State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1880

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Allyn Defries,
Appellant.

Filed July 2, 2018
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Wilkin County District Court
File No. 84-CR-15-302

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Carl Thunem, Wilkin County Attorney, Breckenridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A Breckenridge police officer watched Matthew Defries rush two strangers and
punch one of them. Defries threatened to kill one of the intervening police officers. The
state charged Defries with, and Defries pleaded guilty to, one count of terroristic threats
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and two counts of misdemeanor assault. The district court stayed a 30- month prison
sentence on probationary conditions. Defries violated the conditions, and the district court
revoked probation and executed the prison sentence. Defries appeals, arguing that the
district court improperly concluded that the need for confinement outweighed the policies
favoring continued probation. The argument is unpersuasive, and we affirm.
FACTS
Officer Kris Karlgaard restrained Matthew Defries after he watched him run up to
J.K. and C.C. and begin punching one of them. J.K. and C.C. explained that they did not
know Defries and that he abruptly began yelling at them, striking one of them in the face
and back of the head, and pushing the other . When Officer Patrick Kirsch spoke with
Defries, Defries told him, “Y ou’re f---ing dead b---h.” The officers arrested Defries. On
the way to jail, Defries repeated, “That officer is dead.” The state charged Defries with one
count of terroristic threats and two counts of misdemeanor assault.
Defries pleaded guilty to all three charges. Defries told the district court that he had
been “belligerently drunk” and regretted his actions. The district court imposed but stayed
a 30-month prison sentence on the following probationary conditions: remain law abiding;
complete a mental-health and chemical- dependency evaluation and follow all
recommendations; maintain contact with, and follow all instructions of, the probation
office; and refrain from alcohol and unprescribed drug use. A bit over a year later, Defries’s
probation officer reported that Defries violated these conditions. He had failed to attend a
relapse-prevention program as recommended by his chemical-dependency evaluation,
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failed to maintain contact with the probation office, had used marijuana, and had not
completed a mental-health evaluation.
The same district court judge who sentenced Defries presided at his probation-
revocation hearing. Defries admitted to the violations. But he said that he believed he could
be readmitted to the relapse-prevention program and claimed that he missed seven
probation-office appointments without notice or rescheduling because he was sick or at
work. He said that he had been thrice shot with a shotgun, causing him chronic pain that
he alleviated with marijuana. The district court found that Defries’s violations were
intentional and inexcusable and that the need for his confinement outweighed the policies
favoring continued probation. The court executed Defries’s 30-month prison sentence, and
Defries appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Defries argues that the district court improperly revoked his probation and executed
his prison sentence. We will reverse only if the district court abused its broad discretion.
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249–50 (Minn. 1980). A district court abuses its discretion
when it rests its judgment on clearly erroneous facts, id., or fails to explain its “substantive
reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon,” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602,
608 (Minn. 2005). A district court must make three record-supported findings before
revoking probation. It must find that the defendant violated a specific probation condition,
that the violation was intentional, and that the need for confinement outweighs policies
favoring continued probation. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 606. Whether a district court has
made adequate findings is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 605.
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Defries contends that the district court improperly concluded that the need for
confinement outweigh s the policies favoring continued probation. District courts “must
bear in mind that ‘policy considerations may require probation not be revoked even though
the facts may allow it’ and that ‘[t]he purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation
should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.’” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at
606 (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250). In making this determination, district courts
consider whether:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
activity by the offender; or

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can
most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation
if probation were not revoked.

Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Probation
§ 5.1(a) (Approved Draft 1970)). The district court found that the need for Defries’s
confinement outweighed the policies favoring continued probation because Defries was a
threat to public safety, treatment could be most effectively provided if Defries were
confined, and continuing probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of Defries’s
violations.
The district court’s findings are sufficiently supported and its rationale is sound. The
record does not contradict the district court’s observation that Defries has “clearly . . . not
put the effort into probation that needs to be put into probation.” The district court reasoned
that Defries remains a threat to public safety based on his violent attack on two strangers
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and threats to police combined with his “failure to take the necessary care and treatment to
limit that type of behavior.” The district court observed that his chronic absenteeism and
termination from the relapse-prevention program, his failure to maintain contact with his
probation officer, and his drug use all reflected a cavalier attitude toward the rehabilitative
opportunity he was afforded by probation. The district court had already determined that
these conditions of probation were necessary to prevent Defries from engaging in the same
kind of violent behavior. The district court reasonably considered that allowing Defries to
continue on probation would undermine the seriousness of his violations. It also reasonably
concluded that treatment could most effectively be provided if Defries were confined under
direct supervision. We hold that t he district court did not abuse its discretion by finding
that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring continued probation.
Defries complains that the district court improperly referenced the downward
dispositional departure it afforded Defries at sentencing, arguing that it is not a relevant
factor when considering the need for confinement. But whether to revoke a defendant’s
probation is a fact-specific inquiry left to the discretion of the district court, and, in
exercising that discretion, a district court may consider its previous grant of a downward
dispositional departure. See State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015)
(“Fleming complains that the district court considered its grant of a downward dispositional
departure when deciding whether to revoke probation. That was a proper consideration.”),
aff’d 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). We see nothing in the district court’s probation -
revocation consideration that suggests any abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.