -May, after the police report was made, K.Y. and her family
became aware that appellant had fraudulently claimed K.Y. as a dependent on his taxes.
Appellant waived a jury trial and t he district court found appellant guil ty of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to 168 months in prison. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that his conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct should
be reversed because there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

6
appellant sexually penetrated K.Y. Alternatively, appellant argues that his conviction
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the prosecutor committed serious
misconduct through cross -examination questioning. Additionally, appellant’s pro se
supplemental brief adds multiple arguments that are either waived or duplicative.
I.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court will affirm if the fact-
finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offense. State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016). The reviewing
court must assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “This is
especially t rue where resolution of the case depends on conflicting testimony, because
weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the [fact -finder].” State
v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). Appellate courts “use the same standard
of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.”
State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
To convict appellant of third -degree criminal sexual conduct under Min n.
Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) , the state was required to prove that appellant sexually
penetrated K.Y. when she was at least 13 years old but less than 16 years old and appellant
was more than 24 months older than K.Y. Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b). Sexual
penetration includes “sexual inte rcourse, cunnilingus, [or] fellatio,” or “any intrusion
however slight into the genital or anal openings.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12 (2014).

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Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the state’s evidence with respect to his or
K.Y.’s age.
Appellant’s argument solely challenges K.Y.’s credibility. He argues that this court
must reverse his conviction because there are “additional reasons” to question K.Y.’s
credibility and the state presented no corroborating evidence. See State v. Huss , 506
N.W.2d 290, 292 -93 (Minn. 1993) (holding that testimony of the alleged victim of child
abuse was insufficient to convict because it was not sufficiently credible and the victim
had been exposed to highly suggestive material by the state). The “additional reasons” that
appellant gives for questio ning K.Y.’s credibility include that K.Y. initially denied the
incident to the police, and that it is reasonable to believe that K.Y. had a motive to fabricate
the allegations. These arguments were considered by th e district court when weighing
K.Y.’s credibility.
“[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible
witness.” State v. Foreman , 68 0 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts defer to the fact -finder’s credibility determinations. State v. Anderse n,
784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). Here, the district court found that K.Y. was “an
extremely credible witness” because her demeanor was consistent with the nature of her
testimony and her testimony was “remarkably consistent” with her forensic interview even
though they were two years apart and she had not reviewed that interview. The defense
argued that K.Y. was not credible because she initially denied everything to the police.
The district court found:

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It is not surprising that [K.Y.] initially failed to acknowledge
what happened to [the] police, considering she was a 13 year
old girl confronted with accusations about which she felt
conflicted, angry, afraid, and ashamed. Her initial reaction –
that of nondisclosure – is consistent with the possible reactions
of a child victim of sexual assault.

On the other hand, the district court found that appellant’s credibility was negatively
affected by, among other things, the following facts that he admitted in his testimony:
 Appellant cheated on K.Y.’s sister with other females and lied to her by telling her
that he was not cheating;
 Appellant was illegally providing and selling marijuana to K.Y. and other middle -
school- and high-school-aged children and using marijuana with K.Y.;
 Appellant initially denied that K.Y.’s sister let him use her car, but later referred to
it as “basically our car”;
 Appellant filed a fraudulent tax return to receive an improper $6,000 refund;
 Appellant initially denied texting K.Y., but later acknowledged that he texted her “a
couple times”;
 Appellant has four prior felony convictions in the last ten years;
 Appellant acknowledged that he and his friends are “in the streets” and “doing stuff
they aren’t supposed to be doing”;
 Appellant repeatedly denied that he was ever alone with K.Y. in the whole time that
he knew her—a period of two to three years; and
 Appellant described his relationship with K.Y. as being “close” but not friends.

Appellant argues that K.Y.’s testimony was unreliable because she had a motive to
lie about the incident. Appellant claims that K.Y.’s sister may have asked K.Y. to create
her testimony to “get back at him” for his “alleged infidelity.” Appellant also claims that
K.Y. may have lied in her testimony because her family was upset with him for fraudulently
claiming K.Y. as a dependent on his taxes.
The determination of whether a witness was reliable is a matter for the fact -finder,
not the reviewing court. See State v. White , 357 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Minn. App. 1984).
Evidence of bias and motive are relevant considerations for a fact -finder to assess witness

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credibility. See State v. Larson , 787 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2010). Here, the district
court found that “[t]here is no credible evidence that there was a scheme by any of the
women to get [appellant] in trouble because [K.Y.’s sister] was trying to get revenge on
him.” The district court also found that:
There is insufficient evidence to support the claim that
[appellant] was being set up by any of the female witnesses
related to [appellant] fraudulently claiming [K.Y.’s] exemption
on his tax return in early 2015. By all accounts, this did not
become an issue of concern within the family until mid -May,
well after the police report was made.

Appellant raises no persuasive reasons for this court to second guess the district court’s
credibility assessment. Appellant merely states that it is reasonable to believe that the
women had motive to “get back at” appellant. Thus, K.Y.’s credible testimony —along
with other corroborating witness testimony —is evidence that sufficiently su pports
appellant’s third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
II.
Appellant also argues that serious prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the
prosecutor cross -examined ap pellant because the questions were (1) criticisms of the
presumption of innocence and appellant’s right to have a contested trial, (2) attempts to
inflame the passions of the fact-finder, and (3) attempts to elicit inadmissible evidence from
appellant.
Defense counsel objected to the relevant cross -examination questions. There are
two standards for determining whether objected -to prosecutorial misconduct merits
reversal; serious misconduct requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable

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doubt. State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974). An error
is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to
the error.” State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). If the
misconduct is “less serious,” the standard for reversal is “whether the misconduct likely
played a substantial part in influencing the [fact-finder] to convict.” Id. Appellant argues
that serious misconduct occurred here.
The following exchange ensued during direct-examination of appellant:
Q: [Appellant], you’ve heard that the [s]tate is probably
going to bring up some prior convictions that you have, right?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Did you go to trial in those cases?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Why not?
A: I was – I know I did it, so it wasn’t no point with me
playing around knowing I did do those things.
Q: Okay. And so you’re here today because you didn’t
have any sexual contact with [K.Y.]?
A: Correct. Yes.

