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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A17-1741

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

State of Minnesota, ex rel. Robert A. Young,
Concurring in part, dissenting in part,
Hudson, Chutich, Thissen, JJ.

Appellant,

vs. Filed: March 24, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Paul Schnell, Commissioner of Corrections,

R e s p o n d e n t .

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Bradley Sim on, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for respondent.

Justin M. Page, Eren Sutherland, Minnea polis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Mid-
Minnesota Legal Aid Minnesota Disability Law Center.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. Because the issues appellant presents are capable of repetition but may evade
review, his release from prison during his appeal does not re quire that the appeal be
dismissed as moot.

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2. Review hearings held by the Department of Corrections are lawful under the
Administrative Procedure Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 14 (2020), and Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2
(2020).
3. The Department of Corre ctions did not violate a ppellant’s substantive due
process rights under the United States Constitution when it revoked appellant’s conditional
release and extended his reincarceration through review hearings.
4. The Department of Corrections did no t violate the rule of law set forth in
State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008).
5. A claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
cannot be raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question in this case is whether appellant Robert Young, a Level III predatory
offender currently serving the conditional release term of his sentence, is entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus. Young seeks reversal of the Department of Corrections’s revocation of
his conditional release and an order preventing the Department from using his inability to
maintain an agent-approved placement due to his epilepsy as a basis for future revocations
of his conditional release.
The district court denied Young’s petition for a writ of ha beas corpus, finding that
Young’s disability was not the sole reason for his continued incarceration. Young
appealed, but because the Depart ment released him shortly after his brief was filed, the

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court of appeals held that Young’s appeal is moot. State ex rel. Young v. Roy (Young I) ,
No. A17-1741, 2018 WL 2407259, at *3–4 (Minn. App. May 29, 2018), rev. granted
(Minn. Aug. 21, 2018). We granted Young’s petition for review and stayed it pending the
resolution of a related case. We then vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded
for reconsideration. The court of appeals again held that Young’s claim is moot. State ex
rel. Young v. Schnell (Young II) , No. A17-1741, 202 0 WL 614249, at *3 (Minn. App.
Feb. 10, 2020), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 28, 2020). We granted Young’s second petition
for review.
Because the issues raised in Young’s appeal are capable of repetition but may evade
review, we reverse the court of appeals’ conclusion that this appeal is moot. Reaching the
merits of Young’s claims, we further hold that: (1) the Department’s use of review
hearings is lawful; (2) the Department did not violate Young’s substantive due process
rights when it revoked Young ’s conditional release and extended his reincarceration
through review hearings; (3) the Department did not violate the rule of law set forth in State
ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008); and (4) a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, cannot be asserted in a habeas
petition. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
In 2012, Young was convicted of third-de gree criminal sexual conduct in Dakota
County and sentenced to 32 months in pris on plus a 10-year cond itional release term.
Young’s conditional release term began in 2 014 and ends in 2025. Young challenges
actions the Department of Corrections took in connection with his conditional release term.

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Before turning specifically to those challenges, it is helpful to examine the process and
rules applicable to conditional release.
In Minnesota, a prison sentence consists of two terms: a prison term and a
supervised release term. Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2020). Predatory offenders must
also complete an additional term of conditional release. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.3455,
subds. 6–7 (2020). The conditional release term for a Level III predatory offender, like
Young, is governed by the rules for Intensiv e Supervised Release (“ISR”), which require
in relevant part that an offender reside in agent-approved housing while on release. Minn.
Stat. §§ 244.05, subd. 6(a), .15, subd. 3 (2020 ). If an offender violates the conditions of
his or her conditional release, the Department may revoke the offender’s release and re-
incarcerate the offender “for th e appropriate period of time” not to “exceed the period of
time remaining in the [offender’s] sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3(2) (2020).
When an offender violates ISR conditions , the offender’s s upervising agent from
the Department of Corrections investigates th e alleged violation and, if grounds exist to
begin the revocation process, files a termination report with the Department’s Hearings and
Release Unit (“Hearings Unit”). Minn. R. 2940.3900 (2019). If the Hearings Unit decides
to begin revocatio n proceedings, that unit notifies the supervising agent and the State
Public Defender’s Office. Minn. R. 2940.4100 (2019). The supervising agent then gives
the offender a copy of the violation report and informs the offender of his right to either
admit the violation or request a revocation he aring. Minn. R. 2940.4200 (2019). If the
offender requests a revocation hearing, the offender appears before a Hearings Unit officer
and may be represented by co unsel of choice or a State Public Defender, may present

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evidence, and may confront an d cross-examine witnesses. Id.; Minn. R. 2940.3500,
2940.4300 (2019). If the officer finds that a violation has been proven, the officer has the
option to reincarcerate the offender and specif y a “projected release date.” Minn. R.
2940.0100, subp. 21 (2019) (defining the term “projected release date”); see also Minn. R.
2940.3800 (2019) (describing the Department’s practice of setting a “release date” after
revoking an offender’s conditiona l release). The Department will then either release the
offender on the projected release date or hol d a review hearing to address the offender’s
release planning. The Depart ment’s procedures for holding review hearings are not
included in the Department’s rules or policies.
Turning back to the facts before us, Young filed a habeas petition in 2017. Before
that time, Young’s conditional release had been revoked on five separate occasions. Four
of these revocations, including the two re vocations being chal lenged here, followed
Young’s termination from his residential place ment due to his failure to complete the
placement’s residential programming, a specific condition of Young’s release.
Young was first released in October 2014 to RS Eden-Ashland in Ramsey County.
A month after his release, RS Eden terminat ed his placement for failure to complete
residential programming and for “sexually abusive behaviors.” Based on this termination,
Young’s agent from the Department filed a violation report that alleged that Young touched
another RS Eden client in a sexually inappr opriate manner. In the subsequent revocation
hearing, the Hearings Unit revoked Young’s co nditional release and reincarcerated him.
Young’s predatory offender risk assessment was increased from Level II to Level III before
he was released.

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Young’s second release was in June 2 015. He was released to 180 Degrees’
residential treatment program. His agent f iled a violation report in September 2015,
alleging that he had failed to inform her of his residence a nd activities. Young’s release
was revoked for 90 days or less.
Young was released a third time in Nove mber 2015, again to 180 Degrees. Two
months later, his agent filed a violation re port alleging that Young failed to complete
residential programming. He had been terminated from 180 Degrees because he failed to
maintain medication compliance, failed to attend all medical and mental health
appointments, failed to spend 40 hours per week working or searching for work, and failed
to secure agent-approved housing. At his subsequent revocation hearing, the Hearings Unit
officer found these violations “willful and inexcusable” and revoked Young’s conditional
release for 120 days.
Young was then released to Alpha Human Services in May 2016. The revocations
being challenged in this appeal occurre d shortly thereafter in July 2016 and
September 2016.
In a violation report filed in July 2016, Young’s agent alleged that Young violated
his release because he failed to comple te residential programming at Alpha Human
Services. The report stated that Young “i solated himself and refused to engage in
treatment.” Young’s agent di scussed Young’s behavioral i ssues, poor attitude, lack of
participation in treatment, as well as his self-harm and suicidal ideation. The report details
an incident in which Young was hospitalized after he intentionally burned his arms with a
lighter and contemplated using his GPS charge r to harm himself. Young’s agent also

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explains how she, along with Young’s ther apist and supervisor, “confronted [Young] on
his poor attitude, lack of pa rticipation in treatment, and his preoccupation with getting a
transfer to Georgia to live with his brother.”1 In addition to all of these issues, the report
detailed that Young “had seiz ures multiple times per week.” Ultimately, the violation
alleged was Young’s failure to complete the residential programming at Alpha Human
Services.
The Hearings Unit held a revocation hear ing in July 2016. Young’s conditional
release was revoked and he was re-incarcerated for 30 days. In August 2016, Young was
released from prison for a fifth time to 180 Degrees.
In a violation report filed in September 2016, Young’s agent again alleged that
Young failed to complete programming. The report noted that “Mr. Young had an
extremely difficult adjustment to treatment and as a result, he suffered stress-related
seizures, per medical personnel, multiple times per week. His medical issues and suicidal
ideation which resulted in many hospital visits, combined with a resistance to participate
in group treatment in any way resulted in his termination.” In a termination report, Young’s
case manager from 180 Degrees further explained that “[w]hile in the program [Young’s]
health was a huge barrier that prevented him from success. [He] was hospitalized on the
following dates: 08/ 15/2016, 08/20/2016, 08/26/2016 , 08/27/2016, 08/30/2016, and

1 At some point after these discussions, Young’s brother moved to Alabama. Young
requested an interstate transfer to live with him there, but this request was apparently
refused by the State of Alabama.

