State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1791

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lance Martin Odegard,
Appellant.

Filed February 25, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-17-121

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Keith Helgeson, Yellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Tracy M.
Smith, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Yellow Medicine County jury found Lance Martin Odegard guilty of assault ing
a correctional officer based on evidence that he stomped on her hand and pressed it against

2
the floor. At trial, the district court allowed the state to introduce evidence of four prior
acts of aggression by Odegard toward police and correctional officers at the same jail. We
conclude that the district court did not err by admitting the evidence of his prior acts on the
ground that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 9, 2017, Odegard was detained at the Yellow Medicine County jail. At
approximately 10:25 a.m., Kathy Busack, a uniformed administrator who supervises jail
staff and was working as a corrections officer that day, went to Odegard’s cell to get him
ready for a court appearance . She was accompanied by Deputy Sheriff Eric Diekmann,
who was planning to escort Odegard to the courtroom. Odegard was lying on his bed and
refused to get up, stating that he would not go to court and wished to be left alone. Officer
Busack and Deputy Diekmann asked Odegard several times to get up and get ready, but he
refused to do so each time. Additional deputies arrived to provide back-up assistance.
Because Odegard would not cooperate, Officer Busack attempted to put leg shackles
on him. Odegard kicked at Officer Busack, which prompted Deputy Diekmann and three
other deputies to assist Officer Busack by restraining Odegard. After a struggle lasting
approximately 30 seconds, the deputies held Odegard in a standing position against the
wall of his cell. When Officer Busack again attempted to put leg shackles on Odegard, he
suddenly and forcefully stepped on her right hand with his right foot and continued to put
his weight on her hand until the deputies lifted him up so that she could remove her hand.
When asked why he stepped on Officer Busack’s hand, Odegard said to the officers who

3
were present, “I’ve been going through f---ing years of this sh -t over that vindictive . . .
b--ch over there. That’s why.” Officer Busack suffered severe bruising and swelling of
her hand, which required medical attention.
The state charged Odegard with fifth -degree assault , in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.224, subd. 4(b) (2016), and fourth -degree assault of a correctional employee with
infliction of demonstrable bodily harm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 3(1)
(2016). The fifth -degree assault charge was enhanced to a felony based on two prior
convictions.
The case was scheduled for trial in May 2017. On May 3, 2017, one day before the
pre-trial hearing, the state moved in limine for a ruling that it could introduce evidence of
14 prior incidents in which Odegard engaged in assaultive or physically aggressive conduct
toward others. The state argued in its motion papers that the evidence of the prior incidents
should be admitted to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or acci dent, and common
scheme or plan. At the pre-trial hearing on May 4, 2017, Odegard opposed the motion.
On May 12, 2017, the district court filed an order granting the state’s motion in part and
denying it in part . The district court ruled that the state could introduce evidence of only
four prior acts of aggression by Odegard toward law-enforcement officers or correctional
officers occurring at the Yellow Medicine County jail and only for the purpose of proving
motive, intent, or absence of mistake or accident.
The case was tried to a jury on May 25, 2017. Included in the state’s evidence was
a video-recording of the incident, which was captured by a surveillance camera in
Odegard’s jail cell. The state called nine witnesses, four of whom testified about the four

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prior incidents , as follows . A deputy sheriff testified that, in July 2016, at the Yellow
Medicine County jail, Odegard kicked an officer who tried to put Odegard in a restraint
chair. Another deputy sheriff testified that, in July 2014, at the Yellow Medicine County
jail, Odegard was verbally aggressive and lunged at him while he administer ed an
intoxication test. A Granite Falls assistant police chief testified that, in June 2013, at the
Yellow Medicine County jail, Odegard threatened to throw h is boot at him during the
booking process. And a corrections officer testified that, in March 2011, at the Yellow
Medicine County jail, Odegard spoke to her with profanities, pushed her against the wall,
and attempted to punch her before two other inmates grabbed Od egard and pulled him
away. The district court read a cautionary instruction to the jury before each of these four
witnesses testified and also read a limiting instruction to the jury before its deliberations.
The jury found Odegard guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced him to
one year and one day of imprisonment. Odegard appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Odegard argues that the district court erred by granting the state’s motion in limine
in part and admitting evidence of four prior acts of aggression against law-enforcement
officers or correctional officers at the Yellow Medicine County jail.
Odegard’s argument is governed by a rule of evidence that states, in relevant part:
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not
be admitted unless . . . the probative value of the evidence is

5
not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the
defendant.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (2017).1 Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is known in Minnesota
as “Spreigl evidence.” State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State
v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 ( Minn. 1965)). A district court must apply a five -part test to
determine whether Spreigl evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence
is admissible if:
1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the evidence
consistent with the rules of criminal procedure; 2) the
prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be offered
to prove; 3) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation
in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing
evidence; 4) the evidenc e is relevant to the prosecutor’ s case;
and 5) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.

