Hodan Dirie, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1866

Hodan Dirie,
Relator,

vs.

Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority,
Respondent.

Filed June 11, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority

Heather Meyers, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota
(for relator)

Mary G. Dobbins, Landrum Dobbins LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Hodan Dirie challenges the terminat ion of her Section 8 Rental Assistance,
arguing that (1) the notice of benefit termin ation she received was inadequate, (2) the
hearing officer relied solely on hearsay evidence in reach ing her decision, and (3) the
hearing officer failed to explain why she discredited Dirie’s testimony. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2011, Dirie enrolled in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section
8)—a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) program—
administered by respondent Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority
(MHRA). HUD regulations provide that fam ilies receiving Section 8 benefits “may not
commit any serious or repeated violation of [their] lease.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(e) (2017).
To that end, each year Dirie was required to review and sign MHRA’s rent-assistance
statement of responsibilities, which stated, in relevant part:
I understand and certify that:

 Any household members or guests must not commit any
serious or repeated violation of the lease. Serious and
repeated violations will include but are not limited to
nonpayment of rent, utilities or other fees, moving without
proper notice, disturbance to neighbors, unauthorized
guests, destruction of property , or living or housekeeping
habits that cause damage to the unit or premises and
criminal activity.

. . . .

 If any member of my househol d or guests commit serious
or repeated lease violations . . . the [MHRA] will terminate
my rent assistance.

A guest is defined in the statement as “a person who can verify a permanent address
elsewhere and lives or stays in [the tenant’s] home less than 30 days.”
In May 2014, Dirie and her three children, including Y.J., moved into an apartment
at Centennial Commons in Roseville. In Marc h 2016, after Y.J. turned 18, he moved out
of Dirie’s apartment. In April 2017, Y.J. re peatedly parked Dirie’s car in other tenants’

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parking spaces. Dirie was notified that this was a lease violation and that, if Y.J. continued
to park the car in other tenants’ spots, the car would be towed. Y. J. apparently stopped
parking the car in other tenants’ spots until August 1, when the ca r was again found in
another tenant’s spot. Dirie was again notified, and she moved the car.
Eight days later, in the early morning hours of August 9, a tenant in another
apartment building at Centennial Commons awoke to find a man standing in her apartment.
The man fled, and the tenant called 911. When the police arrived, they saw Y.J. walking
toward his mother’s apartment building. Based on the victim’s description of the intruder,
the police stopped Y.J. Y.J. denied being the intruder, claiming he had just arrived from
Hopkins. However, when the police officer indicated he was going to check and see if
Y.J.’s engine was still warm, Y.J. changed his story, claiming that he had fallen asleep in
his vehicle after parking it. The police brou ght the victim out to the sidewalk, and she
identified Y.J. as the intruder. Y.J. was arrested for burglary.
Later that day, Dirie received a notic e from Centennial Commons that it was
terminating her lease effective September 9. On August 22, MHRA sent Dirie a letter
informing her that it would be terminating her rental assistance effective September 30 due
to “serious/repeated lease violations and [an] unauthorized adult in the household.” Dirie
challenged the termination, and an informal hearing was held on September 13. MHRA’s
evidence consisted almost entirely of exhi bits, including a police report describing the
investigation into the intrusion committed by Y.J. Following the hearing, the hearing
officer concluded there was not sufficient evid ence to uphold the de termination that an
unauthorized adult had been living in Dirie’ s apartment. Howeve r, the hearing officer

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concluded there was sufficient evidence to conc lude that there were serious and repeated
lease violations and upheld the termination of benefits.
Dirie appeals.
D E C I S I O N
When a public-housing authority receives evidence, hears testimony, and makes a
determination to deny an individual Section 8 benefits, it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Carter v. Olmsted Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App.
1998). “An agency’s quasi-judicial determ inations will be upheld unless they are
unconstitutional, outside the ag ency’s jurisdiction, procedur ally defective, based on an
erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.”
Id.
I. Dirie’s notice of benefit termination sa tisfied constitutional and regulatory due
process requirements.