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09/06/2016. It is recommended that [Young] be placed in an inpatient institution where
his health can be monitored.”
But Young’s agent from the Department also noted that, as with previous releases,
Young had issues maintaining medication compliance and that “although Mr. Young does
have medical issues beyond his control, he has minimal seizures while in a jail or prison
setting and had far fewer seizures while at 180 Degrees.” Finally, Young’s agent explained
that Young “has had behavioral issues throug hout his releases in the community. He all
but refused to participate in treatment at Al pha and he continues to deny his offense was
anything more than a ‘threesome.’ ” Young’s agent said that she was “willing to work with
Mr. Young, but would like it noted that the expectation is that Mr. Young needs to make a
concerted effort during his release so that his mental health team and agents are not working
harder than he is at keeping him in the community.”
The Hearings Unit held a revocation hear ing in September 2016. Young’s agent
recommended that Young’s conditional release be revoked “until an appropriate placement
can be secured that can address his mental health and medical needs.” Young’s conditional
release was revoked for 90 days or less. The Hearings Unit officer made Young’s release
from re-incarceration contingent upon having an agent-approved housing plan, and Young
was informed that “he must avoid conviction of discipline violations while incarcerated or
[the Hearings Unit] may extend the [projected release date].”2

2 Young was convicted of six discipline vi olations during his incarceration, resulting
in a total of at least 115 days of segregated confinement and an extension of his projected

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Because by December 2016, Young and his team had not yet agreed on an agent-
approved release plan, the Hearings Unit held a review hearing. A case manager and social
worker discussed possible placements at 180 Degrees and Dama scus Way, but the
placements were not viable due to Young’s medical needs. The case manager and social
worker also discussed possibl e placements at the Frasier House and the Cochran House,
but both locations refused to accept Young. The case manager stated that she was waiting
for Young’s social worker to explore the possibility of a CADI waiver assessment in Anoka
County.3 The Hearings Unit officer noted that Young’s “[p]lacement options are extremely
limited . . . due to his current medical needs a nd his Level III Predatory Offender status.”
The officer extended Young’s incarceration for 90 days or less, pending Young’s
placement in an agent-approved residence.
In March 2017, the Hearings Unit held a second review heari ng. Young’s agent
from the Department stated that Young’s team “attempted placement at 180 Degrees,
Damascus Way and Alpha Inpatient Services without success” because those placements
did not feel they could meet Young’s medical needs. She stated that Young’s team was
still waiting on the CADI waiver process to see what placement options became available.
Young testified that the only placement he could find was at Evergreen House in Beltrami
County. However, Evergreen House’s age limit made him ineligible. Young’s attorney

release date by 39 days. The district court found that Young’s time in segregation made it
difficult for his agent to work with him to secure agent-approved housing.

3 Community Access for Disability Inclus ion (CADI) is a program that provides
home and community-based servi ces to children and adults with disabilities who require
the level of care provided in a nursing facility as an alternative to institutionalization.

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asserted that placement at RS Eden had not been explored. Young’s agent responded that
it is not an accepted practice within Dakota County to place Level III predatory offenders
at RS Eden. Young’s incarceration was extended for an additional 90 days or less.
In July 2017, Young petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus.4 The
district court denied Young’s habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that
Young’s epilepsy was not the sole reason for the revocation of his conditional release and
his continued incarceration. The district c ourt emphasized the violation reports filed by
Young’s agent in July 2016 and September 2016, noting th at Young had an extremely
difficult adjustment to treatment, continued to deny the seriousness of his offense, and at
times simply refused to engage in treatment. The district court further highlighted the
efforts by Young’s agent from the Department of Corrections to s ecure housing on his
behalf: “These efforts included attempting to arrange an inter-state transfer for Young to
live with his brother in Alabama, approving Young’s placement in residential group homes
five times, and helping Young secure government benefits.” The district court also found
that “[s]ince 2014, Young has not made any significant efforts on his own behalf to secure
housing. At Young’s last review hearing the agent and case manager reviewed their efforts
to find housing for Young at halfway houses, private residences, group residential housing,
and other supportive programs.” Moreover, the court determined that Young’s behavioral

4 After Young filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Hearings Unit held
another review hearing in late July 2017. Young was in segreg ation in prison due to “his
assaultive, abusive behavior an d as a result [was] not eligible for release.” During the
review hearing, Young’s case manager report ed that the CADI wa iver obtained on his
behalf had expired during You ng’s time in segregation. Young’s projected release date
was extended an additional 60 days.

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issues, refusal to participate in his own re lease planning, and his extensive time in
segregated confinement contributed to his extended incarceration. Ultimately, the district
court concluded that requiring predatory offenders to have an agent-approved residence
was not an unworkable condition of release and does not violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Young appealed in November 2017 and the Department released Young from prison
in December 2017. 5 The court of appeals determined that Young’s release from prison
rendered his appeal moot. Young I, 2018 WL 2407259 at *3.6
We granted Young’s petition for review but stayed it pending resolution of State ex
rel. Leino v. Roy, 910 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. granted (Minn. June 27, 2018),
dismissed as improvidently granted (Minn. May 10, 2019). After we dismissed Leino as
improvidently granted, we continued the stay in Young’s appeal pending resolution of State
ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2019). When we released our decision in
Ford, we vacated the court of appeals’ deci sion in Young’s appeal and remanded for
reconsideration. The court of appeals found Young’s appeal still to be moot based on his

5 The date of Young’s release is not in the record, but the parties stipulated to it during
oral argument before the court of appeals. Young I, 2018 WL 2407259 at *2.

6 Since the court of appeals’ first opinion, several more events ha ve transpired that
are likewise outside the record. Young’s release was revoked some time before June 2019,
he was released in June 2019, and his releas e was revoked yet again in September 2019.
As of the date of this opi nion, Young’s release has been revoked seven times. The
Department of Corrections moved to supplement the record with details regarding Young’s
subsequent revocations, which Young opposed. We denied the Department’s motion to
supplement the record. At oral argument before our court, both parties agreed that Young
is currently incarcerated but that his current incarceration is not relevant to mootness
because it is due to reasons unrelated to his current petition.

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release from incarceration. Young II, 2020 WL 614249 at *4. We granted Young’s second
petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Young presents four substa ntive arguments in this a ppeal: (1) the Department’s
practice of holding review hearings is unlawful; (2) the Department violated his substantive
due process rights by impairing his liberty inte rest in his conditional release date; (3) the
Department violated the rule of law set forth in Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d 792; and (4) the
Department violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In addition
to responding to these arguments , the Department contends th at Young’s appeal is moot
because while his appeal was pending, Young was released from prison.
I.
We turn first to the Department’s argument that we should dismiss Young’s appeal
as moot. An appeal must be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer
necessary or an award of effectiv e relief is no longer possible. Dean v. City of Winona ,
868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). Mootness is an issue of justiciability, which is an issue of
law we review de novo. Id. at 4.
As we explained in Ford, we do not apply justiciability doctrines “mechanically.”
933 N.W.2d at 402. In Ford, we held that “the writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate
means to challenge future incarceration” as long as the future incarceration is
“nonspeculative.” Id. at 403. Applying that standard, we determined that an offender’s
release from incarceration did not render his app eal moot because the district court found
that he would “ultimately return to prison.” Id. at 400. We upheld the district court,

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reasoning that “the evidence establishes that Ford’s return to prison is imminent and almost
inevitable, even if it has not yet occurred.” Id. at 403.
Here, Young was still incarc erated when the district court ruled on his habeas
petition so there is no similar finding by the district court. And unlike the petitioner in
Ford, Young is unable to point to a definitive date in the future when he is likely to have
his conditional release revoked. We therefore agree with the court of appeals that Young’s
appeal is distinguishable from Ford. But the court of appeals nonetheless erred in
determining that the issues presented by Young’s appeal were moot because, as we explain
below, those issues are capable of repetition yet likely to evade review.7
This mootness exception applies when two el ements are satisfied: “[1] there is a
reasonable expectation that a complaining pa rty would be subjected to the same action
again and [2] the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated.” Dean,
868 N.W.2d at 5. With respect to the reas onable expectation prong, Young’s conditional
release has already been revoked seven times. Four of those revocations were due to
Young’s failure to complete residential programming, and two of those four failures were
compounded by complications caused by Young ’s epilepsy. Moreover, his placement
options are extremely limited due to his medical needs and his Level III predatory offender
status. These facts create a reasonable ex pectation that Young’s conditional release will
be revoked again for his inability to complete residential programming.

7 Young raises other mootness exceptions, but we need not address them because we
find the issues presented by his appeal are capable of repetition yet evading review.

