In the Matter of the Application of J. M. M. o/b/o Minors for a Change of Name

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1730

In the Matter of the Application of J. M. M.
o/b/o Minors for a Change of Name

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Dissenting, Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-18151

Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Lisa L. Beane, Mohammadee Summra Shariff, Robins Kaplan
LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant J.M.M.)

Rana S. Alexander, Standpoint, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Standpoint)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge;
and Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant J.M.M. challenges the district court’s dismissal of her name-change
petition for her two children, after remand. Sh e argues that the district court erred in
determining that the children’s biological fath er is entitled to notice of appellant’s name-
change petition, that it improperly bestowed rights on the children’s biological father who
was avoiding responsibility for the children, and, in the alternative, th at the district court
erred in determining that notice to the father was practicable. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant J.M.M. has three children. She acknowledges that all three are the
biological children of D.G. Appellant and D.G. have never married, nor has any court
adjudicated the paternity of the children. Appellant and D.G. lived together for a number
of years in various locations, during which time appellant gave birth to two of the children.
Appellant gave birth to the third child after her relationship with D.G. ended. D.G. has not
met the third child. He has had little or no c ontact with appellant and the children since
the third child’s birth in July 2013. Appellant testified that, despite his insistence that the
children carry his last name, 1 D.G. refused to sign any of the children’s birth records as
their father as part of his effort to avoi d child-support liability. D.G. has never paid
appellant child support for the children. Appellant testified that, while she and D.G. were
living together, D.G. threatened to harm her and the children if she ever attempted to collect
child support from him or leave him. She further testified th at D.G. once threatened to
kidnap the children if she le ft him. D.G. did not sign a Recognition of Parentage
concerning any of the childre n, and no court action to establish paternity was ever
commenced.
Appellant petitioned the district court to change the last names of the three children
from D.G.’s to her own. The district court informed appellant that she had to notify the
children’s biological father of the name-change petition. Appellant submitted an affidavit

1 The district court noted that, after the thir d child was born, appellant called D.G. and
informed him of the birth. D.G. asked if she had given the child his last name and appellant
confirmed that she had given the child D.G.’s last name. There was no finding of, or record
evidence to support, insistence by D.G. concerning the naming of the youngest child.

3
and a letter to the district court, requesting that the petition proceed without notice to the
biological father because he had no legal relationship with the children and had previously
threatened appellant and the children with violence if appellant sought child support from
him, which rendered notice impracticable. Af ter reviewing the submissions, the district
court dismissed the matter without prejudice, concluding that appellant did not show a basis
to forego the notice requirement under the name-change statute.
Appellant appealed the district court’ s determination that she was required to
provide notice of the name change petition to her children’s biological father. In a
published opinion, In re Application of J.M.M. (J.M.M. I), we determined that Minnesota
Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1 (2016) “does not require an applicant-parent to
provide notice of a name-change application filed on behalf of a minor child to a biological
parent who does not have a legally recognized parent-child relationship with the child”
under the Minnesota Parentage Act. 890 N. W.2d 750, 756 (Minn. App. 2017). We
remanded with instructions that the district court determine whether D.G. “satisfies the
criteria of the parentage act” for a parent-child relationship. Id.
On remand, the district court determined that D.G. has a legally recognized parent-
child relationship with appellant’s eldest two children and is therefore entitled to notice of
the name-change petition and proceeding. The district court relied on Minnesota Statutes
section 257.55, subdivision 1(d) (2016) to conclude that D.G. has a parent-child
relationship with those two children because he is their acknowledged biological father and
received them into his home and openly held them out as his own. It found that the two
children lived in various homes with D.G., that D.G. “insisted” and “required” that the two

