State of Minnesota, ex rel, Robert Young, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1741

State of Minnesota, ex rel,
Robert Young, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections,
Respondent.

Filed May 29, 2018
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-17-3621

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Bradley Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Randall, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking immediate release from prison, appellant argues that the Department of
Corrections (DOC) violated state law by revoking his release, that the revocation violated
his substantive due process rights, and that the revocation violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to benefits, services, programs, and activities.
Appellant was released from prison subsequent to filing this appeal. W e conclude that
Young’s appeal is now moot. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, a district court convicted appellant Robert Young of third -degree criminal
sexual conduct. In January 2014, the district court committed Young to the Commissioner
of Corrections, under the Minnesota DOC, for 32 months, with credit for 392 days, and 10
years conditional release after confinement. Young completed his prison sentence and
supervised release, and is now serving his 10-year conditional release, which will expire in
2025.
In May 2016, the DOC released Young to Alpha House, a residential program for
sex-offender treatment. One month later, the program terminated Young from treatment
“due to the frequency of his seizures and the medical attention required.” Upon
termination, the DOC revoked Young’s release and re-incarcerated him. For a short time,
Young resided at 180 Degrees, a halfway house, but he did not complete the program. In
July 2016, the DOC’s He arings and Release Unit (HRU) held a revocation hearing. The

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hearing officer revoked Young’s release. Young was again imprisoned until the HRU
officer released Young to 180 Degrees in August 2016.
In September 2016, 180 Degrees terminated Young as a client. The manager at 180
Degrees wrote that Young’s “health was a huge barrier that prevented him from success.”
(emphasis added). A subsequent revocation hearing was held. In his HRU report, the case
manager recommended revoking Young’s release until he could be placed in a facility “that
can address his mental health and medical needs .” (emphasis added). The HRU hearing
officer revoked Young’s supervised release for 90 days or less because Young committed
acts requiring discipline while incarcerated, and Young “failed to complete r esidential
program and/or aftercare as directed by agent/designee.”
In December 2 016, the HRU held another review hearing to extend the projected
release date. The case manager reported that neither 180 Degrees nor Damascus Way
programs could take Young because of the extent of his medical needs . The release
attorney explained that t he two largest obstacles for Young are his medical issues,
including seizures, and his status as a level 3 predatory offender. The HRU hearing officer
extended Young’s incarceration 1 by 90 days or less for “accountability” and “to assist in
release planning.”
Young appealed the decision of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer of
the HRU denied it, explaining that Young’s release was revoked “because he did not have
adequate housing to address his multifaceted needs for mental and medical health in

1 “Incarceration” is defined as “[t]he act or process as confining someone .” Black’s Law
Dictionary 878 (10th ed. 2004). Here, the DOC sent Young back to prison.

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addition to being a level 3 sex offender on ISR supervision. [Young] was not revoked
because he had epilepsy.”
Young had a nother review hearing in March 2017. The HRU hearing officer
extended the release date by 90 days or less because Young did not have an agent-approved
release plan with a suitable residence that would provide services for his medical and
mental health needs. The HRU hearing officer encouraged the parties involved to seek “all
viable release opportunities.”
Young appealed the deci sion of the HRU hearing officer. The Executive Officer
again denied the appeal, explaining that the release review process exists “to monitor
progress on the development of a release plan or completion of treatment directives and to
determine whether the projected release date needs to be extended.”
On July 21, 2017, Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that
the Commissioner of Corrections denied his liberty interest in serving his conditional
release term in the community , that administrative rules prohibit the DOC from
incarcerating Young indefinitely because the DOC “must approve an alternative program
with workable conditions of release,” and that the extended release period violated the
ADA, Minnesota law, and his substantive due process rights.
The district court denied Young’s habeas petition. The district court concluded that
Minnesota law authorized the DOC’s decision to return Young to jail while on supervised
release because Young did not obtain an agent-approved res idence. Lack of agent -
approved housing was the result of his medical and mental health issues , and his level 3
sex offender status preclude s him from many of the residences and programs that are

