State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1843

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bryce Monroe Muir,
Appellant.

Filed September 17, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-17-373

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, David W. Hunt, Assistant County Attorney, Chaska,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Bryce Monroe Muir challenges hi s felony-level threats -of-violence
conviction, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

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FACTS
The present appeal stems from appellant’s conviction for committing a felony-level
threats-of-violence crime against his then -girlfriend, S.B. In April 2017, S.B. called the
police to report that appellant threatened to take her possessions during a fight. The
following morning, S.B. again called the police and stated that appellant took her vehicle
during an argument. Police officers arrived at the couple’s home and learned that appellant
was the registered owner of the vehicle. S.B. told the officers that appellant threatened to
kill her and “jiggled his left front pocket,” which S.B. took as a threat becau se appellant
often carried a gun in his pocket. S.B. told the officers that appellant did not want to go
back to prison and would “die by suicide by cop.”
Appellant returned home later that afternoon , and the argument continued. S.B.
texted a friend with the message, “I think [appellant] is coming here to kick my a--.” S.B.’s
friend anonymously reported the threat to the police department, prompting the officers to
return to the home for a welfare check. Upon approaching the front door, a police officer
heard “some yelling and some commotion” inside the home , including “ loud bangs, like
something being thrown against the wall or being moved around .” The officer heard
appellant yell, “I’m going to f --king kill you.” An officer reached S.B. on her cell p hone
and S.B. whispered that she was being threatened. Officers convinced appellant to let S.B.
leave the house. S.B. appeared “very scared” and told the officers that she was afraid of
appellant and feared he was going to beat her up or kill her.
Officers eventually persuaded appellant to come out of the house and placed him
under arrest. The state charged appellant with one felony count of committing a threats-

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of-violence crime. The district court issued a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order
(DANCO), prohibiting appellant from having contact with S.B. When appellant violated
the DANCO, the state amended the complaint to include five misdemeanor DANCO-
violation charges. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial , and the case proceeded to a
bench trial. The district court found appellant guilty of all charges. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for
committing a felony-level threats-of-violence crime. Our review of a sufficiency -of-the-
evidence challenge is limited to a “painstaking analysis of the record” to determine whether
the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to
support the convict ion. State v. DeRosier , 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005) (quotation
omitted). We will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, “acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we
employ the same standard of review for both bench and jury trials. State v. Palmer, 803
N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
To convict appellant for a felony -level threats -of-violence crime, the state must
demonstrate that appellant threatened, directly or indirectly, to commit a felony-level crime
of violence, and acted either with a purpose to terrorize another, or in reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such terror. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016). “Terrorize” is
defined as causing “extreme fear by the use of violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe, 306

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Minn. 395, 399, 237 N.W.2 d 609, 613 (1975). A “threat” is a declaration of an intention
to injure another by some unlawful act . Id. “The test of whether words or phrases are
harmless or threatening is the context in which they are used.” Id.
Where, as here, an element of the offense rests on circumstantial evidence, we apply
a heightened standard of review. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017); State
v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) (holding that a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence warrants heightened scrutiny). First, the reviewing court identifies
the circumstances proved, deferring to the fact-finder’s acceptance of the circumstances
proved and rejection of evidence conflicting with those circumstances. State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013). At this stage in the analysis, we assume that the court,
acting as fact -finder, “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Caldwell , 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“This is especially true where resolution of the case depends on conflicting testimony,
because weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the [fact-finder].”
State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). At the second st age of review, we
“examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.”
State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted).
With respect to the first prong of the heightened -scrutiny analysis, the following
circumstances are proved. Appellant and S.B. argued over the course of two days. On the
afternoon of the second day, S.B. texted her friend that she f eared appellant was going to
“kick [her] a--.” Police officers performed a welfare check at the home on the basis of this

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report. A responding officer heard yelling and loud “bangs” inside the house, which were
later discovered to be caused by appellant throwing a baby gate at S.B. and shoving a chair
across the room. The officer heard appellant tell S.B., “I’m going to f --king kill you.”
During a police interview several days later, S.B. stated that she was afraid of appellant.
At trial, S.B. testified that she told police officers she was afraid appellant would kill her.
The circumstances proved by the state are consistent with appellant’s guilt. See Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599.
The second step requires us to consider whether the circumstances proved are
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at
473-74. Appellant argues that while the circumstances may support a finding of guilt, the
circumstances may equally support a reasonable inference that appellant’s threats were the
product of transitory anger. Transitory anger is short -lived anger that is not intended to
terrorize. State v. Taylor , 264 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Minn. 1978). The threats -of-violence
statute is not intended “to authorize grave sanctions against the kind of verbal threat which
expresses transitory anger [but] which lacks the intent to terrorize.” State v. Jones , 451
N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn. App. 1990) , review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). Nevertheless, a
person can co mmit a felony-level threats -of-violence offense without having a specific
intent to terrorize , and t he general intent requirement is satisfied when the perpetrator
disregards a known, substantial risk that the threat will terrorize another. State v. Bjergum,
771 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009).
The evidence does not support a determination that appellant’s anger was transitory
or fleeting in nature. The argument continued over the course of two days and the police

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were contacted on three separate occasions , suggesting that appellant’s anger cannot be
characterized as “transitory.” See State v. Fischer, 354 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. App. 1984)
(calling it “a mockery to suggest [defendant’s] actions were spur -of-the-moment threats”
when threatening behavior continued for six hours), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984).
The district court determined that appellant’s threat that he would “f --king kill” S.B.,
coupled with his actions of throwing items around the home, was done i n “reckless
disregard of the terror ” it might cause her. We agree. Further, a victim’s reaction to a
threat may provide circumstantial evidence bearing on the element of the defendant’s
intent. Schweppe, 306 Minn. at 401, 237 N.W.2d at 614. The district court found that S.B.
whispered into the phone that she was being threatened and feared that appellant would
harm her for speaking with the police. The only reasonable inference, given the totality of
the c ircumstances, is that appellant committ ed a felony-level threats -of-violence crime
against S.B.
In sum, we determine that sufficient evidence in the record exists to permit the fact-
finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of violating Minn.
Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1, and we therefore affirm.
Affirmed.