State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1625

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Walter Jukkar Clark, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed November 19, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-17325

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney General, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Ted Sampsell -Jones, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of first -degree aggravated robbery. He appeals his
conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing inadmissible
evidence at trial and denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.
FACTS
On the morning of June 7, 2016, in Minneapolis, D.T. left a store and walked to his
car. As he went to enter the car, a man came running up behind him. D.T. turned around,
and the man put a gun to D.T.’s chest and demanded that he give up the jewelry he was
wearing. The assailant then ripped a gold necklace off of D.T.’s neck and commanded
D.T. to give him the gold bracelet that he was wearing. After D.T. complied, the assailant
took off running and turne d down a street. D.T. jumped into his car, ma de a U-turn, and
pursued the assailant. D.T. testified that he saw the assailant enter the driver side of a black
Camaro and take off. D.T. followed the Camaro for a little while and called the police to
report the robbery. D.T. eventually stopped his pursuit and returned to the store to speak
with two police officers.
About a week later , D.T. spoke on the phone with a different policeman, Officer
Adam McCann, the lead investigator on the case. D.T. described the assailant to officers
as a black man, 2 0 to 23 years of age, with a thin build, wearing a black swe atshirt, and
sporting a goatee. He identified the assailant’s weapon as a 9-millimeter handgun.
Officer McCann obtained surveillance -video footage f rom the store , another
business in the area , and a SafeZone camera. The footage from the store showed D.T.

3
leaving the store, walking to his car, and getting robbed. The SafeZone footage showed a
man, who Officer McCann believed matched the description of the assailant, getting out of
the passenger side of a black Camaro and walking toward the store. The Camaro then
appeared to turn around the corner to pick up the suspect, according to Officer McCann.
Police were unable to identify the license plate number of the Camaro from the videos.
Because he could not identify the license plate of the Camaro, Officer McCann had
another officer search a license-plate-reader system to identify black Camaros that had
been in the area. With the help of the license-plate-reader system, Officer McCann obtained
a spreadsheet of about 30 potential suspects based on matching car descriptions . One of
the suspects on the list was appellant Walter Jukkar Clark, Jr. Officer McCann also
searched a statewide automated pawn system and learned that Clark had pawned a necklace
in February of 2016 —several months before the robbery. Officer McCann then put
together a six-picture sequential photographic lineup that included Clark to show D.T. The
lineup was conducted by an officer who had no knowledge about the case. After seeing
the lineup once, D.T. identified Clark as his assailant.
Officer McCann then obtained search warrants for Clark’s home and car. On June
28, 2016, police arrested Clark at the Anoka County Courthouse after learning that he had
a court date in a sepa rate criminal case . During an in -custody interview with Officer
McCann, Clark denied robbing D.T. and indicated that he had a gold bracelet in his car but
that it was his. The search of the car revealed a gold bracelet. The search of Clark’s home
turned up no evidence. Officer McCann sent D.T. a picture of the gold bracelet found in
Clark’s Camaro, and D.T. confirmed that it was his.

4
Hennepin County charged Clark with one count of first -degree aggravated robbery
under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2 016). The case proceeded to a jury trial. D.T.,
Officer McCann, and the officer who conducted the lineup were the only witnesses at trial.
Before the start of trial, the parties argued different evidentiary issues. Two in particular
are relevant to this appeal. First, Clark made a motion in limine to exclude any reference
to being arrested at the Anoka County Courthouse. Clark argued that specifying that he
had an appointment at the courthouse could lead the jury to believe that he was engaging
in criminal behavior and that it was more prejudicia l than probative. The district court
ruled that the prosecution could elicit testimony that Clark was arrested at the courthouse
and that officers knew he had an appointment there that day but forbade the p rosecution
from eliciting testimony that Clark was present for a criminal matter. Second, Clark made
a motion in limine to exclude any reference to hi s sales as documented in the automated
pawn system. He argued that the evidence was irrelevant and that it would call for an
innocent act “to take on the air of [an ] illeg al [act ].” The district court ruled that the
evidence of prior pawning activity could be admitted at trial.
The trial had some issues along the way. During his testimony, D.T. referenced a
picture that had been sent to him by Officer McCann of the brac elet found in Clark’s
Camaro. It appeared that the picture in question had not been disclosed to the defense in
discovery, so Clark moved for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion.
During part of Officer McCann’s testimony, which took place on a Thursday, it was
revealed that the information h e had obtained from the license -plate-reader system was
given to him in a spreadsheet. The defense had not received this spreadsheet in discovery

