Rufus Cornelius Loyd, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1586

Rufus Cornelius Loyd, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 2, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-12167

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this postconviction appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

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FACTS
On April 13, 2013, Bro oklyn Park police officers found appellant Rufus Cornelius
Loyd apparently asleep next to a car with the key in the ignition and its engine running.
Loyd was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). Loyd agreed to take a
breath test, which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.03. Because this low reading was
inconsistent with the extent of impairment they observed, officers asked Loyd to take a
blood test, and he refused. Loyd was charged with felony test refusal based on his history
of three prior alcohol-related convictions.
At trial, the jury failed to reach a verdict on the test -refusal charge. After the trial,
Loyd’s attorney withdrew because Loyd failed to pay his attorney fees, and a new attorney,
Richard LeRoy, represented Loyd.
In an off-the-record discussion at a hearing that was originally scheduled to consider
a new trial date, LeRoy suggested that, in light of the hung jury, the district court should
(1) permit Loyd to enter a guilty plea to an amended DWI charge of being in control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and (2) stay imposition of sentence .
When the prosecutor raised no objection , the district court agreed to do so . But, at
sentencing, the prosecutor objected to the stay of imposition of sentence because Loyd was
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days of incarceration. The district court
nevertheless stayed impos ition of sentence. The state filed a sentencing appeal in this
court; thereafter, the state filed a motion in the district court, seeking to vacate Loyd’s
conviction under State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (Minn. App. 2004). The state
then dismissed the appeal and proceeded with its motion in the district court.

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At the hearing on the state’s motion , Loyd withdrew his plea to DWI ; LeRoy
advised him to do so after “reviewing the State’s potential appellate motion and District
Court[] motion.” When the judge asked Loyd if he understood what was going on, Loyd
said, “Somewhat, yeah.” Loyd then conferred with LeRoy, and the district court asked
Loyd, “So you’re going to withdraw your plea and then start all over; you understand that?”
Loyd replied, “Yes.” The district court scheduled the matter for a pretrial hearing.
At the pretrial hearing on December 9, 2014, Loyd entered a new guilty plea to
DWI, with the understanding that he would receive a stay of execution of a 48 -month
sentence and remain on probation for four years and five months, in recognition of the fact
that he had already been on probation. The sentencing agreement also included a 180-day
jail sentence, with 104 days stayed and credit for the 76 days that Loyd had already served.
Loyd acknowledged that he understood the terms of the agreement.
During the hearing, LeRoy explained to the court that, although Loyd had pleaded
guilty and apparently agreed to the sentence, Loyd was dissatisfied, because “he went
through a full trial where it was a hung jury. He had several months after that. We had a
contentious plea the first time.” He felt “like the system has kind of trampled upon him.”
The court acknowledged Loyd’s frustration, and Loyd agreed to proceed to sentencing.
The court sentenced Loyd in accordance with the sentencing agreement.
On November 21, 2016, Loyd filed a pro se postconviction petition, alleging that
LeRoy had forced him to agree to the withdrawal of his initial guilty plea and to the entry
of a new guilty plea and sentence. Loyd asked to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to
trial on the original test-refusal charge.

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At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Loyd’s probation officer testified that
Loyd was “frustrated and angry” on the day of the second guilty plea. The probation officer
also testified that he had spent “a couple of office visits” before the guilty plea explaining
to Loyd why he was being called back to court. The probation officer stated that Loyd has
a “process gap” that makes him slower to assimilate information, but the probation officer
spent a lot of time explaining. He described Loyd as “cognitively . . . very functional.”
Loyd testified that he did not understand the various proceedings after the hung jury.
He thought that LeRoy told him that he would go to jail if he refused to agree to the second
guilty plea. Loyd wanted to return to his original deal of a stay of imposition of sentence.
Loyd said that he did not understand what was taking place during his second guilty plea
and that LeRoy kept elbowing him to remain quiet.
LeRoy testified that he was an experienced attorney who had handled approximately
15,000 criminal cases. LeRoy did not remember individual details of Loyd’s case, but he
described his usual routine with new clients. This included explaining the charges and the
possible sentences, the trial process, and the plea process. If a defendant was offered a plea
agreement, LeRoy would go over the details of the agreement and would fill out a plea
petition, explaining every paragraph and repeating explanations until he believed that each
client understood.
LeRoy said he remembered the first guilty plea, because he wanted to take
advantage of the hung jury. He suggested a stay of imposition of sentence, and was
“shocked” when the district court agreed to it and the prosecuting attorney indicated that
he would not appeal the stay of imposition. LeRoy stated that he explained the agreement

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to Loyd, who indicated that he understood. LeRoy knew that the sentence did not conform
to the mandatory minimum incarceration period required by the statute.
After the state appealed and then moved to vacate the conviction, LeRoy explained
to Loyd that the sentence was incorrect and that he should agree to withdraw his plea, enter
a new guilty plea, and receive a sentence that reflected the mandatory minimum. LeRoy
further explained that he believed the state would succeed on a sentencing appeal and that
if Loyd agreed to withdraw his guilty plea, it would “mak[e] the matter continue . . .
moving forward . . . [r]ather than delaying it for the 90 days of appeal.” Loyd initially told
LeRoy that he wanted to go to trial but then agreed to enter a new guilty plea because he
was almost done with his probationary period. LeRoy believed that Loyd understood.
LeRoy described Loyd as an active and engaged client who was able to raise concerns .
LeRoy stated th at he went over the plea petition with Loyd and that he had never in 30
years of practice threatened a client with jail or elbowed a client into silence.
The district court denied Loyd’s postconviction petition, concluding that Loyd had
not demonstrated that LeRoy’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Loyd appeals from this order.
D E C I S I O N
We review the postconviction court’s denial of a petition for an abuse of discretion.
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we review legal issues
de novo and factual findings for clear error . Id. “A postconviction court abuses its
discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.