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available.2 The district court clarified that the revocation of release was not a result of
Young’s medical condition, and noted that Young can only be released to a residence that
can address his medical and mental health needs. The state argued, and the district court
found, that there was no violation of the ADA because Young was not precluded from any
program or benefit offered directly by the prison. The ADA is a real issue. But we do not
need to address it at this time because of our finding that Young’s appeal is moot. 3
Young filed this appeal in November 2017. At oral argument on March 8, 2018,
both parties agreed that on December 18, 2017, Young was placed on intensive supervised
release (ISR) and has remained in the community since that time.
D E C I S I O N
“A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of
habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01
(2016). “[T]he function of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve one from unlawful
restraint.” State v. Schnagl , 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). A
writ of habeas corpus may also be used to challenge conditions of confinement or to raise

2 This is the reoccurring issue on supervised release. Releasees get pulled back into prison,
not for committing crimes, but because nobody wants to rent to them, or because
municipalities enact laws to prevent them from finding a residence.

3 These claims are brought in civil suits either in federal cou rt under the ADA or in state
court under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See generally Randolph v.
Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 857 -59 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing ADA claim separately from
Missouri state law claim); Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Bankin g, 632 N.W.2d 534,
543-44 (Minn. 2001) ( concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding
appellant’s reasonable-accommodation claim for her employer’s failure to accommodate
her fibromyalgia). Pursuing a habeas petition then is not the appropriate vehicle for Young
to challenge his treatment or seek an accommodation.

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claims involving fundamental constitutional rights or significant restraints on liberty. Guth
v. Fabian, 716 N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
The petitioner bears the burden of proving unlawful detention. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d
827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014). A district court’s findings on a denial of a habeas petition
“are entitled to great weight.” Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010).
We review the district court’s findings to determine whether “they are reasonably
supported by the evidence,” and we review questions of law de novo. Guth, 716 N.W.2d
at 26.
I. Young’s appeal is moot.
An action “should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer
necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” Dean v. City of Winona ,
868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). We will not dismiss a claim as moot if the claim is likely
to reoccur but migh t evade review, or if the case is considered “functionally justiciable”
and “of statewide significance.” Id. at 6 (quotation omitted). When an issue is “capable
of repetition, yet evading review,” the aggrieved party must show that “(1) the challenged
action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,
and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct.
347, 349 (1975). We will resolve the case if it is “functionally justiciable” and is an
important public issue “of statewide significance that should be decided immediately.”
State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Minn. 2000) (quotations omitted).

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Young filed a habeas petition seeking immediate release. After filing his petition,
he was released on December 18, 2017 . That made his requested relief —release from
prison—moot. See Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5 ; Limmer v. Swanson , 806 N.W.2d 838, 839
(Minn. 2011). We have no need to provide relief on Young’s habeas corpus petition. The
only relief we can provide on habeas corpus is release. He received it.
Unfortunately, this issue is capable of repetition and does not evade review !4 See,
e.g., State ex rel. Sather v. Roy , A16 -2064, 2017 WL 2920 361, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App.
July 10, 2017) (addressing Sather’s habeas petition despite being released from prison on
ISR); Manska v. Fabian , A08-0025, 2008 WL 5215954, at *1 -2 (Minn. App. Dec. 16,
2008) (applying the collateral consequences exception to mootness to address the merits of
Manska’s appeal despite having been released from custody and placed on supervised
release); Johnson v. Fabian , A07-2132, 2008 WL 3290669, at *2 n.2 (Minn. App. Aug.
12, 2008) (acknowledging the inability to “grant the relief typically given to a successful
habeas petitioner” but finding collateral consequences and concluding that the district court
did not abuse its di scretion by denying Johnson’s habeas petition) . Unless there are
changes in the law, this parade of appeals will continue.
II. If Young had not been released from prison, Marlowe would apply.
In this appeal, Young argues that his prior ongoing detention violates Minnesota
law and administrative rules. He contends that his detention violates the purpose of
conditional release, which is to assist an inmate to transition into the community. He a lso