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Regarding the second element, whether the duration of the challenged action is too
short to be fully litigated, the Department maintains that the re vocation of Young’s
conditional release is properly subject to its broad discretion. We have previously agreed
with this proposition. State v. Schwartz , 628 N.W.2d 134, 142, n.4 (Minn. 2001)
(recognizing the Department’s “broad discretion” in making release decisions). Any future
challenge by Young, therefore, could easily be mooted by the Depa rtment’s decision to
release him from confinement, rendering the challenged action too short to be fully
litigated.
The Department responds that the duratio n of the challenged activity must, “by its
very nature,” be too short to be fully litigated. Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1143
(8th Cir. 1998). The ex ception does not apply, says the Department, because the term of
an offender’s re-incarceration is not, “by its very nature,” too shor t a period to litigate a
habeas corpus proceeding. The Department undermines its own position. If the re-
incarceration term is subject to the Department ’s broad discretion, th en the term, “by its
very nature,” could always be shortened by the Department to moot an offender’s habeas
corpus petition.
Based on this analysis, we hold that the issues Young raises are capable of repetition
yet likely to evade review. Accordingly, we will not dismiss this appeal as moot.
Our conclusion that the appeal will proc eed requires us to determine whether we
should address the merits of Young’s claims or send the case back to the court of appeals
for resolution. We have alrea dy sent Young’s claims back to the court of appeals once.
Doing so again would not serve judicial ec onomy and might actually “thwart the very

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purpose” of a habeas corpus petition. Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 406. We therefore choose to
address the merits of Young’s claims. See Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp. ,
811 N.W.2d 618, 628–29 (Minn. 2012).
II.
Turning to the merits, we consider firs t Young’s contention that the Department’s
use of review hearings for conditional release violators is unlawful. Young asserts that the
Department’s practice is unlawful under Minnesota’s Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), Minn. Stat. ch. 14 (2020), because the Department has not adopted administrative
rules authorizing and regulating review hearings. Even if the Department had followed the
APA rulemaking process, Young argues that Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2 (2020), prohibits
the Department from extending an offender’s projected release date using review hearings.
Both arguments implicate questions of statutor y interpretation that we review de novo.
State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016).
A.
Young argues that the Department’s use of review hearings is unlawful under the
APA. Young implicitly argues that the Department’s practice of holding review hearings
is a “rule” under the APA, and he explicitly argues that “failure to comply with the
necessary procedures results in invalidity of the rule.” White Bear Lake Care Ctr., Inc. v.
Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare , 319 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. 1982 ). The Department responds

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that it is not required to follow APA rulemaki ng procedures for review hearings, citing
Minn. Stat. § 244.13, subd. 1 (2020). We agree with the Department.
The Legislature delegates rule-making authority regarding conditional release to the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2. Although
the Commissioner “shall adopt by rule standa rds and procedures for the revocation of
supervised or conditional rel ease, and shall specify the pe riod of revocation for each
violation of release,” id., the Legislature expressly exempted the Commissioner from
having to follow the APA rulemaking procedures:
[t]he adoption and modification of po licies and procedures to implement
sections 244.05, subdivision 6, and 244.12 to 244.15 are not subject to the
rulemaking procedures of [the APA] because these policies and procedures
are excluded from the definition of a rule under section 14.03, subdivision 3,
paragraph (b), clause (1).

Minn. Stat. § 244.13, subd. 1; see Minn. Stat. §§ 244.05, s ubd. 6 (explaining which
offenders must be placed on ISR, providing authority to impose conditions of release, and
granting authority to impose sanctions for release violations), 2 44.12–.15 (relating to
intensive community supervision).
Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold that the Department’s practice
of holding review hearings for offenders on ISR is not a “rule” subject to the APA, and the
Department therefore is not required to fo llow the APA rulemaking process for review
hearings.
8

8 For the first time on appeal, Young argued that review hearings do not “relate to
ISR” because the offender is no longer in the community. Young forfeited this argument
by failing to present it below. See Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 639–40 (Minn. 2018).

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B.
Young also argues that Minn. Stat. § 244. 05, subd. 2, requires the Department to
“specify the period of revocation for each violation of release” when revoking conditional
release. Young asserts that the Department cannot extend an offender’s projected release
date during review hearings because the revo cation period has already been determined.
The Department responds that it has broad discretion to establish offenders’ release terms.
The parties’ arguments require us to interpret Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2.
We interpret statutes to “ ‘ascertain and effectuate’ the Legislature’s intent.” State
v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019); Mi nn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). We “do not
examine different provisions in isolation.” State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
2011). Rather, we read “words and sentences . . . in light of their context.” Id. Under the
“whole-statute canon,” the relevant context includes different sections of the same statute.
See State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 2018).
Here, the relevant context for section 24 4.05 subdivision 2, includes subdivision 6
of that same statute. Id. Minnesota Statutes section 244.05, subdivision 6, provides that
the Commissioner “shall impose sanctions as provided in subdivi sion 3 and section
609.3455.” Subdivision 3 of section 244.05, in turn, provi des that the Department may
“revoke the inmate’s supervis ed release and reimprison` th e inmate for the appropriate
period of time” not to “exceed the period of time remaining in the inmate’s sentence.”
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(c ), specifies that “[i]f the offender fails to

(Hudson, J., concurring in part and dissenti ng in part) (collecting cases explaining how
forfeiture may occur at each level of the appellate process).

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meet any condition of release, the commissi oner may revoke the offender’s conditional
release and order that the offender serve all or a part of the remaining portion of the
conditional release term in prison .” (emphasis added). The plain language of these
provisions gives the Department broad discretion when establishing a period of revocation
for conditional release violators, and makes clear that the period of revocation may include
all of the time remaining on the conditional release term.
The review hearing process the Departme nt followed for Young’s revocations is
consistent with this authority. In each in stance, the Hearings Unit provided a projected
release date and held a review hearing to determine whether Young would be in violation
of his release conditions imme diately upon his rele ase from prison. For instance, when
Young’s release was revoked fo r “up to 90 days” in Septem ber 2016, the Hearings Unit
held a review hearing 80 days later to de termine whether Young would have an agent-
approved residence in the community upon re lease. Because Yo ung lacked such a
residence, the Hearings Unit extended his incarceration for an additional 90-day period. In
other words, the Department used review hearings to determine the “appropriate period of
time” for Young’s revocation period. Minn. Stat. § 244.05 subd. 3.
In short, the plain language of Minn. Stat . § 244.05, subd. 2, when read in context
of the entire statute, does no t prohibit the Department fro m extending the period of an
offender’s revocation as long as the peri od of revocation does not exceed the time
remaining in the offender’s conditional rele ase term. Here, Young’s conditional release
term does not expire until 2025 and the time periods of his revocations have all been within
the time remaining on his sentence.

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Based on our analysis above, we hold that the Department’s use of review hearings
here was lawful under the APA and Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 2.
III.
We turn next to Young’s claim that the Department’s use of review hearings to
extend his incarceration violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 9 Young argues that the Department
impaired his liberty interest in his conditional release da te and in remaining in the
community on ISR. We review questions of constitutional interpretation de novo. State v.
Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2005).
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether substantive due process protects
Young’s asserted liberty interest. The Depa rtment argues that substantive due process
protects only those liberty interests that the United States Constitution creates. See Bagley
v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that state-created liberty interests
are “meaningful only in the context of procedural-due-process claims” and that a contrary
ruling “would turn every state-law violation into a substantive-due-process claim, a result
that would obliterate comple tely the distinction betwee n state law and the federal
Constitution”); see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985)

9 Young expressly disclaims a procedural due process claim, so we decline to address
that theory. Young’s brief to our court might be read as making both a “facial” and an “as-
applied” substantive due process challenge to review hearings. But to the extent that he
argues the former, the argument is forfeited because he failed to raise it below. State v. Ali,
895 N.W.2d 237, 246 (Minn. 2017) (holding an argument wa ived when not presented to
the district court); see also Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , 924 N.W.2d 594, 607 n.8
(Minn. 2019) (discussing th e difference between facial and as-applied due process
challenges).

20
(Powell, J., concurring) (observing that only the U.S. Constitution can create rights that are
protected under substantive due process).
The Department asserts that Young’s criminal conviction extinguished his
constitutional right to li ve in the community. See Meachum v. Fano , 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976) (“[G]iven a valid conviction, the cr iminal defendant has been constitutionally
deprived of his liberty . . . .”). As a result, the Department contends that Young’s interest
in living in the community before the expiration of his conditional release term is a state-
created conditional liberty interest that substantive due proce ss does not protect. In
response, Young cites to procedural due proc ess cases and substantive due process cases
about indefinite psychiatric confinement.10
We need not decide whethe r substantive due process protects Young’s asserted
liberty interest because, as explained below, we ultimately conclude that the Department’s
actions survive constitutional scrutiny. Acco rdingly, we will assume, without deciding,
that substantive due process protects Young’s asserted liberty interest.