After appellant’s attorney opened the door to th is line of questioning, the prosecutor and
appellant had the following exchange on cross-examination:
Q: You said you are on trial in this case, but you didn’t go
to trial to any of those on [other] cases; is that correct?
A: Correct. Yes.
Q: And that’s why you’re here in trial; is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: You know you didn’t have an offer to resolve this case
going into this trial?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection. That’s not true.
[PROSECUTOR]: It is true.
[APPELLANT]: An offer? Can you define what you mean
by that?
[PROSECUTOR]: The judge has to rule.

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[THE COURT]: I’m going to sustain the objection. My
notes indicate there was an offer. I’m sorry, that’s the other
case. No. I show that there was an offer in January. I’m
sustaining the objection.
[PROSECUTOR]: Can I rephrase, Your Honor?
[THE COURT]: Depends on what your rephrase is.
Q: [Appellant], you know that the offer to resolve your case
was withdrawn two weeks ago?
A: Yes.
. . . .
Q: You don’t want to admit in front of women who you
associate with that you have sex with children do you,
[appellant]?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection; argumentative.
[APPELLANT]: Never had sex with a child.
[THE COURT]: Sustained.
[PROSECUTOR]: It’s a far cry from admitting to an assault
or an aggravated robbery than it is to admit that you have sex
with a child. Would you agree?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection; argumentative.
[APPELLANT]: Those are all—
[THE COURT]: Sto[p]. Just wait, sir.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Argumentative.
[THE COURT]: Sustained.

Appellant first argues that the prosecutor criticized appellant’s decision to not plead
guilty and exercise his constitutional right to trial, which Minnesota courts have held is
misconduct. See State v. McNeil , 658 N.W.2d 228, 235 (Minn. App. 2003) (“It is
misconduct for a prosecutor to attack a defendant for exercising his right to a fair trial.”).
Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s questions were attempts to establish that appellant’s
exercising his right to trial was not based on his presumpt ion of innocence, but by his
reluctance to admit to having sex with children.
Appellant next argues that the prosecutor’s questions constituted serious
misconduct because they were intended to inflame the passions and prejudices of the fact-

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finder, which, as a general rule, the state must avoid. State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363
(Minn. 1995). Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s questions were not related to the facts
of the case, “but instead focused on the prosecutor’s narrative of why [a]ppellant would
not admit to having ‘sex with children.’”
Finally, appellant argues that the prosecutor’s questioning was serious misconduct
because he was attempting to elicit inadmissible evidence from appellant. The
“inadmissible evidence” that appellant cites is appellant’s reason for not entering into a
plea agreement. See State v. Jackson , 325 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. 1982) (h olding that
evidence of guilty-plea negotiations is inadmissible at trial).
It is likely that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred here because defense counsel
opened the door for appellant’s character to be challenged by the prosecutor’s line of
questioning. See State v. Nunn, 399 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that the
appellant’s trial testimony that he pleaded guilty in a prior case because he was guilty and
went to trial in the instant case because he was innocent “put one aspect of appel lant’s
character into issue: his asserted attribute of taking responsibility for his criminal acts”),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987). However, assuming for the sake of argument that
serious misconduct occurred, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
district court’s verdict is surely unattributable to the prosecutor’s cross -examination
questions.
Appellant received a bench trial because he had waived his right to a jury trial. The
district court sustained appellant’s objections to the prosecutor’s questions on the grounds
that they were argumentative. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that during bench

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trials, “judges will set aside ‘extraneous matters’ and decide cases on their merits.” State
v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 247 (Minn. 2005); see State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467
(Minn. 2009) (holding that the distinction between jury trial and bench trial is important
and that risk of unfair prejudice is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that a
judge would use Spreigl evidence for improper purpose). There was no prejudice to
appellant resulting from the prosecutor challenging appellant’s motive to go to trial rather
than plead guilty.
III.

Appellant also filed a pro se supplemental brief, wherein he raises mult iple
incoherent arguments. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (“We will not
consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to
legal authority.”).
Appellant states that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was
“deprived a ‘motion’ for months, which caused [his] ‘defense’ in trial to be labeled
unprepared.” Appellant cites no legal authority to support his assertion that this amounts
to ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, this argument is waived. See State v. Krosch,
642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) ( holding that a pro se defendant’ s assertions are
deemed waived if they contain no argument or legal authority to support the allegations).
Appellant also a rgues that certain evidence should not have been admitted. “The
admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court and its ruling
will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or constitutes an
abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn.

14
1997) (quotation omitted). Again, appellant cites no legal authority to support his assertion
that the district court’s evidentiary rulings were based on erroneous views o f the law or
constituted an abuse of discretion. Thus, this argument is also waived.
Appellant also argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him because the state did not subpoena K.Y.’s cousin, who K.Y.’s mother
testified told her about K.Y. and appellant’s sexual relationship. Appellant claims that
K.Y.’s cousin’s testimony was used as evidence to support the state’s case against him, but
there is no evidence that K.Y.’s cousin testified. See State v. Ma nley, 664 N.W.2d 275,
286 (Minn. 2003) (refusing to consider portions of pro se briefs that contain only argument
and are not supported by the facts in the record).
Finally, appellant argues that K.Y.’s testimony was not credible, which is
duplicative of appellant’s insufficiency-of-evidence argument addressed above.
Affirmed.