State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1883

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Lee Morgan,
Appellant.

Filed August 6, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-24379

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of fi rst-degree sale of a controlled substance
and second-degree possession of a controlled substance, arguing that the district court erred

2
in denying his motion to suppress drug evid ence found on his pers on during a search
incident to his arrest. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a $20,000 fine when sentencing him. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 12, 2016, a cooperating informant (CI) told a law enforcement officer
that appellant Michael Lee Morgan had dealt large quantities of methamphetamine and had
sold methamphetamine to the CI on multiple occasions. The CI had not previously worked
with law enforcement. The CI gave the o fficer appellant’s name and cell-phone number
and identified appellant when shown his driver’s-license photo. At the officer’s direction,
the CI called appellant’s cell phone while two officers monitore d the call. The CI
confirmed that the recipient’s voice was that of appellant. During the call, the officers
heard the CI and appellant discuss the purc hase of one ounce of methamphetamine from
appellant. They also heard the CI and appell ant agree to meet at a designated address in
Minneapolis at around 9:00 to 9:45 p.m. to conduct a drug transaction.
Law-enforcement officers subsequently es tablished surveillance at the designated
address of the drug transaction. At around the designated time, the officers observed a
vehicle driven by a person suspected to be appellant approach the location and park on the
side of the street. An officer drove an unmarked police car toward the front of the parked
vehicle and visually identified appellant as the driver. Th e officer then activated his
emergency lights.
The officer saw appellant immediately m ove his hands toward his waistband and
appear to shove something down the front of his pants, which led the officer to believe that

3
appellant had concealed a weapon or drugs. The officer exited his car and approached
appellant’s vehicle, at which point he observ ed that appellant was sweating and appeared
jittery and nervous. The officer then placed appellant under arrest. When appellant exited
his vehicle, the officer observed that the front of appellant’s pants was unzipped.
The officer handcuffed appellant, and then proceeded to search appellant’s vehicle
while a second officer searched appellant’s person incident to his arrest. The second officer
indicated that he felt a hard object concealed near appellant ’s groin. The first officer
conducted a second search of appellant’s pers on and felt a hard granular substance near
appellant’s groin, which he testified that he “immediately recognized to be
methamphetamine.” The officer s then transported appellant to the police station where
they searched him and di scovered approximately 27 to 28 grams of suspected
methamphetamine concealed within his pants.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant with first-degree sale of a
controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd.1(1) (2016), and second-
degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd.
2(a)(1) (2016). The district court initially appointed a public defender to represent
appellant after determining him to be eligible. Approximately three weeks later, appellant
retained private counsel.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered on his person, arguing,
in part, that the officers lacked probable cause to lawfully arrest him before searching his
person. Following a contested hearing, the district court de nied the motion to suppress,
concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant based on the information

4
provided by the CI and corrobor ated by the officers, or in th e alternative, that they had
reasonable suspicion to stop appellant base d on the CI’s information and developed
probable cause to arrest him upon observi ng his furtive movements and his sweaty and
nervous demeanor.
Appellant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial, stipulated to the state’s
evidence, and agreed to submit the case to the district court pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 4, to preserve for appellate review the pretrial suppression ruling. The district
court found appellant guilty of both char ges, entered convictions on both charges, 1 and
sentenced appellant to 125 months imprisonment and imposed a $20,000 fine. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The officers had probable cause to arrest appellant.
Appellant argues that the district court e rred in denying his motion to suppress the
drug evidence discovered on his person on the grounds that the officers lacked probable
cause to arrest him because (1) they did not adequately corroborate the CI’s accusations or
establish the CI’s reliability and (2) their observations at the scene failed to establish
probable cause.2 We disagree.
In reviewing a district court’s pretrial suppression ruling, “we may independently
review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whethe r the district court erred in

1 Appellant does not challenge the district court’s entry of judgment of conviction on both
charges.
2 Appellant does not challenge the manner of the officers’ search of his person following
his arrest; he challenges only whether the officers had probable cause to arrest him.

5
suppressing—or not suppre ssing—the evidence.” State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 98
(Minn. 1999). “When the facts are not in di spute, our review is de novo . . . .” State v.
Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007).
The United States and Mi nnesota Constitutions pr otect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and a ny evidence obtained in violation of an
individual’s constitutional rights must be suppressed. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963); State
v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004). Generally, warrantless searches are “per
se unreasonable” and unconstitutional “unless one of the well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement applies.” State v. Ture , 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001)
(quotations omitted). “A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception
to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d
762, 766 (Minn. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
An arrest is lawful if an officer has pr obable cause to believe that a person has
committed a crime. In re Welfare of G.M. , 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997). The
probable-cause standard we apply is “whether the totality of the facts and circumstances
known would lead a reasonable officer to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the
suspect has committed a crime.” State v. Koppi , 798 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). “[T]he fact s present must justify more than mere suspicion but less
than a conviction. In applying this test, a court should not be unduly technical and should
view the circumstances in light of the whole of the arresting officer’s police experience as
of the time of the arrest.” State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Minn.1978).

