State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1588

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeremy David Dickey,
Appellant.

Filed July 9, 2018
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-16-2345

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Tammy L. Merkins, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Luke T. Heck, Severson, Wogsland & Liebl, PC, Fargo, North Dakota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Jeremy Dickey appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he
fled police who responded to a report that he stole items from a hotel. Dickey argues that
police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him because he had not stolen anything from
the hotel on that day —instead, witnesses recognized Dickey as the suspect in a theft that
had occurred three weeks earlier. He argues that because police were misinformed by the
dispatcher that a theft had occurred on that day they lacked reasonable suspicion to seize
him, and therefore evidence that he fled from the seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree. But because we conclude that police had reasonable suspicion to seize
Dickey in connection with the earlier theft even if they were misinformed about its timing,
we affirm the denial of his suppression motion.
FACTS
Before the incident that gave rise to this case, Dickey was a suspect in several
ongoing theft investigations at the Holiday Inn in the City of Detroit Lakes. The hotel’s
surveillance video had captured Dickey attempting to steal a briefcase. Dickey was also
suspected of stealing a set of hotel keys and a wallet; that theft was reported to the Detroit
Lakes Police Department on September 20, 2016 . On October 14, 2016, Holiday Inn
employees saw Dickey on the prem ises, recognized him from earlier video-surveillance
footage, and attempted to confront him about the previous thefts . Dickey fled on foot
toward his black pick-up truck. An employee called 9-1-1. It is not clear what precisely the
employee said to the dispatcher. But the dispatcher informed Officer Josie Johnson of the

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Detroit Lakes Police Department that a theft had “just occurred” at the Holiday Inn and the
victim was following the suspec t to his black pick -up truck with a North Dakota license
plate. When Officer Johnson heard that one of the victims was following the suspect as he
left the parking lot heading east, she activated her lights and sirens.
Officer Johnson spotted Dickey’s truck near the hotel about a quarter of a mile away
from her traveling at a high rate of speed. The truck sped away and made a sharp left turn
into a field. Officer Wayne Tolbert, who was driving an SUV squad car, was able to cut
Dickey off in the field, and the officers apprehended him at gunpoint. After Officer Gary
Kuhn went to the Holiday Inn to investigate, the officers learned that nothing was reported
stolen on that day. Officer Kuhn learned that the Holiday Inn had reported a theft by a
suspect matching Dickey’s description on September 20, 2016, and when employees saw
Dickey on the premises on October 14, they recognized him from video images and
reported him to the police.
The state charged Dickey with Fleeing a Peace Officer in a Motor Vehicle. Di ckey
moved to suppress evidence that he fled from law enforcement, arguing that it was fruit of
an illegal seizure that occurred when the officers pursued his vehicle with activated lights
and sirens. The district court denied the motion. Dickey proceeded to a stipulated-fact trial,
and the district court found Dickey guilty.
Dickey appeals from the denial of his suppression motion.
D E C I S I O N
Dickey argues that police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him as he drove away
from the Holiday Inn because the dispatcher incorrectly informed the officers who pursued

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him that he was suspected of having “just” stolen something from the hotel. When
reviewing a district court’s reasonable-suspicion determination, this court reviews findings
of fact for clear error and the ultimate reasonable-suspicion determination de novo. Wilkes
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239, 242 -43 (Minn. App. 2010). We consider
whether the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Dickey.
Dickey asserts that police did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him because
the dispatcher incorrectly informed them about the timing of the theft they were called to
investigate. But the reasonable -suspicion standard does not require police officers to be
absolutely sure or correct in their suspicions. “All that is required is that the stop be not the
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Marben v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d
697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (quotations and parentheses omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)) . Dickey asserts that Olson v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (1985) , a case involving an anonymous tip about a drunk driver,
requires us to conclude that the police lacked reasonable suspicion because the witness who
called the dispatcher eventually revealed that he did not know if Dickey had stolen anything
on that day. Olson does not sustain Dickey’s argument.
In Olson, two police officers received a radio dispatch reporting that a citizen had
observed a “possible” drunk driver. Id. at 553. The caller described the car and the license
plate number, and the officers eventually spotted the car. Id. The officers followed the car
for about half a mile, during which time they noticed no erratic driving, but they stopped

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the car anyway. Id. Because the officers did not observe any erratic driving themselves
following the non -specific anonymous tip, the Olson court determined that the
admissibility of the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop depended on whether the
dispatcher was in possession of specific and articulable facts supporting rea sonable
suspicion. Id. at 555. The Olson court concluded that the tip on its own did not have
sufficient indicia of reliability because it was anonymous and lacked specificity. Id. at 556.
Because there were no specific and articulable facts supporting rea sonable suspicion, the
seizure was unlawful.
But Olson does not eliminate reasonable suspicion of criminality simply because
police are misinformed about when the criminal act occurred. Olson merely requires police
to have a specific and articulable basis for seizing a person, not some vague concern about
a “possible drunk driver .” Id. at 553. It is true that reasonable suspicion “evaporates” if
police learn information that dispels earlier suspicion. See State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919,
922 (Minn. 1996). But Dickey does not suggest that either the police or the dispatcher
learned information that dispelled reasonable suspicion that Dickey had committed a crime;
he only argues that they eventually learned that no crime had been committed on that day.
Dickey’s asserted distinction based on the timing of the suspected criminality is of such
little consequence that the Supreme Court has treated it as a foregone conclusion . See
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 n.2, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 n.2 (1981) (“Of course,
an officer may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that
person is wanted for past criminal conduct.”).

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The hotel’s employee called police because the employee recognized Dickey as the
prime suspect in an earlier theft they had reported to police. While the witness’s report and
the dispatcher’s relay might have been incorrect as to the timing of the complained-of theft,
both contained specific , articulable facts tying Dickey to alleged criminal activity which
justified seizing Dickey for a brief investigatory stop. On the facts reported to the
dispatcher and relayed to the officers—that a suspect in a theft was fleeing the scene of the
theft, even if the theft did not occur on that day—the reasonable-suspicion standard was
satisfied.
Affirmed.