5
and considered it to be potentially exculpatory evidence since it included a list of potential
alternative perpetrators. The district court instructed the prosecutor to obtain the
spreadsheet and send it to the defense that night. Defense counsel initially moved for a
mistrial but withdrew the motion the next morning. And defense counsel offered to spend
the weekend looking over the list in order to determine whether there was any relevant
evidence that she could use in her client’s defense if the district court would grant a
continuance. The prosecutor felt that delaying the trial that Friday (and not resuming until
the following Monday) would unfairly prejudice the state, and she moved for a mistri al,
preferring to start over. The district court gave the defense a continuance until Monday
and denied the state’s motion for a mistrial.
On that Monday, the state continued its direct examination of Officer McCann. In
response to the prosecutor’s question if he had discovered “any other informa tion that
supported a conclusion that Mr. Clark might be the suspect,” Officer McCann responded,
“Yes. He was involved in a prior case that - -.” The defense objected, arguing that Officer
McCann’s statement violated the district court’s pre -trial order that the prosecutor should
instruct her witness to not reference any other criminal cases involving Clark.
The defense then moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury ultimately
convicted Clark. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Clark challenges his conviction. He argues that the district court should have
excluded some of the state’s evidence and granted his second motion for a mistrial.

6
I. Admissibility of Evidence
Clark argues that the district court erred by not excluding evidence of his arrest at
the Anoka County courthouse and his prior pawning activity. We review a district court’s
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 204 (Minn.
2013).
Clark first argues that the district court erred by admitting the courthouse arrest and
pawning activity evidence because it constitutes Spreigl evidence. “Evidence of another
crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the chara cter of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Spreigl, 139
N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965). While Spreigl evidence is not admissible to prove that a
defendant acted in conformity with his character, it may be admissible “as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
The state disputes that this was Spreigl evidence. The courthouse arrest and the
pawning activity were not argued by Clark as Spreigl evidence before the district court.
Instead, Clark made a rule 403 argument about the courthouse arrest, claiming it would be
more prejudicial than probative, and he made a r ule 401 relevance argument about the
pawning activity. Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403.
Our review of the record confirms that evidence of Clark’s arrest at the courthouse
and his pawning activity was not Spreigl evidence. With regard to the arrest, t he district
court limited the state to intr oducing evidence that Clark had a hearing at the courthouse,
and it forbade any mention that the hearing was for a criminal matter. Based on this record,

7
the jurors did not know the nature of the hearing as it could have been for a civil or family
law matter. And pawning jewelry is not a crime. The state only used the pawning activity
to give context for how Officer McCann came to focus on Clark as a suspect. Accordingly,
neither piece of evidence was o f a crime, wrong, or act that would prove that Clark acted
in conformity with his character. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Clark’s second argument is that his courthouse arrest and pawning activity were
irrelevant under Minn. R. Evid. 401 and 402. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. And the Minnesota Supreme Court explained “that
evidence is generally admissible to give jurors the context for an investigation.” State v.
Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). The courthouse arrest was relevant to the context
of the investigation because law enforcement recovered the gold bracelet —the only piece
of physical evidence tying Clark to the crime—from Clark’s car while arresting him at the
courthouse. And t he pawning activity was relevant to the context of the investigation
because it helped to explain how Clark became a suspect.
Clark’s third and final argument with respect to his courthouse arrest and p awning
activity is that the evidence’s probative value was outweighed by it s danger of unfair
prejudice under Minn. R. Evid. 4 03. Rule 403 explains that relevant “evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. The district
court limited the state to introducing evidence that Clark had a hearing at the courthouse