4
children bear his last name, that he cared for the children and arranged child care, that he
financially contributed to raising the children while he lived with them, and that he took
the children out publicly.
The district court also concluded that serving D.G. notice of the name-change
petition is practicable. In reaching this conc lusion, it found that appellant knows where
D.G. lives. It acknowledged that appellant wanted to be excused from serving notice
because of D.G.’s threats that he would harm appellant or her family if she “ever left him
or tried to collect child support.” It furthe r found that appellant had obtained a “Family
Violence Waiver”2 from her obligation to pursue child support against D.G. The district
court ordered that appellant notify D.G. of the petition, considering that the risk of violence
to appellant did not render service impracticable. D.G. never physically harmed appellant
or the children, and his threats involved the pursuit of child support or appellant leaving
him; no threats concerned changing the children’s last name. The district court found that
there are other ways to adequately address a ppellant’s safety concerns, such as having
deputies at any court hearings or redactin g appellant’s contact information from court
documents.
Appellant appeals from the district court’ s order that D.G. must be notified of
appellant’s petition to change the names of her eldest two children.

2 The record indicates J.M.M. has applie d for, and received, an exemption from the
Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) requirement that she must pursue child
support from the noncustodial parent by reason of safety concerns resulting from D.G.’s
threats of violence.

5
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that the children’s
biological father is entitled to notice of her petition to change her eldest two children’s last
name, that the district court improperly protec ted the rights of a biological father who is
avoiding any responsibility for the children, and, in the alterna tive, that the district court
erred in determining that notice to the father is practicable.3
I. The district court did not err in concludi ng that D.G. is entitled to notice under
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, in light of J.M.M. I, because it applied the
criteria set forth in Minneso ta Statutes section 257.55 to determine that D.G.
has a legally recognized pa rent-child relationship with appellant’s children,
and the record supports its factual findings.

A. The district court followed ou r remand instructions and applied
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55 to determine that D.G. is a legal
parent entitled to notice.

We first address appellant’s argument that the district court erred in using Minnesota
Statutes section 275.55 to determine that D. G. has a legally recognized parent-child
relationship with appellant’s children so as to be entitled to notice under the name-change
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1.
Interpretation of the Minnesota Parentage Act is a question of law that appellate
courts review de novo. County of Dakota v. Blackwell, 809 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. App.
2011). “Misapplying the law is an abuse of discretion.” Bauerly v. Bauerly, 765 N.W.2d
108, 110 (Minn. App. 2009). On remand from an appellate court, “a district court must
abide by the appellate court’s mandate strictly according to its terms and has no power to

3 Appellant makes no argument on appeal that D.G. waived notice, and she made no such
argument to the district court.

6
alter, amend, or modify the mandate.” State ex. rel. Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v.
Nicollet Cty. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs , 799 N.W.2d 619, 631 (Min n. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted). “But ‘district courts are given broad discretion to determine how to proceed on
remand, as they may act in any way not in consistent with the remand instructions
provided.’” Id. (quoting Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP, 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.
2005)).
Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1, provides that “no minor child’s name may be changed
without both parents having notice of the pending application for change of name,
whenever practicable, as dete rmined by the court.” In J.M.M. I , we held that, for the
purposes of the name-change statute, “notice is required to be given to a biological father
only if he has a parent-child relationship under the Minnesota Parentage Act.” 890 N.W.2d
at 756.
The Parentage Act defines the “parent a nd child relationship” as “the legal
relationship existing between a child and the child’s biological or adoptive parents incident
to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.” Minn. Stat.
§ 257.52 (2016). Minnesota Statutes secti on 257.54 (2016) provides that this legal
relationship may be establis hed by a biological father under Minnesota Statutes
sections 257.51 to 257.75. Minnesota Stat utes section 257.55 pr ovides a procedure for
establishing a presumption of paternity. Appellant agrees that section 257.55, subdivision
1(d), is the operative provision here; that subdivision provides that “[a] man is presumed
to be the biological father of a child if[,] . . . while the ch ild is under the age of majority,
he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child.”

