Robert F. Goerdt, et al., Respondents,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1751

Robert F. Goerdt, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Joyce E. Folsom, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed July 2, 2018
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Grant County District Court
File No. 26-CV-14-287

Dennis W. Hagstrom, Law Offices of Dennis W. Hagstrom, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Nathan L. Seeger, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
After a court trial in this intrafamilial real-property dispute, appellants argue that the
district court erred in determining that (1) respondents’ action is not barred by Minn. Stat.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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§ 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2016)1; (2) respondents’ interest in the property was not extinguished
by Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a (2016); and (3) respondents are the fee simple owners of
the property. We affirm.
FACTS
This case involves the disputed ownership of a 120-acre parcel of farmland in Grant
County, which the parties call “the Section 3 land.” The following facts were found by the
district court after a bench trial and are undisputed on appeal.
On November 15, 1978, Cornelius and Clara Goerdt, the original owners o f the
Section 3 land, entered into a contract for deed to sell the Section 3 land to their grandson
and his wife, respondents Robert and Debra Goerdt. Under the contract for deed ,
respondents agreed to pay $54,000 for the land, with $15,660 down, and the balance to be
paid in annual installments from 1979 until 1994. The contract for deed provided for
accrual of interest at the rate of 7% per year. However, Cornelius and Clara never intended
to charge interest and specifically wanted respondents to pay only the principal balance of
$54,000. They included the interest clause in the contract only as a formality based on the
recommendation of the lawyer who drafted it, and waived all interest payments during the
contract.
Respondents moved onto the Section 3 land shortly after entering into the contract
for deed. Since 1978, respondents have farmed the land and paid all real estate taxes on

1 We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat. § 541.05 because it has not been amended
in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566,
575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the
time they rule on a case”).

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the property. During that time, respondents spent over $210,000 on improvements to the
property, including replacing the foundations of the granary and hog barn, remodeling and
repairing the house, installing a new driveway, moving buildings, digging ditches, and
installing a new sewer line. In 2013, respondents’ son moved a house onto the property at
the cost of $100,000.
Clara died in 1989, and Cornelius died in 1990. Clara’s vendor interest passed from
her estate to Cornelius, and then from Cornelius’s estate to their children, Lorain Goerdt
and appellant Joyce Folsom, in equal shares. Lorain Goerdt is respondent Robert Goerdt’s
father. Following Cornelius’s death, Lorain administered the contract for deed, and
respondents made payments to him and to Folsom until the principal balance of the contract
for deed was paid off in 1997 . Payment records show annual payme nts by respondents
against the principal balance and reflect no interest accrual or interest payments over the
duration of the contract. Folsom received payments through 1997 but never asked for, nor
obtained, any details on the contract for deed . After respondents’ final payment in 1997,
Lorain presented them with the abstract for the property, but because both Lorain and
respondents erroneously believed that the abstract conveyed title, respondents never
received a warranty deed for the property. Lorain died in 2013.
In 2014, respondents discovered that they did not have good title to the property
because they did not possess the warranty deed. They obtained quit -claim deeds from
several relatives in an attempt to clear title to the property, but Folsom refused to sign.
In December 2014, approximately 17 years after receiving respondents’ last
payment, Folsom notified respondents for the first time that she believed they owed money

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on the contract for deed. In 2015, Lorain’s vendor’s interest in the property was transferred
to his widow, appellant Lucille Goerdt, the mother of Robert Goerdt. Appellants Folsom
and Lucille Goerdt subsequently notified respondents that they believed respondents had
defaulted on the contract for deed, and, based on unpaid interest, owed appellants
$88,168.44. Folsom claimed that she was never informed that the original vendors had
agreed to waive interest on the contract.2
Respondents sued Folsom and the estate of Lorain Goerdt “to determine the title to
the [Section 3 l and] and [any] adverse claims,” claiming fee simple ownership of the
property. Appellant Kathleen Stoesser, as personal representative of Lorain Goerdt’s
estate, and Lucille Goerdt, were later added as defendants. Following a bench trial, the
district court issued its order for judgment and decree, concluding that respondents are fee
simple owners of the Section 3 land; the doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel preclude
appellants from asserting nonp ayment of the contract for deed; and appellants have no
right, title, estate, interest in, or lien upon the Section 3 land. Appellants moved to amend
the district court’s findings, conclusions of law, and order, or in the alternativ e, for a new
trial, which the district court denied.
This appeal follows.

