State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1876

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gloria Richards,
Appellant.

Filed November 5, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-33304

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Lof tus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge ; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal from her conviction of gross-misdemeanor financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult, appellant argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she financially exploited the victim. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2014, R.A.F. turned 67 years old. Her husband had died seve ral years earlier,
and she had no children or close family members. She sought he lp managing her affairs
from her few remaining connections. One of those connections was her former insurance
agent, appellant Gloria Hidalgo.1 R.A.F. ultimately granted appellant power of attorney.
Appellant was not R.A.F.’s first attorney-in-fact. K.J. previously held that position.
He worked at the same company as R.A.F. between 2008 and 2011. K.J. and R.A.F. rarely,
if ever, met face to face, but they struck up a friendship. On August 26, 2013, R.A.F.
signed a document granting power of attorney to K.J., with appe llant listed as successor
attorney-in-fact. The 2013 power-of-attorney document contained a provision adopted by
R.A.F. that maintained the power s granted even if R.A.F. became incapacitated or
incompetent. It also contained a gift-giving provision authorizing the attorney-in-fact to
make gifts to certain individuals, but that provision was not adopted by R.A.F.
Law enforcement became concerned about R.A.F.’s well-being in M arch 2014. A
bank manager thought that R.A.F. was being scammed after she requested cashier’s checks
for an international wire transfer. He reviewed R.A.F.’s account and noticed a significant
drop in the balance. He contacted law enforcement, and on Marc h 12, an officer went to
R . A . F . ’ s r e s i d e n c e . R . A . F . w a s r e t i c e n t t o t a l k a b o u t t h e m o n ey transfer and was not
interested in pursuing charges. The officer left his contact information. About two months
later, R.A.F. contacted the officer. She kept repeating herself during the conversation, and

1 Gloria Richards is appellant’s maiden name. Though Gloria Richards is listed in the case
caption, appellant goes by the name Gloria Hidalgo.

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the officer thought that she might be having a stroke. He and another officer went to her
apartment. R.A.F. seemed confused, and paramedics were request ed. By the time
paramedics arrived, R.A.F. began speaking more clearly and coherently. She refused to be
transported to the hospital.
In May 2014, R.A.F. was hospita lized after falling and sufferin g an arm fracture.
At the hospital, she showed signs of confusion. She did not know why she was there and
was not oriented to time and date. Doctors suspected progressive dementia. R.A.F. started
to clear mentally and was oriented upon discharge. She was tra nsferred to Augustana, a
transitional-care facility. She remained at Augustana until th e end of July, except for a
couple days of hospitalization. During her stay, she showed si gns of confusion and
memory loss and underwent cognitiv e testing, which indicated is sues with insight and
judgment. Towards the end of her stay at Augustana, R.A.F. was diagnosed with mild to
moderate unspecified neurocognitive disorder.
On June 19, 2014, during R.A.F.’s stay at Augustana, K.J. revok ed his power of
attorney. Appellant facilitated the revocation by contacting K .J., but R.A.F. spoke with
K . J . b y p h o n e a n d c o n f i r m e d t h a t s h e w a n t e d t h e r e v o c a t i o n . T hat day, appellant and
R.A.F. entered into a contract . Appellant agreed to render car etaking and power-of-
attorney services to R.A.F. for $25 per hour. The contract gave appellant access to R.A.F.’s
bank accounts and money and allowed her to use that money for caretaking and power-of-
attorney duties.
On July 25, R.A.F. left Augustana and returned home with the as sistance of a 24-
hour home-care service. She still showed signs of confusion. The home-care service was