7
A presumption established under section 257.55 may be rebutted “in an appropriate action
only by clear and convincing evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 2 (2016).
The district court properly looked to Minnesota Statutes section 257.55 to determine
whether D.G. is a parent entitled to notice under Minnesota Statutes section 259.10,
subdivision 1.
Our decision in J.M.M. I functions here as both bindi ng precedent and law of the
case. See Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 19 94) (the doctrine of law of the
case “applies where an appellate court has ruled on a legal issue and has remanded the case
to the lower court for further proceedings”). In J.M.M. I, we held that the district court
erred in determining that D.G. was entitled to notice of the name-change petition “based
upon the sole fact that he is the biological father.” 890 N.W.2d at 756. We reversed and
remanded, with direction that the district court on remand “consider and determine whether
the biological father satisfies the criteria of the parentage ac t” to determine whether D.G.
has a legal parent-child relationship entitlin g him to notice of appellant’s petition. Id.
Appellant agrees that D.G. is the biological father of all three children. She argues, and we
agreed in J.M.M. I, that this biological fact, withou t more, does not entitle D.G. to notice
of the name-change petition. The question for the district court on remand after J.M.M. I
was to determine whether a legal parent-child relationship exists between D.G. and any or
all of the children.
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subd ivision 1, provides for a number of
situations in which “a man is presumed to be the biological father of a child.” Minnesota
Statutes section 257.55, subdivi sion 2, provides that a pr esumption under section 257.55

8
may be rebutted by “clear and convincing eviden ce.” Read together, this means that a
presumed biological father is also presumed to have a parent-child relationship with a child
(and is therefore, under J.M.M. I, entitled to notice of a name-change petition) unless and
until the presumption of paternity has been rebutted.
B. The district court properly applie d Minnesota Statutes section 257.55,
subdivision 1(d), to determine that D.G. is entitled to notice under
Minnesota Statutes section 259.10.

Appellant next argues that, even if the di strict court properly looked to Minnesota
Statutes section 257.55, subdivision 1(d), to determine whether D.G. is a parent entitled to
notice, it incorrectly determined that D.G. satisfies subdivision 1(d). She contends that the
district court failed to interpret what “openly holds out” means under the statute, and that
the record evidence does not su pport the district court’s conclusion that D.G. satisfied
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivision 1(d).
As stated, we review the district cour t’s application of the law for abuse of
discretion. Bauerly, 765 N.W.2d at 110. We review findings of fact for clear error.
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). When reviewing
factual findings, we view the ev idence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings; “[t]hat the record mi ght support findings other than those made by the [district]
court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
The district court made extensive factual findings that D.G. received appellant’s
eldest two children into variou s homes in which he, appellant, and the children lived. It
found that he openly held the eldest two ch ildren out as his own. These findings are

9
supported by the record. The district court thoroughly questioned appellant about D.G.
and appellant’s child care and living arrangements and found that D.G. insisted the children
have his last name, that he received the elde st child into seven different homes and the
middle child into three, that he “inconveni enced his friends and family” so that he,
appellant, and the children could have a place to live, that he cared for or was responsible
for caring for both children, that he arranged child care for both children, and that he
financially contributed to raising both children, among other findings. These findings are
supported by appellant’s statemen ts under oath. Even though the record indicates that
some of D.G.’s actions indicate belligerent a voidance of financial responsibility for the
children after he and appellant separated, th at the district court could have reached a
different conclusion than it did does not make its findings defective. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d at 474.4
Although the district court did not expre ssly interpret what it means for a man to
receive a child into his hom e and openly hold th e child out as his own pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivis ion 1(d), appellant has not shown that the
district court applied the provision in a way that conflicts with previous reported cases. In
Pierce v. Pierce , we affirmed a district court’s fi nding that a man did not openly hold a

4 Appellant challenges a number of individual fact ual findings by the district court as not
supported by the record: that appellant’s elde st two children were D.G.’s first children,
that D.G. “named” the second eldest child and not appellant, and that it appeared to third
parties that the eldest two children were D. G.’s. Although there may be some merit to
these arguments, these factual findings do not appear to us to have influenced the result
reached by the district court. Harmless error is to be ignored. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.

