State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1653

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

T. J.,
Respondent.

Filed June 25, 2018
Reversed
Ross, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-05-482

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Gary W. Bjorklund, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

James Perunovich, Law Offices of James Perunovich, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presid ing Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Twelve years after T.J. pleaded guilty to possession of pornography involving a
minor, the district court granted his petition to expunge his felony conviction from records
kept by the judicial and executive branches. The state challenges the district court’s

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expungement of the executive branch’s records. Because Minnesota Statutes, section
609A.02 (2016), does not authorize the distri ct court to require the executive branch to
expunge its records of a child-pornography-possession conviction, we reverse.
FACTS
T.J. used his work computer at Fairview Health Systems in 2005 to visit chat rooms
where people posted links to pictures of nude girls posing sexually or engaging in sex acts.
The Hibbing Police Department learned from the St. Paul Police Department’s crimes-
against-children task force that a cyber tip traced child porn ography to Fairview Health
Systems and later to T.J.’s home computer. The Hibbing Police Department investigated
and found numerous photographs constituting child pornography on T.J.’s home computer.
The St. Louis County Attorney charged T.J. with possessing pornographic material
depicting minors.
T.J. pleaded guilty, resulting in a convic tion that required him to register as a
predatory sex offender. The district court gran ted a stay of imposition and ordered T.J. to
complete three years of supervised probation. T.J. met all the requirements of the Hibbing
Men’s Sex Offender Group Program, and the program’s psychologist described T.J. as
hard-working, sincere, reliable, and motivated . The district court discharged T.J. from
probation in 2008 and downgraded his offe nse from a felony to a misdemeanor under
Minnesota Statutes, section 609.13 (2016).
T.J. petitioned the district court to expu nge both the judicial-branch and executive-
branch records of his offense. The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension objected,
arguing that T.J.’s offense required him to register as a sexual predator and that Minnesota

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Statutes, section 609A.02, subdivision 4 (2016), prohibited expungement. St. Louis County
also objected.
The district court found that the statute’s language is ambiguous as to whether it
prohibits expungement of an offense for whic h a sexual predator is no longer required to
register. The district court reasoned that, be cause ten years had passed and T.J. was no
longer required to register, the statute allowed it to order the sealing of both judicial- and
executive-branch records, which it did, and it immunized T.J. from perjury for any future
failure to acknowledge that he was arrested for the offense.
The state appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The state argues that the district court exceeded its authority by expunging the
executive branch’s record of T.J.’s felony child-pornography conviction. Whether a district
court exceeded its authority to expunge criminal records is a question of law requiring our
de novo review. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013).
The district court derives its authority to expunge criminal records from two sources.
One source is the judicial branch’s inherent power to expunge its own records. Id. The state
does not challenge the district court’s expu ngement order as it regards judicial-branch
records. The other source is Chapter 609A of the Minnesota Statutes, which authorizes the
district court to expunge executive-bra nch records in specific circumstances. Id. This
appeal concerns only the interpretation and application of the st atute authorizing the
expungement of executive-branch records.

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The state argues that the district court exceeded its statutory authority when it
ordered the expungement of the executive branch’s records of T.J.’s conviction. The state’s
argument requires us to interpret the st atute, a task we perform de novo. State v. R.H.B.,
821 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. 2012). When a statute is unambiguous, we will adhere to the
unambiguous interpretation. Id. The expungement statute treats misdemeanors and felonies
differently. If certain conditions are met, the expungement st atute broadly authorizes the
district court to order the expungement of “all records relating to an arrest, indictment or
information, trial, or verdict” related to convictions or stayed sentences for offenses
ranging from petty misdemeanors to gross mi sdemeanors. Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd.
3(a) and 3(b)(3)–(4) (2016). By contrast, the statute selectively includes a lengthy but finite
list of felonies that qualify for expungement. Id., subd. 3(a) and 3(b)(1)–(50). As the state
points out, possessing child pornography is a fe lony that is not included on the list. And
although the district court eventually deemed T.J.’s conviction a misdemeanor, the
supreme court has held that downgraded felony convictions do not qualify for
expungement under the misdemeanor provi sions of the expungement statute. State v.
S.A.M., 891 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Min n. 2017). Because the stat ute does not authorize the
district court to order the expungement of records of T.J.’s child-pornography conviction,
the district court erred by ordering the executive branch to expunge those records.
The state also argues that the district cour t erred when it ordered that T.J. could not
be guilty of perjury if he should ever fail to acknowle dge his arrest for possessing
pornography involving a minor. The argument is convincing. The dist rict court cited no
source authorizing it to immunize a convicted defendant from prosecution for perjury, and

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T.J. submitted no brie f defending or explaining the di strict court’s decision. The
expungement statute provides that a person shall not be held guilty of perjury for failing to
acknowledge an arrest contained in an expunged record “[i]f the court orders the sealing of
the record of proceedings under section 152. 18” or if the person’s crime shared a nexus
with the person’s status as a crime victim. Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subds. 6, 6a (2016).
These immunity provisions do not apply here. Section 152.18 refers only to expungement
for certain first-time drug offenders, unlike T.J., and T.J. is not a crime victim. Because the
district court did not identify the basis for its immunity decision and we are aware of none,
we also reverse the portion of the district court’s order immunizing T.J. from a perjury
conviction should he fail to acknowledge his arrest for possessing child pornography.
Reversed.