2 On appeal, appellants do not challenge the district court’s factual finding that Cornelius
and Clara never intended to charge interest on the contract for deed.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in determining that respondents’ action is to
determine adverse claims and is not barred by Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1).

Appellants argue that the district court erred in determining that respondents brought
an action to determine adverse claims, rather than a contract action for specific
performance, which would be barred by the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat.
§ 541.05, subd. 1(1). We review the construction and applicability of statutes of limitations
de novo. Benigni v. County of St. Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn. 1998).
We first determine whether respondents brought an action to determine adverse
claims or a contract action. Minn. Stat. § 559.01 (2016) defines an action to determine
adverse claims to real property. The statute provides:
Any person in possession of real property personally or
through the person ’s tenant, or any other person having or
claiming title to vacant or unoccupied real property, may bring
an action against another who claims an estate or interest
therein, or a lien thereon, adverse to the person bringing the
action, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim and
the rights of the parties, respectively.
Minn. Stat. § 559.01 . In both respondents’ initial and amended compl aints, they alleged
that appellants claimed a right or title to the Section 3 land, and that “the purpose of
[respondents’] action is to determine the title to [the Section 3 land] and the adverse claims
thereto, if any, and to forever bar the claims of any other persons.”
Appellants contend that two statements in respondents’ amended complaint show
that respondents brought a contract action for specific performance. First, appellants point
to a caption in the amended complaint listing the case type as “Specific Performance,”
when previous filings listed the case type as “Quiet Title.” Second, appellants claim that

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respondents’ statement that they “are entitled to a Warranty Deed pursuant to the terms of
the Contract for Deed” shows that they sought specific performance under the contract.
Here, the record contains no evidence explaining the amended case type or showing
that either respondents or the district court treated the complaint as an action for specific
performance. Respondents’ amended complaint added appellants Lucille Goerdt and
Kathleen Stoeser as defendants, but did not change the stated purpose of the complaint or
the requested relief. Respondents’ statement that they are entitled to a warranty deed
merely evinces support for their allegation that they fully performed the contract for deed
by paying off the principal balance in full. Respondents did not seek to compel appellants
to deliver a warranty deed pursuant to the contract , nor did the district court order such
relief. We conclude that appellants’ characterization of the complaint as a contract action
for specific performance is u nsupported by law or the record and that the district court
correctly determined that respondents brought an action to determine adverse claims , or a
“quiet title” action.
We next determine whether respondents’ action to determine adverse claims is
barred by the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). Minn.
Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), provides that “the following actions shall be commenced within
six years: (1) upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other
limitation is expressly applied.” In Coates v. Cooper, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that an action to determine adverse claims is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations
under a prior version of section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), containing identical language.
121 Minn. 11, 21 -22, 140 N.W. 120, 12 4 (1913) (citing R.L. § 4076). In Coates, the

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supreme court concluded that the parties had executed a contract to transfer title to land
even though the vendee never received a deed, and therefore the vendee properly brought
an action to determine adverse claims. Id. at 20-22, 140 N.W. at 124.
Here, the undisputed facts show that the parties treated the contract for deed as
satisfied and the Section 3 land as belonging to respondents, beginning in 1997, when
respondents paid off the principal balance and received an abstract for the property, which
they erroneously believed conveyed title. More than 17 years passed until respondents first
learned of the title defect, and after Folsom rejected their request to sign a quit-claim deed,
they properly brought an action to determine adverse claims. The district court did not err
in concluding that respondents’ action to determine adverse claims is not barred by the six-
year statute of limitations under section 541.05, subdivision 1(1). See Coates, 121 Minn.
at 21-22, 140 N.W. at 124.
II. The district court did not err in determining that respondents’ interest in the
property was not extinguished by Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a.