10
child out as his “natural” 5 child. 374 N.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Minn. App. 1985), review
denied (Minn. Nov. 4, 1985). We reached this conclusion by relying on facts that the father
“took no action to claim paternity at the time of [the child’s] birth, nor when her mother
was being divorced from the st atutorily presumed father.” Id. at 451. Further, the father
acknowledged that the child was a child “of his wife’s former marriage” and the child did
not use the father’s surname. Id. at 451-52.
This case is distinguishable from Pierce. D.G. did take action at the birth of the two
older children to ensure that their birth cert ificates used D.G.’s last name, despite not
permitting himself to be listed as the father on the birth record s. The district court made
extensive factual findings concerning these actions, and the record supports the findings.
In Spaeth v. Warren , we affirmed a district court’s conclusion that a man did not
have a parent-child relationship under Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivision 1(d),
and we stated that the section “must be cons trued liberally, to achieve its remedial and
humanitarian purposes.” 478 N.W.2d 319, 32 2 (Minn. App. 1991) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). There, we concluded that the man, although receiving
the child into his home, had not “held [the child] out” as his biological child. Id. Despite
the child referring to the ma n as “daddy” and the man’s provision of financial and
emotional support to the child, the district court found that he had “taken no action to assert
paternity at any time,” and the child did not use the man’s last name. Id. We also noted
that the man’s decision to adopt the child rather than pursue a paternity adjudication “shows

5 Subdivision 1(d) has since been amended to replace “natural” with “biological.”

11
he did not hold himself out to be [the] biological father” and concluded that the man could
not be the presumed father under subdivision 1(d).
This case is also distinguishable from Spaeth. Appellant’s children all have D.G.’s
last name, which is something on which D.G. insisted. And nothing in the record indicates
that D.G. denied paternity; in stead, the record reveals that D.G. refused to sign the birth
records as part of an ongoin g attempt to avoid child support. The district court did not
apply Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdiv ision 1(d), in a way that is inconsistent
with previous reported cases applying that provision.
Finally, appellant argues that, even if we determine that the record supports a
presumption of paternity unde r Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivision 1(d), the
district court erroneously failed to recogni ze that appellant rebutted the presumption.
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivision 2, provides that a presumption of paternity
may be rebutted in an “appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.”
Appellant argues that D.G.’s failure to take “any legal or financial responsibility for the
children” and to “communicate with them in any way” constitutes cl ear and convincing
evidence that rebuts any presumption of paternity under Minnesota Statutes section 257.55.
The district court conclude d on remand that D.G. satisfied the conditions of
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55, subdivisi on 1(d), and is a legal “parent” entitled to
notice of a pending name-change petition for appellant’s two eldest children. This
conclusion is not inconsistent with our remand instructions in J.M.M. I. Although paternity
has not been formally adjudicated under Mi nnesota Statutes section 257.57 (2016), the
district court implicitly found that the presump tion that D.G. is the biological father of

12
appellant’s eldest two children has not been rebutted under Minnesota Statutes section
257.55, subdivision 2. Absent the presumption being rebutted, we must conclude that D.G.
also has a presumptive parent-child relationship with appellant’s eldest two children. And,
in context, this makes sense. Appellant not only did not rebut the presumption that D.G.
is the biological father of her children—sh e expressly acknowledges that he is the
biological father.
II. The district court did not err in concluding that noti ce to D.G. is practicable
under Minnesota Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding notice to D.G. is
practicable. We interpret Minnesota Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1, de novo. See
Blackwell, 809 N.W.2d at 228. We review the district court’s application of the provision
for abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010).
We must give “words and phr ases [in a statute] their pl ain and ordinary meaning.” State
v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. 2014). When a statute is “susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation,” we must apply its plain meaning. Id.
Notice of a name-change petition shall be given to both parents “whenever
practicable, as determined by th e court.” Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1. “Practicable” is
defined as “reasonably capable of being accomplished.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1361
(10th ed. 2014). Similarly, “practicable” has a plain-language definition to like effect:
“capable of being effect ed, done or put into practice; feasible.” The American Heritage
Dictionary 1421 (3rd ed. 1992). The language of Minnesota Statutes section 259.10,