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soon terminated, and appellant began providing and facilitating care. On August 11, 2014,
R.A.F. signed a new document gr anting appellant power of attorn ey. The document
contained a gift-giving provis ion that authorized appellant to make gifts to herself or to
a n y o n e a p p e l l a n t h a d a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p o r t . R . A . F . a d opted the gift-giving
provision. A bank manager notarized the document in the presence of R.A.F. He did not
have any concern that appellant w as forcing R.A.F. to sign the document and felt that
R.A.F. was competent, as she presented identification and was able to hold a conversation.
R.A.F.’s cognitive abilities and h ealth declined. On October 6 , R.A.F. was
hospitalized for health issues, including swelling in her legs, and she remained at the
hospital until October 16, when she was placed into a long-term -care facility. Appellant
used her basement to store R.A.F.’s possessions. That month, the department of commerce
opened an investigation into appe llant’s handling of R.A.F.’s a ffairs. On October 14,
appellant gave a statement to investigators. She indicated that she was being paid in cash
by R.A.F. for care services, and acknowledged that cash withdrawals from R.A.F. were for
that purpose. Appellant stated that she tracked the hours that she worked for R.A.F. A
spreadsheet was subsequently prepa red documenting those hours, and it indicated 1,359
hours worked, entitling appellant to $33,975 based on the $25 per hour compensation rate.
Appellant denied using R.A.F.’s funds to pay for her own personal expenses. In November
2014, a search warrant was executed at appellant’s home.
The state charged appellant with one count of theft by swindle and one count of
financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult (in excess of $5,000). In June 2017, a jury trial
was held. Evidence at trial showed numerous transfers of funds from R.A.F.’s account to

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appellant’s account. For example, on July 25, 2014, the date t hat R.A.F. left Augustana
and returned home, R.A.F. opened a new account and made a $2,000 cash withdrawal, and
that same day appellant made a $2,000 cash deposit into her own account. Also that day,
appellant made a mortgage payment of $2,235.94 on a mortgage he ld in the name of
appellant’s ex-husband. A June 2014 notice of foreclosure admi tted into evidence
indicated that the mortgage had a past-due amount of $3,787.88, and additional evidence
of other delinquent accounts w as admitted. From July 25 throug h November 17, 2014,
appellant made regular deposits i nto her accounts totaling $12, 970, deposits that were
inconsistent with the deposits mad e prior to July 2014. R.A.F. ’s account indicated
numerous cash withdrawals corresponding with appellant’s deposi ts. From July 25 to
November 17, 2014, the cash withdrawals from R.A.F.’s account totaled $24,120.
Evidence at trial showed that appellant made numerous payments and purchases
using R.A.F.’s funds. An AT&T p ayment for $230.99 was made on appellant’s account
on October 28, 2014. The payment was made using $240 in cash, and testimony was
received indicating that the payme nt corresponded with a cash w ithdrawal from R.A.F.’s
account. Cash withdrawals in $5 00 increments were made from R. A.F.’s account every
day from October 1 to October 6. An AT&T cash payment for $545 was made on
appellant’s account on October 26, 2014. Evidence was admitted indicating that appellant
purchased a $287.50 Sanyo LED TV on October 2, 2014. R.A.F.’s credit card was used
for that transaction. Evidence was admitted indicating that appellant purchased a $198.88
TV on October 1, 2014, as well as other items totaling $532.56, and R.A.F.’s funds were
used for that transaction. Tes timony was received indicating t hat two computers were

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purchased, a $559 HP laptop purchased on October 7 using R.A.F.’s funds, and a $449 HP
stand-alone computer purchased with cash on October 15, 2014. These payments and
purchases all occurred during the same month that R.A.F.’s cognitive abilities declined and
she was placed into a long-term-care facility. Evidence at tri al indicated that some of
R.A.F.’s bills were not being paid, including a large outstanding bill owed to Augustana.
The jury found appellant not gu ilty of theft by swindle, but gu ilty of financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult. The jury found that the to tal taken was $1,000 or less,
a gross misdemeanor. Appellant r eceived a 365-day stayed sente nce. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant’s sole argument on app eal is that there was insuffici ent evidence for a
conviction. When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we conduct “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determ ine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was s ufficient to permit the juror s to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We
will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doub t, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State , 684
N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).

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Appellant was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1)(ii) (2014),2 which
criminalizes intentionally using, managing, or taking either temporarily or permanently the
property or financial resources of a vulnerable adult for the benefit of someone other than
the vulnerable adult in breach of a fiduciary obligation recognized by law.3 The jury was
instructed to find the following seven elements:
(1) R.A.F. was a vulnerable adult;
(2) appellant knew or had reason to know R.A.F. was
vulnerable;
(3) appellant was in a fiducia ry relationship with R.A.F.;
(4) appellant breached a fiduciary obligation recognized in
the law and arising from the fiduciary relationship;
(5) appellant used, managed, or took either temporarily or
permanently the real or personal property or other
financial resources of R.A.F., whether held in the name
of R.A.F. or a third party, for the benefit of someone
other than RA.F.;
(6) appellant acted intentionally; and
(7) appellant’s acts took place in Hennepin County between
June 19 and November 17, 2014.