Dirie first argues that her benefits must be reinstated because MHRA failed to give
her adequate notice of the reasons why her benefits were being terminated. 1 Whether an
administrative agency has provided sufficient notice is a question of law we review de
novo. See Wilhite, 759 N.W.2d at 257.

1 MHRA argues that Dirie forfeited her notice argument by failing to raise it below. This
argument is without merit. The requirement for notice stems from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and we have previously held that a tenant does not forfeit a
constitutional challenge to the adequacy of no tice by failing to raise the issue before the
hearing officer. See Wilhite v. Scott Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 759 N.W.2d 252,
257 n.1 (Minn. App. 2009).

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Due process requires adequate notice. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.
Ct. 1011, 1020 (1970). In th e context of Section 8, the re quirements of that notice stem
from both the Fourteenth Amendment and federal regulations. See Wilhite, 759 N.W.2d at
257. To be constitutionally sufficient, “the notice must communicate the interest at stake.”
Id. To comply with federal regulations, “[t] he notice must (1) stat e the reasons for the
termination, (2) advise the individual of the right to request an informal hearing to contest
the termination, and (3) state the deadline for requesting an informal hearing.” Id. (citing
24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)(2) (2008)).
Here, Dirie received a letter stating, “[MH RA] is terminating your rent assistance
effective September 30, 2017. This action is being taken due to serious/repeated lease
violations and unauthorized adult in the household.” This letter clearly “communicate[d]
the interest at stake.” It also advised Diri e of the right to an in formal hearing and the
deadline for requesting such a hearing. Di rie argues, however, that the letter did not
adequately “state the reasons for the termination” becaus e the notice “does not inform
Ms. Dirie of who in her household committed the alle ged serious/repeated lease
violations[,] . . . of the nature of any of the serious/repeated lease violations[,] . . . [or] of
the dates on which any of the alleged violations occurred.”
Although Dirie challenges other aspects of the notice, she concedes that it
adequately informed her that the August 9 burglary would be at issue during the hearing.
As discussed below, this burglary was a sufficient basis for the hearing officer to conclude
that a serious lease violation meriting benefit termination occurred. Therefore, because we
agree with Dirie that notice regarding the bur glary was adequate, we need not reach the

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issue of whether Dirie had adequate notice that other lease violations would also be at issue
during the hearing.
II. The hearing officer did no t abuse her discretion in relying on hearsay evidence.

Dirie next argues that the hearing officer’s conclusion that a serious lease violation
occurred is not supported by substantial eviden ce because she “relied solely on hearsay
evidence that would be inadmissible in a judicial pr oceeding,” specifically the police
report. We evaluate an administrative hearing officer’s reliance on hearsay for an abuse of
discretion. See State ex rel. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 276 v. Dep’t of Educ., 256 N.W.2d 619,
627 (Minn. 1977) ( Dist. No. 276) (“Only where it appears that the [hearing officer] clearly
abused [her] discretion in re lying upon inherently unrelia ble evidence, under the hearsay
rule or otherwise, should the courts intervene.”).
“The general rule is that in the absence of a special statute, an administrative agency
cannot, at least over objection, rest its findings of fact solely upon hearsay evidence which
is inadmissible in a judicial proceeding.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, the federal
regulations governing benefit termination he arings provide that “[e]vidence may be
considered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2017). It is also “reasonable to assume that the
[hearing officer] is in a position to judge the inherent trustworthiness and reliability of the
evidence before him.” Dist. No. 276, 256 N.W.2d at 627.
In support of her argument that hearsay alone is not substantial evidence, Dirie cites
to Carter. In that case, we held that the stat ement “[unauthorized tenant] is still there”
from a landlord’s daughter to the HRA did not constitute substantial evidence that the