Appellants argue that the district court erred in determining that respondents’
interest in the Section 3 land was not extinguished by operation of Minn. Stat. § 500.20,
subd. 2a. Specifically, appellants contend that respondents acquired no legal title because
they never fully performed the contract for deed, and therefore their interest in the property
remained tied to the contract until it extinguished when the contract voided after 30 years
by operation of Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a.3

3 Appellants also argue that equitable relief is unavailable if an instrument conveying
property is voided by operation of Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a . Because we conclude
that Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a , does not operate to void a contract for deed, we need
not address this question.

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Whether a contract for deed may be voided by operation of Minn. Stat. § 50 0.20,
subd. 2a, presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See
Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). “The object of all
interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). “When interpreting a statute, we first look to
see whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous. A statute is only
ambiguous when the language therein is subject to more than one r easonable
interpretation.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation and citation omitted). “When legislative i ntent is clear from the statute’s plain
and unambiguous language, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without
resorting to other principles of statutory interpretation.” State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy , 887
N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a, provides:
Restriction of duration of condition. Except for any right to
reenter or to repossess as provided in subdivision 3, all private
covenants, conditions, or restrictions created by which the title
or use of real property is affected, cease to be valid and
operative 30 years after the date of the deed, or other
instrument, or the date of the probate of the will, creating them,
and may be disregarded.
The language of the statute limits the “duration of [a] condition” affecting title or use of
real property, and provides that all such “private covenants, conditions, or restrictions” are
invalid and inoperable “30 years after the date of the deed, or other instrument . . . creating
them.” But the statute’s language imposes no limitation on the term of the instrument
through which such conditions or restrictions are created.

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Appellants cite no case in which the statute has been applied to void a contract for
deed or other instrument conveying land. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the
statute applies t o “covenants, conditions, or restriction s created b y any instrument
conveying land,” and addresses the “general problem of conditions that impose a perpetual
restriction on the use or title of land.” In re Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364,
373 (Minn. 1979) (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2 (1978)); see Hiller v. County
of Anoka , 529 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn. App. 1995) (noting that Minn. Stat. § 500.20,
subd. 2, was repealed in 1982 but reenacted in 1988 as Mi nn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a).
“The statute itself is notice to all t hose who place any restriction on the use of land that
such restriction will become invalid 30 years after its creation. ” Turners, 277 N.W.2d at
373. The broad sweep of appellants’ interpretation of the statute would have the effect of
invalidating all contracts for deed with terms longer than 30 years. The statute’s plain
language does not support appellants’ interpretation, and we conclude that Minn. Stat.
§ 500.20, subd. 2a, does not void a contract for deed after 30 years. Therefore, the district
court did not err in determining that respondents’ interest in the property was not
extinguished by the statute.
III. The district court did not err in determining that respondents are the fee simple
owners of the property.

Appellants argue that the district court erred in determining that respondents are the
fee simple owners of the property because they did not fully perform the contract for deed

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and because the district court cannot transfer legal title through a quiet title action. 4
Appellants’ argument is misguided.
First, appellants fail to address the district court’s determination that respondents
are the fee simple owners of the property based on the equitable doctrines of laches, waiver,
and estoppel, which preclude appellants from asserting that respondents did not pay off the
contract for deed in full .5 Second, the district court did not “transfer” title to respondents
through quiet title, but rather, determined that respondents are the fee simple owners under
equitable principles, and that appellants possessed no right, title, or interest in the property.
“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument
or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons
Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519–20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971). Prejudicial error is not
obvious upon mere inspection of the unchallenged factual findings. We conclude that the
district court did not err in determining that respondents are the fee simple owners of the
property.
Affirmed.

4 Appellants raise two additional arguments: first, that respondents did not take ownership
by adverse possession; and second, that appellants should not receive an opportunity to
redeem the property if the contract for deed is voided. Appellate courts generally consider
only those issues presented and considered by the district court. See Thiele v. Stich , 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) . Because the district court neither determined th at
respondents took the property by adverse possession nor ordered cancellation of the
contract, we need not decide the issues.
5 We note that appellants challenge the equitable relief granted by the district court only on
the grounds that respondents’ int erest was extinguished by operation of Minn. Stat.
§ 500.20, subd. 2a. Because we previously determined that the contract for deed wa s not
voided by Minn. Stat. § 500.20, subd. 2a, we need not readdress that argument here.