In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial for the Child Foster Care License Application of Shelia Ayres.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1828

In the Matter of the Appeal of the Denial for the
Child Foster Care License Application of Shelia Ayres.

Filed January 14, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Minnesota Department of Human Services, OAH
File No. 67-1800-34171

Thomas R. Witt, Fryberger, Buchan an, Smith & Frederick, P.A., D uluth, Minnesota (for
relator Shelia Ayres)

Keith M. Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail Coun ty Attorney, Kurt A. Mortenson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent MN DHS)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, J udge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from a final order issued by respondent Minnesota Commissioner of
Human Services (the commissioner), relator argues that the commissioner erred in denying
her application for a child foster-care license because she incorrectly interpreted Minn. R.
2960.3060, subp. 3(D) (2017), to require her to ensure her lett ers of reference were
submitted to the Otter Tail County Human Services (the county). We affirm.

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FACTS
On or about May 2016, relator S helia Dian Ayres sought informa tion about
obtaining a child foster-care li cense. Shortly thereafter, the county visited relator at her
home in Fergus Falls, Minnesota, to provide her with an application packet and explain the
licensing process. The requirements of relator’s application i ncluded submission of three
letters of reference.
Relator submitted her application to the county. Thereafter, t he county mailed a
first set of reference forms to each of the three individuals r elator identified in her
application. A few weeks later, the county notified relator that none of her references had
returned the reference forms. The county followed up with a letter to relator outlining the
outstanding required documents of her application, and informed her that, if the documents
were not received, it would reco mmend denial of her application to the Minnesota
Department of Human Services (the department). Relator contacted the county to request
that it resend the reference fo rms because all three individual s allegedly lost their forms.
The county sent the three individuals a second set of forms.
Almost two weeks passed and the reference letters were still ou tstanding. The
county sent a letter to the department recommending denial of r elator’s application. The
county eventually received one reference letter, but informed r elator that it had already
submitted a negative recommendation to the department. In Dece mber 2016, the
department issued an order denying relator’s application.
Relator appealed the department’s decision, and an administrative-law judge (ALJ)
held a two-day appeal hearing. Two of the three individuals id entified as references in

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relator’s application testified at the hearing and claimed they had submitted both sets of
reference forms sent by the county. The ALJ recommended affirm ing the denial of
relator’s application. In Octob er 2017, the commissioner issue d a final order, denying
relator’s application. The commissioner based its denial solely on the fact that relator failed
to meet her burden to show compliance with the reference-letter requirement.
Relator filed a request for recons ideration of the commissioner ’s final decision,
enclosing three letters of reference. Relator argued that she “had no reason to believe that
[her application] was incomplete.” The commissioner denied rel ator’s request for
reconsideration, noting that the three reference letters relato r submitted with relator’s
request did not appear to be copies of the reference letters allegedly included in her original
application. The commissioner also rejected relator’s claim th at she had no reason to
believe her application was incomplete, noting that during the application process, relator
asked the county to resend refere nce forms because all three of her references allegedly
lost their forms. Relator filed this appeal by writ of certiorari.
D E C I S I O N
Relator argues that the commissioner erred in denying her appl ication for a child
foster-care license because she incorrectly interpreted Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), to
require her to ensure her letters of reference were submitted to the county. We disagree.
Review of an agency’s interpretation of its own rules or regul ations is a question of
law that we review de novo. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit
Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater , 731 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 2007).
Considerable deference is given to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules if the relevant

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language is unclear or ambiguous. St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. 437
N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1 989) (footnote omitted); accord Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 514,
516-17 (noting regulation is amb iguous if reasonably susceptibl e to more than one
reasonable interpretation.) However, we give no deference to a n agency’s interpretation
of its rule if the language is clear and capable of being understood. St. Otto’s, 437 N.W.2d
at 40.
If a rule is unambiguous, then we must apply its plain and ordinary meaning. J & W
Asphalt, Inc. v. Belle Plaine Twp. , 883 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2016) (quoting
Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti, 865 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. 2015)). Every word of a rule
should be given effect. Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. , 777 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2010)
(citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (1979)). While
statutory construction focuses on the language of the provision at issue, we may analyze
that provision in the context of surrounding sections to gain c larity on the regulation’s
operation. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Minn. 2000).
Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), states that “[t]he applicant must help the licensing
agency obtain at least three letters of reference . . . .” (Emphasis added. ) Here, while the
parties agree that the language is unambiguous, each draws from it a different interpretation
of the duty imposed on an applicant. Relator’s interpretation appears to rely solely on the
word “help.” She interprets Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), to r e q u i r e h e r t o m e r e l y
identify or direct the county to the three individuals who will provide references for her.
The commissioner interprets Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), to require relator to provide

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continuous assistance to the county, to ensure that the county ultimately receives the
reference letters.
We agree that the language of the rule is unambiguous and subje ct to only one
reasonable interpretation. “Must” indicates an obligation by law, morality, or custom. The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1191 (3d ed. 1992). To “help” is
to provide assistance. Id. at 840. “Obtain” is defined as succeeding in gaining possession
of something as a result of planning or endeavor. Id. at 1250. Under these definitions, we
conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), imposes
an obligation on the applicant to assist the county to successf ully gain possession of the
reference letters. Put differently, relator’s duty did not end when she identified the three
individuals in her application.
Even though further analysis i s unnecessary when the language a t issue is
unambiguous, we note that surround ing sections of Minn. R. 2960 .3060, support our
interpretation. Minn. R. 2960. 3020, subp. 2 (2017), states tha t an application for a child
foster-care license is not complete until an applicant signs th e application and submits all
of the required information. (Emphasis added.) Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), further
outlines the information required by an agency for its evaluation of an applicant’s personal
characteristics, including inform ation about the applicant’s su pport system, observations
of the applicant’s interaction with children, and the applicant ’s ability to accept different
points of views. The only way the rule permits collection of t his information is through
reference letters. It follows, therefore, that an agency’s receipt of information is crucial to
an applicant’s advancement in the licensing process.

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Because the language of Minn. R. 2960.3060, subp. 3(D), is plain and unambiguous,
we need not address relator’s remaining two arguments in suppor t of her position that the
commissioner incorrectly interpreted the rule.
Affirmed.