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unauthorized tenant was in fact still residing in the rent-assist ance recipient’s apartment.
574 N.W.2d at 728, 731- 32. Dirie argues that Carter stands for the proposition that
“hearsay . . . that would be inadmissible in c ourt [is] insufficient for the HRA to meet its
burden and terminate assistance.”
We disagree. First, Dist. No. 276 , upon which Carter relies, provides that the
general rule prohibiting reliance on solely hearsay does not apply when there is “a special
statute” permitting such use. 256 N.W.2d at 627. Here, there is a federal regulation
permitting such reliance, see 24 C.F.R. 982.555(e)(5), and we see no reason why “special
statute” should not be read to include the federal regulations governing Section 8.
Second, in reaching our conclusion that the hearsay in Carter was insufficient, we
found significant that “the record [did] not indicate what facts led the [daughter] to believe
that [the unauthorized tenant] was residing with [relator] rather than visiting or even that
he was present.” Id. at 732. Here, the hearsay upon which the hearing officer relied—the
police report of the burglary—contained the underlying facts which led both the officer
writing the report and the individual that identified Y.J. to reach their respective
conclusions. This informati on allowed the hearing office r to “judge the inherent
trustworthiness and reliability” of the hearsay. Dist. No. 276, 256 N.W.2d at 627. Thus,
we conclude that there was substantial evid ence that a serious lease violation occurred,
namely, the police report describing the burglary committed by Y.J., and that the hearing
officer did not abuse her discretion in relying on that report to reach her conclusions.
Dirie also raises additional arguments about the hearing officer relying on hearsay
in order to conclude that repeated lease violations occurred. We need not reach these

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arguments, however, because we conclude th at substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that a serious lease violation occurred, and a serious lease violation is sufficient
grounds for terminating Section 8 benefits. See Wilhite, 759 N.W.2d at 255 (“The decision
is to be upheld if the lower tribunal furnished any legal and substantial basis for the action
taken.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).
III. The hearing officer did not abuse her disc retion in finding that Y.J. was Dirie’s
guest at the time of the burglary.

Finally, Dirie argues that the hearing office r abused her discretion in finding that
Y.J. was Dirie’s guest at the time he committ ed the burglary. A hearing officer “abuses
[her] discretion when [her] decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn.
2018) (quotation omitted).
When evaluating a housing and redevelopment authority hearing officer’s decision,
we have indicated:
To be legally sufficient, th e [officer] must make an
express credibility determinat ion, must set forth the
inconsistencies in the record which have led to the rejection of
the Plaintiff’s testimony, must demonstrate that all relevant
evidence was considered and ev aluated, and must detail the
reasons for discrediting pe rtinent testimony. These
requirements are not suggestive guidelines, but are mandates
which impose affirmative duties upon the deliberative process.

Carter, 574 N.W.2d at 729-30 (quoting Garthus v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 847
F. Supp. 675, 689 (D. Minn. 1993)).
Dirie argues the hearing officer abused he r discretion because Dirie testified “that
she did not know [Y.J.] was at Centennial Commons” the night of the burglary, the hearing

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officer “found Ms. Dirie to be credible in her testimony, ” and yet the hearing officer
concluded that Y.J. was a guest of Dirie’s that evening. Dirie argues that this conclusion
is “legally problematic because it failed to detail [the] reasons for . . . discounting
Ms. Dirie’s credible testimony.”
We disagree that the hearing officer’s conc lusion is inconsistent with the hearing
officer’s finding that Dirie’s testimony wa s credible. Although Dirie may not have
explicitly invited Y.J. to her home on the night of the burglary, the record establishes and
the hearing officer found a clear “pattern of [Y.J.] coming and going from the apartment
complex with Ms. Dirie’s knowledge and consent.” Dirie testified that Y.J. would visit her
apartment, “helped at the apartment,” and used Dirie’s car—which, even after Y.J. moved
out of Dirie’s apartment, was occasionally parked at Centennial Commons—indicating that
Dirie gave Y.J. general permissi on to be on the property. Fu rthermore, Y.J. had keys to
the apartment complex, was walking toward his mother’s apartment, and told police he was
going “home” when he was questioned. Based on this record, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence that Y.J. was Dirie’s guest and that reaching th is conclusion did not
require the hearing officer to discredit Dirie’s testimony.
Affirmed.