Craig Philip Christianson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1697

Craig Philip Christianson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed May 29, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-17-929

Rodd Tschida, Minnesota Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Drew D. Bredeson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s order sustaining the revocation of his
driving privileges, arguing that there was not probable cause for his arrest. He argues that
there was insufficient evidence to establish a temporal connection between his intoxication
and driving conduct. We affirm.
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FACTS
At 5:57 p.m. on April 8, 2017, a sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to contact the wife
of appellant Craig Philip Christianson. Appellant’s wife told the deputy that appellant had
been missing the night before and had returned home at 3:00 p.m. that day. She believed
he was intoxicated “when he came home,” and he then left again on an all-terrain vehicle
(ATV). She did not know where he went. Th e deputy understood that appellant’s wife
had not seen appellant since 3:00 p.m.
The deputy located appellant at 6:39 p.m. Appellant appeared to be passed out on
the ATV. The deputy woke appellant and obs erved that his eyes were bloodshot and
watery, his speech was very slurred, and he emitted a strong odor of alcohol. Appellant
told the deputy that he had been sitting there for 20 minutes and he had not consumed any
alcohol while sitting there. Appellant admitted to driving the ATV to where he was found.
Appellant’s balance was so poor that the deputy did not have him perform any field sobriety
tests except nystagmus and a preliminary breath test (PBT). The deputy observed signs of
intoxication during the nystagmus test, and the PBT resulted in a 0.206 alcohol
concentration. The deputy arrested appellant and transported him to jail, where he took a
breath test resulting in a 0.27 alcohol concentration.
Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant’s license to drive,
and appellant petitioned for judici al review of the revocation. Appellant did not dispute
that he drove the ATV to where he was found and did not disp ute that he was intoxicated
when he was arrested. However, appellant challenged the temporal proximity between his
driving conduct and the intoxication and argued a post-driving-consumption defense.
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The district court sustained the license revocation. The district court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to establish a temporal connection between the driving conduct
and the intoxication to satisfy probable cause. The district court based this conclusion on
evidence that appellant’s wife believed he ha d been intoxicated at home before he left on
the ATV as well as appellant’s statement to the deputy “that he had driven to the location
20 minutes prior to being found and [he] had not consumed any alcohol at the location.”
The district court rejected appellant’s post-d riving-consumption defense, concluding that
appellant’s story that he consumed alcohol after he drove the ATV was not credible.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
“A determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and of law.” Groe
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 615 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 13, 2000). We review the district c ourt’s findings of fact supporting an order
sustaining a license revocation for clear error, “giving due weight to inferences drawn from
those facts by the district court.” Mell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 757 N.W.2d 702, 708
(Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). We w ill “defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.” Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013). “After the facts are determined, this court must
apply the law to determine if probable cause existed.” Groe, 615 N.W.2d at 840. This
court does not review probable cause de novo; “instead, we determine if the police officer
had a substantial basis for concluding that pr obable cause existed at the time of invoking
the implied consent law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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Probable cause exists when, “based on the totality of th e circumstances, there is a
reasonable ground of suspicion supporte d by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in be lieving” that the person drove or exercised
physical control of the vehicle. Shane v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 587 N.W.2d 639, 641
(Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). We evaluate probable cause from the arresting officer’s
point of view, giving deference to th e officer’s experience and judgment. Delong v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 386 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn.
June 13, 1986).
A “temporal connection” between the driving conduct and the officer’s observation
of intoxication must exist in order to establish probable cause to believe a person was
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Dietrich v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
363 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. App. 1985). Here, appellant does not deny that he drove the
ATV to the location and does not deny that he was intoxicated when he interacted with the
officer. But he argues the commissioner failed to establish a temporal connection between
his driving of the ATV and the officer’s observation of intoxication. He essentially argues
that the officer could not know if appellant dr ove one, two, or three hours prior to being
found by the officer, and if he was legally intoxicated when he drove.
In Dietrich, we affirmed a district court’s dete rmination that the evidence failed to
link the time of driving to when the driver was found to be under the influence. Id. at 803.
In Dietrich, the driver was in an accident and left the scene. Id. at 802. Witnesses identified
Dietrich as the driver but did not indicate whether he appeared intoxicated at the scene. Id.
The officer went to Dietrich’s home, where Dietrich appeared intoxicated, failed field
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sobriety tests, tested above a 0.10 alcohol concentration, and admitted to drinking alcohol.
Id. But the officer did not pr ovide information about when the accident occurred, and
stated only that he was on duty around 9:19 p.m. and provided the implied-consent advisory
at 10:24 p.m. Id. We concluded that the evidence failed to establish the connection
between the driving conduct and the officer’s observations of intoxication. Id. at 803. We
indicated that the time the officer was on duty did not establish when Dietrich had been
driving. Id. We concluded that the facts establis hed a sequence of events culminating in
Dietrich’s intoxication but that there was no temporal connection between the intoxication
and the driving conduct. Id.
“Where there is no evidence whatsoever connecting the time of driving with the
time of an officer’s observations, the officer’s proof of probable cause is inadequate.”
Hedstrom v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 410 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Minn. App. 1987). However, we
have affirmed cases where the officer is aware that the driv er consumed alcohol before
driving, and also where the officer observed indicia of intoxication hours after driving. See
Eggersgluss v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 393 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn. 1986) (affirming
revocation where passenger admitted the driver had been dri nking before the accident
despite a 2.5-hour delay between the acc ident and the officer’s observations); Weldon v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 400 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming revocation
where driver told officer he had been at a bar earlier, he was then in an accident, and showed
signs of intoxication 1.5 hours after the accident). We have also indicated that there is no
requirement that the officer establish the exac t time the driver was driving or actually
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observe the driving. Delong, 386 N.W.2d at 298; Graham v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374
N.W.2d 809, 811 (Minn. App. 1985).
The record establishes that appellant’s wi fe saw appellant at 3:00 p.m. and believed
that he was intoxicated. She to ld the deputy that appellant th en drove away on his ATV.
The deputy located appellant on the ATV, visibly intoxicate d, and appellant admitted to
driving the ATV to that location. Appellant to ld the deputy that he had been sitting there
for 20 minutes and had not consumed any alc ohol while sitting there. The preliminary
breath test indicated that appellant’s alcohol concentration was significantly above the legal
limit. While appellant argues there is some ambiguity over whethe r appellant meant he
had only been sitting on the AT V for 20 minutes, rather than that the ATV had come to
rest there 20 minutes earlier, the circumstances, taken from the officer’s point of view, are
sufficiently strong for a reasonable person to believe that appellant operated the ATV while
under the influence of alcoho l. Respondent prov ided sufficient evidence to establish a
temporal connection between the intoxicated state appellant was found in and the driving
conduct.
Affirmed.