In re the Marriage of: Danielle M. Kerr, n/k/a Danielle M. Dubois, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1858

In re the Marriage of:
Danielle M. Kerr, n/k/a Danielle M. Dubois, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan R. Kerr,
Appellant,

County of Dakota,
Intervenor.

Filed July 16, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-F8-07-010912

Christine J. Cassel lius, Ryan J. Bies, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer P.A.,
Apple Valley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jonathan R. Kerr, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to modify parenting time,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to analyze all of the

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statutory best-interests-of-the-child factors and that the district court’s findings are clearly
erroneous. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jonathan Kerr and respondent Danielle Kerr, n/k/a Danielle Dubois
married in 2002. They divorced in 2008 and share joint legal and joint physical custody of
their two minor children, son (age 1 2) and daughter (age 1 1). Kerr pays child support to
Dubois. Kerr and Dubois each have a nonjoint child.
Before their 2008 dissolution trial, Kerr and Dubois agreed to a 5-4-3-2 parenting-
time schedule. Over a two-week period, Dubois has the children for a total of eight nights,
including Sunday nights; Kerr has the children for six nights. This parenting-time schedule
remains in effect to date.
This is Kerr’s fourth appeal to this court since entry of the dissolution judgment.
Kerr v. Kerr, No. A12-1663, 2013 WL 1859116 (Minn. App. May 6, 2013), review denied
(Minn. July 16, 2013) ; Kerr v. Kerr, No. A11-1128, 2012 WL 612315 (Minn. App. Feb.
27, 2012); Kerr v. Kerr , 770 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. App. 2009). The full extent of Kerr’s
motions and appeals are summarized in our 2012 and 2013 unpublished opinions. Kerr,
2013 WL 1859116, at *1; Kerr, 2012 WL 612315, at *6. Since the dissolution, Kerr has
brought at least six motions in district court requesting modification of parenting time and
child support, all of which were denied. In some of those motions, Kerr argued that the
current parenting -time schedule should be modified to provide him with Sunday
overnights.

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In August 2017, Kerr moved again to modify the parenting-time schedule to a week
on/week off arrangement in order to reduce the number of transitions between houses. The
district court denied the motion, determining that modif ication of the parenting -time
schedule is not in the best interests of the children and that the current schedule provides
emotional stability for the children and allows Dubois to prepare them for the school week
on Sunday nights. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Kerr argues that the district court did not consider all the relevant best -interests
factors, that the district court’s factual findings are not supported by the record, and that
the district court misapplied the law. A district court has broad discretion when deciding
parenting-time matters. Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). Our
review “is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion by making findings
unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Id. at 599.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2016):
If modification would serve the best interests of the
child, the court shall modify the decision-making provisions of
a parenting plan or an order granting or denying parenting time,
if the mod ification would not change the child’ s primary
residence. Consideration of a child’ s best interest includes a
child’s changing developmental needs.

District courts are not required to make detailed findings on each best-interests factor under
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2016), when deciding parenting -time modification

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motions; instead , district court s must consider only the relevant best-interests factors.
See id.
In evaluating the best interests of the child for purposes of determining issues of
parenting time, the district court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including:
(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child’s needs and development;
(2) any special medical, mental health, or educational
needs that the child may have that may require special
parenting arrangements or access to recommended services;
(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to
express an independent, reliable preference;
(4) whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the
parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship . . . ;
(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a
parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;
(6) the history and nature of each parent ’s participation
in providing care for the child;
(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the child; to meet the child ’s ongoin g
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;
(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development
of changes to home, school, and community;
(9) the effect of the propose d arrangements on the
ongoing relationships between the child and each parent,
siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting
time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
parenting time with either parent;
(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse as
described in clause (4) has occurred, the disposition of each
parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent
and to encourage and permit frequent and c ontinuing contact
between the child and the other parent; and
(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information
and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to

