State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1881

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Josphe Kriesel,
Appellant.

Filed July 23, 2018
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-17-61

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean M. McGuire, As sistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Daniel Josphe Kriesel pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault against a former
girlfriend. The district court ordered him to pay restitution to the victim in an amount that
includes approximately $700 for lost wages. We conclude that the record supports the
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district court ’s finding that the victim missed work for six weeks because of Kriesel ’s
assault. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of December 29, 2016, the Duluth police department
received a report of domestic abuse at an apartment. A few hours e arlier, Kriesel had
approached his former girlfriend, P.S., in the parking lot of the restaurant where she worked
as a server. Kriesel persuaded her to allow him to go with her to her apartment. While
there, Kriesel yelled at P.S. and “push[ed] her around.” He pushed her into a shelf, which
caused her to fall and hit her head. P.S. left the apartment and screamed for help. When
officers arrived, they saw her “lying on the floor in a state of undress and bleeding profusely
from her hair and facial area.” An ambulance transported her to a hospital, where medical
personnel closed a laceration along her hairline with three staples. She also was treated for
significant swelling and bruising on her left cheek.
The state charged Kriesel with felony domestic assault , in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016). Kriesel and the state entered into a plea agreement by which
he pleaded guilty to the charge in exchange for a n agreement to a downward durational
departure of one year and one day in prison. At a sentencing hearing in April 2017, the
district court imposed the agreed-upon sentence and left the issue of restitution open for 60
days.
In May 2017, P.S. filed a request for restitution in which she sought, among other
things, $2,052.43 in lost wages for a six-week period. At a restitution hearing in June 2017,
counsel informed the district court that they had agreed to prepare and file a stipulation of
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facts relevant to restitution. In July 2017, the parties stipulated that P.S.’s average net pay
(exclusive of tips) was $116.51 per week before the assault , that she did not work as a
server for six weeks after the assault, and that “[t]he total amount of lost net pay, if the
court were to find that [P.S.] was unable to work for six weeks as a result of the offense, is
$699.04.” Kriesel opposed P.S.’s restitution request on the grounds that the state failed to
prove that P.S. was actually unable to work during the six-week period or that her inability
to work was caused by the assault. Kriesel also argued that he is unable to pay restitution
because he is incarcerated and has approximately $5,000 in outstanding debts.
In August 2017, the district court granted P.S.’s request for restitution in the amount
of $759.04, which includes $699.04 for lost wages. Kriesel appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Kriesel argues that the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to P.S.
for her lost wages. Kriesel contends that the state did not prove that P.S. was unable to
work after the assault or that her inability to work was directly caused by the assault. The
state did not submit a responsive brief. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
In Minnesota, restitution awards are governed primarily by statute. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 611A.04-.45 (2016); see also State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 646-52 (Minn. 2011).
The “primary purpose ” of restitution is “to restore crime victims to the same financial
position they were in before the crime. ” State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.
2007). Accordingly, “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the
disposition of a criminal charge . . . against the offender if the offender is convicted . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). “A request for restitution may include, but is not limited
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to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime, including . . . replacement of wages
. . . .” Id.
In determining whether to order restitution and in what amount, a district court must
consider “(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense;
and (2) the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 1(a). A victim’s loss must “have some factual relationship to the crime committed.”
State v. Nelson , 796 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. App. 2011); see also State v. Fader, 358
N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984) (concluding that factual record did not support restitution
award). In addition, the victim’s “compensable loss must be directly caused by the conduct
for which the defendant was convicted.” Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (quotation omitted);
see also State v. Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 517-18 (Minn. App. 2010) (reversing restitution
award that “far exceed[ed] the loss attributable to the offense ”). Furthermore, a victim’s
loss must be “a reasonably foreseeable result of” the defendant’s actions, State v. Maxwell,
802 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011), and cannot
be “so attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result from the defendant ’s criminal
act,” Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667.
The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, “the
amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense. ” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3(a); see also State v. Johnson , 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 ( Minn. 2014). If a victim has
sustained a loss, the district court has “significant discretion” to determine the amount of
restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). This court applies an
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abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district cou rt’s decision concerning an award
of restitution. Id. at 672.
In this case , the parties stipulated that P.S. did not work as a restaurant server for
six weeks after the assault. The question raised by Kriesel’s appeal is whether she did not
work during that six-week period because of the assault. Kriesel contends that there is a
lack of evidence supporting that causal connection. He also contends that her physical
injuries were not so serious that they would have prevented her from working. He further
contends that P.S. missed work because of chemical dependency. In the district court, the
state argued that P.S. was unable to work after the assault because it caused her to “suffer
fear, anxiety and some panic ” due to the fact that the incident began i n the parking lot of
her workplace. The state acknowledged that P.S. had admitted to using drugs and alcohol
during the six -week period but argued that the assault triggered her drug and alcohol
dependency. The district court generally agreed with the state’s argument and found that
“the assault was the proximate cause of the victim’s six-week absence from work.”
The evidentiary record concerning restitution is relatively sparse. Neither party
presented any live testimony at the restitution hearing . Rat her, t he parties elected to
provide the district court with a relatively short stipulation of facts . But the record also
includes P.S.’s victim-impact statement, which the district court received at the sentencing
hearing. A district court may rely on a victim-impact statement when considering the issue
of restitution. See Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 67 1-72; State v. Anderson, 507 N.W.2d 245,
247 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993).
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P.S.’s victim-impact statement is a relatively lengthy, detailed, and strongly worded
description of the emotional impact, physical impact, and financial impact of Kriesel’s
assault. She stated that she remained fearful after the assault and that she found it difficult
to remain in her apartment. She stated that she hid from friends and family members
because she had “bruises and cuts on [her] face/head ” and “could not bear to let people in
[her] life see [her].” She stated that she “could barely chew” food because of the injuries
to her jaw and “struggle[s] with headaches.” With respect to the financial impact of the
assault, she stated,
After the incident, I tried returning to work, but was triggered
by the [assault]. I looked at the parking lot a nd work felt
unsafe. I was unable to go back to work for 6 weeks and
financially was unable to support myself as best as I could
before the incident. I ended up having to apply for financial
support while I dealt with the emotional impact of all of this,
and that was something I never thought I ’d have to do. I
struggled to buy groceries because I was unable to work.

P.S.’s victim-impact statement supports the district court ’s finding that Kriesel’s
assault caused her to miss work for six weeks after the assault. P.S.’s loss of income has a
“factual relationship to the crime committed ” because the assault arose from contact
between Kriesel and P.S. in the parking lot of her workplace. See Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at
347. P.S. ’s loss of income was “directly caused by the conduct for which the defendant
was convicted” because, but for the assault, she would not have been injured and would
not suffered the emotional, physical, and financial consequences described in her victim -
impact statement. See id.
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Thus, the district court did not err by ordering restitution in an amount that includes
$699.04 in lost wages.
Affirmed.