In re: the Trust Agreement of Eugene L. Johnson u/t/a dated December 22, 2008 In re: the Eugene L. Johnson Irrevocable Trust B.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1765

In re: the Trust Agreement of Eugene L. Johnson u/t/a dated December 22, 2008
In re: the Eugene L. Johnson Irrevocable Trust B.

Filed June 11, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-TR-CV-12-73, 27-TR-CV-16-30

Bradley C. Johnson, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

James F. Baldwin, Cindy J. Ackerman, Moss & Barnett A Professional Association,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Donna Mae Johnson, Peggy J. Bleskacek,
Rodney D. Johnson, and James G. Johnson)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
In this trust dispute, respondents filed a petition to remove appellant Bradley
Johnson as a co-trustee on the grounds that he was uncooperative, acted against the interest
of the trust, and harassed the other co -trustees. The district court ordered the p arties to
engage in mediation, and they reached an agreement where Bradley would resign as co -
trustee in return for a payment of money. After the district court approved the settlement,
Bradley filed a petition to void it on numerous grounds, ranging from duress to allegations
2
that the district court and respondents were conspiring to further criminal activity. The
district court denied the petition and directed the parties to comply with the mediated
settlement agreement. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Donna Mae Johnson and Eugene L. Johnson were married and had four
children: respondents Peggy Bleskacek, Rodney Johnson, James Johnson, and appellant
Bradley Johnson.1 During their marriage, Donna Mae and Eugene established a revocable
trust, where Eu gene was the lone trustee and Donna Mae and the children were the
beneficiaries. Eugene appointed the children as successor trustees. In May 2011, Eugene
passed away.
Following his death, the family and trust have been troubled with interfamily
litigation. In 2012, Bradley filed a p etition for instructions on trust property interests,
arguing the trust had a property interest in a parcel of land that respondents argued belong
solely to Donna Mae. Following a determination that the trust did not have an interest in
the property, the parties appealed to this court arguing over attorney fees.2 And in separate
actions, judgments were entered in favor of the Estate of Eugene Johnson against Bradley
for approximately $786,000, and in favor of Donna Mae against Bradley for approximately
$221,000.3

1 While Karol M. Johnson signed the notice of appeal to this court, she was not a party in
the district court proceedings and is not a party on appeal.
2 For more background on the trust and the prior appeal, see In re Tr. Agreement of Johnson,
No. A14-2110, 2015 WL 4715341 (Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2015).
3 Both of these judgments were the result of breach-of-contract claims.
3
Following these disputes, respondents filed a petition seeking to remove Bradley as
a co-trustee. The petition alleged that Bradley “embarked upon a pattern of behavior to
impede the administration of the Trust and harass [respondents], their professional advisors
and financial institutions holding trust assets.” The petition detaile d Bradley’s failure to
cooperate with respondents in regards to the administration of the trust , in addition to
communications Bradley had with the trust’s financial institution where he demanded
money and accused it of fraud. In response, Bradley filed a petition for attorney fees he
incurred while serving as a trustee. This amounted to approximately $1,000,000. Bradley
also consistently accused the referee in probate court of bias and committing crimes and
unsuccessfully attempted to have the referee recused. Subsequently, t he district court
ordered the parties to engage in mediation.
In March 2017, the parties engaged in mediation . The parties reached —and
signed—a settlement agreement. The parties were all advised to seek legal advice before
signing it. The agreement stated it was binding, and all “parties agree[d] to mutually
release each other, their agents, officers, and employees in full satisfaction of any and all
claims, counter-claims, and cross claims, known or unknown, that they may have against
each other.” Respondents agreed to pay Bradley $800,000 and forebear the breach -of-
contract judgments.4 In return, Bradley agreed to resign as co -trustee and to dismiss all
objections to respondent’s petition to remove him as co -trustee. Bradley also agreed to

4 Bradley had the alternative option to receive $700,000 and have the breach -of-contract
judgments assigned to him, but he selected the other option.
4
“completely waive of any of [his] rights or interests of any kind now or in the future with
respect to” the trust.
The following day , a hearing was held before the district court where the parties
informed the court of the settlement agreement.5 Respondents’ attorney explained that they
were “seeking approval of the agreement by the court in lieu of any other proceedings.”
The court confirmed with the parties that the reached agreement was a global settlement of
all issues relating to the trust. The district court then had this exchange with Bradley:
THE COURT: So, [Bradley], you have signed this mediated
settlement agreement, correct?

[BRADLEY]: Yes.

THE COURT: And you are also asking that the court approve
it?

[BRADLEY]: Yes.
There was some confusion over an edit to one of the items in the agreement, and the district
court went off the record to make a correction. When the parties went back on record, this
exchange occurred:
THE COURT: All right. [Bradley], you do approve of those
corrections?

[BRADLEY]: Yes.

THE COURT: And anything else you wanted to tell me about
your proposed order?

[COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS] : You know, other than
that issue about the slight modification, I believe the rest of it
is consistent with the mediated settlement.

5 A summary judgment hearing was originally scheduled for that day.
5

THE COURT: [Bradley], do you believe the proposed order is
consistent with the mediated settlement?

