Brandyn Brett Phillips, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1563

Brandyn Brett Phillips, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Cook County District Court
File No. 16-CR-06-197

Joseph A. Gangi, Daniel J. Bellig, Farrish Johnson Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Molly Hicken, Cook County Attorney, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of his postconviction petition
seeking a declaration of eligibility for exoneration compensation under Minn. Stat.

2
§ 590.11 (2016). Because appellant’s petition was time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.11,
subd. 2, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2006, appellant Brandyn Brett Phillips was charged with one count of
criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd.
1(b) (2004). The state alleged that Phillips, then age 38, engaged in a sexual relationship
with S.M., then age 14, for approxi mately six months. At a three -day jury trial, Phillips
offered the affirmative defense of mistake as to the age of the juvenile, arguing th at he
believed that S.M. was 19 years old, relying on his own testimony. On August 1, 2007, the
jury found Phillips guilty of the charged offense. The district court sentenced Phillips to 28
months, but stayed execution of the sentence. We affirmed Phillips’s conviction. See State
v. Phillips, No. A08-0231, 2009 WL 1118874, at *6 (Minn. App. Apr. 28, 2009), review
denied (Minn. July 22, 2009). Phillips served the 28 -month sentence due to a probation
violation.
In July 2010, Phillips petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in his 2007 trial. In December 2010, the dis trict court
granted Phillips’s petition, concluding that “[t]rial [c]ounsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial
counsel’s] unprofessional errors, the result of the p roceeding would have been different.”
The district court found that Phillips’s trial counsel was “constitutionally ineffective in his
failure to investigate and prepare for trial,” citing several examples of ineffective assistance
during the trial, including the failure to elicit favorable testimony from S.M. and her mother

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regarding Phillips’s mistake-of-age defense. The district court granted Phillips’s request
for a new trial and the state did not appeal.
In January 2012, the district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the criminal
sexual conduct charge, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.01 . The state’s motion reasoned
that Phillips had served his sentence for the charged crime and, therefore, “dismissal of this
charge [was] in the interests of justice.”
In November 2016, Phillips petitioned for exoneration compensation under Minn.
Stat. § 590.11. On January 20, 2017, the state replied to Phillips’s petition, arguing (1) that
Phillips had not been exonerated and was not entitled to compensation, and (2) Phillips’s
petition should be rejected as untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2.
On September 12, 2017, t he district court denied Phillips’ s petition. The district
court determined that the petition had been filed outside the statutory deadline, but because
Phillips “diligently pursued the claim, ” it would consider the petition in the “interests of
justice.” On the merits, however, the district court rejected Phillips’s request for relief ,
determining that he was not exonerated because the 2010 finding of ineffective assistance
of counsel did not rise to the level of a reversal “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA) authorizes
compensation to persons who have served time in prison after a wrongful conviction. Minn.
Stat. §§ 611.362-.368 (2016); see generally Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 2017).
Under the exoneration-compensation statute, the “threshold” determination is whether the

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individual has been “exonerated” as that term is defined in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subds. 1,
3. Back, 902 N.W.2d at 26 (describing threshold determination) ; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 611.362, subd. 1 (providing that an individual seeking exoneration compensation must
receive “ an order under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to
compensation based on exoneration”).1 In addition, an exoneration-compensation petition
must be timely. The timing requirements are set out in section 590.11, which provides that
an exoneration-compensation petition “must be brought within two years, but no less than
60 days after the petitioner is exonerated.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2.
In opposition to Phillips’ s petition, the state argued that the two-year deadline for
Phillips to file his petiti on expired in July 2016 , and thus, his November 2016 petition
should be rejected as untimely. In response, Phillips urged t he district court to hear his
claim in the interests of justice. The district court agreed with Phillips that it could review
his untimely petition, but then rejected relief on the merits after determining he had not
been exonerated. 2 Phillips asks this court to reverse the district court’s decision. The
timeliness of Phillips’ s exoneration-compensation petition raises a question of statutory

1 If an individual has been exonerated, and meets other “eligibility requirements,” then the
district court “shall” declare that individual to be eligib le for exoneration compensation.
See Back, 902 N.W.2d at 26; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 5 (setting out criteria for
eligibility); id., subd. 7 (order declaring eligibility).