4 District court and appellate court records show that this is an ongoing problem.

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argues that the condition requiring him to obtain agent -approved housing is unworkable
given his epilepsy.
Minnesota statutes require that a person convicted of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 309.344 (2012) is to serve a 10-year conditional-release term.
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2016). Due to the nature of the offense, an inmate may
be required to se rve his conditional release on ISR for the duration of the release term.
Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6 (2016).
The commissioner may impose conditions on the release of an inmate, Minn. Stat.
§ 244.05, subd. 6(b), from successful completion of treatment and aftercare in a program
to those that “the commissioner considers appropriate,” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(b).
The commissioner has “broad discretion” in making conditional release decisions,
including the imposition of release conditions. State v. Schwartz , 628 N.W.2d 134, 142
n.4 (Minn. 2001). Conditions of release are “based on the need for public safety,” Min n.
R. 2940.1900, but balance the purpose of assisting former inmates to assimilate “into
society during a potentially difficult period of transition,” Miller v. State, 714 N.W.2d 745,
748 (Minn. App. 2006). When the inmate violates those conditions, the c ommissioner is
authorized to revoke the release and reimprison the inmate for an “appropriate period of
time,” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 , which may be either a part or all of the remaining
portion of the conditional release term, Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 8(c). But if the
release conditions are unworkable, such as having “no suitable residence . . . in [the
offender’s] county of commit,” then the DOC must restructure the conditions of supervised

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release. State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2 d 792, 796-97 (Minn. App. 2008)
(emphasis added).
In Marlowe, this court determined that the denial of Marlowe’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was an abuse of discretion because it extended Marlowe’s incarceration
after he reached his supervised-release date. Id. at 793. Marlowe was a level 3 sex offender
who served his prison sentence and was released on ISR. Id. Because he could not secure
agent-approved housing , Marlowe’s release was revoked. Id. At the review hearing,
Marlowe’s agent explained “the difficulty of finding a suitable residence for a sex offender
placed on ISR in Washington County.” 5 Id. Although the HRU officer wanted to release
Marlowe to a correctional facility in another county, he found that Marlowe violated the
so-called “no housing” term of his release and revoked it. Id. at 794.
Marlowe appealed the denial of his habeas petition, arguing that he was deprived of
a protected liberty interest due to a violation of an impossible condition. Id. This court
noted that “the DOC’s own policies and rules point out that it has an obligation to assist an
offender in finding residential placement,” and stated that “there is a key difference
between Marlowe’s imprisonment for the underlying offense and the confinement that he
is currently experiencing; namely, if he can find an approved residence, he will be
released.” Id. at 795. This court reversed and remanded, recommending that the DOC
restructure the conditions of supervised release because “a suitable residential place ment
[was] available in a neighboring county.” Id. at 796-97.

5 This is part and parcel of the earlier -mentioned reoccurring issue, and the problem in
resolving that issue.

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Here, the HRU officer repeatedly revoked Young’s release because he violated a
condition of his release —maintaining agent -approved housing. 6 Multiple residences
terminated Young as a client because “they are not able to deal with his seizures and they
interfere with his treatment. They are willing to take him back if he can get his seizures
under control.” But Young suffers from epilepsy, a medical condition generating frequent
seizures beyond his control. Young’s medical condition cannot be the basis for a violation.
Because Young suffers frequent seizures that require hospitalization, the conditions of his
supervised release m ust be modi fied, such as to allow for admission to an inpatient
institution for medical treatment. Except for our ruling on mootness, this case is controlled
by Marlowe. The commissioner’s process of determining release conditions and releasing
offenders on ISR to serve the remainder of their sentences is hampered by the informal
policy of giving local communities almost a de facto veto in the community. 7 We believe
that both the DOC and the Youngs to follow are entitled to legislative relief and common-
sense guidance.
Young’s habeas petition is moot. He has been released.
Affirmed.

6 Same as footnote 3.

7 As evident by Young’s case, the community, not the DOC, most controls the return to
prison of individuals simply by refusing to allow housing.