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utilize me thods for resolving disputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a).
In its decision on Kerr ’s parenting -time modification motion, the district court
considered the following relevant best -interests factors: (1) the children’s physical,
emotional, and other needs; (2) any special medical, mental health, or educational needs;
(3) the reasonable preference s of the children; (4) the history and nature of each parent’s
participation to provide ongoing ca re; (5) the effect on the children’s well -being and
development of changes to home, school, and community; (6) the effect of the proposed
arrangements on the ongoing relationships between the children and each parent; (7) the
benefit to the children on max imizing parenting time with both parents and the detriment
to the children in limiting parenting time with either parent; and (8) the willingness and
ability of the parents to cooperate in the rearing of the children. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a).
I.
Kerr argues that the district court misapplied the best -interests factors, reasoning
that the district court relied on non-child-related conduct and did not consider all relevant
best-interests factors.
A. Non-child-related conduct.
Kerr contends that the district cour t erred by relying on non -child-related conduct
in determining that modification of the current parenting-time schedule is not in the best
interests of the children. In analyzing the best -interests factors, the district court shall not

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consider “conduct of a party that does not affect the party’s relationship with the
child[ren].” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016).
In its order denying Kerr’s motion, the district court provided the procedural history
of the case. In the proce dural history, the district court noted that Kerr has initiated nine
court proceedings in district court, appealed to this court three times, and moved to modify
parenting time so that he could reduce his child -support obligation. Kerr maintains that
these facts constitute non-child-related conduct and that the district court erroneously relied
on them. We disagree. The district court did not include these facts in its best -interests
analysis. Rather, the district court discussed these facts as part of the procedural history of
the case. Therefore, the district court did not erroneously rely on non-child-related conduct
in analyzing the best-interests factors.
B. The children’s changing developmental needs.
Kerr contends that the district court did not consider the children’s changing
developmental needs. One of the best-interests factors includes the “willingness and ability
of each parent to provide ongoing care f or the child; to meet the child’ s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to maintain consistency and
follow through with parenting time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(7).
Despite Kerr’s contention, the district court did consider the effect of Kerr’s
proposed schedule on the children ’s changing develo pmental needs . The district court
determined that adopting the proposed week on/week off schedule , thereby increasing
Kerr’s parenting time, would adversely affect the parties’ daughter because it would lead
to Kerr spending more time coaching their son’s hockey team. The district court stated

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that, during the winter months, Kerr “spends most of his time with [son] related to his
hockey activities.” The district court found that if Kerr’s parenting time were increased,
their daughter “would be forced to spend more time watching [ father] and [son] pursue
their hockey interests,” especially this year because Kerr “will coach [his son’s] hockey
team.”
The record supports the district court’s findings on the children’s changing needs.
A 2015 email from Dubois to Kerr indicates that their daughter was upset because Kerr
made her watch their son’s hockey practice and tag along to the store when Kerr bought
him new hockey skates. A 2016 email exchange establishes that Kerr planned on spending
time watching their son’s hockey practice on their daughter’s birthday. In another 2016
email, Dubois stresses that their daughter is “struggling with the attention [son] gets with
his sports and not getting to spend as much one on one time with [father] as [son] does.”
A 2017 email summarizes a meeting between a school counselor and daughter during
which they came up with a list of self -care practices that she could use “to cope with her
feelings of boredom and sadness when at her father’s.” In April 2017, their daughter met
with a licensed professional clinical counselor for a mental -health evaluation; during the
evaluation, she identified “sadness related to not having a closer relationship with her
father.”
The district court’s findings on the chi ldren’s changing developmental needs are
supported by the record. Therefore, the findings are not clearly erroneous. And even if
there is evidence in the record that could support other findings, the fact “[t]hat the record
might support findings other t han those made by the trial court does not show that the

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court’s findings are defective.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn.
App. 2000); see Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating that
although appellant’ s recitat ion of facts “might prompt another trier of fact to different
findings, because there is sufficient contradictory evidence to reasonably support the tri al
court’s findings,” appellant’ s evidence “ does not render the trial court’ s findings clearly
erroneous”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999).
C. The proposed week on/week off schedule.
Kerr contends that the district court did not consider the proposed week on/week off
schedule because there are “no findings which indicate any consideration was made by the
court regarding the proposed week/on off schedule which reduces transitions between
homes from 110 to 63 per year.” We disagree.
First, the district court did consider the proposed schedule. The district court
explained that if the schedule were chan ged, the children would not be prepared for the
school week because Kerr has often failed to address the children’s homework and
educational needs, and Dubois does the better job of preparing the children for school on
Sunday nights. Second, district courts are not required “to make specific findings on every
statutory factor if the findings that were made reflect that the district court adequately
considered the relevant statutory factors.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Minn.
App. 2004).
D. Legislative intent of Minn. Stat. § 518A.36 (2016).
Kerr also argues that the district court erred “in not recognizing how significantly
[Minn. Stat. § 518A.36] relates to this case and the legislative intent behind making child-