6
“Whether the information pr ovided by a confidential in formant is sufficient to
establish probable cause is determined by ex amining the totality of the circumstances,
particularly the credibility and veracity of the informant.” State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301,
303-04 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts consider several factors
in reviewing the reliability of a CI who is not anonymous, including:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

Id. at 304. The CI’s “[v]eracity can be estab lished . . . ‘by showing that details of the tip
have been sufficiently corroborated so that it is clear th e informant is telling the truth on
this occasion.’” State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. App. 2008) (quoting State
v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Mi nn. 1978). “Even corrobor ation of minor details
lends credence to an informant’s tip and is rele vant to the probable-cause determination.”
Id. at 841.
Here, the CI identified appellant by na me, phone number, photo identification, and
voice.3 The officers corroborated this information when the CI contacted appellant using
appellant’s cell-phone number and discussed purchasing methamphetamine from him

3 We note that factors one, two, four, and si x are not present because the CI was a first-
time informant who did not voluntarily offer information on appellant, but rather, provided
information to avoid being charged for a drug crime.

7
during a monitored call. The officers furthe r corroborated this in formation when they
observed appellant arrive at the time and lo cation designated for the drug transaction.
When evaluating probab le cause based on an informan t’s tip, an informant’s detailed
prediction of a suspect’s future behavior is a “key distinguishing characteristic” from
situations in which an informant shares onl y “easily obtained inform ation and not inside
information.” Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 305. Under the totality of the circumstances, the
information provided by the CI and corroborated by the offi cers establishes both the CI’s
reliability and probable cause to arrest appellant for controlled-substance crime.
We also observe that, as the district c ourt concluded, the circumstances known to
the officer at the time he identified appellant at the designated location for the drug buy
would lead a reasonable officer to entertai n, at minimum, a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that appellant was i nvolved in a drug transacti on, sufficient to justify an
investigatory stop. See State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (providing
that a stop is justified if specific, articulable facts lead officer to reasonably suspect person
of criminal activity and that the reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high”). The officer’s
subsequent observations of ap pellant’s furtive movements, which would be reasonably
interpreted as an attempt to conceal a weapon or drugs, and his nervous demeanor would
lead the officer to form probable cause to be lieve that appellant had committed a crime,
and, provides an alternative basis to justify hi s arrest. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered
on his person during a search incident to his arrest.

8
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a $20,000 fine when
sentencing appellant.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a $20,000
fine because the court failed to consider appe llant’s indigent status or whether the fine
would impose an undue hardship, in light of his initial qualification for a public defender.
We disagree.
We review the district cour t’s imposition of a fine for an abuse of discretion. See
State v. McLaughlin and Schultz, Inc. , 397 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a criminal fine).
Under Minnesota law, the maximum fine for a first-degree controlled-substance
conviction is $1,000,000. Minn . Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3 (2016). The district court is
required to impose a minimum of 30% of th e maximum fine. Minn. Stat. § 609.101,
subd. 3(a) (2016). However, under Minn. Stat. § 609.101, subd. 5(b) (2016), the district
court may reduce the minimum fine to not less than $50 for specific reasons, including the
defendant’s indigent status. The statute provides:
If the defendant qualifies for the services of a public defender
or the court finds on the record that the convicted person is
indigent or that immediate pa yment of the fine would create
undue hardship for the convicted person or that person’s
immediate family, the court may reduce the amount of the
minimum fine to not less than $50.
Minn. Stat. § 609.101, subd. 5(b) (emphasis added). Under the language of the statute, the
district court’s decision to reduce the fine if the defendant qualifies for a reduction is
discretionary. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2016) (“‘May’ is permissive.”).

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Here, appellant was convicted of first-degree controlled substance crime carrying a
maximum fine of $1,000,000 and a minimum 30% fine of $300,000. The district court
initially stated that it would impose a $40,000 fine, which represented a $260,000 reduction
from the statutory minimum. Appellant’s counsel replied, “[I]s the fine necessary at this
point with the fact that he’s going to go to prison?” Th e district court responded by
reducing the fine by another $20, 000, but noted that appellant was able to afford private
counsel. The district court’s statement show s consideration of appellant’s status as non-
indigent, which appellant’s counsel did not cha llenge. Moreover, “the district court need
not determine if a defendant is able to pay a fine that has been reduced below the statutory
minimum.” State v. Lambert, 547 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Minn. App. 1996). Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $20,000 fine.
Appellant seeks remand to the district court for reconsideration of his fine and relies
on State v. Rewitzer, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that imposition of
$273,600 in fines and surcharges for convi ctions of second-, third-, and fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime created an undue hardship on the defendant. 617 N.W.2d 407,
408 (Minn. 2000). However, in Rewitzer, the defendant challenged the fines under the
Excessive Fines Clause of both the Un ited States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. The supreme court applied the Solem factors for determination of

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excessive fines and held that the fines violated both federal and state constitutions.4 Id. at
415. Here, appellant argues only that the di strict court abused its discretion in imposing
the fine. He does not challenge the fine unde r the Excessive Fines Clauses of either the
United States Constitution or the Minnesot a Constitution. Moreover, the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s statement in Rewitzer that the fines also imposed an undue hardship under
Minn. Stat. § 609.101, subd. 5(b), is unsupporte d by analysis or application of the statute
and does not address whether the district c ourt must consider indigent status or an
offender’s ability to pay in every circumstance. 617 N.W.2d at 415. Appellant’s argument
is unavailing.
Affirmed.

4 “In Solem, the [United States Supreme] Court pr ovided three factors to consider in
determining proportionality: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,
(2) comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for the commission of other crimes
in the same jurisdiction, and (3) comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 413 (citing Solem v. Helm ,
463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010-11 (1983)).