State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1581

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Dietz Lauck,
Appellant.

Filed July 30, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-16-3584

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant James Dietz Lauck challenges his sentence for two counts of second-
degree assault with a deadly weapon. He argues that the district court abused its discretion
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by failing to adequately consider his status as an armed-serv ices veteran and by not fully
considering the treatment options available to him if he were put on probation. We affirm.
FACTS
Between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. on August 26 , 2016, appellant arrived at his ex-
girlfriend’s residence to claim the belongings he had left there. Appellant entered the
house, approached his ex-girl friend, and held a handgun to her head. He demanded that
she go downstairs to the basement, from which he demanded that his ex-girlfriend’s mother
join them. She did. At one point, appellant put the handgun muzzle in his ex-girlfriend’s
mouth. He counted out six bullets, indicating for whom each was intended, and indicating
the last one was for himself. Appellant told hi s ex-girlfriend that he wanted to feel her
“blood all over him,” and he threatened the mother that she would never see her grandchild.
Appellant also cut off some of his ex-girlfriend’s hair and made her cut more herself. When
appellant eventually went upstairs, the tw o women broke a basement window, climbed
outside, and ran to the safety of a neighbor’s house. Appellant was arrested later that day.
The state charged appellant with two co unts of second-deg ree assault with a
dangerous weapon, one count of kidnaping with a firearm, and two counts of terroristic
threats with a firearm. Appellant pleaded gu ilty to two counts of second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon, and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
Appellant moved for a downward dispositi onal departure sentence, arguing that he
is amenable to probation and that he suffers from diminished mental capacity because of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He submitted 14 char acter-reference letters and a
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certificate commemorating his completion of th e PTSD program at a medical center in
Wisconsin.
At sentencing, the district court cons idered appellant’s motion and attached
documents, the presentence investigation (PS I) report, and a psychologist’s report of a
mental-health examination of appellant. Appellant is a military veteran with no criminal
history. He exhibits signs of PTSD, borderline personality disorder, unspecified depressive
disorder, and polysubstance use disorder. The district court recognized its obligation to
consider appellant’s amenability to probation and supervision, and appellant’s remorse,
among other things. The district court expressly acknowledged appellant’s military service
and his PTSD diagnosis “when crafting an appropriate sent ence.” The district court
imposed concurrent 36-month executed senten ces for the two counts of second-degree
assault.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
A district court has great discretion in sentencing. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014). The Minnesota Sent encing Guidelines pr ovide a prescribed
sentencing range that is “presumed to be a ppropriate.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1.
(2016). When the district court departs from a presumptive sentence, it must place on the
record at the time of sentencing the reasons for a sentencing departure. State v. Geller, 665
N.W.2d 514, 517 (Minn. 2003).
“[W]e will not ordinar ily interfere with a sentence falling within the presumptive
sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even if there are grounds that would
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justify departure.” State v. Bertsch , 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (M inn. 2006) (quotation and
alteration omitted). We “may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler,
378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985). Only in rare cases does a refusal to depart from
the guidelines warrant reversal. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668.
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred when it denied his motion for a
downward dispositional departure from the sentencing guidelines because he is particularly
amenable to probation. Appe llant points to his young age, his lack of a prior criminal
record, his remorse, his cooperation with authorities, and the overwhelming community
support available to him as supporting a departure.
A downward durational or dispositional depa rture is permitted when there “exist
identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances that distinguish a case and
overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308
(quotation omitted). Minnesota law expressly allows district courts sentencing a defendant
to consider whether he is “cu rrently serving in th e military or is a veteran and has been
diagnosed as having a mental illness.” Mi nn Stat. § 609.115, subd. 10 (2016). In
considering this factor, the district court may order a presentence evaluator to consult with
government agencies or personnel to prov ide “the court with information regarding
treatment options available to the defendant.” Id. The district court also may, in such a
case, “consider the treatment recommendations of any diagnosing or treating mental health
professionals together with the treatmen t options available to the defendant.” Id. The
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statute indicates that the district court may consider that the offender is a veteran, but the
legislature wisely left to th e district court’s discretion how that consideration comes into
play in each individual case.
Here, before the district court imposed a guidelines sentence, it expressly considered
appellant’s diagnoses of PTSD, borderline personality disorder, depression, and substance
abuse. It took into account appellant’s status as a veteran, and considered the requirements
of section 609.115, subdivision 10. Th e district court reviewed the PSI and
recommendation of the psychologist, who concluded:
[A]lthough Mr. Lauck is diagnos ed with a mental illness, the
symptoms did not prevent him from appreciating the nature or
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the alleged
offense. . . . Mr. Lauck was not laboring under such a defect
of reason that he did not know the nature of the acts
constituting the offense with which he is charged.

The district court also considered the Trog factors, which require the court to consider the
defendant’s “particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.”
State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) ( listing age, prior record, remorse,
cooperation, attitude in court, and support of friends and/or family as factors relevant to
determining whether defendant is particularly amenable to probation). In imposing the
sentence, the district court explained:
I am looking at just a horrific crime. I am looking at the effect
that it had on the victims and I appreciate [their] courage in
coming to court and reading [their] statements.
On the other side, I am looking at a recommendation, or
a series of recommendations from a probation officer that are
very unusual in a case like this that specifically state things that
I am supposed to take into account. They include the absence
of any significant prior record. The amenability to supervision.
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The remorsefulness, and other things that are not only quoted,
but described in some detail in that report. So I am asked to
depart because of that. I also have read this morning a
presentence investigation from a dispositional . . . adviser . . .
that is consistent with the probation department’s
recommendations.

Moreover, the district court judge explained that he, like appellant, had served in the
military, has “a high respect” for it, and appla uded appellant’s efforts to improve so far.
Considering all of these things, the district court declined to depart from the guidelines.
The district court acted within its discreti on. We agree with the district court’s
observation at sentencing that this was “a horrific crime.” It had a substantial and
permanent effect on the victims. The district court considered all of the necessary and
relevant factors for departing from a guidelines sentence and made a detailed record of its
analysis. The district court thoughtfully and carefully considered all of the relevant legal
factors in a very thorough record. See Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80. We see no abuse of
the district court’s discretion.
Affirmed.