10 See Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (a pr ocedural due process case
holding that parolees’ interests in remain ing on parole required due process before
revocation); Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (addressing substantive due
process in the context of indefinite psychiatric confinement); Carrillo v. Fabian ,
701 N.W.2d 763, 772–74 (Minn. 2005) (a procedural due process case holding that an
inmate serving his prison sentence had a protected liberty interest in his supervised release
date); In re Blodgett , 510 N.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Minn. 1994) (same); In re Linehan ,
557 N.W.2d 171, 181 (Minn. 1996) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Linehan v.
Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997) (s ame). As noted above, Young does not assert a
procedural due process challenge and so thos e cases are not helpful. The indefinite
confinement cases are likewise inapposite because Young’s situation also does not involve
indefinite confinement; his conditional release term expires in 2025.

21
Assuming that substantive due process right s apply, we must next consider what
level of scrutiny to apply to the Departme nt’s decision to revoke Young’s conditional
release and extend his incarcer ation using review hearings. Young argues that strict
scrutiny or rational basis applies. For its pa rt, the Department contends that the “shocks
the conscience” standard governs. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998); Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 487 (Minn. 2006) (applying the standard
in an excessive force case).
While Young argues that we should apply strict scrutiny, he does not cite any case
where we applied strict scrutiny in a substantive due process challenge to the Department’s
decision to revoke an offender’s conditional release.11 Our own research has disclosed no
case that applies strict scrutiny to a substantive due process challenge of an administrative
decision such as the one we have here.
Young does cite, however, a number of case s in which we applied rational basis
review to challenges to administrative rules and decisions. See Jacka v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 580 N.W.2d 27, 35 (Minn. 1998) (app lying rational basis to determine the
constitutionality of healthcare regulations); see also Mfg. Hous. Inst. v. Pettersen ,
347 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 1984) (apply ing rational basis to a Minnesota Health
Department rule setting a maximum indoor ai r level of formaldehyde). And we have
consistently deferred to the Department’s decisions made within the scope of its
discretionary authority, a deference reflected in the application of rational basis review.

11 The cases to which Young cites for this proposition, see supra note 10, dealt either
with procedural due process or indefinite psychiatric confinement.

22
See State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Minn. 1999) (suggesting that
deference is due to the Department regardin g whether an inmate is amenable to sex
offender treatment), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 301
(Minn. 2007); State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Mi nn. 2001) (agreeing with the
notion that the executive branch has “ ‘absolute discretion’ over the release portion of an
offender’s sentence”); Mitchell v. Smith , 817 N.W.2d 742, 75 0 (Minn. App. 2012)
(applying rational basis review to prisoner’s challenge to Department visitation policy).
For these reasons, we hold that rational basis review applies to Young’s challenge.
Applying rational basis review, we must determine whether (1) the State has a
permissible objective in revoking Young’s release and in holding review hearings to extend
his incarceration; and (2) whether the Depart ment used reasonable means to obtain that
objective and whether those means we re arbitrary or capricious. See State v. Holloway ,
916 N.W.2d 338, 344–45 (Minn. 2018). We hold that the De partment’s actions have a
rational basis.
There is no question that the State has permissible objectives here. Those objectives
include: rehabilitating sex offenders, McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002); maintaining
public safety, Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916 (noting the state’s “legitimate and compelling”
interests in protecting the safety of others); ensuring the health and wellbeing of offenders
with mental illnesses, Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 426 ( 1979) (“The state has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are
unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves”); and ensuring the wellbeing
of victims, cf. id.; Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916.

23
The Department’s revocation of Young’s conditional rel ease and its extension of
his incarceration through the use of review h earings are reasonable means to obtain those
objectives and are not arbitrary or capricious. The record is clear that Young had found no
potential housing after any of his multiple placements were terminated. If the Department
had not reincarcerated Young while his team searched for housing on his behalf, Young
would have been left homele ss. Even temporary homelessness of a Level III predatory
offender could impair the State’s interests in maintaining public sa fety and rehabilitating
sexual offenders. The State would also be less capable of providing treatment for Young’s
medical and mental health issues if he were left homeless. The Department’s actions were
thus not arbitrary or capricious and were reasonable to obtain permissible objectives. The
Department’s actions survive rational basis re view and we therefore hold that Young’s
substantive due process rights were not violated.
IV.
We turn next to Young’s argument that his petition fo r a writ of habeas corpus
should be granted because the Department violated the rule of law set forth in Marlowe,
755 N.W.2d at 792. Whether Marlowe was violated is a “legal question . . . subject to de
novo review.” Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 406. And the burden of proof in a habeas petition is
on the offender to show the illegality of his detention. Breeding v. Swenson, 60 N.W.2d 4,
7 (Minn. 1953). In reviewing a denial of a wr it of habeas corpus, we give “great weight”
to factual findings made by the district court. Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 401. Such findings
will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 406.

24
When applying the clear error standard of review, we do not ove rturn the district
court’s findings merely because we disagree with them, or because we may have reached
a different conclusion based on the record. See, e.g., Prod. Credit Ass’n of Mankato v.
Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. 1987); C ont’l Retail, LLC v. Cnty of Hennepin ,
801 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Minn. 2011). Instead, ou r inquiry is limited to “examin[ing] the
record to see ‘[i]f there is reasonable eviden ce’ in the record to support the court’s
findings.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d. 790, 797 (Minn. 2013)
(quoting Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press , 589 N.W2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999)). To
determine that a finding is clea rly erroneous, we must be “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).12
Before addressing Young’s arguments that the Department violated the rule from
Marlowe, we look first to Marlowe and our decision in Ford applying the rule from
Marlowe.

12 The dissent departs from our well-establ ished standard of review for habeas
petitions, see Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 401, by substituting its judgment for that of the district
court. The dissent concludes that the district court clearly erred in several of its findings.
The district court found that Young’s re vocations were based on his lack of an
agent-approved residence, not his epilepsy, that Young was terminated from his residences
for a multitude of factors, only one of which was the complication caused by his epilepsy,
and that Young’s agent made great efforts to find placements for him. The record reveals
that some of the attempted pl acements referenced by the dist rict court were outside of
Dakota County.
In concluding that these findings are erroneous, the dissent cherry-picks a few select
statements in the Hearings Unit notes and ignores much of the record, including the
termination reports fi led by Young’s agent. As recounted above, supra pages 6–7, the
termination reports provide reasonable evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion

25
A.
In Marlowe, the offender was sentenced in Washington County and was serving the
ISR portion of his sentence. 755 N.W.2d at 79 3. He located housing in Ramsey County
where “a bed had been previously approved for him,” but the Department refused to
approve the placement because it was outside his county of commitment. Id. In reviewing
the offender’s subsequent habeas petition, the court of appeals examined the Department’s
policies regarding the placement of offenders on supervised release. Id. at 795. The court
of appeals highlighted Depart ment Policy 203.010 § C.2, wh ich at the time provided in
pertinent part:
If no practical residential placement option can be made in the county where
the offender was convicted, the local corrections agency for adult felons in
the county of commitment will arrange for housing an d supervision. This
housing and supervision can occur within any county where it can be
established and where the offender can most effectively be provided
appropriate correctional programming.

Id. (quoting Minn. DOC, Policy No. 203.010 § C.2(d) (July 3, 2007)). Because the
Department limited Marlowe’s release planning to Washington County even though “a bed
had been previously approved for him” in Ramsey County, and because the Department’s
own rules required it to supervise Marlowe “within any county where [housing] can be
established,” the court of appeals held that the Department was required “to develop a plan

that Young’s releases were revoked for numerous reasons. And the Hearings Unit notes,
when read as a whole, provide reasonable evidence upon which to conclude that Young’s
release planning was not restricted to Dakota County.
The dissent is also simply wrong to assume, based on the Department’s conduct in
other cases, that the Department, in this case, limited Young’s release planning to Dakota
County, especially when the district court found otherwise and the record supports the
district court’s findings.

