A18-0170

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1773
A18-0170

Janet H. Krasner,
Appellant,

vs.

Gregory Hoffman, et al.,
Respondents,
Scott Neff, et al.,
Respondents,
Luke Koski,
Respondent,
Lori Schultze, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 10, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CV-17-470

Janet H. Krasner, Ely, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Peter J. Raukar, Thibodeau, Johns on & Feriancek, P.L.L.P., Dulu th, Minnesota (for
respondents Gregory Hoffman, et al.)

Bryan M. Lindsay, Scott C. Neff, Trenti Law Firm, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondents
Scott Neff, et al.)

Michael K. Kearney, Colosimo, Pat chin & Kearney, Ltd., Virginia , Minnesota (for
respondent Luke Koski)

Rae R. Bentz, Defenbauch Law Offi ce, Ely, Minnesota (for respon dent Lori Schultze, et
al.)

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Considered and decided by Reyes , Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summa ry judgment against
her, relying on numerous arguments including: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) violation of due
process; (3) an abuse of discretion in allowing respondents to be heard at the summary-
judgment motion hearing; and (4) an abuse of discretion in deny ing her request for
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. Appellant also challenges the district
court’s sanctions rulings against her. We affirm.
FACTS
These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute concerning a cabin located on Lake
Vermilion. The cabin is jointly owned by appellant, Janet H. Krasner, and her respondent-
siblings, Eric D. Humphreys and Paul A. Humphreys. In 2012, respondent-siblings agreed
to sell the cabin. Krasner opposed the idea. Respondent-sibli ngs filed a partition action
and obtained a judgment ordering the sale of the cabin.1 This partition action commenced
a succession of legal disputes between Krasner and respondent-siblings.
After several unsuccessful acti ons against respondent-siblings in Virginia,
Minnesota, Krasner filed a new action in Duluth, Minnesota, all eging similar causes of

1 The judgment in the partition action is not before this court on appeal.

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action and adding several new defendants.2 The district court granted respondent-siblings’
request to transfer the new action to Virginia.
In June 2017, Krasner mailed to all respondents a document enti tled “Motion to
Quash Claims by Defendants to Nullify or Dismiss Claim and Ask for Sanctions or Bonds
Against Plaintiff Without Merit” (motion to quash). The motion to quash alleged numerous
causes of action intertwined with convoluted narratives of the various issues. Krasner did
not file the motion to quash with the district court.
By August 2017, respondent-siblings and respondents Neff, Hoffman, and Jacobsen
had filed motions for summary judgment and motions for sanctions against Krasner under
rules 9 and 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 22, 2017, the district
court held a hearing on respondents’ motions (the August 22 hearing).
By the August 22 hearing, Krasner had not filed a response to t he motions before
the district court.3 The district court nevertheless accepted a hardcopy of Krasner’s motion
to quash from the bench and allowed Krasner to respond to respondents’ arguments against
her. On September 8, 2017, the district court issued an order granting respondents’ motions
for summary judgment and ordering a separate hearing on the motions for sanctions.

2 The new defendants include respondents Gregory Hoffman (Hoffma n), Mary Jacobsen
(Jacobsen), Coldwell Banker Properties, Scott Neff (Neff), Luke Koski, Lori Schultze, and
Wildwoods Land Company.
3 A party responding to a dispos itive motion is required to file their documents with the
district court at least nine days prior to the hearing. Minn. R. Civ. P. 115.03(b). Krasner
filed her motion to quash with the court on August 18, 2017, two business days before the
August 22 hearing.

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Two weeks after the August 22 hearing, Krasner filed a document entitled “Motion
for Retrial for Summary Judgments held on August 22, 2017” (mot ion for retrial). The
district court denied this motion. In October 2017, Krasner filed a “Motion for Default . . .
due to Non-Compliance.” The district court construed this motion as a request for default
judgment and sanctions against tw o of respondents’ attorneys. All respondents filed
memoranda in opposition to this motion.
In November 2017, Krasner filed an appeal of the district court’s September 8, 2017
grant of summary judgment (A17-1773). In December 2017, the di strict court held a
hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions. The distr ict court issued an order
granting respondents’ motions for rule 11 sanctions against Krasner, denying respondents’
rule 9 motion for sanctions, and denying Krasner’s motions for rule 11 sanctions against
respondents. The district cour t ordered that Krasner shall not file any motions in the
partition action or bring any additional claims unless she has a licensed attorney sign a
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 11.01 acknowledgment or obtains prior court approval
to file the motion or claim. Kra sner appealed the December 201 7 sanctions order (A18-
0170), and we consolidated her two appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in granting respondents’ moti on for summary
judgment.