Appellant concedes that R.A.F. was a vulnerable adult, appellant knew that R.A.F.
was vulnerable, appellant was in a fiduciary relationship with R.A.F., and appellant’s acts
took place in Hennepin County between June and November of 2014. However, appellant
argues that there was insufficien t evidence to establish that s h e b r e a c h e d a f i d u c i a r y

2 The complaint alleged that the offense occurred between June 2014 and November 2014.
Our sufficiency analysis focuses on acts committed after August 1, 2014, and we therefore
generally cite to the 2014 statutes in this opinion.
3 The sentencing order lists the p enalty statute as Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(2) (2014)
(theft exceeding $5,000). It app ears that the sentencing order is incorrect, and the actual
penalty statute being utilized is Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3 (4) (2014) (theft exceeding
$500 but less than $1,000). This issue was not raised, and bec ause there is sufficient
evidence that the theft here exceeded $500, we do not delve further into the matter.

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obligation and intentionally fin ancially exploited R.A.F. Appe llant raises two primary
arguments. She asserts that she never intentionally misused R.A.F.’s funds, and she argues
that R.A.F. gave her competent consent for expenditures by granting her power of attorney.
If a person is competent and approves of expenditures made by his or her attorney-in-fact,
the attorney-in-fact is permitted to make those expenditures, even if the person consenting
is a vulnerable adult. State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn. App. 2008), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008).
Appellant’s arguments are unava iling. Evidence showed that app ellant overbilled
R.A.F. for care services. For example, appellant documented th at she provided 24 hours
of “homecare” on August 9, 2014, but a Facebook posting was sub mitted into evidence
indicating that appellant was at a YMCA that day working out for over an hour. Likewise,
appellant indicated 24 hours of care on August 11 and September 6, but Facebook posts
indicated that appellant was wor king out during portions of tho se days. An investigator
opined at trial that appellant overbilled R.A.F. This evidence supports the verdict.
Evidence was also admitted that appellant made payments and pur chases for her
own benefit, and not for the benefit of R.A.F. Appellant ackno wledges that, as attorney-
in-fact, she was under a duty to exercise her power “in the sam e manner as an ordinarily
prudent person of discretion a nd intelligence would exercise in t he m a na ge m ent of t he
person’s own affairs” with “the interests of the principal utmo st in mind.” Minn. Stat.
§ 523.21 (2014). Evidence indicated that appellant made AT&T payments, purchased two
TVs, two computers, and other items using R.A.F.’s funds. A $4 49 computer was
purchased the day before R.A.F. entered a long-term-care facility. Evidence indicated that

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R.A.F. did not have the TVs or computers in her long-term-care facility, and appellant was
using the TVs and computers at her residence. The jury could have reasonably concluded
that appellant intentionally made some or all of these purchase s and expenditures for her
own benefit in breach of her fiduciary obligations.
The power-of-attorney document from August 11, 2014, contained a gift-giving
provision. Under Minn. Stat. § 523.24, subd. 8(2) (2014), the gift-giving provision
authorized appellant to make gifts to herself for purposes whic h she deemed “to be in the
best interest of the principal, specifically including minimiza tion of income, estate,
inheritance, or gift taxes.” The jury could have reasonably co ncluded that some or all of
the purchases and expenditures were not made in accordance with the gift-giving provision,
or were made without R.A.F.’s interests “utmost in mind.” See Minn. Stat. § 523.21.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence o f overbilling and
unwarranted purchases was sufficient to permit the jurors to find appellant guilty, beyond
a reasonable doubt, of gross-misdemeanor financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult.
Finally, while neither party asse rts that a circumstantial evidence standard of review
is applicable, this court has previously applied that standard when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence for a conviction of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. See State
v. Campbell, No. A11-1847, 2012 WL 6554410, a t *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 17, 201 2); see
also State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) (recognizing that because intent
is a state of mind, it is generally proved by circumstantial ev idence). Even under that
standard, the evidence is sufficient. The circumstances proved, including the overbilling,
purchases, and payments that be nefited appellant and not R.A.F. , are consistent with

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appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. See State
v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn. 201 6) (setting forth circumstantia l evidence
standard of review).
Affirmed.