2 Phillips claimed that he was exonerated by the December 2010 new -trial order. He
specifically argued that the district court had (a) “ordered a new trial on grounds consistent
with innocence and the prosecutor dismissed the charges . . .” and (b) the time for appeal
had expired so the order was final. See Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1.

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interpretation which we review de novo. See Nelson v. State, 896 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn.
App. 2017).
In Phillips’s reply brief to this court, he argues that the state did not file a notice of
related appeal on the timeliness issue, which was decided adversely to the state at the
district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 106 (respondent’s right to obtain review). Phillips
concludes that this court is unable to consider the timeliness issue. We disagree. First, the
issue was fully briefed, argued, and decided during district court proceedings. Next, “it is
well-established that the respondent on appeal in a criminal case may present to this court
an alternative reason for affirming the district court, if the alternative reason is permitted
by both the law and the factual record and would not expand the relief granted.” State v.
Bennett, 867 N.W.2d 539, 543 n.1 (Minn. App. 2015) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.04,
subd. 6 ), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015) ; State v. Grunig , 660 N.W.2d 134, 137
(Minn. 2003) (holding court of appeals erred in refusing to consider alternative grounds for
affirming district court’s decision) . Accordingly, whether Phillips timely filed his
exoneration-compensation petition is properly before this court.
As mentioned above, the exoneration-compensation statute provides deadlines for
bringing a claim:
A petition must be brought within two years, but no less than
60 days after the petitioner is exonerated. Persons released
from custody after being exonerated before July 1, 2014, must
commence an action under this section within two years of July
1, 2014.

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2. Initially, we must determine when Phillips was allegedly
exonerated. T he postconviction court granted relief in December 2010 after ruling that

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Phillips’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The state dismissed its case against
Phillips in January 2012. Thus, Phillips’s alleged exoneration occurred before July 1, 2014.
Accordingly, we conclude that Phillips was required to file his exoneration-compensation
petition by July 1, 2016. See id. Because Phillips did not file his petition until November
15, 2016, the district court correctly determined that his petition was untimely.
The district court relied on Minnesota’s postconviction statute when it concluded
that it could hear Phillips’ s untimely petition in the interest s of justice. See Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4 (2016) . Section 590.01 imposes a two -year time limit on petitions for
postconviction relief. Id. It also lists exceptions and specifically provides that a court may
hear a postconviction petition that is filed outside the two -year limitations period if the
petitioner establishes that the petition “is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5).
The legislature enacted the interests -of-justice exception for pos tconviction
petitions filed under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, but did not include a similar exception in Minn.
Stat. § 590.11. We find no support for applying the interests -of-justice exception to an
exoneration-compensation petition filed under s ection 590.11. Phillips has not cited any
legal authority that authorized the district court to do so and we have found no relevant
authority. In fact, app lying the interests -of-justice exception to section 590.11 would
effectively add terms to the exoneration-compensation statute, which we will not do . See
State v. Noggle , 881 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 2016) (“[O]ur rules of construction forbid
adding words or meaning to a statute that are purposely omit ted or inadvertently

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overlooked.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the interests-of-justice exception does not apply to
an exoneration-compensation petition.
We conclude that Phillips’s petition was time barred and the district court’s decision
should be affirmed on this alternative basis. See Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318
(Minn. 2014) (“[A] postconviction court may summarily deny a claim that is time
barred.”). We , therefore, do not reach the district court’s decision rejecting Phillips’s
petition on the merits.3 Thus, we affirm.
Affirmed.

3 After oral argument, Phillips filed a letter citing supplemental authority, pursuant to Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 128.05 , asking this court to consider bills from both chambers of the
Minnesota Legislature, in support of his contention that he was exonerated on grounds
consistent with innocence. See S.F. 2778, 90th Leg. (Minn. 2018) ; H.F. 2856, 90th Leg.
(Minn. 2018). We note that “the fact that the legislature may pass such legislation in the
future is not sufficient grounds for overturning the district court’s decision on appeal.” See
Altimus v. Hyundai Motor Co. , 578 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. App. 1998) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 401 (Minn. App. 1995) (courts are
required to apply the law in effect at the time it renders a decision), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 14, 1995)). Moreover, our decision turns on the timeliness of Phillips’ s petition, and
we do not decide whether he was eligible for exoneration compensation.