26
that can achieve Marlowe’s release from prison and placement in a suitable and approved
residence, whether in Washington Coun ty or in a neighboring county.” Id. at 797.
Critically, Marlowe’s rule was premised on the Department’s obligation under its own
policies and rules, not on statutory or constitutional grounds. Id. at 795 (citing Minn. DOC,
Policy No. 203.010 § C.2(d) (July 3, 2007)).
We reviewed the application of Marlowe’s rule in Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 406–07.13
In Ford, we upheld a district court ruling that re quired the Department to approve Ford’s
release to a county other than his county of commitment and, if that county refused to
supervise him, to provide Department superv ision in that county or to modify Ford’s
conditions of release. Id. at 407–08.
The dissent argues that our holding in Ford stands for a much larger proposition,
concluding that our holding in Ford “announced a broad rule.” In Ford, however, we were
merely asked to resolve whether habeas cor pus was an appropriate procedural remedy
“under the circumstances.” Id. at 404. We specifically re sponded to the Department’s
argument that “habeas relief is not available for an alleged violation of an internal agency
policy.” Id. (emphasis added). In rejecting the Department’s argument, we did not
explicitly adopt all of Marlowe’s reasoning. See id. at 404–05. Rather, we explained that
our habeas statute and precedent did not support the Department’s narrow view of habeas
corpus. Id. The dissent is certainly correct that we cited Marlowe in that discussion. But
in so citing Marlowe, we merely emphasized what th e district court found to be

13 The Department did not challenge the rule from Marlowe in Ford and it does not
do so in this case either.

27
unacceptable conduct on the part of the Department: “Here, the district court found that
Ford’s liberty was restrained by the Department’s failure to abide by its own internal
policies and judicial precedent.” Id. at 404 (emphasis added). In so holding, we had no
occasion to comment on the scope of the rule in Marlowe.
Our analysis in Ford was therefore limited to: (1) determining whether habeas relief
was an appropriate form of relief “under the circumstances,” (2) considering the
Department’s argument that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy for “an alleged
violation of an internal agen cy policy,” and (3) applying the rule from a court of appeals
decision—Marlowe, a case which neither party asked us to overturn—to a case that had
“similar” facts. Id. at 404–06. Ford did not broadly interpret the rule in Marlowe to apply
to other types of conditions or to occasions in which the Department had not violated its
own policies and rules. Accordingly, we disa gree with the dissent’s characterization of
Ford.
Not only is the dissent’s interpretation of Ford inconsistent with Ford itself, but it
is also inconsistent with ou r precedent that gives deference to the Department in its
supervision of offenders on conditional release. We expressly recognized in Ford that the
Department has “broad discretion” in making release decisions. 933 N.W.2d at 407–08
n.12 (citing Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d at 142, n.4). And in Schwartz, we said that the
executive branch has “ ‘absolute discretion’ over the release porti on of an offender’s
sentence.” 628 N.W.2d at 140. These observations are appropriate given the Legislature’s
grant of authority to the Department to revoke an offender’s release for the remainder of
that offender’s conditional release term. See Minn. Stat. §§ 244.05, subd. 3, 609.3455,

28
subd. 8(c). In doing so, the Legislature has bestowed upon the executive branch—not the
judiciary—broad discretion over an offender’s conditional re lease term. Consistent with
this broad discretion granted by the Legislature, our precedent expresses deference to the
Department’s decisions regarding predatory offenders. See Morrow, 590 N.W.2d at 792.
We give deference to the Department in this area for a good reason. Decisions
regarding an offender’s conditional release must be informed by a number of competing
considerations. As the dissent observes, one of these considerations is the importance of
reintegrating offenders into the community. See Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 477. But the
Department must also consider public safety and ensure that predatory offenders on ISR
are closely monitored by a supervising agent. For that reason, the Department is statutorily
obligated to ensure that Level III predator y offenders are monitored in agent-approved
housing while on release. See Minn. Stat. §§ 244.05, subd. 6(a), .15, subd. 3 (2020).
Ford is consistent with these pr inciples. We cautioned in Ford that the
Department’s “broad discretion is not unbounde d discretion.” 933 N.W.2d at 408 n.12.
And in delineating between “broad ” and “unbounded” discretion, in Ford, we drew the
bounds of the Department’s discretion by prohibiting it from failing to “abid[e] by its own
polic[ies].” Id.
In sum, the rule of law set forth in Marlowe and Ford is straightforward: the
Department must follow its own rules for rel easing offenders into the community. If the
Department’s failure to follow its own rule s related to housing upon release causes an

29
offender’s continued incarceration, the incarc eration may constitute illegal restraint that
may be remedied by a writ of habeas corpus. See Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020).14
B.
With this context in mind, we turn to Young’s arguments and examine whether the
Department violated Marlowe by failing to follow its own policies.
Young argues that the Department violated the rule from Marlowe because the
Department conditioned “his release on an im possible condition: that he cease to have
seizures.” The district court disagreed as a factual matter, finding that “[t]here is no
evidence that the [Department] has said it will not release Young from imprisonment until
he is seizure free.” Instead, the district court noted that the Department had released Young
five times notwithstanding his seizures and ma de extensive efforts to find placements for
Young. The record supports th e district court’s findings. Because the district court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous, we reje ct Young’s argument that the Department
conditioned his release on being seizure-free.
Young also argues that the Department violated Marlowe because it restricted his
release planning to Dakota County. The Department’s policies require an offender’s agent
to “assist the offender in lo cating an available and suitab le residence both within and

14 Our discussion here is limited to the Marlowe rule, which, again, was not based
upon statutory or constitutiona l grounds. Notably, we are not presented wi th an Equal
Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and we do not have occasion to decide
whether the Department’s conduct violated the ADA. Our conclusion in this case does not
foreclose the possibility that these or other statutory or constitutio nal provisions might
afford relief to offenders struggling to obta in agent-approved h ousing due to medical
conditions outside of their control.

30
outside the county of histori cal ties or county of commitm ent.” Minn. DOC, Policy No.
203.018 § B2 (Apr. 3, 2018). The record establishes that Young’s agent did so.
During Young’s review hearings, his agent reported exploring placement options in
Hennepin County and Young’s social worker requested a CADI waiver for a placement in
Anoka County.15 Far from limiting Young’s release to his county of commitment (Dakota),
then, the record supports the district court’s finding that Young’s team affirmatively sought
out placements in other counties.16 Young’s case simply does not present the same cross-
county restriction that was present in Marlowe and Ford.
In arguing otherwise, Young points to 23 Department-leased ISR houses and
suggests that he is similar to the petitioners in Marlowe and Ford because he has not been
released to one of those houses. But unlike Marlowe and Ford, Young has not proposed a
specific residence at which he is eligible for placement. In Marlowe, the offender had “a
bed . . . previously approved for him” in Ramsey County, 755 N.W.2d at 793, and in Ford,
the offender had already been accepted to, and was currently residing in, a residential

15 As explained above, supra note 3, Young’s social worker was apparently later able
to obtain a CADI waiver on Young’s behalf. But because Young was still in segregation
at this time due to his “abusive and assaultive behaviors,” the CADI waiver lapsed.

16 Young and the dissent point to two stat ements in the Hearings Unit notes of his
second review hearing: “[Young’s agent] repor ts that the offender is a Dakota County
commitment and there are no viab le placements within her s upervision area” and “[s]he
states that there are no known options for pla cement at this time with in Dakota County.”
But Young takes these statements out of contex t. The hearing notes state that Young’s
team “attempted placement at 180 Degrees, Damascus Way and Alpha Inpatient Services,”
which are Hennepin County placements.

31
facility in Hennepin County. 933 N.W.2d at 398. 17 Young has not established that he is
eligible for placement at any specific reside nce, and his argument that the Department
violated Marlowe on this basis therefore fails.
Young next argues that Marlowe entitles him to a placement in Department-funded
housing. Department Policy 203.018 allows for the use of residency funding for “offenders
deemed eligible under” Department Policy 205.130. Minn. DOC, Policy No. 203.018 § C
(Apr. 3, 2018). Department Policy 205.130, in turn, states that initial funding lasts only 60
days. Minn. DOC, Policy No. 205.130 § A.2 (Sep. 3, 2019). To be eligible for additional
funding, the offender must be in compliance “with release conditions and demonstrat[e]
substantial progress toward securing an approvable residence.” Id. The district court found
that Young was not in compliance with his release conditions. The court found that “Young
has engaged in self-injurious behavior, threatened to comm it suicide, refused to take
prescription medication, failed to demonstr ate personal responsibility for his medical
condition by going to neurology appointments obtain ed by his case worker, failed to
engage in treatment while at residential trea tment and failed to personally engage in any
meaningful attempt to secure agency-approved housing on his own behalf.” Moreover, the
court found that “[s]ince 2014, Young has not made any significant efforts on his own

17 The offender’s county of commitment was Bl ue Earth County. 933 N.W.2d at 397.

32
behalf to secure housing.” The record supports these findings. The Department therefore
did not break its own rule by failing to provide department-funded housing.18
Young also argues that the Department violated Marlowe by failing to contract with
ADA-compliant halfway houses. Young does not cite, and we are unable to find, a policy
requiring the Department to do so. Instead, Young claims that one of the Department’s
regulations mandates that the Department require its housing providers to comply with the
law. This regulation, howeve r, refers only to the Department’s own rules and does not
require compliance with federal statutes like the ADA. Minn. R. 2920.0210 (2019)
(requiring compliance with “a rule, part, s ubpart, or item designate d ‘mandatory’ unless
waived by the commissioner”). Accordingly, even if the Department did not contract with
ADA-compliant halfway houses, this failure does not violate the rule from Marlowe.19
Finally, Young argues that the Department violated Marlowe by failing to modify
the terms of his release to allow him to go to an inpatient institution for medical treatment.