[BRADLEY]: Yes. There’s a couple of things that have to be
taken care of but they are in there so it’s consistent with that.
The district court then issued an order approving the settlement agreement.
But the next month, Bradley filed a petition to void or correct the order approving
the settlement agreement. The petition stated:
The reasons for this Petition are acts by the Petitioner s, their
attorneys, the Courts, and the Mediator of Fraud, Criminal
Conduct, Misrepresentation of Material Facts, Dishonesty,
Collusion with the Mediator, Collusion with the Court to deny
[Bradley] and [his children] an honest, fair and equitable
settlement.
The petition accused the mediator of being biased against Bradley and of conspiring with
respondents to commit crimes. The petition also stated Bradley did not have an opportunity
to consult with an attorney befo re signing the agreement, he was forced to proceed pro se
during the mediation, the settlement agreement was incomplete, he did not agree to some
of the terms in the agreement, he did not agree with the corrections made to the agreement
at the district court hearing, and the trust is being used to further criminal activity.
Following the petition, respondents filed a motion to compel settlement, which was
subsequently granted. The district court found all of the parties entered into the agreement
voluntarily and there was “no evidence of error, mistake, fraud, or other reason to void or
correct the Court’s Order Approving Mediated Settlement Agreement.”
This appeal follows.
6
D E C I S I O N
Bradley contends that, because of a multitude of reasons, the district court abused
its discretion by granting the motion to compel settlement and declining to vacate the
settlement agreement. Settlement agreements are favored by law, and are enforced “absent
fraud or collusion, mistake, or such an improvident agreement that it ought not to stand in
equity and good conscience.” Jallen v. Agre, 264 Minn. 369, 373, 119 N.W.2d 739, 742 -
43 (1963). We review a district court’s refusal to vacate a settlement for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. St. Pa ul Ins. Co. , 305 N.W.2d 571, 57 3 (Minn. 1981). We first
address whether the parties reached a binding settlement agreement and we then address
Bradley’s arguments that the settlement agreement should be vacated.
For a mediated settlement agreement to be binding, the agreement must state: (1) it
is binding; (2) the mediator has no duty to protect any of the parties’ interests; (3) the
settlement may adversely affect parties’ rights; and (4) the parties should consult legal
counsel before signing it if uncertain of their rights . Minn. Stat. § 572.35, subd. 1(1)
(2016).6
Here the parties engaged in mediation and reached a written settlement agreement.
The agreement stated it was binding, that the mediator had no duty to protect any of the
parties’ interests, that the settlement agreement may adversely affect the parties, and that
the parties should consult with an attorney if they were uncertain of their rights. Th e
agreement complied with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 572.35, and as a

6 Alternatively, the parties can be advised of these conditions inst ead of including them in
the written settlement agreement. Minn. Stat. § 572.35, subd. 1(2) (2016).
7
result, was binding. Furthermore, at the hearing seeking approval of the settlement before
the district court, the parties stated the settlement agreement was accurate and that it
resolved all of the issues related to the parties . The court therefore acted within its
discretion in approving the settlement agreement.
But Bradley contends that the settlement agreement should be vacated because of
several defenses to contract enforcement: duress , fraud, and criminal activity. Br adley
argues that he reached the settlement agreement under duress, because he was only at
mediation because he was pursuing, as damages, legal fees that he believed were rightfully
his. We disagree. A party cannot claim the fact that they are seeking damages as grounds
for duress during mediation, as this would necessarily void most settlement agreements.
Furthermore, Bradley fails to explain how this would fit Minnesota’s definition of duress.
See St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co. , 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. App.
1987) (stating duress requires coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats that
destroy one’s free will) , review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1987) . Nor does Bradley’s
conclusory allegation that the agreement should be void because the mediation process was
fraudulent provide a contract defense . His argument in this regard contains no legal
arguments nor legal authorities, and we deem it waived. See Fannie Mae v. Heather
Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn. 2012). Because there are no
valid contract defenses, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate
the settlement agreement.
Bradley further argues that the settlement agreement should be invalidated because
he was not represented during the mediation and because he was not given an opportunity
8
to consult with an attorney before signing the agreement. This is contradicted by the
record. The settlement agreement stated that if he had any unce rtainties about his rights,
he should consult with an attorney before signing the settlement agreement. Despite this,
Bradley signed the agreement and attested to agreeing with it at a hearing . The district
court therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate the settlement agreement
due to Bradley’s lack of legal representation.
In addition, Bradley contends that the settlement agreement should be invalidated
because the hearing—where the parties sought approval of the agreement—was scheduled
to be solely about summary judgment arguments. We are not persuaded that this should
stand in the way of the agreement being enforced. While the hearing was not scheduled
for purposes of approving a settlement agreement, this was understand able as the parties
reached the agreement only a day before the hearing. Despite this change of purpose,
Bradley stated that he sought approval of the settlement agreement at the hearing. And
Bradley fails to cite to any legal authorities suggesting that a hearing must explicitly be
scheduled for the purpose of approving a settlement agreement for it to satisfy that
purpose.7 This argument therefore does not establish that the district court abused its
discretion by declining to vacate the settlement agreement.
Finally, Bradley sets forth several arguments that are either unsupported by the
record, or are unsupported by any legal reasoning or legal authorities. Bradley contends

7 Additionally, this argument does not appear in Bradley’s petition to void the settlement
agreement at the district court level, and therefore is forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich , 42
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts do not address issues raised
for the first time on appeal).
9
that the mediator and district court were biased against him. There is nothing in the record
to indicate this. Similarly, he argues that the settlement agreement presented to the court
was incomplete. B ut the record shows that he signed the agreement and stated at the
hearing that the settlement agreement was consistent with the proposed order. Bradley also
contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to preside over the case because it failed
to timely send a notice of judicial assignment. However, Bradley fails to explain how this
potential deficiency would rise to a jurisdictional issue, nor does he provide any legal
authorities to support his argument. Because none of these arguments are supported, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate the settlement agreement.
Affirmed.