John Cortland Robinson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1875

John Cortland Robinson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed June 18, 2018
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-3670

Scott J. Strouts, Scott J. Strouts LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Drew D. Bredeson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant John Robinson challenges the revocation of his driver’s license, arguing
that the stop of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it was not
supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. We affirm.

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FACTS
On March 16, 2017, Officer Donahue of the Edina Police Department was on
routine patrol in the area of Edina High School and Valley View Middle School. At
approximately 12:55 a.m., while conducting a directed patrol of the area, Officer Donahue
pulled into the east entrance of the parking lot to the west of Valley View Middle School.
As he entered the parking lot, Officer Donahue observed a dark passenger car drive by the
western edge of the parking lot the officer had just entered, and drive out the west entrance.
The vehicle’s lights were on, and the road the vehicle was driving on encircles the schools
and connects all of the school parking lots. Officer Donahue testified that “there was a
large construction site near that part of the [high] school where the vehicle came out.”
At the time Officer Donahue saw the vehicle, there were no other cars in the area
and the lights in the high school were off; the school appeared close d. Officer Donahue
testified that he found the vehicle’s presence suspicious because it was late, the high school
was closed, and there was a construction site at the high school near where the vehicle was
located. Officer Donahue has worked for the Edina Police Department for about two years
and has been a licensed peace officer in Minnesota for about nine years, and i n Officer
Donahue’s training and experience, “construction sites are often sought out by thieves for
theft and damage-related crimes.” The district court found Of ficer Donahue’s testimony
credible.
After observing the vehicle, Officer Donahue followed it. Officer Donahue saw the
vehicle cross Valley View Road onto Chapel Lane, where he caught up to i t and ran a
license plate check, which showed that a lease company owned the vehicle and that the

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lessee lived on the 5500 block of Goya Lane. Goya Lane is approximately one mile north
of Edina High School.
Officer Donahue continued following the vehicle and thought that the route taken
by the vehicle was suspicious because it was not the most direct route from the school to
the address on Goya Lane. Robinson crossed Valley View Road, drove along several
residential streets to the south of Valley View Road, and then turned onto Valley Vi ew
Road. Officer Donahue initiated a traffic stop on Valley View Road, the vehicle stopped
almost immediately, and Officer Donahue identified Robinson as the driver. From when
Officer Donahue first observed the vehicle, until he stopped it on Valley View Road, he
did not observe any traffic or equipment violations, inappropriate, unusual, or unlawful
driving, and found no outstanding warrants. Officer Donahue also acknowledged that a
driver does not have to take the most direct route to or from his home even if it is 1:00 a.m.
Robinson submitted to a breath test which disclosed an alcohol concentration of
0.10, in excess of the legal limit, and his driver’s license was revoked for 90 days. See
Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a) (2016). He filed a timely petition for judicial review,
and the district court held a hearing. After the parties submitted briefs, the district court
sustained the revocation of Robinson’s license, holding that Officer Donahue had “specific
and articulable” suspicion to stop Robinson’s vehicle.
D E C I S I O N
A judicial challenge to revocation of a driver’s license under the implied -consent
statute is civil, not criminal. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918, 919 –
20 (Minn. Ap p. 2010). However, the exclusionary rule applies to license -revocation

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proceedings under the implied-consent law if the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights are
violated. See id. at 920. We review de novo a district court’s ruling on whether an officer
had reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Hoekstra v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 839 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. App. 2013). “[A] district court’s findings of fact
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .” Kramer v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 706
N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. App. 2005).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth A mendment applies to seizures of the person, including
brief investigatory [vehicle] stops . . . . An investigatory stop must be justified by some
objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal
activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694–95 (1981). Based
upon the totality of the circumstances, “the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id.
at 417–18, 101 S. Ct. at 695. Courts must not evaluate the sufficiency of each observation
that could support reasonable suspicion in isolation because doing so would not take into
account the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122
S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002).
Reasonable suspicion is not a high standard, requiring less than probable cause.
Hoekstra, 839 N.W.2d at 538–39. But it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008)
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000)). “The officer

5
need not be absolutely certain of the possibility of criminal activity, but he cannot satisfy
the test of reasonableness by relying on an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.” State v. Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. App. 2001) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968)) (quotation marks omitted) , review denied
(Minn. July 24, 2001) ; see also State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 101 (Minn. 1999) (“ A
hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, c annot provide the ba sis for an
investigatory stop.”).
Officer Donahue had a particularized and objective basis to stop Robinson.
Robinson was driving on school grounds around 1 :00 a.m., near a construction site at the
high school, when the school was closed. He was driving on a road that encircled both
schools and does not provide access to anywhere other than the schools, their parking lots,
and the construction site at the high school—the road is more akin to a driveway than to a
public thru-street. And when Robinson drove out of the school area , he drove across a
main road, through several residential roads, only to return to the main road —which he
could have turned directly on to as he left the school area. Standing alone, each individual
fact may not be sufficient to support reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. But viewed
together, and through the eyes of Officer Donahue’s experience and training that
construction sites are often targeted for theft and vandalism crimes, Officer Donahue had
a particularized and objective basis for an investigatory stop.
Minnesota courts have found reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop in a
similar situation. In Thomeczek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, this court held that a stop was
reasonable where the a ppellant was in a car with the headlights on and “parked near an

6
empty lot [at 11:18 p.m.] in an area undergoing construction, where a burglary, vandalism
or theft might occur.” 364 N.W.2d 471, 47 1–72 (Minn. App. 1985). The area where the
car was parked was the site of residential development, with some homes occupied and
others unoccupied or being built, and the appellant was parked in front of a vacant lot. Id.
at 472. Here it was even later at night —very early in the morning in fact —and instead of
being parked on a public street , Robinson was driving through the school complex on a
road that only provides access to school grounds.
While Robinson was driving and the appellant in Thomeczek was parked, both
placed themselves near areas where theft or vandalism might occur, and the area where
Robinson was driving only gave access to the schools, their parking lots, and the
construction site at the high school. The fact that Robinson was not stopped when Officer
Donahue observed the vehicle is not a relevant distinction because the road he was driving
on was not a public thru-street and the high school was closed with no other cars observed
in the parking lot. It was therefore reasonable for Officer Donahue to infer that Robinson
was coming from the construction site and that he likely did not have a legal reason to be
there at that time of night , providing reasonable suspicion that Robinson was engaged in
criminal activity. P olice need not be certain that an individual is engaging in criminal
activity to conduct an investigative stop, and Officer Donahue’s description of the entire
encounter—which the district court found credible —contained enough particularized and
objective facts that criminal activity may have been afoot to support an investigative stop.
See Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d at 847; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. Because

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the stop was valid, we affirm the district court’s decision not to rescind the driver’s license
revocation.
Affirmed.