Meshbesher & Associates PA, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1660

Meshbesher & Associates PA,
Appellant,

vs.

Lindell & Lavoie LLP,
Respondent.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-14813

William R. Skolnick, Amy D. Joyce, Samuel M. Johnson, Skolnick & Joyce, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Peter J. Gleekel, Mark A. Solheim, John M. Bjorkman, Stephanie L. Chandler,
Larson ∙ King, LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant law firm challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of its claims against
respondent law firm for breaches of a referral agreement. Appellant asserts that the district
court erred in concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and
misapplied the law. Because the referred clients discharged appellant, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Meshbesher & Associates, PA (Meshbesher) and res pondent Lindell &
Lavoie, LLP (L&L) are both Minnesota law firms. Meshbesher primarily practices
criminal defense and L&L primarily practices personal-injury law. On April 16, 1997 ,
Meshbesher and L&L entered into a “mutual and exclusive referral relationship for
criminal and personal injury plaintiffs’ cases” (the referral agreement). The parties agreed
that L&L would “refer all criminal clients to Meshbesher, and Meshbesher [would] refer
all personal injury plaintiffs to [L&L].” The firms would be jointly responsible for
representing the referred cases and would share the fees. The referred clients would sign
retainer agreements consenting to the joint representation and the fee division.
Around 2005, L&L hired an attorney with criminal -law experience who handled
criminal-defense cases that were referred to him personally while working for L&L. L&L
continued to refer other criminal cases to Meshbesher. In 2012, Meshbesher hired an
attorney to conduct personal-injury work in house. Meshbesher continued to refer medical-
malpractice and workers’-compensation cases to L&L.
On March 8, 2016, L&L sent Meshbesher a letter alleging that Meshbesher had
breached the referral agreement by hiring an in-house personal-injury attorney. The letter
also states that after discussing the matter with impacted clients, a few of the clients elected
to discharge Meshbesher and directed that no part of an attorney fee should be paid to
Meshbesher if a recovery was made. L&L attached letters from the impacted clients to its
letter.

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On O ctober 7, 2016, Meshbesher filed a complaint against L&L , which it later
amended, alleging: (1) breach of the referral agreement after L&L failed to pay
Meshbesher its earned portion of the shared attorney fee s; (2) breach of the implied
covenant of good f aith and fair dealing after L&L induced its clien ts to discharge
Meshbesher; (3) promissory estoppel after Meshbesher relied on the promises made by
L&L in the referral agreement and retainer agreements by investing in personal -injury
advertising and by referring personal-injury clients to L&L; (4) unjust enrichment after
Meshbesher referred clients to L&L and L&L failed to compensate Meshbesher as agreed
upon; (5) fraud based on L&L’s false representations; and (6) accounting to determine the
amounts L&L owed Meshbesher as a result.
L&L moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on August 23,
2017. The district court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and
entered judgment for L&L on all claims. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we
determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine
issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v.
JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). “[W]e may
affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds.” Doe v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
“There is no genuine issue of material fact . . . when the nonmoving party presents
evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not

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sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the non moving party’s case
to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566
N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). “[T]he party resisting summary judgment must do more than
rest on mere averments.” Id.
Meshbesher argues that genuine dis putes of material fact remain precluding
summary judgment and that the district court misapplied the law. We disagree.
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e) requires a client to agree in writing to a fee-splitting
arrangement between two attorneys who are not in the same firm. A client has the right to
discharge her attorney at any time, with or without cause. Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281,
283, 176 N.W. 989, 989 (1920). When a client discharges her attorney, the contingency-
fee contract between the cli ent and her attorney terminates, and “the compensation terms
of the contract become unenforceable. ” Trenti, Saxhaug, Berger, Roche, Stephenson,
Richards & Aluni, Ltd. v. Nartnik, 439 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied
(Minn. July 12, 1989). Instead, a discharged attorney retained on a contingency -fee basis
may recover “the reasonable value of his service [s] based on quantum meruit.” Stall v.
First Nat’l Bank of Buhl, 375 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. App. 1985).
Here, although the impacted clients signed retainer agreement s agreeing to the fee
division, they later rescinded their approval of any payments to Meshbesher in their letters
terminating Meshbesher’s legal services. Meshbesher does not provide any evidence that
it performed substantive work on the impacted clients’ cases after making the initial referral
to L&L; in fact, the record suggests the opposite. Given the impacted clients’ rescinded
approval of the fee division , and given the inadequate record on the reasonable value of

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services that Meshbesher provided in the referred clients’ cases, if any, Meshbesher is not
entitled to recover under its referral agreement with L&L. The district court did not err in
granting L&L summary judgment. Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on this basis, we need not reach the remaining issues raised by Meshbesher. See
Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 163 (“[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be
sustained on any grounds.”).
Affirmed.