13
subdivision 1, is not ambiguous. Notice is required when it is feasible or capable of being
accomplished.
Here, the district court determined that notice to D.G. was re asonably capable of
being accomplished. Appellant knows where D.G. lives and is able to serve him. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that giving D.G. notice is a thing that
can be accomplished. It is practicable.
Moreover, and even if “practicable” is cons idered to incorporate an element of the
petitioning party’s safety, the di strict court explicitly and ca refully considered whether
notice can be given to D.G. in a way that safeguards appellant from harm. Noting that
D.G. “has never physically harmed [appella nt] or the children,” that appellant “is not
pursuing [D.G.] for child support,” and that appellant knows how to contact D.G., and did
contact him after the third child was born, the district court determined that serving D.G.
with notice of this proceeding is not “so da ngerous that it becomes impracticable.” The
district court found that measures such as redacting court doc uments to eliminate
appellant’s contact information and “ensuring deputies are pres ent at the hearing” can be
implemented to ensure appellant’s safety. We think the district court is best positioned to
determine whether and how litigants in the district court can be protected there. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that giving notice to D.G. is a thing that can be
accomplished, and that it can be safely accomplished.
We do not reach this re sult lightly, and we acknowl edge the important policy
arguments made by both appellant and by St andpoint in its amicus brief that domestic-
abuse victims may place themselves and their ch ildren in danger if they are required to

14
notify their abusers of a pending name-cha nge petition. The pl ain and unambiguous
language of Minnesota Statutes section 259.10, subdivision 1, requires that notice be given
if it is “practicable.” “It is the duty of this court to apply the law as written by the
legislature,” and we cannot disregard the plain language of a statute. Int’l Bhd. Of Elec.
Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 2009).
Appellant makes a final public-policy argum ent that we should “be reluctant to
bestow rights on an alleged father who is ac tively shirking parental responsibilities.” In
J.M.M. I, we stated:
A putative father who fails to accept some measure of
responsibility for the child’s futu re does not have a protected
interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship. A
father with no protected interest in preservation of the parent-
child relationship is unlikely to have any due-process interest
in a name-change application.

890 N.W.2d at 755 (quotation and citation omitted). Here, however, the district court
determined, and the record supports, that th ere exists more than merely a “biological
connection” between appellant’s eldest tw o children and their biological father. See
Heidbreder v. Carton , 645 N.W.2d 355, 372 (Minn. 20 02) (stating that a biological
connection “does not confer due process pr otection on [a] putative father’s parental
interests”). Under Minnesota Statutes secti on 257.55, subdivision 1(d), as a presumptive
biological father, D.G. has a parent-child re lationship under the Minnesota Parentage Act
which entitles D.G. to notice under the name-change statute where, as here, such notice is

15
practicable.6 It is not for us to ignore the law in the name of a policy we might prefer. Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 765 N.W.2d at 68.
Affirmed.

6 We express no opinion concerning whether the children’s names should be changed. This
appeal concerns only whether D.G. is entitled to notice of the name-change petition.

D-1
CLEARY, Chief Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s
determinations that D.G. is a parent en titled to notice under Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (2016)
and that notice to D.G. is practicable under Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1.
J.M.M. is the sole legal parent of and decision-maker for her three minor children.
No other person is named on any of the three birth certificates and no one has come forward
at any time to execute a recognition of parentage or adult paternity.
From late 2008 to early 2013, D.G. and J. M.M. lived together at various locations
in Wisconsin, until a pregnant J.M.M. move d back to Minnesota with her two minor
children. Although D.G. is the father of all three children, he has never met the third child
and has not had contact with J.M.M. or any of the three children in the ensuing five years.
As to the four and one-half years J.M.M. and D.G. lived together, D.G.:
 Refused to sign any of the children’s birth records as
their father or execute a ny recognition of parentage
acknowledging paternity;
 Refused to pay for, or be responsible for, child support;
 Threatened to harm J.M.M. if she ever attempted to
collect child support from him; and
 Threatened to kidnap or harm the children and harm
J.M.M. if she ever left him.