Krasner raises four arguments related to the grant of summary judgment against her.
We address each argument in turn.

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A. The district court retained jurisdiction to hear and issue o rders in this
c a s e .

We construe Krasner’s argument to be that, under Minnesota Rule o f C i v i l
Appellate Procedure 108.01, subd. 2, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on
respondents’ summary-judgment mo tions because it was directly r elated to issues in an
appeal pending before this court—Humphreys v. Krasner, No. A16-1643 (Minn. App. June
19, 2017).
4 We are not persuaded.
“The interpretation of procedura l rules presents a question of law reviewed de
novo.” Zirnhelt v. Carter , 843 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Minn. App. 2014) (citation omitted).
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, states that the filing o f a timely and proper appeal
suspends a district court’s authority to issue any order that w o u l d a f f e c t t h e o r d e r o r
judgment that is on appeal. A d istrict court retains authority to adjudicate a case if the
matter is “independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment” that is
on appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). A matter is considered “independent” if th e district
court need not reconsider the merits of the issue appealed from. In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d
140, 143 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Spaeth v. City of Plymouth , 344 N.W.2d 815, 825
(Minn. 1984)).
Krasner’s claims that were before the district court included claims of waste of the
subject property, negligence, diminution of property, “contract tort” (including invasion of
privacy), representation without authority by an attorney of la w, loss of saleability to
property and fire liability to owners, malicious and frivolous action taken by respondents,

4 We take judicial notice of appeal no. A16-1643 as it is not in the record on appeal.

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personal-property losses, pain and suffering, and cost, fees and other sanctions. In contrast,
appeal no. A16-1643 involved a d istrict court’s order enjoining all parties from using the
cabin and a denial of Krasner’s motion for a continuance. As a result, the district court did
not have to consider the merits of appeal no. A16-1643 when it adjudicated these claims.
Furthermore, this court issued a final judgment in appeal no. A 16-1643 several months
before the district court heard and issued orders in this case. Therefore, we conclude that
this case is independent of appeal no. A16-1643 and that the di strict court retained
jurisdiction under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, to adjudicate this case.
B. Krasner’s due-process rights w ere protected at the August 22 hearing.
Krasner’s next argument appears to be that her due-process righ ts were violated
because she was denied an opportunity to “fully” argue her motion to quash at the August
22 hearing for summary judgment. We disagree.
“This court reviews the procedural due process afforded a party de novo.” Staeheli
v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007) (citation omitted). For a court
to consider a claim, litigants m ust present relevant facts and legal authority to support it.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(d) (listing requirements for argument section of
appellant’s brief); see also Stephens v. Bd. Of Regents , 614 N.W.2d 764, 770 n.4 (Minn.
App. 2000) (citation omitted) (de clining to address appellant’s claims because her brief
provided no citations to legal authority or analysis). A party that appears pro se is held to
the same standard of an attorney in presenting her appeal. Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d
892, 896 (Minn. 2010) (quoting State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 372-73 (Minn. 1988)).

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Because Krasner offers no relevant legal authority in support o f her argument, it is
forfeited. Even if we were to consider her argument, it lacks merit. “Generally, due process
requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Staeheli, 732 N.W.2d
at 304. Krasner argues that she was denied a meaningful opport unity to be heard at the
August 22 hearing. The record does not support her argument. The transcript of the August
22 hearing reflects that the district court gave Krasner ample time to respond to
respondents’ motions. It also r eveals that the district court allowed her to submit
documents despite not timely filing them before the hearing. We conclude that Krasner’s
due-process rights were not violated at the August 22 hearing b ecause she was given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying K rasner’s
motion for “retrial” of the August 22 hearing.