Id.; see also State v. Ness , 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 –86 (Minn. 2006). This court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’ s admission of Spreigl evidence.
State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016).
Odegard c hallenges the district court’s ruling only with respect to the fifth
requirement of rule 404(b), the requirement that the probative value of the evidence not be
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Spreigl evidence has probative value if it
has a sufficiently close relationship to the charged offense. See Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at

1Rule 404(b) recently was amended, effective January 1, 2019. Order Promulgating
Amendments to Rules of Evidence , No. ADM10-8047 (Minn. Nov. 16, 2018). We quote
the prior version o f the rule because that version was in effect at the time of the relevant
district court proceedings.

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390. In considering whether the fifth requirement is satisfied, a court should balance the
relevance of the Spreigl evidence, “the State’ s need to strengthen weak or inadequate
proof,” and the risk that the evidence will be used as propensity evidence. State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009). Spreigl evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice”
if the evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.” State v. Smith , 749 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted).
The dis trict court carefully weighed the probative value of the Spreigl evidence
proffered by the state against its potential for unfair prejudice and expressed its reasoning
in a detailed order and memorandum.2 The district court narrowed the state’s proposed
justifications by reasoning that the proffered evidence is not admissible to prove a common
scheme or plan but may be admissible to prove motive, intent, or absence of mistake or
accident. The district court stat ed that the proffered evidence has less probative value to
the extent that it concerns acts occurring outside a jail and to the extent that it concerns acts
against persons who are not law-enforcement officers or correctional officers. The district
court also stated that evidence of all 14 prior incidents “would be repetitive and

2Odegard did not include a copy of the district court’s order and memorandum in an
addendum to his brief. A rule of appellate procedure states, “Appellant must prepare an
addendum and file it with the opening brief or petition.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 130.02(a).
The rule further states that the addendum “must include,” among other things, “ a copy of
any order, judgment, findings, or trial court memorandum in the action directly relating to
or affecting the issues on appeal.” Id. In this case, the district court’s order and
memorandum obviously are directly related to the sole issue on appeal. In fact, Odegard’s
appellate brief cites the distric t court’s order and memorandum. For future purposes, w e
encourage all appellants to provide the court with a copy of any district court order that is
being challenged on appeal.

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cumulative.” The district court then stated, “The events which are most similar —
aggressive behavior inside a jail facility —are the most similar to the current charges and
therefore the most useful in evaluating the defend ant’s motive and intent.” The district
court found these incidents to have “high relevance” because the “circumstances are nearly
identical” and they “are relatively recent.” The district court noted that the state’s case
appeared to be “strong on the elements of identity, result, the act, and venue” but that “the
issue of intent may be in dispute .” The district court further reasoned that the four most
similar incidents were unlikely to cause the jury to convict for improper reasons. The
district court concluded that “the potential for unfair prejudice by admitting the four prior
acts does not outweigh the probative value.”
Odegard contends that the district court erred on the ground that the probative value
of the Spreigl evidence was “far outweighed” by its potential for unfair prejudice. He
asserts that the Spreigl evidence was unfairly prejudicial because the jury may have used
it “for an improper purpose, such as determining [he] had a propensity to commit crimes
against the police and jail staff” or “to conclude he was a bad person, worthy of
punishment.”
We believe that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion when it
determined that the probat ive value of the Spreigl evidence was not outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice. The district court correctly foresaw that intent would be the
dispositive issue at trial. Both parties focused their closing arguments on the question
whether Odegard intended to assault Officer Busack. The prosecutor argued that Odegard
acted intentionally, as demonstrated by the video-recording of the incident, the comment

8
he made immediately after the incident, and the four prior acts of aggression toward
officers at the same county jail . Odegard’s attorney argued that the state had not proved
Odegard’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, t he state’s Spreigl evidence was
relevant to Odegard’s motive or intent and the absence of a mistake or accident on March
9, 2017. The potential for unfair prejudice was lim ited because e ach of the four prior
incidents was closely related to the alleged offense in that each incident involved
aggressive physical conduct by Odegard toward a law-enforcement or correctional officer
at the Yellow Medicine County jail. The district court further reduced the risk of unfair
prejudice by cautioning the jury about the Spreigl evidence immediately before the
testimony of each witness and again in its final instructions, and we presume that the jury
followed those cautionary instructions. See State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn.
2009). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reasoning that the probative
value of the state’s Spreigl evidence was not outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.
In sum, the district court did not err by granting the state’s motion in limine in part
and by allowing the state to introduce Spreigl evidence of four prior incidents in which
Odegard was physically aggressive toward police or correctional officers at the Yello w
Medicine County jail.
Affirmed.