For the past several years, J.M.M. unde rstandably has sought to change the last
names of her children from D.G.’s to her ow n. She argues that Minn. Stat. § 257.55,
subd. 1(d) (2016), properly interpreted, does not result in D.G. being entitled to notice of
the pending name change request and that, in any case, notice to D.G. is not practicable,
given his threats of violence toward J.M.M. and her family. I agree.

D-2
The majority acknowledges that being the biological father of the children does not
give D.G. the right to notice of the name-change petition “without more.” In other words,
it is not enough for D.G. to have fathered th e children to raise this presumption; he must
have a legally recognized relationship with them. Under these circumstances, the operative
provision of the Minnesota Parentage Act is Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d), which
provides that he must have openly held out the children as his biological children to qualify
as a “presumed . . . biological father.”
The majority further acknowledg es that the district court did not analyze or interpret
what “openly hold[ing] out” these children as his biological children means.
Having these children carry his surname, perhaps for mere reasons of vanity,
without any legal or financial commitment to these children, can not sufficiently qualify
D.G. as a presumed biological father under the statute. Instead, the district court gave great
weight to both D.G.’s sporadic financial su pport over these four and one-half years, and
the speculative presumption of others as to a relationship between D.G. and the children,
in finding that D.G. openly held these children out as his biological children. However,
providing some financial support does not satisfy the statutory standard where other factors
weigh against a presumption of paternity, Spaeth v. Warren, 478 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn.
App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992), and there is no evidence that D.G. ever
told others that he is the fa ther of the children. What others may assume as to D.G.’s
relationship to the children is of limited probative value. To hold himself out as the father
of these children, D.G. needed to claim the special legal status of a biological father. See

D-3
Black’s Law Dictionary 849 (10th ed. 2014) (defining the phrase “hold out” as “to represent
(oneself or another) as having a certain legal status”).
D.G. could have held himself out as a parent by acknowledging paternity and
making a financial commitment to these children during these four plus years. He did not
do so. He is not entitled to a presumption under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d).
The presumptions found in section 257.55 “are not c onclusive of paternity” and
merely establish “paternity in the eyes of the law and the community until something more
is done either to attack the presumption or to establish by action a father who will be viewed
as conclusive in the eyes of the law.” In re Welfare of C.M.G. , 516 N.W.2d 555, 558
(Minn. App. 1994). Any presumption that may exist is rebutted by D.G.’s failure to have
any contact with the two oldest children over the past five years (as noted earlier, he has
never met the third child he fathered with J. M.M.) as well as by his ongoing refusal to
acknowledge these children as his own legally and to take financial responsibility for them
over the past nine years, since the first child was born. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 2
(2016) (any presumption of paternity may be rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence”).
That should end the inquiry, but in add ition to finding that a presumption existed
and that the presumption was no t rebutted, the district cour t also found that notice was
“practicable” in this case sinc e J.M.M. knows where D.G. lives . In so doing , the district
court dismissed J.M.M.’s safety concerns de spite her testimony concerning threats of
violence made by D.G. toward her and her family. Based on these threats of domestic
violence, J.M.M. obtained a family-vio lence waiver from the Minnesota Family

D-4
Investment Program relieving he r from seeking child support fro m D.G. This is further
proof that the threat is ongoing.
The district court concluded that the thre at to J.M.M. and her family was remote
because D.G. had limited his threats of physical violence in the past to J.M.M.’s pursuit of
child support and to J.M.M. leaving him. The district court surmised that D.G. would not
act on these threats when it came to changing th e names of his biological children. But
threats of domestic violence must be taken seriously, and the district court should have
concluded that notice to D.G. was not practicable under sec tion 259.10, given the threats
he made toward J.M.M. and her family.
I would remand this case with instructions to the district court to schedule a hearing
for a name change for the thre e minor children without notice to D.G. as to the pending
applications of all three children.