We interpret Krasner’s argument to be that the district court i ncorrectly construed
her motion for retrial as a motion for reconsideration and that the motion should have been
g r a n t e d b e c a u s e s h e f i l e d i t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s s u e d i t s s u m m a ry-judgment order. We
disagree.
Although Krasner filed a motion for retrial, such a motion does not exist for motion
hearings. As the district court properly determined, a motion for reconsideration is the
vehicle for what Krasner was trying to achieve.
A district court’s decision regarding a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Goerke Family P’ship v. Lac qui Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed Dist.,
857 N.W.2d 50, 52–53 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing In re Welfare of S.M.E. , 725 N.W.2d

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740, 743 (Minn. 2007)). “Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express
permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a show ing of compelling
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ” M i n n . R . G e n . P r a c . 1 1 5 . 1 1 . “ M o t i o n s f o r r e c onsideration are not
opportunities to present facts or arguments that were available when the prior motion was
considered.” Am. Bank of St. Paul v. Coating Specialties, Inc. , 787 N.W.2d 202, 206
(Minn. App. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11 1997 advisory comm. cmt.) (other
citation omitted).
Under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11, the timing of a motion for reconsideration is not
a justification for considering reversal of the district court’s decision absent a showing of
compelling circumstances. Therefore, the second part of Krasner’s argument fails.
Even if this court were to consider the substance of Krasner’s motion, we would
reach the same conclusion as the district court. Krasner’s motion states that, had she been
allowed to argue her motion to quash at the August 22, hearing, it would have evidenced
material facts in dispute, thus p recluding the district court f rom granting respondents’
motion for summary judgment. Put differently, Krasner seeks to have the arguments in her
motion to quash rereviewed in hopes of receiving a different re sult on the motion for
summary judgment. This reason is discouraged by the rules and does not rise to the level
of a compelling circumstance as required by Rule 115.11.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Krasner’s
motion of its grant of summary judgment.

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D. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing res pondents
to be heard at the August 22 hear i n g o n t h e i r m o t i o n s f o r s u m m ary
judgment.

We construe Krasner’s argument to be that the district court abused its discretion in
allowing respondents to be heard at the August 22 hearing becau se, at that time,
respondents were in default for failing to provide responses to her various motions.
Krasner’s argument is misguided.
The record shows that respondents submitted responses to all of Krasner’s motions
that complied with Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115. Krasner’s motions that failed to comply with
Rule 115 did not trigger a response from respondents. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing respondents to be hear d at the August 22 hearing
because they were not in default at that time.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting res pondents’ motion
for sanctions and denying Krasner’s motion for sanctions.

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting res pondents’
motions for rule 11 sanctions.

Krasner argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting respondents’
rule 11 motion for sanctions against her because respondents fa iled to provide sufficient
evidence showing that sanctions were warranted. We disagree.
A district court’s award of sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Collins
v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 15, 2011). By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other document to the court,
an attorney or self-represented litigant certifies, among other things, that: (1) the filing is
not being presented for any improper purpose; (2) the claims, d efenses, and other legal

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contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-f rivolous argument; and
(3) the allegations or other factual contentions have evidentiary support. Minn. R. Civ. P.
11.02(a)-(c).
In its order dated December 12, 2 017, the district court set fo rth a timeline of
Krasner’s various causes of acti on and filings. Observed in it s entirety, the timeline
supports the district court’s conclusion that Krasner’s filings were motivated by an
improper purpose to delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation for all parties. The
timeline also supports the conclusion that Krasner engaged in frequent unnecessary filings
that contained causes of action not warranted by existing law and unsupported by relevant
legal authority. We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
B. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g K r a sner’s
motion for rule 11 sanctions against attorneys for respondents.

Krasner argues that sanctions should have been levied against two of respondents’
attorneys because they failed to respond to several of her moti ons and they engaged in
illegal and unethical behavior. We disagree.
A request for rule 11 sanctions m ust: (1) be filed in a motion separate from other
motions or requests; (2) contain a description of the specific conduct alleged to violate rule
11; (3) be served in compliance with rule 5; and (4) adhere to the “Safe Harbor” provision
which states that the motion must not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within
21 days after service of the motion, the challenged document or claim is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a).

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Krasner’s motion for sanctions did not comply with rule 11. I t appears in several
different documents5 and is combined with requests for other forms of relief. She fails to
provide a clear description of the specific conduct by respondents alleged to have violated
rule 11. Although Krasner served her motion in compliance with rule 5, none of the
documents mention the “Safe Harbor” provision or certify that i t was observed. We
conclude that, because Krasner’s motions for sanctions failed to comply with rule 11, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Affirmed.

5 Krasner discusses sanctions in the motion to quash, in the “Ad dendum to the Motion to
Quash,” and in her motions for sanctions.