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(quotation omitted). The petitioner has the burden of producing evidence that entitles him
to relief. Carridine v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Minn. 2015).
Loyd argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his second guilty plea because
he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. A defendant does not have an absolute
right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). But a
court must permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea in order to correct a manifest
injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is
not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citation omitted). A plea is not intelligent unless
a defendant understands the charges, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of
entering the plea. Id. at 96. A plea is not voluntary if a defendant succumbs to improper
pressure or coercion, considering all relevant circumstances. Id. Loyd argues that his
second guilty plea was not intelligent because he did not receive effective assistance of
counsel and was not voluntary because his attorney improperly pressured him to enter the
plea.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendan t must prove
“(1) that his counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’;
and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. ’” Nissalke v. State , 861 N.W.2d 88,
94 (Minn. 2015) ( quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 68 8, 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064 , 2068 (1984)). An appellate court need not address both prongs of the
Strickland test if one is dispositive. Andersen v. Sta te, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).

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“In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a strong presumption
that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Id. Generally, an appellate court does not
review matters of trial strategy. Id.
Loyd asserts four bases for his belief that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel: (1) LeRoy advised him to enter the first guilty plea, despite knowing that the
district court had agreed to impose an unauthorized sentence; (2) LeRoy advised him t o
withdraw his guilty plea and enter into a new, less beneficial, plea agreement in response
to the state’s motion to vacate , despite the fact that the state’s motion was improper;
(3) LeRoy pressured Loyd into entering the second guilty plea by threatening him with jail
time; and (4) LeRoy failed to adequately explain to Loyd what was happening during the
second guilty plea, including the charge and the consequences of pleading guilty.
LeRoy advised Loyd to plead guilty the first time despite knowing that a stay of
imposition of sentence was not authorized. The decision to enter a plea with a guarantee
of an unauthorized sentence is similar to trial strategy —because the prosecutor originally
indicated that he would not appeal the sentence , the outcome would have been favorable
for Loyd. See id. (stating that an appellate court generally does not review matters of trial
strategy). And even if we assume that advising Loyd to plead guilty and accept an
unauthorized sentence fell below an objective standard o f reasonableness, later events
undermine Loyd’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
The state filed a sentencing appeal with this court, challenging the unauthorized
sentence; it then dismissed th e appeal and , instead, pursued a motion to vacate the

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conviction in the district court.1 Instead of challenging the state’s motion, LeRoy advised
Loyd to withdraw his guilty plea, and, at the hearing on the state’s motion, the district court
permitted Loyd to withdraw his plea, which, in effect, resolved the state’s motion.
When considering the state’s motion to vacate, it was not reasonable for LeRoy to
expect that the unauthorized sentence that Loyd initially received would not eventually be
corrected. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (stating that district court “may at any time
correct a sentence not authorized by law”). Thus, LeRoy’s advice that Loyd withdraw his
guilty plea did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness even if we assum e
that the state’s motion to vacate the conviction was improper. Challenging the state’s
motion would not have prevented the sentence from being corrected, and withdrawing the
plea put Loyd in the same position that he was in before he pleaded guilty , which means
that there is not a reasonable probability that LeRoy’s earlier advice to plead guilty had any
effect on Loyd.
After Loyd withdrew his first guilty plea, the district court scheduled a pretrial
hearing. At the pretrial-hearing, Loyd chose to enter a new guilty plea after being advised
of, and waiving, his rights. Loyd claims that LeRoy pressured him into agreeing to the
second guilty plea by threatening him with jail and pressuring him to remain silent. During
the postconviction evidentiary hear ing, Loyd testified to this effect, and LeRoy denied it.
This is essentially a credibility determination, which is the province of the postconviction

1 The state relied on Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d at 414-15, in which this court held that a guilty
plea is per se invalid when the district court improperly injects itself into plea negotiations.
Although Anyanwu was overruled by Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 568 (Minn. 2018),
at the time of the hearing, the state believed Anyanwu to be valid.

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court. See Bobo v. State , 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012) (“An evidentiary hearing
provides the postconviction court the means of evaluating the credibility of a witness.”).
Finally, Loyd claims that LeRoy failed to explain the charge and the consequences
of entering a second guilty plea. The district court found that LeRoy adequately explained
the second plea to Loyd, and that Loyd “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
and provided a sufficient factual basis for a finding of guilty.” The record support s this
finding. During his testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Loyd stat ed that
he did not want to go to trial but wanted his original deal of a stay of imposition. 2 That
deal, however, included an unauthorized sentence and, therefore, was not available.
Loyd has failed to sustain his burden of proving that he is entitled to postconviction
relief. See Carridine, 867 N.W.2d at 492. Loyd had the burden of showing both that
LeRoy’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was
a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for LeRoy’s errors.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that counsel’s performance did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Affirmed.

2 This is sufficient to distinguish this matter from Lee v. United States , 137 S. Ct. 1958 ,
1963 (2017), in which the defendant consistently insisted at every stage of the proceedings
that he wanted to go to trial if there was any chance he would be dep orted after pleading
guilty.