18 The dissent concludes that “the Department should have made efforts to search for
suitable housing for Young within its own IS R housing network.” But as we explained
above, the Department’s rules make clear th at, on this record, Young was not entitled to
further department-funded housing. Additionally, it is worth noting that Young attached
the list of the 23 ISR houses in his reply brief to the district court. The Department had no
opportunity, then, to provide the evidence demanded by the dissent in its brief to the district
court.

19 We express no view on whether the Depart ment’s alleged failure to contract with
ADA-compliant residential facilities is a violation of the ADA’s integration mandate. See
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring , 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999 ) (discussing “unjustified
isolation” as an ADA violatio n). We merely hold that Marlowe requires the Department
to follow its own rules and, here, the Depart ment has no rule regarding ADA-compliant
halfway houses.

33
But Young does not cite a rule that requires the Department to grant this specific request.20
Moreover, Young’s conditional release terms do not prohibit i npatient treatment, and the
record establishes that he was in fact admi tted for such treatment on multiple occasions.
Accordingly, we hold that the Depa rtment did not violate the rule in Marlowe for failing
to modify the terms of Young’s release.
Having considered each of Young’s arguments and determined that the Department
did not violate its own rules in its treatment of Young, we hold that the Department did not
violate Marlowe. As the district court found, Young’s agent worked extensively to find a
housing placement in the community for him. Any delay that resulted was not a product
of the Department’s disregard for its own rule s. Young’s situation is unfortunate and his
options may be limited due to his unique circumstances, but his predicament does not give
rise to a Marlowe violation.
V.
Young’s final argument is that the Depart ment violated the ADA. Young argues
that his conditional release was revoked and his incarceration was extended solely because
of his epilepsy. Young also asserts that th e Department violated the ADA’s integration
mandate by failing to administer its conditional release programming in the most integrated
setting appropriate. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring , 527 U.S. 581, 591–92 (1999);

20 Department Policy No. 203.250C (Oct . 16, 2018), arguably applies. But the
Department concedes that Young does not need to adhere to that rule, which Young does
not dispute. Further, that rule requires Young to follow a specific process for proposing a
modification. The record and the briefing indicates he has not done so.

34
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Th e Department responds that a habeas petition is not an
appropriate vehicle for an ADA claim. We agree with the Department.
Whether an ADA claim may be asserted in a habeas petition is an issue of first
impression for our court. While we may turn to persuasive authority from other states
when addressing issues of first impression, see State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 156–57
(Minn. 2020), such authority is only marginally helpful here. 21 Accordingly, we focus
primarily on the principles of habeas corpus relief.
A writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy.” State ex rel. Schwanke v.
Utecht, 47 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Minn. 1951). This extraordinary remedy was traditionally
limited to resolving jurisdictional issues and violations of constitutional rights. See State
ex rel. Bassett v. Tahash, 116 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn. 1962); State ex rel. Flynn v. Rigg,
98 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1959). And we have adhered to the principle that “[q]uestions
which should be determined . . . through some other regular legal procedure have no place
in a habeas corpus proceeding.” State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson , 66 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
1954); see also Schwanke, 47 N.W2d at 103 (holding that a habeas corpus proceeding is

21 Our research reveals that appellate courts from at least three states have expressly
excluded ADA claims fro m habeas petitions. See Yoder v. Walker , No. 2 CA-HC 2007-
0002, 2008 WL 4638927, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (holding that ADA claims
are “not cognizable bases for a writ of habeas corpus”); Lagunas v. Williams, No. 71122,
2017 WL 1438705, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017) (hol ding that an ADA claim “is
not properly raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”); Bloom v. Cline, No. 110,763,
2014 WL 5347375, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2014) (“Failure to comply with a statute
[referring to the ADA] is not by itself a constitutional claim that falls within the scope of a
habeas petition.”). Young did not cite, and we were unable to find, a state supreme court
decision affirmatively holding otherwise.

35
not a substitute for appeal); State ex rel. Adams v. Rigg, 89 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Minn. 1958)
(petitioner “must show not only a statutory violation but also that such violation was so
materially prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial, and further that the resulting error
could not have been corrected by a timely ex ercise of an existing and available right of
appeal”).22 While some of our recent decisions reflect a departure from the traditional view
that only jurisdictional and co nstitutional questions are proper bases for a writ of habeas
corpus, see Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 405 (collecting cases), those decisions remain consistent
with the principle that habeas relief is not available when there exists an adequate
alternative remedy at law.
For example, in Kelsey v. State , we held that habeas relief was available to a
petitioner whose parole was wrongfully denied. 283 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1979). The
petitioner had no alternative remedy because Minnesota’s postconviction statute at the time
provided no redress. Id. at 894–95. In State v. Schnagl, we held that a motion to correct a
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27 was an inappropriate method of challenging the
Department’s calculation of the length of an offender’s release term. 859 N.W.2d 297, 303

22 The principle that habeas relief is not av ailable when there is an adequate remedy at
law is neither novel nor unique to Minnesota. See, e.g., Billiter v. Banks, 988 N.E.2d 556,
557 (Ohio 2013) (“[H]abeas corpus is not ava ilable when there is an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.” (i nternal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Haas v.
McReynolds, 643 N.W.2d 771, 775–76 (Wis. 2002) (“[I]f the petitioner has an otherwise
adequate remedy that he or she may exercise to obtain the same relief, the writ will not be
issued.”); In re Chapman , 796 S.E.2d 843, 848 (S.C. 2017) (“[H]abeas relief is only
available when other remedies , such as [post-conviction relief], are inadequate or
unavailable.”); Murray v. Henderson, 964 P.2d 531, 533 (Colo. 1998) (“[R]elief by way of
habeas corpus is not available when othe r legal remedies exist, such as a motion
under Crim. P. 35.”).

36
(Minn. 2015). The petitioner had no other remedy available to him, and we held that habeas
relief was appropriate. Id. at 302; see also State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy , 887 N.W.2d 271,
275 n.4 (Minn. 2016) (applying Schnagl’s holding to a factually similar case). And lastly
in Ford, we held that a writ of habeas corpus is proper to redress the Department’s failure
to follow its own policies. 933 N.W.2d at 405. Despite representing a broader view of the
writ, the holdings from these cases are consistent with the principle that habeas relief is not
available when there is some “other regular legal procedure” to remedy the alleged wrong.
State ex rel. Butler, 66 N.W.2d at 4.
It is for precisely this reason that we mu st decline Young’s invitation to resolve his
ADA claim in this petition. Young has alterna tive legal relief available to him. He may
bring a claim under the ADA itself or under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See Minn.
Stat. § 363A.01–.44 (2020). Because Young can challenge the Department’s allegedly
discriminatory treatment in civil litigation, his ADA claim is not properly before us in his
habeas petition. We therefore hold that ADA claims cannot be asserted in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus and decline to address the merits of Young’s ADA claims.23

23 In urging us to hold ot herwise, Young points to a case involving the federal habeas
corpus statute, Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1999). But cases involving
the federal habeas statute are unhelpful he re. Federal courts generally disallow ADA
claims in habeas petitions. See Gorrell v. Hastings, 541 F. Appx. 943, 945 (11th Cir. 2013)
(excluding ADA claim challenging “the circumstances” of confinement (emphasis
added)). But federal courts make an exception for claims challenging the validity of
confinement to preserve the effectiveness of the federal statute’s exhaustion requirement.
The federal statute requires petitioners to fi rst “exhaust[] the remedies available in
the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(a). Prisoners have attempted to avoid this
exhaustion requirement by labeling their complaints as ADA claims, rather than as habeas
petitions. Bogovich, 189 F.3d at 1002. Accordingly, federal courts look beyond the “label”

37
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision
of the court of appeals.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

on the complaint and examine whether, in essence, the nature of the relief sought is a writ
of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 489 (1973).
If the complaint, in essence, challenges th e validity of the confinement, then federal
courts not only allow but require it to be brought under the federal habeas statute. See
Bogovich, 189 F.3d at 1003 (noting that, in such situa tions, the writ is a plaintiff’s “sole
federal remedy”). Failing to require that such challenges be brou ght under the federal
habeas statute would “wholly frustrate exp licit congressional intent” because it would
allow prisoners to plead ar ound the federal statute’s exhaustion requirement. Preiser,
411 U.S. at 489–90. Because Minnesota’ s habeas statute has no such exhaustion
requirement, there is no similar reason for allowing ADA claims under Minnesota’s habeas
corpus statute. See Minn. Stat. § 589.01.