8
without indicating what type of hearing was involved, and pawning jewelry is not an illegal
activity. To the extent that the jury could draw negative inferences from this evidence, we
fail to see how the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
This argument fails, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of Clark’s courthouse arrest and prior pawning activity.
II. Motion for a Mistrial
Clark next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial
following Officer McCann’s comments about Clark ’s involvement in another case.
Because a district court judge “is in the best position to determine whether an outburst
creates sufficient prejudice to deny the defendant a fair trial such that a mistrial should be
granted,” we review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discr etion. State
v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2006).
Both Clark and the state agree that the officer’s comments that he was aware of
Clark from a prior case violated the district court’s pre-trial order. The question is whether
the prejudice to Cl ark from this statement was so great that the district court abused its
discretion by not declaring a mistrial. When assessing the prejudice from the denial of a
motion for a mistrial, the question is whether the defendant was sufficiently prejudiced so
as to deny him a fair trial. Id.
Clark frames his prejudice argument as being about the collective prejudice from
the denial of his motion for a mistrial, the courthouse arrest evidence, and the prior pawning
activity evidence. We have held that the courthouse arrest evidence and the prior pawning

9
activity evidence were properly admitted at trial, so we will not consider them in the
prejudice analysis, though we note that the outcome would have been the same if we did.
Clark makes three prejudice arguments. He argues that the evidence against him
was weak because D.T.’s eyewitness testimony was unreliable. He asserts that the lineup
procedures used to identify him as the suspect were suggestive and tainted the
identification. And he claims that the evidence against him was weak because there were
inconsistencies and contradictions in D.T.’s testimony.
Clark argues that the evidence against him was weak because the s tate relied on
D.T.’s inherently flawed testimony. To bolster his claim, he cites to social science
evidence which shows that “high levels of stress significantly impair a witness’s ability to
recognize faces and encode details into memory” and that when it comes to identifications
“certainty is not correlated with accuracy.” But none of this social science evidence was
presented to the jury. The jury based its decision upon evidence presented during the trial
and found D.T.’s testimony to be credible. And determinations of witness credibility and
the weight to be given to a witness’s testimony lie solely with the jury. State v. Skinner,
450 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990).
Clark’s argument about the photo graphic lineup also fails . He argues that the
photographic lineup was suggestive and tainted. If the jury had been presented with
evidence and arguments suggesting that the identification was unreliable, then it could be
reasonable to determine that the jury was swayed by the inadmissible evidence that came
in. But there were no such arguments made at trial about the lineup. Moreover, nothing
indicates that this lineup was suggestive. It was conducted sequentially, the officer

10
presenting the lineup had no knowledge of the case, and the other men in the lineup looked
similar to Clark. While suggestive lineups are a threat to a fair criminal justice system, this
lineup does not fall into that category.
Clark also argues that the evidence against him was weak because there were
inconsistencies and contradictions in D.T.’s testimony compared to his initial statements
to police. Clark points out that D.T. initially described his assailant as being 20 to 23 years
old with a thin build and an afro (which contrasts with Clark being 26 at the time of the
robbery and described by some as being of medium build). Clark also points out that D.T.
failed to note that the assailant was wearing a baseball cap, and mistakenly testified that
the assailant entered the driver side of th e Camaro after robbing him. But D.T. was
consistent in his description of the robbery and the assailant’s getaway in a black Camaro,
and he was able to identify Clark in a photographic lineup. In addition, the prosecution
had evidence outside of D.T.’s eyewitness identification that supported a finding of guilt.
This includes the fact that a gold bracelet was found in Clark’s car which D.T. identified
as being the bracelet that was stolen from him and the video footage that showed the
assailant leaving the scene of the robbery in a black Camaro similar to that owned by Clark.
In light of the eviden ce against Clark, we hold that O fficer McCann’s testimony did not
deny Clark a fair trial. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Clark’s motion for a mistrial.
Affirmed.