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focused decisions.”1 The statute on which Kerr relies, Minn. Stat. § 518A.36 , governs
parenting-expense adjustments for purposes of calculating child support. Essentially, Kerr
contends that the district court erred because it did not consider a child -support statute in
determining Kerr’s motion to modify parenting time. We disagree. There is no language
in the best -interests statute or the parenting -time-modification statute requiring a district
court to consider the legislative intent behind Minn. Stat. § 518A.36. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 518.17, subd. 1, .175, subd. 5 (2016). Because Kerr moved to modify parenting time,
not child support, the district court did not err by not analyzing Minn. Stat. § 518A.36.
II.
Kerr contends that the district court’s factual findings on the children’s educational
needs and emotional stability are clearly erroneous, reasoning that the record does not
support a finding that Kerr “does not address the children’s educational needs as much as
[Dubois]” and that “the current schedule provides emotional stability for the children.”
With respect to the children’s educational needs, the district court found that Dubois
is better at ensuring the children complete their homework assignments and that Kerr has,
“[t]oo often,” failed to address “the children’s homework needs before the children return
to [Dubois’s] home on Sundays.” The district court also found that Kerr was unsupportive
of son attending remedial reading classes during Kerr’s parenting time, which, the district
court reasoned, “could have adversely affected [the child’s] progress at his grade school

1 Kerr, in his brief, cites the statute as “Minn. Stat. § 518A.36 (2017).” In 2016, the
legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 518A.36. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 189, art. 15, § 20, at
235-37. That amendment, however, does not take effect until Augus t 1, 2018. Id.
Therefore, the statute in effect to date is Minn. Stat. § 518A.36 (2016).

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level.” With respect to the children’s emotional stability, the district court found that
Kerr’s commitment to their son’s hockey has had a negative effect on their daughter’s well-
being and that Kerr’s hands -off approach on homework assignments has negatively
affected both children’s well-being. On this record, we conclude that those findings have
support in the record and are not clearly erroneous. See Wilson v. Moline, 234 Minn. 174,
182, 47 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1951) (stating that an appellate court need not “discuss and
review in detail the evidence for the pu rpose of demonstrating that i t supports the trial
court’s findings,” and that its “duty is performed when [it] consider[s] all the evidence . . .
and determine[s] that it rea sonably supports the findings”) ; Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 360
(concluding summarily that the record on appeal supported the district court’s factual
findings on spousal income).
Kerr also argues that Dubois submitted false and misleading affidavits to the district
court that have, in turn, caused the district court to find facts that are wholly unsupported
by the record. Even if there is evidence in the record that supports Kerr’s arguments on
appeal, it does not mean that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474. As we have stated above, the district court’s findings are
adequately supported by the record. Therefore, the findings are not clearly erroneous.
III.
Kerr maintains that the district court erred by analyzing “the benefit to the child in
maximizing parenting time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
parenting time with either parent.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(10). He avers that the
district court misapplied this factor “because it . . . failed to consider that it is in the best

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interests of the child to promote the child’s healthy growth and development through safe,
stable, nurturing relationships between a child and both parents.”
But the district court did consider the benefit in maximizing parenting time with
both parents. The district court explained that increasing Kerr’s parenting time would
adversely affect their daughter because Kerr already spends so much time with their son at
hockey practice. The district court also explained that it would adversely affect the
children’s educational needs. The district court, therefore, did not misapply the law.
Kerr also argues that it is a misapplication of the law “to conclude that a half-sibling
relationship is more important than a parent -child relationship .” In reasoning that the
proposed schedule is not in the best interests of the children, the district court stated that
the children would have less contact with their half-siblings. But the district court did not
conclude that a half-sibling relationship is more important than a parent-child relationship.
One of the best-interests factors is “the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing
relationships between the child and each parent, siblings, a nd other significant persons in
the child’s life.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9) (emphasis added). The district court
did not misapply the law.
Affirmed.