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C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T
HUDSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the court that Young’s appeal meets an exception to mootness and that
the Department of Corrections’ review hearings are lawful. I disagree, however, with the
court’s conclusion that Young’s two most recent revocations of supervised release and two
subsequent extensions of incarceration— the only ones he challenged here—were not
Marlowe violations.1 The record clearly demonstrates that Young’s supervised release was
revoked and extended because his residentia l treatment facilities could not accommodate
his seizures. By requiring Young to have agent-approved housing where none could meet
his medical needs, the Department effectively required that Young not have seizures at all;
a condition that was impossible for him to fulfill. That is the heart of a Marlowe violation.
I respectfully dissent.
I.
Nearly every person convicted under our la ws has a statutory right to supervised
release.2 See Carillo v. Fabian , 701 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Mi nn. 2005). A registered
predatory offender subject to intensive supe rvised release must, however, meet certain

1 Because I conclude that the De partment of Corrections violated Marlowe by
revoking Young’s release solely due to his epilepsy, I would not reach the Americans with
Disabilities Act issue.

2 The purpose of supervised and conditional release is to “help individuals reintegrate
into society as constructive individua ls as soon as they are able.” Morrissey v. Brewer ,
408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).

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conditions to maintain that release. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6 (2020). But that does
not grant the Department unfettered discretion to impose whatever conditions it chooses.
When a condition of release becomes unworkable “due to the circumstances largely
outside the control of an offender, the [Dep artment] must consider a restructure or
modification of those conditions.” State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian , 755 N.W.2d 792,
796−97 (Minn. App. 2008). Significantly, the burden is not entirely on the offender to seek
out acceptable housing because the Department ’s own policies require it “to assist an
offender in finding residential placement.” Id. at 795 (citing Minn. DOC Policy No.
203.010 § C.2).
The Department is required “to ab ide by its own internal policies and judicial
precedent.” State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393, 404 (Minn. 2019). In Ford, we
held that the Department violated the binding precedent of Marlowe when it did not fulfill
its own “obligation to fashion conditions of release that ar e workable and not impossible
to satisfy.” Id. at 406 (quoting Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d at 793). We were particularly
concerned that the Department had repeatedly ignored the “clear holding of Marlowe” by
denying offenders meaningful access to their statutory right to supervised release. Id. at
407 n.11. While the offenders in both Marlowe and Ford specifically sought relief from a
condition confining their residence to a particular county, the respective holdings were not
limited to those particular facts. To the contrary, we admonished the Department for
“ignor[ing] the clear language and full context of the Marlowe decision,” and announced a

C/D-3
broad rule requiring the Department to co nsider alternate conditions whenever those
conditions are clearly impossible for the offender to satisfy.3 Id. at 407.
The court’s conclusion that Young has not demonstrated a Marlowe violation is
based primarily on the district court’s clearly erroneous factual findings, which were made
without an evidentiary h earing. In doing so, the court narrowly reads Marlowe and
undermines the “grand purpose” of habeas —protecting individua ls “from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty.” Id. at 404 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243
(1963)).
II.
The court concludes that not having seizures was not a condition of Young’s release.
It does so by summarily deferring to the district court’s finding that “[t]here is no evidence
that the [Department] has sa id it will not release Young from imprisonment until he is
seizure free.” Of course the Department would never outright say so, nor do I suggest that
the Department actually intends for that to be a condition. Nevertheless, the simple fact
remains that that is precisely the condition the Department is practically imposing when it
continues to revoke Young’s release for lack of agent-approved housing.
This is not a complicated puzzle. Indeed there are only three dots to connect: (1) the
DOC required Young to possess agent-approved housing as a condition of his release;

3 Unless and until the Department either revo kes the policy that served as the basis
for habeas relief in Marlowe, or we explicitly ov errule the court of appeals’ decision in
Marlowe, that rule stands as the law of the land. See Ford , 933 N.W.2d at 404–05
(recognizing that Marlowe is “binding judicial precedent” on the Department of
Corrections).

C/D-4
(2) Young could not obtain such housing due to his epilepsy and predatory offender status;
and (3) the DOC revoked his release because he could not obtain su ch housing. These
three dots lead straight to a Marlowe violation.4 The court’s conclusion to the contrary is
based on several errors, each of which I address in turn.
A.
The first error the court commits is improperly looking to Young’s prior revocations
that have no bearing on his habeas petition here. The court exhaustively recounts Young’s
past history of non-compliance with treatment regimens, struggles with mental health, and
sexual and physical misconduct. But Young’s past conduct is not at issue here. The sole
focus of his habeas petition is based upon his four most recent review hearings.5 In several
of these hearings, the hearing officer identified that Young’s seizures were the sole reason
for the termination of his housing and subsequent revocation of supervised release.
In particular, at Young’s Ju ly 14, 2016 hearing, the hearing officer noted that
Young’s “only violation was that he lost his placement at Alpha [a halfway house] because
they could not handle the frequency of his seizures.” At this hearing, Young’s agent further
stated that he “was discharged from Alpha be cause they are not able to deal with his
seizures and [the seizures] interfere with his treatment.” The agent also noted that Alpha

4 Young was revoked for “90 days or less” beginning September 7, 2016. Thus, he
should have been rele ased no later than December 6, 2016. Instead, Yo ung remained in
custody until December 18, 2017—over a year past his release date.

5 Young challenges the July 14, 2016 an d September 22, 2016 revocations of his
supervised release and the D ecember 12, 2016 and March 13 , 2017 extensions of his
imprisonment for lack of agent-approved housing.

C/D-5
was “willing to take him back if he [could] get his seizures under control.” The agent then
emphasized that Young “has been honest about his offense, and is willing to do treatment.”
Young was then accepted into 180 Degrees (another halfway house), which also
eventually terminated him as a client due to his seizures. The September 7, 2016
termination report positively noted that Young was tested multiple times for illicit
substances and was negative each time. Young also “had no issues with [his accountability
goal] and remained compliant with all aspect s of this goal.” However, the termination
report concluded that Young’s “health was a huge barrier that prevented him from success”
and the report noted his multiple hospitalizations.
After 180 Degrees terminated Young due to his seizures, the officer at his
September 22, 2016 hearing stated that “[a] halfway house placemen t is not equipped to
handle his medical needs” and that Young “does have medical issues beyond his control.”
Then at Young’s December 12, 2016 he aring, the hearing officer noted that
“[p]lacement options are extr emely limited to [Young] due to his current medical needs
and his Level III Predat ory Offender status.” Young’s agent observed that multiple
residences were not viable for him “due to [Young’s] medical needs,” while others outright
refused him due to his Level III Predatory Offender status. Yo ung’s agent put it plainly:
“[T]here are no other options available at this time.”
Finally, at Young’s March 13, 2017 hearing, the hearing officer once again affirmed
that placement was difficult because of Young’s “significant medical issues,” in particular
his “seizure disorder.” The officer reaffirm ed that Young’s prior housing options denied
him placement “due to his medical issues and their inability to meet his medical needs.”

C/D-6
Young’s case manager was seeking a CADI waiver to assist with potential placement, but
Young had not yet been certifie d as having a disability. Yo ung’s agent confirmed that
“there are no known options for placement” in Dakota County.6
The court identifies statements in Young’s termination reports that were submitted
to the hearing officer as evid ence that Young’s revocation wa s actually due to more than
just his epilepsy. See supra at 24, n.11. But in doing so , the court effectively concludes
that we should not take the h earing officers at their word. See State v. Stempfley ,
900 N.W.2d 412, 417 n.10 (Minn. 2017). The district court’s responsibility—and ours—
is to determine why the heari ng officers revoked Young’s releas e. It may be that there
were other potential reasons warranting Young ’s release revocation; 7 but when the
Department by its own clear and unequivocal admission relies on an actual impermissible
reason, it violates Marlowe.
The record of the hearings that Young actua lly challenges is clear. For at least his
July 14, 2016 revocation, Young’s housing was terminated solely due to his medical needs,

6 The record plainly shows th at the Department was in fact restricting its searches at
the time to Dakota County, and in this respect Young’s case closely mirrors the geographic
restrictions we found unlawful in Ford. See 933 N.W.2d at 406–08. The court asserts that
Young “takes these statements out of context” because the hearing officer also identified
several attempted placements at facilities located in Hennepin County. First, the court
cannot simply ignore this clear statement that is consiste nt with the Department’s recent
history of abdicating its obliga tion to construct workable cond itions of release. Second,
even under the context as as serted by the court, the record demonstrates that the
Department was still only searching a lim ited geographic area because Dakota and
Hennepin Counties are adjacent.

7 Even the behaviors identified in the violation reports coul d be explainable by
Young’s medical conditions. Because the dist rict court did not conduct an evidentiary
hearing, we cannot be certain.

