State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1790

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lance Martin Odegard,
Appellant

Filed September 24, 2018
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-17-113

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Keith Helgeson, Yellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant challenges the imposition of two concurrent top-of-the-box sentences for
felony fifth-degree assault convictions. Because the assaults were committed against two
victims, the sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct, and the
record shows that the district court carefully evaluated the relevant factors, we affirm.
FACTS
While on patrol, Deputy Sheriff Doyle arrested appellant Lance Martin Odegard on
an outstanding warrant and brought him to the jail’s booking room. At the ja il, Doyle
asked Odegard, who smelled of alcohol, to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT), but
Odegard refused. Doyle said that he would tell Odegard’s probation officer about the
refusal, and Odegard swore at Doyle, and his demeanor became aggressive.
Corrections officers Duis and Evenson were also present in the booking room. At
Duis’s request, Odegard removed his shoes and jacket. But when Duis asked Odegard to
remove his cross necklace, he refused, saying that it was religious and citing the Bil l of
Rights and religious freedom. Odegard removed one of his socks, stood up, and held the
sock near Duis’s face. Doyle advised Odegard to sit down or he would face more charges,
and Odegard flung the sock past Duis’s head. Odegard sat down, removed his other sock,
stood up again, and asked Duis if she wanted the sock. Doyle put his hand on Odegard’s
shoulder to get him to sit back down, and, with the sock in his hand, Odegard swung his
arm around and hit Doyle on the side of his head.
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In an effort to control Odegard, Doyle stepped in front of him, and Evenson grabbed
him under his right arm from behind. Odegard pushed Evenson away and began struggling
against Doyle and Evenson. Odegard got Doyle into a headlock, and Doyle was unable to
get out of it because Odegard was holding his head so tightly. Doyle testified at trial that
he was afraid because his breathing was restricted, and he was in a position in which
Odegard could have broken his neck. Doyle removed his taser from his belt and tasered
Odegard to get Odegard to release him from the headlock. When Doyle got out of the
headlock, Odegard came back after him and punched him on the side of the head
repeatedly. Doyle got pinned against the wall and hit his head on the doorway. Doyle and
Evenson got Odegard to the ground and restrained him. While on the ground, Odegard
kicked Doyle.
During the incident, Odegard was swearing at the officers and telling them not to
touch him. After being restrained, Odegard threatened to break Doyle’s neck and beat him
until “he wanted to shoot himself. ” As a result of the assault, Doyle had swelling on the
side of his head from being hit by Odegard, scratches on his forehead from hitting the wall,
and marks on his cheek and jawbone from his radio being squeezed into his head while he
was in the headlock. Evenson got a bloody nose during the assault.
The jury found Odegard guilty of felony fifth -degree assault-harm against Doyle,
felony fifth-degree assault-harm against Evenson, and fourth-degree assault against a peace
officer (Doyle). The jury acquitted him of felony fifth-degree assault-fear against Duis and
fourth-degree assault against a correctional employee (Evenson). The district court
sentenced Odegard for the felony fifth -degree assault convictions against two victims,
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Doyle and Evenson . At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that the assaults
were more serious than a typical assault because they occurred in a jail and noted Odegard’s
criminal history of 63 prior offenses. The distric t court sentenced Odegard to concurrent,
top-of-the-box prison sentences of 36 and 39 months.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews sentences imposed by the district court for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Delk , 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20,
2010).
Imposition of two sentences
“[C]ourts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple
crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims;
and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant 's
conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006). A defendant “may
be sentenced separately for multiple convictions arising from the same behavioral incident
if those convictions relate to multiple victims . . . because where multiple victims are
involved, a defendant is equally culpable to each victim.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d
596, 605 (Minn. 2009).
Odegard argues that the multiple sentences unfairly exaggerated the criminality of
his conduct because the only target of his ange r was Doyle and he unintentionally hit
Evenson when Evenson attempted to help Doyle. This argument is contrary to the jury’s
finding that Odegard assaulted Evenson because an element of fifth -degree assault is the
intentional infliction or attempted infliction of bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.
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1(2) (2016). Also, the way in which Odegard committed the assaults, resisting the booking
process in the presence of multiple officers, made it more likely that multiple persons
would be injured. See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 605 (stating that a “defendant who commits
an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to cause
harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person”)
(quotation omitted).
The cases relied on by Odegard involved the affirmance of consecutive sentences
for crimes against multiple victims. State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1992);
State v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28,
1988). The fact that those cases involved more egregious conduct than this case does not
support Odegard’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
multiple concurrent sentences in this case. See State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 259 (Minn.
2014) (“In cases with multiple victims, consecutive sentences are rarely, if ever,
disproportionate to the offense.”).
Top-of-the-box sentences
Sentence ranges in the sentencing guidelines are presumed appropriate for the
crimes to wh ich they apply. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016). “This court will
generally not exercise its authority to modify a sentence within the presumptive range
absent compelling circumstances.” Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428 (quotation omitted). “The
district court is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence,”
and we will affirm a presumptive “sentence when the record shows the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
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determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). “[A]ny sentence within the presumptive
range for the convicted offense constitutes a presumptive sentence.” Delk, 781 N.W.2d at
428.
“[A] district court sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including
sentencing, and is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct.” State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Odegard cites hi s chemical
dependency and mental -health issues as mitigating factors. Although the district court
noted these factors and stated that Odegard’s acts were not rational, the court stated reasons
for imposing top-of-the-box sentences, including Odegard’s extensive criminal history, the
fact that the offenses took place in jail, and Odegard’s threatening taunts to Doyle after
being restrained. On Odegard’s argument that he had religious reasons for refusing to take
off the necklace, the district court stated that jail procedures prohibit wearing jewelry and
noted Odegard’s familiarity with the criminal -justice system. Notably, Odegard swore at
Doyle and his demeanor became aggressive when Doyle said he would tell Odegard’s
probation officer about the PBT refusal, which occurred before Odegard was instructed to
remove the necklace, and Odegard continued to swear at the officers during the assaults.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Odegard.
Affirmed.