C/D-7
and his seizures specifically. And each su bsequent revocation rested primarily on the
inability of the respec tive facilities to accommodate hi s medical needs. By requiring
Young to have agent-approved housing when none were suitable to address his medical
needs—which the record stat es were clearly “beyond hi s control”—the Department
functionally placed an impossible condition on his release—that Young cease having
seizures. The district court’s finding to the contrary was clear error.8
B.
The court’s second error is its agreement with the district court’s finding that Young
was not in compliance with his release cond itions and did not demonstrate substantial
progress towards securing approvable housing. Based on this finding, the district court
further found that Young was not eligible for Department-funded housing that could better
meet his needs. As previously explained, the only four hearings challenged by Young do
not contain any evidence—outside of his inability to not have seizur es—that he failed to

8 The court accuses the dissent of “cherry-pic king,” but has itself joined in the harvest
by selectively reframing our statement regardin g the Department of Corrections’ “broad
discretion” in Ford. We emphasized in Ford that the “broad discretion” from Schwartz “is
not unbounded discretion,” and that in add ition to following its own policies, “the
Department must follow judicial precedent.” Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 407–08 n.12 (quoting
State v. Schwartz , 628 N.W.2d 134, 14 2 n.4 (Minn. 2001)). Moreover, this comment—
made in a footnote—cited to Schwartz, which itself quoted from an Ohio Supreme Court
case, Woods v. Telb , 733 N.E.2d 1103, 1110 (Ohio 2000); see Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d at
140. But both Schwartz and Woods dealt with the same lim ited question of whether
sanctions imposed by the executive branch due to a violation of release conditions violate
the separation of powers. See 628 N.W.2d at 139–41; 733 N.E.2d at 1110. This case, as
did Ford and Marlowe, presents a different question: whether the imposition of sanctions
can violate self-imposed, binding policy and rules. Marlowe held that it can, 755 N.W.2d
at 796–97, and we agreed in Ford that habeas relief was an appropriate remedy for that
violation, 933 N.W.2d at 405.

C/D-8
comply with his release conditions.9 Essentially, the Department precludes Young from
accessing funding that would allow him to secu re appropriate housing because he cannot
meet his release conditions; co nditions he cannot meet beca use the Department will not
release him without approved h ousing; housing he cannot ob tain because none of the
housing facilities can adequately address his seizures. This argument is circular and
baffling and allows the Department to create quintessentially unworkable conditions.
Similarly, in contrast to the district c ourt’s findings, the record shows that Young
meaningfully and actively participated in finding housing. He proposed at least two private
residences, but both fell through due to circumstances outside his control.10 And notably
in Young’s December 12, 2016 hearing, one of the two extensions of imprisonment at issue
here, the hearing officer indicated that “all parties are exploring possible housing options.”
Young’s counsel at his March 13, 2017 hearing also noted that RS Eden, located in Ramsey
County, had not yet been explored as an option. But Young’s agent stated that a Level III
Predatory Offender like Young c ould not be placed there beca use “it is not an accepted
practice within Dakota County Supervision.” 11 Young’s case manager, to her credit, has
actively tried to obtain a CADI waiver to facilitate more housing options for Young.

9 In fact, the district court ignored record evidence that Young had become compliant
with his medication and treatment plans. In stead, the district court, again without an
evidentiary hearing, looked back into Youn g’s past when he was struggling due to his
seizures and other mental health challenges.

10 Young proposed transferring to his br other’s residence, but the residence was
condemned. When Young identified family in Alabama, Alabama refused the transfer.

11 As noted above, see supra note 6, this geographical restriction mirrors the one that
we struck down in Ford.

C/D-9
I am not unsympathetic to the Department ’s difficult position. There are no doubt
financial constraints that limit the ability of the Department to maintain or facilitate housing
equipped for offenders with disabilities like Young, whose st atus as a predatory offender
precludes many housing options as the numerous hearings in the record demonstrate. But
the Department is not powerless given that it inspects and approves the halfway houses
with which it contracts. See Minn. Stat. § 241.021, subd . 1 (2020); Minn. DOC, Policy
No. 205.130 (Sep. 3, 2019). The Department similarly maintains 23 ISR houses
throughout Minnesota that provide housing fo r individuals under in tensive supervised
release who otherwise lack an independent h ousing option. Notable by its absence, there
is nothing in the record to show that the Department attempted to contact any of its ISR
houses to assist Young. Indeed, it appears that the Department lacks any comprehensive
policy to ensure that its administration of its various housing programs meets the needs of
individuals with disabilities like Young.
In any event, the Department’s previous attempts to help Young find suitable
housing do not relieve it of its obligation now to modify the conditions of his release when
those conditions are unworkable due solely to his seizures. See Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 407
(rejecting “the Department’s attempt to parse Marlowe into pieces” and emphasizing that
“the Department is required to ‘consider restructuring [the offender’s] release plan and . . .
seek to develop a plan that can achieve [the offender’s] release from prison and placement
in a suitable and approved residence.’ ” (quoting Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d at 797)). Today,
the court effectively relieves the Department of that obligation.

C/D-10
The court instead suggests that becaus e Young had not identified a specific
residence that he was eligible for, he cannot establish a Marlowe violation. That, however,
completely flips Marlowe on its head. When the Department is the one structuring the
conditions of release, it must bear the burden to show that those conditions are workable.
To suggest otherwise places a disproportionate burden on offenders when those for whom
it is most difficult to find appropriate housing will be the ones least able to demonstrate a
Marlowe violation.
The court proffers a narrow, wooden interpretation of Marlowe and Ford, and
contends that the rule of law set forth in those cases is straightforward. The court suggests
that all they stand for is the proposition that the Department must follow its own rules for
releasing offenders into the community; and if it does so, habeas relief is not warranted.
Thus, the court concludes here, that because the Department did not violate its own rules
in its treatment of Young, the Department did not violate Marlowe.
But that is not the rule of law set forth in Marlowe and Ford. Without question, the
rulings in Marlowe and Ford relied heavily on the fact th at the Department had not
followed its own policies and rules for releasing offenders into the community. Marlowe
and Ford, however, stand for a much broader prin ciple, namely: the Department of
Corrections has an independent obligation to fashion cond itions of release that are
workable and not impossible to satis fy. The first paragraph of the Marlowe opinion says
precisely that; and this directive is repeated throughout the opinion. Marlowe, 755 N.W.2d
at 793, 796. And in Ford, we cited repeatedly to these statements from Marlowe. Ford,
933 N.W.2d at 406–07. The court thus minimizes Marlowe by suggesting that we “merely

C/D-11
emphasized what the district court found to be unacceptable conduct,” supra at 26, while
ignoring the fact that we dedicated all of Section III of the opinion in Ford to analyzing the
merits of the Marlowe violation.12 See Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 405–08.
In sum, the rule of law set forth in Marlowe and Ford is not that the Department
must follow its own rules for releasing offende rs—although, of course, it must. Rather,
the rule of law set forth in Marlowe and Ford is that the Department must make reasonable
modifications to its housing programs to ensure that all offenders—including those with
disabilities like Young—have the same opport unities for release to DOC-administered
housing. Thus, the Department cannot revoke an offender’s release because his disability
cannot be accommodated in DOC housing. By this measur e, the Department did not
comply with Marlowe in its treatment of Young.
Here, the record shows that Young both complied with the conditions of his release
and made substantial progress to wards securing approvable housing. 13 Young was thus
eligible for Department-funded housing, which would likely better suit his medical needs.
At the very least, the Department should have made efforts to search for suitable housing

12 The court is correct that we have not explicitly adopted the reasoning of Marlowe,
but that is irrelevant to what the De partment’s legal obligations are under Marlowe. The
opinion in Marlowe, as a court of appeals case that we have not overruled, is “binding
judicial precedent.” Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 404–05.

13 The court concerningly provides no guidanc e as to what else and how much more
Young should have done. Gi ven the Department’s freque nt abdication of its legal
obligations, see 933 N.W.2d at 407 n.11, offenders should have some reasonable guidance
as to what must be established in the record to be entitled to habeas relief going forward.

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for Young within its own ISR housing network. As before, the district court’s findings to
the contrary were, based on the record, clear error.
The record, or relative lack thereof, bear s one additional comme nt. The district
court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing instead of essentially deferring to the
Department’s Hearing and Release Unit Findings. See State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297,
303 n.6 (Minn. 2015) (preferring habeas petitions to be first heard in district courts because
appellate courts are “not equipped to take testimony and to exam ine witnesses in the
proceedings that would be required by entert aining original writs of habeas corpus”
(quoting State ex rel. Alexander v. Rigg , 76 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Minn. 1956))). The
petitioner in Ford had an evidentiary hearing, whic h this court relied heavily on in
upholding the district court’s grant of habeas relief. See 933 N.W.2d at 406–07. Young
was denied the same opportunity here.
Ultimately, if Young’s seizures are the so le basis for the Department’s revocation
of his release, it must alter the conditions of that release. In light of the record, I would
conclude that Y oung has shown a Marlowe violation and is ther efore entitled to habeas
relief.

CHUTICH, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Hudson.

THISSEN, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Hudson.